


**SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY**



# SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

*A Compendium and Commonplace-Book*

DESIGNED FOR THE USE OF  
THEOLOGICAL STUDENTS

BY

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IN THREE VOLUMES

VOLUME II  
THE DOCTRINE OF MAN

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**Christo Deo Salvatori.**

"THE EYE SEES ONLY THAT WHICH IT BRINGS WITH IT THE POWER OF SEEING."—*Cicero*.

"OPEN THOU MINE EYES, THAT I MAY BEHOLD WONDROUS THINGS OUT OF THY LAW."—*Psalm 119 : 18.*

"FOR WITH THEE IS THE FOUNTAIN OF LIFE : IN THY LIGHT SHALL WE SEE LIGHT."—*Psalm 36 : 9.*

"FOR WE KNOW IN PART, AND WE PROPHECY IN PART ; BUT WHEN THAT WHICH IS PERFECT IS COME, THAT WHICH IS IN PART SHALL BE DONE AWAY."—*1 Cor. 13 : 9, 10.*

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# SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

## VOLUME II.

### CHAPTER IV.

#### THE WORKS OF GOD ; OR THE EXECUTION OF THE DECREES.

##### SECTION I.—CREATION.

###### I. DEFINITION OF CREATION.

By creation we mean that free act of the triune God by which in the beginning for his own glory he made, without the use of preëxisting materials, the whole visible and invisible universe.

Creation is designed origination, by a transcendent and personal God, of that which itself is not God. The universe is related to God as our own volitions are related to ourselves. They are not ourselves, and we are greater than they. Creation is not simply the idea of God, or even the plan of God, but it is the idea externalized, the plan executed ; in other words, it implies an exercise, not only of intellect, but also of will, and this will is not an instinctive and unconscious will, but a will that is personal and free. Such exercise of will seems to involve, not self-development, but self-limitation, on the part of God ; the transformation of energy into force, and so a beginning of time, with its finite successions. But, whatever the relation of creation to time, creation makes the universe wholly dependent upon God, as its originator.

F. H. Johnson, in *Andover Rev.*, March, 1891:260, and *What is Reality*, 285—"Creation is designed origination. . . . Men never could have thought of God as the Creator of the world, were it not that they had first known themselves as creators." We agree with the doctrine of Hazard, Man a Creative First Cause. Man creates ideas and volitions, without use of preëxisting material. He also indirectly, through these ideas and volitions, creates brain-modifications. This creation, as Johnson has shown, is without hands, yet elaborate, selective, progressive. Schopenhauer: "Matter is nothing more than causation ; its true being is its action."

Prof. C. L. Herrick, *Denison Quarterly*, 1896:248, and *Psychological Review*, March, 1899, advocates what he calls *dynamism*, which he regards as the only alternative to a materialistic dualism which posits matter, and a God above and distinct from matter. He claims that the predicate of reality can apply only to energy. To speak of energy as *residing in* something is to introduce an entirely incongruous concept, for it continues our quest *ad infinitum*. "Force," he says, "is energy under resistance, or self-limited energy, for all parts of the universe are derived from the energy. Energy manifesting itself under self-conditioning or differential forms is force. The change of pure energy into force is creation—the introduction of resistance. The progressive complication of this interference is evolution—a form of orderly resolution of energy. Substance is pure spontaneous energy. God's substance is his energy—the infinite and inexhaustible store of spontaneity which makes up his being. The form which self-limitation

impresses upon substance, in revealing it in force, is not God, because it no longer possesses the attributes of spontaneity and universality, though it emanates from him. When we speak of energy as self-limited, we simply imply that spontaneity is intelligent. The sum of God's acts is his being. There is no *causa posterior* or *extranea*, which spurs him on. We must recognize in the source what appears in the outcome. We can speak of *absolute*, but not of *infinite* or *immutable*, substance. The Universe is but the partial expression of an infinite God."

Our view of creation is so nearly that of Lotze, that we here condense Ten Broeke's statement of his philosophy: "Things are concentered laws of action. If the idea of being must include permanence as well as activity, we must say that only the personal truly is. All else is flow and process. We can interpret ontology only from the side of personality. Possibility of interaction requires the dependence of the mutually related many of the system upon an all-embracing, coördinating One. The finite is a mode or phenomenon of the One Being. Mere things are only modes of energizing of the One. Self-conscious personalities are created, posited, and depend on the One in a different way. Interaction of things is immanent action of the One, which the perceiving mind interprets as causal. Real interaction is possible only between the Infinite and the created finite, *i. e.*, self-conscious persons. The finite is not a part of the Infinite, nor does it partly exhaust the stuff of the Infinite. The One, by an act of freedom, posits the many, and the many have their ground and unity in the Will and Thought of the One. Both the finite and the Infinite are free and intelligent.

"Space is not an extra-mental reality, *sui generis*, nor an order of relations among realities, but a form of dynamic appearance, the ground of which is the fixed orderly changes in reality. So time is the form of change, the subjective interpretation of timeless yet successive changes in reality. So far as God is the ground of the world-process, he is in time. So far as he transcends the world-process in his self-conscious personality, he is not in time. Motion too is the subjective interpretation of changes in things, which changes are determined by the demands of the world-system and the purpose being realized in it. Not atomism, but dynamism, is the truth. Physical phenomena are referable to the activity of the Infinite, which activity is given a substantive character because we think under the form of substance and attribute. Mechanism is compatible with teleology. Mechanism is universal and is necessary to all system. But it is limited by purpose, and by the possible appearance of any new law, force, or act of freedom.

"The soul is not a function of material activities, but is a true reality. The system is such that it can admit new factors, and the soul is one of these possible new factors. The soul is created as substantial reality, in contrast with other elements of the system, which are only phenomenal manifestations of the One Reality. The relation between soul and body is that of interaction between the soul and the universe, the body being that part of the universe which stands in closest relation with the soul (*versus* Bradley, who holds that 'body and soul alike are phenomenal arrangements, neither one of which has any title to fact which is not owned by the other'). Thought is a knowledge of reality. We must assume an adjustment between subject and object. This assumption is founded on the postulate of a morally perfect God." To Lotze, then, the only real creation is that of finite personalities, — matter being only a mode of the divine activity. See Lotze, *Microcosmos*, and *Philosophy of Religion*. Bowne, in his *Metaphysics* and his *Philosophy of Theism*, is the best expositor of Lotze's system.

In further explanation of our definition we remark that

(a) Creation is not "production out of nothing," as if "nothing" were a substance out of which "something" could be formed.

We do not regard the doctrine of Creation as bound to the use of the phrase "creation out of nothing," and as standing or falling with it. The phrase is a philosophical one, for which we have no Scriptural warrant, and it is objectionable as intimating that "nothing" can itself be an object of thought and a source of being. The germ of truth intended to be conveyed in it can better be expressed in the phrase "without use of preëxisting materials."

(b) Creation is not a fashioning of preëxisting materials, nor an emanation from the substance of Deity, but is a making of that to exist which once did not exist, either in form or substance.

There is nothing divine in creation but the origination of substance. Fashioning is competent to the creature also. Gassendi said to Descartes that God's creation, if he is the author of forms but not of substances, is only that of the tailor who clothes a man with his apparel. But substance is not necessarily material. We are to conceive of it rather after the analogy of our own ideas and volitions, and as a manifestation of spirit. Creation is not simply the thought of God, nor even the plan of God, but rather the externalization of that thought and the execution of that plan. Nature is "a great sheet let down from God out of heaven," and containing "nothing that is common or unclean;" but nature is not God nor a part of God, any more than our ideas and volitions are ourselves or a part of ourselves. Nature is a partial manifestation of God, but it does not exhaust God.

(c) Creation is not an instinctive or necessary process of the divine nature, but is the free act of a rational will, put forth for a definite and sufficient end.

Creation is different in kind from that eternal process of the divine nature in virtue of which we speak of generation and procession. The Son is begotten of the Father, and is of the same essence; the world is created without preëxisting material, is different from God, and is made by God. Begetting is a necessary act; creation is the act of God's free grace. Begetting is eternal, out of time; creation is in time, or with time.

Studia Biblica, 4:148—"Creation is the voluntary limitation which God has imposed on himself. . . . It can only be regarded as a creation of free spirits. . . . It is a form of almighty power to submit to limitation. Creation is not a development of God, but a circumscription of God. . . . The world is not the expression of God, or an emanation from God, but rather his self-limitation."

(d) Creation is the act of the triune God, in the sense that all the persons of the Trinity, themselves uncreated, have a part in it—the Father as the originating, the Son as the mediating, the Spirit as the realizing cause.

That all of God's creative activity is exercised through Christ has been sufficiently proved in our treatment of the Trinity and of Christ's deity as an element of that doctrine (see pages 310, 311). We may here refer to the texts which have been previously considered, namely, John 1:3, 4—"All things were made through him, and without him was not anything made. That which hath been made was life in him"; 1 Cor. 8:6—"our Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things"; Gal. 1:16—"all things have been created through him, and unto him"; Heb. 1:10—"Thee, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands."

The work of the Holy Spirit seems to be that of completing, bringing to perfection. We can understand this only by remembering that our Christian knowledge and love are brought to their consummation by the Holy Spirit, and that he is also the principle of our natural self-consciousness, uniting subject and object in a subject-object. If matter is conceived of as a manifestation of spirit, after the idealistic philosophy, then the Holy Spirit may be regarded as the perfecting and realizing agent in the externalization of the divine ideas. While it was the Word through whom all things were made, the Holy Spirit was the author of life, order, and adornment. Creation is not a mere manufacturing,—it is a spiritual act.

John Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, 1:120—"The creation of the world cannot be by a Being who is external. Power presupposes an object on which it is exerted. 122—There is in the very nature of God a reason why he should reveal himself in, and communicate himself to, a world of finite existences, or fulfil and realize himself in the being and life of nature and man. His nature would not be what it is if such a world did not exist; something would be lacking to the completeness of the divine being without it. 144—Even with respect to human thought or intelligence, it is mind or spirit which creates the world. It is not a ready-made world on which we look; in perceiving our world we make it. 152-154—We make progress as we cease to think our own thoughts and become media of the universal Intelligence." While we accept Caird's idealistic interpretation of creation, we dissent from his intimation that creation is a necessity to God. The trinitarian being of God renders him sufficient to himself, even without creation. Yet those very trinitarian relations throw light upon the method of creation, since they disclose to us the order of all the divine activity. On the definition of Creation, see Shedd, *History of Doctrine*, 1:11.

## II. PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION.

Creation is a truth of which mere science or reason cannot fully assure us. Physical science can observe and record changes, but it knows nothing of origins. Reason cannot absolutely disprove the eternity of matter. For proof of the doctrine of Creation, therefore, we rely wholly upon Scripture. Scripture supplements science, and renders its explanation of the universe complete.

Drummond, in his *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, claims that atoms, as "manufactured articles," and the dissipation of energy, prove the creation of the visible from the invisible. See the same doctrine propounded in "The Unseen Universe." But Sir Charles Lyell tells us: "Geology is the autobiography of the earth,—but like all autobiographies, it does not go back to the beginning." Hopkins, *Yale Lectures on the Scriptural View of Man*: "There is nothing *a priori* against the eternity of matter." Wardlaw, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 85—"We cannot form any distinct conception of creation out of nothing. The very idea of it might never have occurred to the mind of man, had it not been traditionally handed down as a part of the original revelation to the parents of the race."

Hartmann, the German philosopher, goes back to the original elements of the universe, and then says that science stands petrified before the question of their origin, as before a Medusa's head. But in the presence of problems, says Dörner, the duty of science is not petrification, but solution. This is peculiarly true, if science is, as Hartmann thinks, a complete explanation of the universe. Since science, by her own acknowledgment, furnishes no such explanation of the origin of things, the Scripture revelation with regard to creation meets a demand of human reason, by adding the one fact without which science must forever be devoid of the highest unity and rationality. For advocacy of the eternity of matter, see Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 157-183.

E. H. Johnson, in *Andover Review*, Nov. 1891: 505 sq., and Dec. 1891: 592 sq., remarks that evolution can be traced backward to more and more simple elements, to matter without motion and with no quality but being. Now make it still more simple by divesting it of existence, and you get back to the necessity of a Creator. An infinite number of past stages is impossible. There is no infinite number. Somewhere there must be a beginning. We grant to Dr. Johnson that the only alternative to creation is a materialistic dualism, or an eternal matter which is the product of the divine mind and will. The theories of dualism and of creation from eternity we shall discuss hereafter.

1. *Direct Scripture Statements.*

A. Genesis 1:1—"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." To this it has been objected that the verb  $\text{קָוַם}$  does not necessarily denote production without the use of preëxisting materials (see Gen. 1:27—"God created man in his own image"; cf. 2:7—"the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground"; also Ps. 51:10—"Create in me a clean heart").

"In the first two chapters of Genesis  $\text{קָוַם}$  is used (1) of the creation of the universe (1:1); (2) of the creation of the great sea monsters (1:21); (3) of the creation of man (1:27). Everywhere else we read of God's *making*, as from an already created substance, the firmament (1:7), the sun, moon and stars (1:16), the brute creation (1:25); or of his *forming* the beasts of the field out of the ground (2:19); or, lastly, of his *building up* into a woman the rib he had taken from man (2:22, margin)"—quoted from Bible Com., 1: 31. Guyot, *Creation*, 30—"Bora is thus reserved for marking the first introduction of each of the three great spheres of existence—the world of matter, the world of life, and the spiritual world represented by man."

We grant, in reply, that the argument for absolute creation derived from the mere word  $\text{קָוַם}$  is not entirely conclusive. Other considerations in connection with the use of this word, however, seem to render this inter-

pretation of Gen. 1:1 the most plausible. Some of these considerations we proceed to mention.

(a) While we acknowledge that the verb  $\text{בָּרָא}$  "does not necessarily or invariably denote production without the use of preëxisting materials, we still maintain that it signifies the production of an effect for which no natural antecedent existed before, and which can be only the result of divine agency." For this reason, in the Kal species it is used only of God, and is never accompanied by any accusative denoting material.

No accusative denoting material follows *bara*, in the passages indicated, for the reason that all thought of material was absent. See Dillmann, *Genesis*, 18; Oehler, *Theol. O. T.*, 1: 177. The quotation in the text above is from Green, *Hebrew Chrestomathy*, 57. But E. G. Robinson, *Christian Theology*, 88, remarks: "Whether the Scriptures teach the absolute origination of matter—its creation out of nothing—is an open question. . . . No decisive evidence is furnished by the Hebrew word *bara*."

A moderate and scholarly statement of the facts is furnished by Professor W. J. Beecher, in *S. S. Times*, Dec. 23, 1898: 807—"To create is to originate divinely. . . . Creation, in the sense in which the Bible uses the word, does not exclude the use of materials previously existing; for man was taken from the ground (Gen. 2:7), and woman was builded from the rib of a man (2:22). Ordinarily God brings things into existence through the operation of second causes. But it is possible, in our thinking, to withdraw attention from the second causes, and to think of anything as originating simply from God, apart from second causes. To think of a thing thus is to think of it as created. The Bible speaks of Israel as created, of the promised prosperity of Jerusalem as created, of the Ammonite people and the king of Tyre as created, of persons of any date in history as created (Is. 43:1-15; 45:13; Is. 21:20; 28:13, 15; Ps. 102:18; Eccl. 12:1; Mal. 2:10). Miracles and the ultimate beginnings of second causes are necessarily thought of as creative acts; all other originating of things may be thought of, according to the purpose we have in mind, either as creation or as affected by second causes."

(b) In the account of the creation,  $\text{בָּרָא}$  seems to be distinguished from  $\text{עָשָׂה}$ , "to make" either with or without the use of already existing material ( $\text{עָשָׂה לְבָרָא}$ , "created in making" or "made by creation," in 2:3; and  $\text{עָשָׂה}$ , of the firmament, in 1:7), and from  $\text{יָצַק}$ , "to form" out of such material. (See  $\text{יָצַק}$ , of man regarded as a spiritual being, in 1:27; but  $\text{יָצַק}$ , of man regarded as a physical being, in 2:7.)

See Conant, *Genesis*, 1; Bible Com., 1: 37—"created to make" (in Gen. 2:3)—created out of nothing, in order that he might make out of it all the works recorded in the six days." Over against these texts, however, we must set others in which there appears no accurate distinguishing of these words from one another. *Bara* is used in Gen. 1:1, *asah* in Gen. 2:4, of the creation of the heaven and earth. Of earth, both *yatzar* and *asah* are used in Is. 45:18. In regard to man, in Gen. 1:27 we find *bara*; in Gen. 1:26 and 9:6, *asah*; and in Gen. 2:7, *yatzar*. In Is. 43:7, all three are found in the same verse: "whom I have *bara* for my glory, I have *yatzar*, yes, I have *asah* him." In Is. 45:12, "*asah* the earth, and *bara* man upon it"; but in Gen. 1:1 we read: "God *bara* the earth," and in 9:6 "*asah* man." Is. 44:2—"the Lord that *asah* thee (i. e., man) and *yatzar* thee"; but in Gen. 1:27, God "*bara* man." Gen. 5:2—"male and female *bara* he them." Gen. 2:22—"the rib *asah* he a woman"; Gen. 2:7—"he *yatzar* man"; i. e., *bara* male and female, yet *asah* the woman and *yatzar* the man. *Asah* is not always used for *transform*: Is. 41:20—"fir-tree, pine, box-tree" in nature—*bara*; Ps. 41:10—"bara in me a clean heart"; Is. 65:18—God "*bara* Jerusalem into a rejoicing."

(c) The context shows that the meaning here is a making without the use of preëxisting materials. Since the earth in its rude, unformed, chaotic condition is still called "the earth" in verse 2, the word  $\text{בָּרָא}$  in verse 1 cannot refer to any shaping or fashioning of the elements, but must signify the calling of them into being.

Oehler, *Theology of O. T.*, 1:177—"By the absolute *berashith*, 'in the beginning,' the divine creation is fixed as an absolute beginning, not as a working on something that already existed." Vers 2 cannot be the beginning of a history, for it begins with 'and.' Delitzsch says of the expression 'the earth was without form and void': "From this it is evident that the void and formless state of the earth was not uncreated or without a beginning. . . . It is evident that 'the heaven and earth' as God created them in the beginning were not the well-ordered universe, but the world in its elementary form."

(d) The fact that  $\aleph\aleph\aleph$  may have had an original signification of "cutting," "forming," and that it retains this meaning in the Piel conjugation, need not prejudice the conclusion thus reached, since terms expressive of the most spiritual processes are derived from sensuous roots. If  $\aleph\aleph\aleph$  does not signify absolute creation, no word exists in the Hebrew language that can express this idea.

(e) But this idea of production without the use of preëxisting materials unquestionably existed among the Hebrews. The later Scriptures show that it had become natural to the Hebrew mind. The possession of this idea by the Hebrews, while it is either not found at all or is very dimly and ambiguously expressed in the sacred books of the heathen, can be best explained by supposing that it was derived from this early revelation in Genesis.

E. H. Johnson, *Outline of Syst. Theol.*, 94—"Rom. 4:17 tells us that the faith of Abraham, to whom God had promised a son, grasped the fact that God calls into existence 'the things that are not.' This may be accepted as Paul's interpretation of the first-verse of the Bible." It is possible that the heathen had occasional glimpses of this truth, though with no such clearness as that with which it was held in Israel. Perhaps we may say that through the perversions of later nature-worship something of the original revelation of absolute creation shines, as the first writing of a palimpsest appears faintly through the subsequent script with which it has been overlaid. If the doctrine of absolute creation is found at all among the heathen, it is greatly blurred and obscured. No one of the heathen books teaches it as do the sacred Scriptures of the Hebrews. Yet it seems as if this "One accent of the Holy Ghost The heedless world has never lost."

Bib. Com., 1: 81—"Perhaps no other ancient language, however refined and philosophical, could have so clearly distinguished the different acts of the Maker of all things [as the Hebrew did with its four different words], and that because all heathen philosophy esteemed matter to be eternal and uncreated." Prof. E. D. Burton: "Brahmanism, and the original religion of which Zoroastrianism was a reformation, were Eastern and Western divisions of a primitive Aryan, and probably monotheistic, religion. The Vedas, which represented the Brahmanism, leave it a question whence the world came, whether from God by emanation, or by the shaping of material eternally existent. Later Brahmanism is pantheistic, and Buddhism, the Reformation of Brahmanism, is atheistic." See Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 1:471, and Mosheim's references in Oudworth's *Intellectual System*, 3:140.

We are inclined still to hold that the doctrine of absolute creation was known to no other ancient nation besides the Hebrews. Recent investigations, however, render this somewhat more doubtful than it once seemed to be. Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, 142, 143, finds creation among the early Babylonians. In his *Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, 372-397, he says: "The elements of Hebrew cosmology are all Babylonian; even the creative word itself was a Babylonian conception; but the spirit which inspires the cosmology is the antithesis to that which inspired the cosmology of Babylonia. Between the polytheism of Babylonia and the monotheism of Israel a gulf is fixed which cannot be spanned. So soon as we have a clear monotheism, absolute creation is a corollary. As the monotheistic idea is corrupted, creation gives place to pantheistic transformation."

It is now claimed by others that Zoroastrianism, the Vedas, and the religion of the ancient Egyptians had the idea of absolute creation. On creation in the Zoroastrian system, see our treatment of Dualism, page 222. Vedic hymn in *Rig Veda*, 10:9, quoted by J. F. Clarke, *Ten Great Religions*, 2: 205—"Originally this universe was soul

only; nothing else whatsoever existed, active or inactive. He thought: 'I will create worlds'; thus he created these various worlds; earth, light, mortal being, and the waters." Renouf, Hibbert Lectures, 216-223, speaks of a papyrus on the staircase of the British Museum, which reads: "The great God, the Lord of heaven and earth, who made all things which are . . . the almighty God, self-existent, who made heaven and earth; . . . the heaven was yet uncreated, uncreated was the earth; thou hast put together the earth; . . . who made all things, but was not made."

But the Egyptian religion in its later development, as well as Brahmanism, was pantheistic, and it is possible that all the expressions we have quoted are to be interpreted, not as indicating a belief in creation out of nothing, but as asserting emanation, or the taking on by deity of new forms and modes of existence. On creation in heathen systems, see Pierret, *Mythologie*, and answer to it by Maspero; Hymn to Amen-Rha, in "Records of the Past"; G. C. Müller, *Literature of Greece*, 87, 88; George Smith, *Chaldean Genesis*, chapters 1, 3, 5 and 8; Dillmann, *Com. on Genesis*, 6th edition, *Introd.*, 5-10; LeNormant, *Hist. Ancienne de l'Orient*, 1:17-26; 5:238; Otto Zöckler, *art.*: Schöpfung, in Herzog and Plitt, *Encyclop.*; S. B. Gould, *Origin and Devel. of Relig. Beliefs*, 281-283.

B. Hebrews 11:3—"By faith we understand that the worlds have been framed by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not been made out of things which appear"—the world was not made out of sensible and preëxisting material, but by the direct fiat of omnipotence (see Alford, and Lünemann, Meyer's *Com. in loco*).

Compare 2 Maccabees 7:28—*ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ ὁ θεός*. This the Vulgate translated by "quia ex nihilo fecit illa Deus," and from the Vulgate the phrase "creation out of nothing" is derived. Hedge, *Ways of the Spirit*, points out that Wisdom 11:17 has *ἐξ ἀμύθητον ὄντων*, interprets by this the *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων* in 2 Maccabees, and denies that this last refers to creation out of nothing. But we must remember that the later Apocryphal writings were composed under the influence of the Platonic philosophy; that the passage in Wisdom may be a rationalistic interpretation of that in Maccabees; and that even if it were independent, we are not to assume a harmony of view in the Apocrypha. 2 Maccabees 7:28 must stand by itself as a testimony to Jewish belief in creation without use of preëxisting material,—belief which can be traced to no other source than the Old Testament Scriptures. Compare Ex. 34:19—"I will do marvels such as have not been wrought [marg. 'created'] in all the earth"; Num. 16:30—"if Jehovah make a new thing" [marg. 'create a creation']; Is. 4:5—"Jehovah will create . . . a cloud and smoke"; 41:20—"the Holy One of Israel hath created it"; 45:7, 8—"I form the light, and create darkness"; 57:19—"I create the fruit of the lips"; 65:17—"I create new heavens and a new earth"; Jer. 31:22—"Jehovah hath created a new thing."

Rom. 4:17—"God, who giveth life to the dead, and calleth the things that are not, as though they were"; 1 Cor. 1:23—"things that are not" [did God choose] "that he might bring to naught the things that are"; 2 Cor. 4:6—"God, that said, Light shall shine out of darkness"—created light without preëxisting material,—for darkness is no material; Col. 1:16, 17—"in him were all things created . . . and he is before all things"; so also Ps. 33:9—"he spake, and it was done"; 148:5—"he commanded, and they were created." See Philo, *Creation of the World*, chap. 1-7, and *Life of Moses*, book 8, chap. 36—"He produced the most perfect work, the Cosmos, out of non-existence (*τὸν μὴ ὄντων*) into being (*εἰς τὸ εἶναι*)." E. H. Johnson, *Syst. Theol.*, 94—"We have no reason to believe that the Hebrew mind had the idea of creation out of *invisible* materials. But creation out of *visible* materials is in Hebrews 11:3 expressly denied. This text is therefore equivalent to an assertion that the universe was made without the use of *any* preëxisting materials."

## 2. Indirect evidence from Scripture.

(a) The past duration of the world is limited; (b) before the world began to be, each of the persons of the Godhead already existed; (c) the origin of the universe is ascribed to God, and to each of the persons of the Godhead. These representations of Scripture are not only most consistent with the view that the universe was created by God without use of preëxisting material, but they are inexplicable upon any other hypothesis.

(a) Mark 13:19—"from the beginning of the creation which God created until now"; John 17:5—"before the world was"; Eph. 1:4—"before the foundation of the world." (b) Ps. 90:2—"Before the mountains were brought forth, Or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, Even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God"; Prov. 8:23—"I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, Before the earth was"; John 1:1—"In the beginning was the Word"; Col. 1:17—"he is before all things"; Heb. 9:14—"the eternal Spirit" (see Tholuck, *Com. in loco*). (c) Eph. 3:9—"God who created all things"; Rom. 11:36—"of him . . . are all things"; 1 Cor. 8:6—"one God, the Father, of whom are all things . . . one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things"; John 1:3—"all things were made through him"; Col. 1:16—"in him were all things created . . . all things have been created through him, and unto him"; Heb. 1:9—"through whom also he made the worlds"; Gen. 1:2—"and the Spirit of God moved [margin, 'was brooding'] upon the face of the waters." From these passages we may also infer that (1) all things are absolutely dependent upon God; (2) God exercises supreme control over all things; (3) God is the only infinite Being; (4) God alone is eternal; (5) there is no substance out of which God creates; (6) things do not proceed from God by necessary emanation; the universe has its source and originator in God's transcendent and personal will. See, on this indirect proof of creation, Philipp, *Glaubenslehre*, 2:231. Since other views, however, have been held to be more rational, we proceed to the examination of

### III. THEORIES WHICH OPPOSE CREATION.

#### 1. *Dualism.*

Of dualism there are two forms:

A. That which holds to two self-existent principles, God and matter. These are distinct from and coeternal with each other. Matter, however, is an unconscious, negative, and imperfect substance, which is subordinate to God and is made the instrument of his will. This was the underlying principle of the Alexandrian Gnostics. It was essentially an attempt to combine with Christianity the Platonic or Aristotelian conception of the *ύλη*. In this way it was thought to account for the existence of evil, and to escape the difficulty of imagining a production without use of preëxisting material. Basilides (flourished 125) and Valentinus (died 160), the representatives of this view, were influenced also by Hindu philosophy, and their dualism is almost indistinguishable from pantheism. A similar view has been held in modern times by John Stuart Mill and apparently by Frederick W. Robertson.

Dualism seeks to show how the One becomes the many, how the Absolute gives birth to the relative, how the Good can consist with evil. The *ύλη* of Plato seems to have meant nothing but empty space, whose not-being, or merely negative existence, prevented the full realization of the divine ideas. Aristotle regarded the *ύλη* as a more positive cause of imperfection,—it was like the hard material which hampers the sculptor in expressing his thought. The real problem for both Plato and Aristotle was to explain the passage from pure spiritual existence to that which is phenomenal and imperfect, from the absolute and unlimited to that which exists in space and time. Finiteness, instead of being created, was regarded as having eternal existence and as limiting all divine manifestations. The *ύλη*, from being a mere abstraction, became either a negative or a positive source of evil. The Alexandrian Jews, under the influence of Hellenic culture, sought to make this dualism explain the doctrine of creation.

Basilides and Valentinus, however, were also under the influence of a pantheistic philosophy brought in from the remote East—the philosophy of Buddhism, which taught that the original Source of all was a nameless Being, devoid of all qualities, and so, indistinguishable from Nothing. From this Being, which is Not-being, all existing things proceed. Aristotle and Hegel similarly taught that pure Being—Nothing. But inasmuch as the object of the Alexandrian philosophers was to show how something could be originated, they were obliged to conceive of the primitive Nothing as capable of such originating. They, moreover, in the absence of any conception of absolute creation, were compelled to conceive of a material which could be fashioned. Hence the Void, the Abyss, is made to take the place of matter. If it be said that they did

not conceive of the Void or the Abyss as substances, we reply that they gave it just as substantial existence as they gave to the first Cause of things, which, in spite of their negative descriptions of it, involved Will and Design. And although they do not attribute to this secondary substance a positive influence for evil, they notwithstanding see in it the unconscious hinderer of all good.

Principal Tulloch, in *Encyc. Brit.*, 10:704—"In the Alexandrian Gnosis . . . . the stream of being in its ever outward flow at length comes in contact with dead matter which thus receives animation and becomes a living source of evil." Windelband, *Hist. Philosophy*, 139, 144, 239—"With Valentinus, side by side with the Deity poured forth into the Pleroma or Fulness of spiritual forms, appears the Void, likewise original and from eternity; beside Form appears matter; beside the good appears the evil." Mansel, *Gnostic Heresies*, 139—"The Platonic theory of an inert, semi-existent matter, . . . . was adopted by the Gnosis of Egypt . . . . 187—Valentinus does not content himself, like Plato, . . . . with assuming as the germ of the natural world an unformed matter existing from all eternity. . . . The whole theory may be described as a development, in allegorical language, of the pantheistic hypothesis which in its outline had been previously adopted by Basilides." A. H. Newman, *Ch. History*, 1:181-192, calls the philosophy of Basilides "fundamentally pantheistic." "Valentinus," he says, "was not so careful to insist on the original non-existence of God and everything." We reply that even to Basilides the Non-existent One is endued with power; and this power accomplishes nothing until it comes in contact with things non-existent, and out of them fashions the seed of the world. The things non-existent are as substantial as is the Fashioner, and they imply both objectivity and limitation.

Lightfoot, *Com. on Colossians*, 78-113, esp. 83, has traced a connection between the Gnostic doctrine, the earlier Colossian heresy, and the still earlier teaching of the Essenes of Palestine. All these were characterized by (1) the spirit of caste or intellectual exclusiveness; (2) peculiar tenets as to creation and as to evil; (3) practical asceticism. Matter is evil and separates man from God; hence intermediate beings between man and God as objects of worship; hence also mortification of the body as a means of purifying man from sin. Paul's antidote for both errors was simply the person of Christ, the true and only Mediator and Sanctifier. See Guericke, *Church History*, 1:161.

Harnack, *Hist. Dogma*, 1:128—"The majority of Gnostic undertakings may be viewed as attempts to transform Christianity into a theosophy. . . . In Gnosticism the Hellenic spirit desired to make itself master of Christianity, or more correctly, of the Christian communities." . . . 232—Harnack represents one of the fundamental philosophic doctrines of Gnosticism to be that of the Cosmos as a mixture of matter with divine sparks, which has arisen from a descent of the latter into the former [Alexandrian Gnosticism], or, as some say, from the perverse, or at least merely permitted undertaking of a subordinate spirit [Syrian Gnosticism]. We may compare the Hebrew Sadducee with the Greek Epicurean; the Pharisee with the Stoic; the Essene with the Pythagorean. The Pharisees overdid the idea of God's transcendence. Angels must come in between God and the world. Gnostic intermediaries were the logical outcome. External works of obedience were alone valid. Christ preached, instead of this, a religion of the heart. Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus*, 1:52—"The rejection of animal sacrifices and consequent abstaining from temple-worship on the part of the Essenes, which seems out of harmony with the rest of their legal obedience, is most simply explained as the consequence of their idea that to bring to God a bloody animal offering was derogatory to his transcendental character. Therefore they interpreted the O. T. command in an allegorizing way."

Lyman Abbott: "The Oriental dreams; the Greek defines; the Hebrew acts. All these influences met and intermingled at Alexandria. Emanations were mediations between the absolute, unknowable, all-containing God, and the personal, revealed and holy God of Scripture. Asceticism was one result: matter is undivine, therefore get rid of it. License was another result: matter is undivine, therefore disregard it—there is no disease and there is no sin—the modern doctrine of Christian Science." Kedney, *Christian Doctrine*, 1:380-373; 3:354, conceives of the divine glory as an eternal material environment of God, out of which the universe is fashioned.

The author of "The Unseen Universe" (page 17) wrongly calls John Stuart Mill a Manichean. But Mill disclaims belief in the personality of this principle that resists and limits God,—see his posthumous *Essays on Religion*, 176-195. F. W. Robertson, *Lectures on Genesis*, 4-16—"Before the creation of the world all was chaos . . . but with the creation, order began. . . . God did not cease from creation, for creation is going on

every day. Nature is God at work. Only after surprising changes, as in spring-time, do we say figuratively, 'God rests.'" See also Frothingham, *Christian Philosophy*.

With regard to this view we remark :

(a) The maxim *ex nihilo nihil fit*, upon which it rests, is true only in so far as it asserts that no event takes place without a cause. It is false, if it mean that nothing can ever be made except out of material previously existing. The maxim is therefore applicable only to the realm of second causes, and does not bar the creative power of the great first Cause. The doctrine of creation does not dispense with a cause ; on the other hand, it assigns to the universe a sufficient cause in God.

Lucretius : " Nihil posse creari De nihilo, neque quod genitum est ad nihil revocari." Persius : " Gigni De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti." Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 116 — "The nothing, out of which God creates the world, is the eternal possibilities of his will, which are the sources of all the actualities of the world." Lewes, *Problems of Life and Mind*, 2: 292 — "When therefore it is argued that the creation of something from nothing is unthinkable and is therefore peremptorily to be rejected, the argument seems to me to be defective. The process is thinkable, but not imaginable, conceivable but not probable." See Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, 3: 81 sq. Lipsius, *Dogmatik*, 238, remarks that the theory of dualism is quite as difficult as that of absolute creation. It holds to a point of time when God began to fashion preëxisting material, and can give no reason why God did not do it before, since there must always have been in him an impulse toward this fashioning.

(b) Although creation without the use of preëxisting material is inconceivable, in the sense of being unpicturable to the imagination, yet the eternity of matter is equally inconceivable. For creation without preëxisting material, moreover, we find remote analogies in our own creation of ideas and volitions, a fact as inexplicable as God's bringing of new substances into being.

Mivart, *Lessons from Nature*, 371, 372 — "We have to a certain extent an aid to the thought of absolute creation in our own free volition, which, as absolutely originating and determining, may be taken as the type to us of the creative act." We speak of 'the creative faculty' of the artist or poet. We cannot give reality to the products of our imaginations, as God can to his. But if thought were only substance, the analogy would be complete. Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 1: 467 — "Our thoughts and volitions are created *ex nihilo*, in the sense that one thought is not made out of another thought, nor one volition out of another volition." So created substance may be only the mind and will of God in exercise, automatically in matter, freely in the case of free beings (see pages 90, 105-110, 383, and in our treatment of Preservation).

Beddoes : " I have a bit of *Fiat* in my soul, And can myself create my little world." Mark Hopkins : "Man is an image of God as a creator. . . . He can purposely create, or cause to be, a future that, but for him, would not have been." E. C. Stedman, *Nature of Poetry*, 223 — "So far as the Poet, the artist, is creative, he becomes a sharer of the divine imagination and power, and even of the divine responsibility." Wordsworth calls the poet a "serene creator of immortal things." Imagination, he says, is but another name for "clearest insight, amplitude of mind, And reason in her most exalted mood." "If we are 'gods' (Ps. 82: 6), that part of the Infinite which is embodied in us must partake to a limited extent of his power to create." Veitch, *Knowing and Being*, 239 — "Will, the expression of personality, both as originating resolutions and moulding existing material into form, is the nearest approach in thought which we can make to divine creation."

Creation is not simply the thought of God, — it is also the will of God — thought in expression, reason externalized. Will is creation out of nothing, in the sense that there is no use of preëxisting material. In man's exercise of the creative imagination there is will, as well as intellect. Royce, *Studies of Good and Evil*, 256, points out that we can be original in (1) the style or form of our work ; (2) in the selection of the objects we imitate ; (3) in the invention of relatively novel combinations of material. Style, subject, combination, then, comprise the methods of our originality. Our new con-

ceptions of nature as the expression of the divine mind and will bring creation more within our comprehension than did the old conception of the world as substance capable of existing apart from God. Hudson, *Law of Psychic Phenomena*, 294, thinks that we have power to create visible phantasms, or embodied thoughts, that can be subjectively perceived by others. See also Hudson's *Scientific Demonstration of Future Life*, 158. He defines genius as the result of the synchronous action of the objective and subjective faculties. Jesus of Nazareth, in his judgment, was a wonderful psychic. Intuitive perception and objective reason were with him always in the ascendant. His miracles were misinterpreted psychic phenomena. Jesus never claimed that his works were outside of natural law. All men have the same intuitional power, though in differing degrees.

We may add that the begetting of a child by man is the giving of substantial existence to another. Christ's creation of man may be like his own begetting by the Father. Behrends: "The relation between God and the universe is more intimate and organic than that between an artist and his work. The marble figure is independent of the sculptor the moment it is completed. It remains, though he die. But the universe would vanish in the withdrawal of the divine presence and indwelling. If I were to use any figure, it would be that of generation. The immanence of God is the secret of natural permanence and uniformity. Creation is primarily a spiritual act. The universe is not what we see and handle. The real universe is an empire of energies, a hierarchy of correlated forces, whose reality and unity are rooted in the rational will of God perpetually active in preservation. But there is no identity of substance, nor is there any division of the divine substance."

Bowne, *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, 36—"A mind is conceivable which should create its objects outright by pure self-activity and without dependence on anything beyond itself. Such is our conception of the Creator's relation to his objects. But this is not the case with us except to a very slight extent. Our mental life itself begins, and we come only gradually to a knowledge of things and of ourselves. In some sense our objects are given; that is, we cannot have objects at will or vary their properties at our pleasure. In this sense we are passive in knowledge, and no idealism can remove this fact. But in some sense also our objects are our own products; for an existing object becomes an object for us only as we think it, and thus make it our object. In this sense, knowledge is an active process, and not a passive reception of readymade information from without." Clarke, *Self and the Father*, 38—"Are we humiliated by having data for our imaginations to work upon? by being unable to create material? Not unless it be a shame to be second to the Creator." Causation is as mysterious as Creation. Balzac lived with his characters as actual beings. On the Creative Principle, see N. B. Wood, *The Witness of Sin*, 114-135.

(c) It is unphilosophical to postulate two eternal substances, when one self-existent Cause of all things will account for the facts. (d) It contradicts our fundamental notion of God as absolute sovereign to suppose the existence of any other substance to be independent of his will. (e) This second substance with which God must of necessity work, since it is, according to the theory, inherently evil and the source of evil, not only limits God's power, but destroys his blessedness. (f) This theory does not answer its purpose of accounting for moral evil, unless it be also assumed that spirit is material,—in which case dualism gives place to materialism.

Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 121—"God becomes a mere demiurge, if nature existed before spirit. That spirit only who in a perfect sense is able to commence his work of creation can have power to complete it." If God does not create, he must use what material he finds, and this working with intractable material must be his perpetual sorrow. Such limitation in the power of the deity seemed to John Stuart Mill the best explanation of the existing imperfections of the universe.

The other form of dualism is:

B. That which holds to the eternal existence of two antagonistic spirits, one evil and the other good. In this view, matter is not a negative and

imperfect substance which nevertheless has self-existence, but is either the work or the instrument of a personal and positively malignant intelligence, who wages war against all good. This was the view of the Manichæans. Manichæanism is a compound of Christianity and the Persian doctrine of two eternal and opposite intelligences. Zoroaster, however, held matter to be pure, and to be the creation of the good Being. Mani apparently regarded matter as captive to the evil spirit, if not absolutely his creation.

The old story of Mani's travels in Greece is wholly a mistake. Guericke, *Church History*, 1: 185-187, maintains that Manichæanism contains no mixture of Platonic philosophy, has no connection with Judaism, and as a sect came into no direct relations with the Catholic church. Harnoch, *Wegweiser*, 22, calls Manichæanism a compound of Gnosticism and Parseeism. Herzog, *Encyclopædie*, art.: Mani und die Manichæer, regards Manichæanism as the fruit, acme, and completion of Gnosticism. Gnosticism was a heresy in the church; Manichæanism, like New Platonism, was an anti-church. J. P. Lange: "These opposing theories represent various pagan conceptions of the world, which, after the manner of palimpsests, show through Christianity." Isaac Taylor speaks of "the creator of the carnivora"; and some modern Christians practically regard Satan as a second and equal God.

On the Religion of Zoroaster, see Haug, *Essays on Parsees*, 129-161, 302-309; also our quotations on pp. 347-349; Monier Williams, in *19th Century*, Jan. 1881: 155-177 — Ahura Mazda was the creator of the universe. Matter was created by him, and was neither identified with him nor an emanation from him. In the divine nature there were two opposite, but not opposing, principles or forces, called "twins" — the one constructive, the other destructive; the one beneficent, the other maleficent. Zoroaster called these "twins" also by the name of "spirits," and declared that "these two spirits created, the one the reality, the other the non-reality." Williams says that these two principles were conflicting only in name. The only antagonism was between the resulting good and evil brought about by the free agent, man. See Jackson, *Zoroaster*.

We may add that in later times this personification of principles in the deity seems to have become a definite belief in two opposing personal spirits, and that Mani, Manes, or Manichæus adopted this feature of Parseeism, with the addition of certain Christian elements. Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, 1: 470 — "The doctrine of the Manichæans was that creation was the work of Satan." See also Gieseler, *Church History*, 1: 203; Neander, *Church History*, 1: 479-508; Blunt, *Dict. Doct. and Hist. Theology*, art.: Dualism; and especially Baur, *Das manichäische Religionsystem*. A. H. Newman, *Ch. History*, 1: 194 — "Manichæism is Gnosticism, with its Christian elements reduced to a minimum, and the Zoroastrian, old Babylonian, and other Oriental elements raised to the maximum. Manichæism is Oriental dualism under Christian names, the Christian names employed retaining scarcely a trace of their proper meaning. The most fundamental thing in Manichæism is its absolute dualism. The kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness with their rulers stand eternally opposed to each other."

Of this view we need only say that it is refuted (a) by all the arguments for the unity, omnipotence, sovereignty, and blessedness of God; (b) by the Scripture representations of the prince of evil as the creature of God and as subject to God's control.

Scripture passages showing that Satan is God's creature or subject are the following: Col. 1: 16 — "for in him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers"; cf. Eph. 6: 12 — "our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world-rulers of this darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places"; 2 Pet. 2: 4 — "God spared not the angels when they sinned, but cast them down to hell, and committed them to pits of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment"; Rev. 20: 2 — "laid hold on the dragon, the old serpent, which is the Devil and Satan"; 10 — "and the devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone."

The closest analogy to Manichæan dualism is found in the popular conception of the devil held by the mediæval Roman church. It is a question whether he was regarded as a rival or as a servant of God. Matheson, *Messages of Old Religions*, says that Parseeism recognizes an obstructive element in the nature of God himself. Moral evil is reality, and there is that element of truth in Parseeism. But there is no reconciler

tion, nor is it shown that all things work together for good. E. H. Johnson: "This theory sets up matter as a sort of deity, a senseless idol endowed with the truly divine attribute of self-existence. But we can acknowledge but one God. To erect matter into an eternal Thing, independent of the Almighty but forever beside him, is the most revolting of all theories." Tennyson, *Unpublished Poem* (Life, 1:314) — "Oh me! for why is all around us here As if some lesser God had made the world, But had not force to shape it as he would Till the high God behold it from beyond, And enter it and make it beautiful?"

E. G. Robinson: "Evil is not eternal; if it were, we should be paying our respects to it. . . . There is much Manichæism in modern piety. We would influence soul through the body. Hence sacramentarianism and penance. Puritanism is theological Manichæism. Christ recommended fasting because it belonged to his age. Christianity came from Judaism. Churchism comes largely from reproducing what Christ did. Christianity is not perfunctory in its practices. We are to fast only when there is good reason for it." L. H. Mills, *New World*, March, 1896:51, suggests that Phariseeism may be the same with Farseeism, which is but another name for Parseeism. He thinks that Resurrection, Immortality, Paradise, Satan, Judgment, Hell, came from Persian sources, and gradually drove out the old Sadduceean simplicity. Pfeifferer, *Philos. Religion*, 1:306 — "According to the Persian legend, the first human pair was a good creation of the all-wise Spirit, Ahura, who had breathed into them his own breath. But soon the primeval men allowed themselves to be seduced by the hostile Spirit Angromainyu into lying and idolatry, whereby the evil spirits obtained power over them and the earth and spoiled the good creation."

Dieselhoff, *Die klassische Poesie und die göttliche Offenbarung*, 13-25 — "The Gathas of Zoroaster are the first poems of humanity. In them man rouses himself to assert his superiority to nature and the spirituality of God. God is not identified with nature. The impersonal nature-gods are vain idols and are causes of corruption. Their worshippers are servants of falsehood. Ahura-Mazda (living-wise) is a moral and spiritual personality. Ahriman is equally eternal but not equally powerful. Good has not complete victory over evil. Dualism is admitted and unity is lost. The conflict of faiths leads to separation. While one portion of the race remains in the Iranian highlands to maintain man's freedom and independence of nature, another portion goes South-East to the luxuriant banks of the Ganges to serve the deified forces of nature. The East stands for unity, as the West for duality. Yet Zoroaster in the Gathas is almost deified; and his religion, which begins by giving predominance to the good Spirit, ends by being honey-combed with nature-worship."

## 2. Emanation.

This theory holds that the universe is of the same substance with God, and is the product of successive evolutions from his being. This was the view of the Syrian Gnostics. Their system was an attempt to interpret Christianity in the forms of Oriental theosophy. A similar doctrine was taught, in the last century, by Swedenborg.

We object to it on the following grounds: (a) It virtually denies the infinity and transcendence of God, — by applying to him a principle of evolution, growth, and progress which belongs only to the finite and imperfect. (b) It contradicts the divine holiness, — since man, who by the theory is of the substance of God, is nevertheless morally evil. (c) It leads logically to pantheism, — since the claim that human personality is illusory cannot be maintained without also surrendering belief in the personality of God.

Saturninus of Antioch, Bardesanes of Edessa, Tatian of Assyria, Marcion of Sinope, all of the second century, were representatives of this view. Blunt, *Dict. of Doct. and Hist. Theology*, art.: Emanation: "The divine operation was symbolized by the image of the rays of light proceeding from the sun, which were most intense when nearest to the luminous substance of the body of which they formed a part, but which decreased in intensity as they receded from their source, until at last they disappeared altogether in darkness. So the spiritual effulgence of the Supreme Mind formed a world of spirit,

the intensity of which varied inversely with its distance from its source, until at length it vanished in matter. Hence there is a chain of ever expanding Æons which are increasing attenuations of his substance and the sum of which constitutes his fulness, *i. e.*, the complete revelation of his hidden being." Emanation, from *e*, and *manare*, to flow forth: Guericke, Church History, 1: 160—"many flames from one light . . . the direct contrary to the doctrine of creation from nothing." Neander, Church History, 1: 372-374. The doctrine of emanation is distinctly materialistic. We hold, on the contrary, that the universe is an expression of God, but not an emanation from God.

On the difference between Oriental emanation and eternal generation, see Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 1: 470, and History Doctrine, 1: 11-12, 312, note—"1. That which is eternally generated is infinite, not finite; it is a divine and eternal person who is not the world or any portion of it. In the Oriental schemes, emanation is a mode of accounting for the origin of the finite. But eternal generation still leaves the finite to be originated. The begetting of the Son is the generation of an infinite person who afterwards creates the finite universe *de nihilo*. 2. Eternal generation has for its result a subsistence or personal hypostasis totally distinct from the world; but emanation in relation to the deity yields only an impersonal or at most a personified energy or effluence which is one of the powers or principles of nature—a mere *anima mundi*." The truths of which emanation was the perversion and caricature were therefore the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit.

Principal Tulloch, in Encyc. Brit., 10: 704—"All the Gnostics agree in regarding this world as not proceeding immediately from the Supreme Being. . . . The Supreme Being is regarded as wholly inconceivable and indescribable—as the unfathomable Abyss (Valentinus)—the Unnameable (Basiliides). From this transcendent source existence springs by emanation in a series of spiritual powers. . . . The passage from the higher spiritual world to the lower material one is, on the one hand, apprehended as a mere continued degeneracy from the Source of Life, at length terminating in the kingdom of darkness and death—the bordering chaos surrounding the kingdom of light. On the other hand the passage is apprehended in a more precisely dualistic form, as a positive invasion of the kingdom of light by a self-existent kingdom of darkness. According as Gnosticism adopted one or other of these modes of explaining the existence of the present world, it fell into the two great divisions which, from their places of origin, have received the respective names of the Alexandrian and Syrian Gnosis. The one, as we have seen, presents more a Western, the other more an Eastern type of speculation. The dualistic element in the one case scarcely appears beneath the pantheistic, and bears resemblance to the Platonic notion of the *ὄλον*, a mere blank necessity, a limitless void. In the other case, the dualistic element is clear and prominent, corresponding to the Zoroastrian doctrine of an active principle of evil as well as of good—of a kingdom of Ahriman, as well as a kingdom of Ormuzd. In the Syrian Gnosis . . . there appears from the first a hostile principle of evil in collision with the good."

We must remember that dualism is an attempt to substitute for the doctrine of absolute creation, a theory that matter and evil are due to something negative or positive outside of God. Dualism is a theory of origins, not of results. Keeping this in mind, we may call the Alexandrian Gnostics dualists, while we regard emanation as the characteristic teaching of the Syrian Gnostics. These latter made matter to be only an efflux from God and evil only a degenerate form of good. If the Syrians held the world to be independent of God, this independence was conceived of only as a later result or product, not as an original fact. Some like Saturninus and Bardesanes verged toward Manichean doctrine; others like Tatian and Marcion toward Egyptian dualism; but all held to emanation as the philosophical explanation of what the Scriptures call creation. These remarks will serve as qualification and criticism of the opinions which we proceed to quote.

Sheldon, Ch. Hist., 1: 206—"The Syrians were in general more dualistic than the Alexandrians. Some, after the fashion of the Hindu pantheists, regarded the material realm as the region of emptiness and illusion, the void opposite of the Pleroma, that world of spiritual reality and fulness; others assigned a more positive nature to the material, and regarded it as capable of an evil aggressiveness even apart from any quickening by the incoming of life from above." Mansel, Gnostic Heresies, 129—"Like Saturninus, Bardesanes is said to have combined the doctrine of the malignity of matter with that of an active principle of evil; and he connected together these two usually antagonistic theories by maintaining that the inert matter was co-eternal with God, while Satan as the active principle of evil was produced from matter (or, according to another statement, co-eternal with it), and acted in conjunction with it. 142—

The feature which is usually selected as characteristic of the Syrian Gnosis is the doctrine of dualism; that is to say, the assumption of the existence of two active and independent principles, the one of good, the other of evil. This assumption was distinctly held by Saturninus and Bardesanes . . . in contradistinction to the Platonic theory of an inert semi-existent matter, which was adopted by the Gnosis of Egypt. The former principle found its logical development in the next century in Manichæism; the latter leads with almost equal certainty to Pantheism."

A. H. Newman, Ch. History, 1:192—"Marcion did not speculate as to the origin of evil. The Demiurge and his kingdom are apparently regarded as existing from eternity. Matter he regarded as intrinsically evil, and he practised a rigid asceticism." Mansel, Gnostic Heresies, 210—"Marcion did not, with the majority of the Gnostics, regard the Demiurge as a derived and dependent being, whose imperfection is due to his remoteness from the highest Cause; nor yet, according to the Persian doctrine, did he assume an eternal principle of pure malignity. His second principle is independent of and co-eternal with the first; opposed to it however, not as evil to good, but as imperfection to perfection, or, as Marcion expressed it, as a just to a good being. 218—Non-recognition of any principle of pure evil. Three principles only: the Supreme God, the Demiurge, and the eternal Matter, the two latter being imperfect but not necessarily evil. Some of the Marcionites seem to have added an evil spirit as a fourth principle. . . . Marcion is the least Gnostic of all the Gnostics. . . . 31—The Indian influence may be seen in Egypt, the Persian in Syria. . . . 32—To Platonism, modified by Judaism, Gnosticism owed much of its philosophical form and tendencies. To the dualism of the Persian religion it owed one form at least of its speculations on the origin and remedy of evil, and many of the details of its doctrine of emanations. To the Buddhism of India, modified again probably by Platonism, it was indebted for the doctrines of the antagonism between spirit and matter and the unreality of derived existence (the germ of the Gnostic Docetism), and in part at least for the theory which regards the universe as a series of successive emanations from the absolute Unity."

Emanation holds that some stuff has proceeded from the nature of God, and that God has formed this stuff into the universe. But matter is not composed of stuff at all. It is merely an activity of God. Origen held that  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  etymologically denotes a being which, struck off from God the central source of light and warmth, has cooled in its love for the good, but still has the possibility of returning to its spiritual origin. Pfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion, 2:271, thus describes Origen's view: "As our body, while consisting of many members, is yet an organism which is held together by one soul, so the universe is to be thought of as an immense living being, which is held together by one soul, the power and the Logos of God." Palmer, Theol. Definition, 63, note—"The evil of Emanationism is seen in the history of Gnosticism. An emanation is a portion of the divine essence regarded as separated from it and sent forth as independent. Having no perpetual bond of connection with the divine, it either sinks into degradation, as Basilides taught, or becomes actively hostile to the divine, as the Ophites believed. . . . In like manner the Deists of a later time came to regard the laws of nature as having an independent existence, i. e., as emanations."

John Milton, Christian Doctrine, holds this view. Matter is an efflux from God himself, not intrinsically bad, and incapable of annihilation. Finite existence is an emanation from God's substance, and God has loosened his hold on those living portions or centres of finite existence which he has endowed with free will, so that these independent beings may originate actions not morally referable to himself. This doctrine of free will relieves Milton from the charge of pantheism; see Masson, Life of Milton, 6:324-326. Lotze, Philos. Religion, xviii, 1, distinguishes creation from emanation by saying that creation necessitates a divine Will, while emanation flows by natural consequence from the being of God. God's motive in creation is love, which urges him to communicate his holiness to other beings. God creates individual finite spirits, and then permits the thought, which at first was only his, to become the thought of these other spirits. This transference of his thought by will is the creation of the world. F. W. Farrar, on Heb. 1: 3—"The word *Aion* was used by the Gnostics to describe the various emanations by which they tried at once to widen and to bridge over the gulf between the human and the divine. Over that imaginary chasm John threw the arch of the Incarnation, when he wrote: 'The Word became flesh' (John 1:14)."

Upton, Hibbert Lectures, chap. 2—"In the very making of souls of his own essence and substance, and in the vacating of his own causality in order that men may be free, God already dies in order that they may live. God withdraws himself from our wills, so as to make possible free choice and even possible opposition to himself. Individual-

ism admits dualism but not complete division. Our dualism holds still to underground connections of life between man and man, man and nature, man and God. Even the physical creation is ethical at heart; each thing is dependent on other things, and must serve them, or lose its own life and beauty. The branch must abide in the vine, or it withers and is cut off and burned" (275).

Swedenborg held to emanation, — see *Divine Love and Wisdom*, 263, 266, 265 — "Every one who thinks from clear reason sees that the universe is not created from nothing. . . . All things were created out of a substance. . . . As God alone is substance in itself and therefore the real *esse*, it is evidence that the existence of things is from no other source. . . . Yet the created universe is not God, because God is not in time and space. . . . There is a creation of the universe, and of all things therein, by continual mediations from the First. . . . In the substances and matters of which the earths consist, there is nothing of the Divine in itself, but they are deprived of all that is divine in itself. . . . Still they have brought with them by continuation from the substance of the spiritual sun that which was there from the Divine." Swedenborgianism is "materialism driven deep and clinched on the inside." This system reverses the Lord's prayer; it should read: "As on earth, so in heaven." He disliked certain sects, and he found that all who belonged to those sects were in the hells, condemned to everlasting punishment. The truth is not materialistic emanation, as Swedenborg imagined, but rather divine energizing in space and time. The universe is God's system of graded self-limitation, from matter up to mind. It has had a beginning, and God has instituted it. It is a finite and partial manifestation of the infinite Spirit. Matter is an expression of spirit, but not an emanation from spirit, any more than our thoughts and volitions are. Finite spirits, on the other hand, are differentiations within the being of God himself, and so are not emanations from him.

Napoleon asked Goethe what matter was. "*Esprit gelé* — frozen spirit" was the answer Schelling wished Goethe had given him. But neither is matter spirit, nor are matter and spirit together more natural effluxes from God's substance. A divine institution of them is requisite (quoted substantially from Dörner, *System of Doctrine*, 2:40). Schlegel in a similar manner called architecture "frozen music," and another writer calls music "dissolved architecture." There is a "psychical automatism," as Ladd says, in his *Philosophy of Mind*, 169; and Hegel calls nature "the corpse of the understanding — spirit in alienation from itself." But spirit is the Adam, of which nature is the Eve; and man says to nature: "This is bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh," as Adam did in *Gen. 2:23*.

### 3. *Creation from eternity.*

This theory regards creation as an act of God in eternity past. It was propounded by Origen, and has been held in recent times by Martensen, Martineau, John Caird, Knight, and Pfeiderer. The necessity of supposing such creation from eternity has been argued from God's omnipotence, God's timelessness, God's immutability, and God's love. We consider each of these arguments in their order.

Origen held that God was from eternity the creator of the world of spirits. Martensen, in his *Dogmatics*, 114, shows favor to the maxims: "Without the world God is not God. . . . God created the world to satisfy a want in himself. . . . He cannot but constitute himself the Father of spirits." Schiller, *Die Freundschaft*, last stanza, gives the following popular expression to this view: "Freundlos war der grosse Weltmeister; Fühlte Mangel, darum schuf er Geister, Sel'ge Spiegel seiner Seligkeit. Fand das höchste Wesen schon kein Gleiches; Aus dem Kelch des ganzen Geisterreiches Schäumte ihm die Unendlichkeit." The poet's thought was perhaps suggested by Goethe's *Sorrows of Werther*: "The flight of a bird above my head inspired me with the desire of being transported to the shores of the immeasurable waters, there to quaff the pleasures of life from the foaming goblet of the infinite." Robert Browning, *Rabbi Ben Ezra*, 31 — "But I need now as then, Thee, God, who mouldest men. And since, not even when the whirl was worst, Did I — to the wheel of life With shapes and colors rife, Bound dizzily — mistake my end, To slake thy thirst." But this regards the Creator as dependent upon, and in bondage to, his own world.

Pythagoras held that nature's substances and laws are eternal. Martineau, *Study of Religion*, 1:144; 2:260, seems to make the creation of the world an eternal process,

conceiving of it as a self-sundering of the Deity, in whom in some way the world was always contained (Schurman, *Belief in God*, 140). Knight, *Studies in Philos. and Lit.*, 84, quotes from Byron's *Cain*, I:1—"Let him sit on his vast and solitary throne, Creating worlds, to make eternity less burdensome to his immense existence And unparticipated solitude. . . . He, so wretched in his height, So restless in his wretchedness, must still Create and recreate." Byron puts these words into the mouth of Lucifer. Yet Knight, in his *Essays in Philosophy*, 143, 227, regards the universe as the everlasting effect of an eternal Cause. Dualism, he thinks, is involved in the very notion of a search for God.

W. N. Clarke, *Christian Theology*, 117—"God is the source of the universe. Whether by immediate production at some point of time, so that after he had existed alone there came by his act to be a universe, or by perpetual production from his own spiritual being, so that his eternal existence was always accompanied by a universe in some stage of being, God has brought the universe into existence. . . . Any method in which the independent God could produce a universe which without him could have had no existence, is accordant with the teachings of Scripture. Many find it easier philosophically to hold that God has eternally brought forth creation from himself, so that there has never been a time when there was not a universe in some stage of existence, than to think of an instantaneous creation of all existing things when there had been nothing but God before. Between these two views theology is not compelled to decide, provided we believe that God is a free Spirit greater than the universe." We dissent from this conclusion of Dr. Clarke, and hold that Scripture requires us to trace the universe back to a beginning, while reason itself is better satisfied with this view than it can be with the theory of creation from eternity.

(a) Creation from eternity is not necessitated by God's omnipotence. Omnipotence does not necessarily imply actual creation; it implies only power to create. Creation, moreover, is in the nature of the case a thing begun. Creation from eternity is a contradiction in terms, and that which is self-contradictory is not an object of power.

The argument rests upon a misconception of eternity, regarding it as a prolongation of time into the endless past. We have seen in our discussion of eternity as an attribute of God, that eternity is not endless time, or time without beginning, but rather superiority to the law of time. Since eternity is no more past than it is present, the idea of creation from eternity is an irrational one. We must distinguish *creation in eternity past* (= God and the world coeternal, yet God the cause of the world, as he is the begetter of the Son) from *continuous creation* (which is an explanation of preservation, but not of creation at all). It is this latter, not the former, to which Rothe holds (see under the doctrine of Preservation, pages 415, 416). Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 81, 82—"Creation is not from eternity, since past eternity cannot be actually traversed any more than we can reach the bound of an eternity to come. There was no *time* before creation, because there was no *succession*."

Birks, *Scripture Doctrine of Creation*, 78-106—"The first verse of Genesis excludes five speculative falsehoods: 1. that there is nothing but uncreated matter; 2. that there is no God distinct from his creatures; 3. that creation is a series of acts without a beginning; 4. that there is no real universe; 5. that nothing can be known of God or the origin of things." Veitch, *Knowing and Being*, 22—"The ideas of creation and creative energy are emptied of meaning, and for them is substituted the conception or fiction of an eternally related or double-sided world, not of what has been, but of what always is. It is another form of the see-saw philosophy. The eternal Self only is, if the eternal manifold is; the eternal manifold is, if the eternal Self is. The one, in being the other, is or makes itself the one; the other, in being the one, is or makes itself the other. This may be called a unity; it is rather, if we might invent a term suited to the new and marvellous conception, an unparalleled and unbegotten twinity."

(b) Creation from eternity is not necessitated by God's timelessness. Because God is free from the law of time it does not follow that creation is free from that law. Rather is it true that no eternal creation is conceivable, since this involves an infinite number. Time must have had a beginning, and since the universe and time are coexistent, creation could not have been from eternity.

Jude 25—"Before all time"—implies that time had a beginning, and Eph. 1:4—"before the foundation of the world"—implies that creation itself had a beginning. Is creation infinite? No, says Dörner, *Glaubenslehre*, 1:459, because to a perfect creation unity is as necessary as multiplicity. The universe is an organism, and there can be no organism without a definite number of parts. For a similar reason Dörner, *System Doctrine*, 2:28, denies that the universe can be eternal. Granting on the one hand that the world though eternal might be dependent upon God and as soon as the plan was evolved there might be no reason why the execution should be delayed, yet on the other hand the absolutely limitless is the imperfect and no universe with an infinite number of parts is conceivable or possible. So Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 1:230-225—"What has a goal or end must have a beginning; history, as teleological, implies creation."

Lotze, *Philos. Religion*, 74—"The world, with respect to its existence as well as its content, is completely dependent on the will of God, and not as a mere involuntary development of his nature. . . . The word 'creation' ought not to be used to designate a deed of God so much as the absolute dependence of the world on his will." So Schurman, *Belief in God*, 146, 156, 225—"Creation is the eternal dependence of the world on God. . . . Nature is the externalization of spirit. . . . Material things exist simply as modes of the divine activity; they have no existence for themselves." On this view that God is the Ground but not the Creator of the world, see Hovey, *Studies in Ethics and Religion*, 23-56—"Creation is no more of a mystery than is the causal action" in which both Lotze and Schurman believe. "To deny that divine power can originate real being—can add to the sum total of existence—is much like saying that such power is finite." No one can prove that "it is of the essence of spirit to reveal itself," or if so, that it must do this by means of an organism or externalization. Eternal succession of changes in nature is no more comprehensible than are a creating God and a universe originating in time."

(c) Creation from eternity is not necessitated by God's immutability. His immutability requires, not an eternal creation, but only an eternal plan of creation. The opposite principle would compel us to deny the possibility of miracles, incarnation, and regeneration. Like creation, these too would need to be eternal.

We distinguish between idea and plan, between plan and execution. Much of God's plan is not yet executed. The beginning of its execution is as easy to conceive as is the continuation of its execution. But the beginning of the execution of God's plan is creation. Active will is an element in creation. God's will is not always active. He waits for "the fulness of the time" (Gal. 4:4) before he sends forth his Son. As we can trace back Christ's earthly life to a beginning, so we can trace back the life of the universe to a beginning. Those who hold to creation from eternity usually interpret Gen. 1:1—"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," and John 1:1—"In the beginning was the Word," as both and alike meaning "in eternity." But neither of these texts has this meaning. In each we are simply carried back to the beginning of the creation, and it is asserted that God was its author and that the Word already was.

(d) Creation from eternity is not necessitated by God's love. Creation is finite and cannot furnish perfect satisfaction to the infinite love of God. God has moreover from eternity an object of love infinitely superior to any possible creation, in the person of his Son.

Since all things are created in Christ, the eternal Word, Reason, and Power of God, God can "reconcile all things to himself" in Christ (Col. 1:20). Athanasius called God *κρίστης*, *οὐκ ἐργάτης*—Creator, not Artisan. By this he meant that God is immanent, and not the God of deism. But the moment we conceive of God as revealing himself in Christ, the idea of creation as an eternal satisfaction of his love vanishes. God can have a plan without executing his plan. Decree can precede creation. Ideas of the universe may exist in the divine mind before they are realized by the divine will. There are purposes of salvation in Christ which antedate the world (Eph. 1:4). The doctrine of the Trinity, once firmly grasped, enables us to see the fallacy of such views as that of Pfleiderer, *Philos. Religion*, 1:286—"A beginning and ending in time of the creating of God are not thinkable. That would be to suppose a change of creating and resting in God, which would equalize God's being with the changeable course of human life. Nor

could it be conceived what should have hindered God from creating the world up to the beginning of his creating. . . . We say rather, with Scotus Erigena, that the divine creating is equally eternal with God's being."

(e) Creation from eternity, moreover, is inconsistent with the divine independence and personality. Since God's power and love are infinite, a creation that satisfied them must be infinite in extent as well as eternal in past duration — in other words, a creation equal to God. But a God thus dependent upon external creation is neither free nor sovereign. A God existing in necessary relations to the universe, if different in substance from the universe, must be the God of dualism; if of the same substance with the universe, must be the God of pantheism.

Gore, *Incarnation*, 136, 137 — "Christian theology is the harmony of pantheism and deism. . . . It enjoys all the riches of pantheism without its inherent weakness on the moral side, without making God dependent on the world, as the world is dependent on God. On the other hand, Christianity converts an unintelligible deism into a rational theism. It can explain how God became a creator in time, because it knows how creation has its eternal analogue in the uncreated nature; it was God's nature eternally to produce, to communicate itself, to live." In other words, it can explain how God can be eternally alive, independent, self-sufficient, since he is Trinity. Creation from eternity is a natural and logical outgrowth of Unitarian tendencies in theology. It is of a piece with the Stoic monism of which we read in Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, 177 — "Stoic monism conceived of the world as a self-evolution of God. Into such a conception the idea of a beginning does not necessarily enter. It is consistent with the idea of an eternal process of differentiation. That which is always has been under changed and changing forms. The theory is cosmological rather than cosmogonical. It rather explains the world as it is, than gives an account of its origin."

#### 4. *Spontaneous generation.*

This theory holds that creation is but the name for a natural process still going on, — matter itself having in it the power, under proper conditions, of taking on new functions, and of developing into organic forms. This view is held by Owen and Bastian. We object that

(a) It is a pure hypothesis, not only unverified, but contrary to all known facts. No credible instance of the production of living forms from inorganic material has yet been adduced. So far as science can at present teach us, the law of nature is "omne vivum e vivo," or "ex ovo."

Owen, *Comparative Anatomy of the Vertebrates*, 3:314-318 — on Monogeny or Thaumatomy; quoted in Argyle, *Reign of Law*, 281 — "We discern no evidence of a pause or intromission in the creation or coming-to-be of new plants and animals." So Bastian, *Modes of Origin of Lowest Organisms, Beginnings of Life*, and articles on Heterogeneous Evolution of Living Things, in *Nature*, 2:170, 193, 219, 410, 431. See Huxley's Address before the British Association, and Reply to Bastian, in *Nature*, 2:400, 473; also *Origin of Species*, 69-70, and *Physical Basis of Life*, in *Lay Sermons*, 142. Answers to this last by Stirling, in *Half-hours with Modern Scientists*, and by Beale, *Protoplasm or Life, Matter, and Mind*, 73-75.

In favor of Redi's maxim, "omne vivum e vivo," see Huxley, in *Encyc. Britannica*, art.: *Biology*, 689 — "At the present moment there is not a shadow of trustworthy direct evidence that abiogenesis does take place or has taken place within the period during which the existence of the earth is recorded"; Flint, *Physiology of Man*, 1:263-265 — "As the only true philosophic view to take of the question, we shall assume in common with nearly all the modern writers on physiology that there is no such thing as spontaneous generation, — admitting that the exact mode of production of the infusoria lowest in the scale of life is not understood." On the *Philosophy of Evolution*, see A. H. Strong, *Philosophy and Religion*, 33-37.

(b) If such instances could be authenticated, they would prove nothing as against a proper doctrine of creation, — for there would still exist an impossibility of accounting for these vivific properties of matter, except upon the Scriptural view of an intelligent Contriver and Originator of matter and its laws. In short, evolution implies previous involution, — if anything comes out of matter, it must first have been put in.

Sully: "Every doctrine of evolution must assume some definite initial arrangement which is supposed to contain the possibilities of the order which we find to be evolved and no other possibility." Hixby, *Crisis of Morals*, 233 — "If no creative fiat can be believed to create something out of nothing, still less is evolution able to perform such a contradiction." As we can get morality only out of a moral germ, so we can get vitality only out of a vital germ. Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, 14 — "By brooding long enough on an egg that is next to nothing, you can in this way hatch any universe actual or possible. Is it not evident that this is a mere trick of imagination, concealing its thefts of causation by committing them little by little, and taking the heap from the divine storehouse grain by grain?"

Hens come before eggs. Perfect organic forms are antecedent to all life-cells, whether animal or vegetable. "Omnis cellula e cellula, sed primaria cellula ex organismo." God created first the tree, and its seed was in it when created (Gen. 1:11). Protoplasm is not *proton*, but *deuteron*; the elements are antecedent to it. It is not true that man was never made at all but only "grewed" like Topsy; see Watts, *New Apologetic*, xvi, 312. Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, 273 — "Evolution is the attempt to comprehend the world of experience in terms of the fundamental idealistic postulates: (1) without ideas, there is no reality; (2) rational order requires a rational Being to introduce it; (3) beneath our conscious self there must be an infinite Self. The question is: Has the world a meaning? It is not enough to refer ideas to mechanism. Evolution, from the nebula to man, is only the unfolding of the life of a divine Self."

(c) This theory, therefore, if true, only supplements the doctrine of original, absolute, immediate creation, with another doctrine of mediate and derivative creation, or the development of the materials and forces originated at the beginning. This development, however, cannot proceed to any valuable end without guidance of the same intelligence which initiated it. The Scriptures, although they do not sanction the doctrine of spontaneous generation, do recognize processes of development as supplementing the divine fiat which first called the elements into being.

There is such a thing as free will, and free will does not, like the deterministic will, run in a groove. If there be free will in man, then much more is there free will in God, and God's will does not run in a groove. God is not bound by law or to law. Wisdom does not imply monotony or uniformity. God can do a thing once that is never done again. Circumstances are never twice alike. Here is the basis not only of creation but of new creation, including miracle, incarnation, resurrection, regeneration, redemption. Though will both in God and in man is for the most part automatic and acts according to law, yet the power of new beginnings, of creative action, resides in will, wherever it is free, and this free will chiefly makes God to be God and man to be man. Without it life would be hardly worth the living, for it would be only the life of the brute. All schemes of evolution which ignore this freedom of God are pantheistic in their tendencies, for they practically deny both God's transcendence and his personality.

Leibnitz declined to accept the Newtonian theory of gravitation because it seemed to him to substitute natural forces for God. In our own day many still refuse to accept the Darwinian theory of evolution because it seems to them to substitute natural forces for God; see John Fiske, *Idea of God*, 97-102. But law is only a method; it presupposes a lawgiver and requires an agent. Gravitation and evolution are but the habitual operations of God. If spontaneous generation should be proved true, it would be only God's way of originating life. E. G. Robinson, *Christian Theology*, 91 — "Spontaneous generation does not preclude the idea of a creative will working by natural law and secondary causes. . . . Of beginnings of life physical science knows nothing. . . . Of the processes of nature science is competent to speak and against its

teachings respecting these there is no need that theology should set itself in hostility. . . . Even if man were derived from the lower animals, it would not prove that God did not create and order the forces employed. It may be that God bestowed upon animal life a plastic power."

Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 1: 190 — "It is far truer to say that the universe is a life, than to say that it is a mechanism. . . . We can never get to God through a mere mechanism. . . . With Leibnitz I would argue that absolute passivity or inertness is not a reality but a limit. 269 — Mr. Spencer grants that to interpret spirit in terms of matter is impossible. 303 — Natural selection without teleological factors is not adequate to account for biological evolution, and such teleological factors imply a psychical something endowed with feelings and will, & c., *Life and Mind*. 2: 130-135 — Causation is more fundamental than cognition. 149-151 — Things and events precede space and time. There is no empty space or time. 253-257 — Our assimilation of nature is the greeting of spirit by spirit. 269-277 — Either nature is itself intelligent, or there is intelligence beyond it. 274-276 — Appearances do not veil reality. 274 — The truth is not God and mechanism, but God *only* and no mechanism. 288 — Naturalism and Agnosticism, in spite of themselves, lead us to a world of Spiritualistic Monism." Newman Smyth, *Christian Ethics*, 24 — "Spontaneous generation is a fiction in ethics, as it is in psychology and biology. The moral cannot be derived from the non-moral, any more than consciousness can be derived from the unconscious, or life from the azoic rocks."

#### IV. THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF CREATION.

1. *Its twofold nature*, — as uniting the ideas of creation and of development.

(a) Creation is asserted. — The Mosaic narrative avoids the error of making the universe eternal or the result of an eternal process. The cosmogony of Genesis, unlike the cosmogonies of the heathen, is prefaced by the originating act of God, and is supplemented by successive manifestations of creative power in the introduction of brute and of human life.

All nature-worship, whether it take the form of ancient polytheism or modern materialism, looks upon the universe only as a birth or growth. This view has a basis of truth, inasmuch as it regards natural forces as having a real existence. It is false in regarding these forces as needing no originator or upholder. Hesiod taught that in the beginning was formless matter. Genesis does not begin thus. God is not a demiurge, working on eternal matter. God antedates matter. He is the creator of matter at the first (*Gen. 1: 1* — *bara*) and he subsequently created animal life (*Gen. 1: 21* — "and God created" — *bara*) and the life of man (*Gen. 1: 27* — "and God created man" — *bara* again).

Many statements of the doctrine of evolution err by regarding it as an eternal or self-originated process. But the process requires an originator, and the forces require an upholder. Each forward step implies increment of energy, and progress toward a rational end implies intelligence and foresight in the governing power. Schurman says well that Darwinism explains the *survival* of the fittest, but cannot explain the *arrival* of the fittest. Schurman, *Agnosticism and Religion*, 24 — "A primitive chaos of star-dust which held in its womb not only the cosmos that fills space, not only the living creatures that teem upon it, but also the intellect that interprets it, the will that confronts it, and the conscience that transfigures it, must as certainly have God at the centre, as a universe mechanically arranged and periodically adjusted must have him at the circumference. . . . There is no real antagonism between creation and evolution. 59 — Natural causation is the expression of a supernatural Mind in nature, and man — a being at once of sensibility and of rational and moral self-activity — is a signal and ever-present example of the interfusion of the natural with the supernatural in that part of universal existence nearest and best known to us."

Seebohm, quoted in J. J. Murphy, *Nat. Selection and Spir. Freedom*, 76 — "When we admit that Darwin's argument in favor of the theory of evolution proves its truth, we doubt whether natural selection can be in any sense the *cause* of the origin of species. It has probably played an important part in the history of evolution; its rôle has been that of increasing the rapidity with which the process of development has proceeded. Of itself it has probably been powerless to originate a species; the machinery by which species have been evolved has been completely independent of natural selec-

tion and could have produced all the results which we call the evolution of species without its aid; though the process would have been slow had there been no struggle of life to increase its pace." *New World*, June, 1896:237-262, art. by Howison on the Limits of Evolution, finds limits in (1) the noumenal Reality; (2) the break between the organic and the inorganic; (3) break between physiological and logical genesis; (4) inability to explain the great fact on which its own movement rests; (5) the *a priori* self-consciousness which is the essential being and true person of the mind.

Evolution, according to Herbert Spencer, is "an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion goes through a parallel transformation." D. W. Simon criticizes this definition as defective "because (1) it omits all mention both of energy and its differentiations; and (2) because it introduces into the definition of the process one of the phenomena thereof, namely, motion. As a matter of fact, both energy or force, and law, are subsequently and illicitly introduced as distinct factors of the process: they ought therefore to have found recognition in the definition or description." Mark Hopkins, *Life*, 189—"God: what need of him? Have we not force, uniform force, and do not all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation, if it ever had a beginning? Have we not the *πᾶσι*, the universal All, the Soul of the universe, working itself up from unconsciousness through molecules and maggots and mice and marmots and monkeys to its highest culmination in man?"

(δ) Development is recognized.—The Mosaic account represents the present order of things as the result, not simply of original creation, but also of subsequent arrangement and development. A fashioning of inorganic materials is described, and also a use of these materials in providing the conditions of organized existence. Life is described as reproducing itself, after its first introduction, according to its own laws and by virtue of its own inner energy.

Martensen wrongly asserts that "Judaism represented the world exclusively as *creatura*, not *natura*; as *κρίσις*, not *φύσις*." This is not true. Creation is represented as the bringing forth, not of something dead, but of something living and capable of self-development. Creation lays the foundation for cosmogony. Not only is there a fashioning and arrangement of the material which the original creative act has brought into being (see Gen. 1:2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 16, 17; 2:2, 6, 7, 8—Spirit brooding; dividing light from darkness, and waters from waters; dry land appearing; setting apart of sun, moon, and stars; mist watering; forming man's body; planting garden) but there is also an imparting and using of the productive powers of the things and beings created (Gen. 1:12, 22, 24, 25—earth brought forth grass; trees yielding fruit whose seed was in itself; earth brought forth the living creatures; man commanded to be fruitful and multiply).

The tendency at present among men of science is to regard the whole history of life upon the planet as the result of evolution, thus excluding creation, both at the beginning of the history and along its course. On the progress from the *Orohippus*, the lowest member of the equine series, an animal with four toes, to *Anchitherium* with three, then to *Hipparion*, and finally to our common horse, see Huxley, in *Nature* for May 11, 1873:33, 34. He argues that, if a complicated animal like the horse has arisen by gradual modification of a lower and less specialized form, there is no reason to think that other animals have arisen in a different way. Clarence King, Address at Yale College, 1877, regards American geology as teaching the doctrine of sudden yet natural modification of species. "When catastrophic change burst in upon the ages of uniformity and sounded in the ear of every living thing the words: 'Change or die!' plasticity became the sole principle of action." Nature proceeded then by leaps, and corresponding to the leaps of geology we find leaps of biology.

We grant the probability that the great majority of what we call species were produced in some such ways. If science should render it certain that all the present species of living creatures were derived by natural descent from a few original germs, and that these germs were themselves an evolution of inorganic forces and materials, we should not therefore regard the Mosaic account as proved untrue. We should only be required to revise our interpretation of the word *bara* in Gen. 1:21, 27, and to give it there the meaning of mediate creation, or creation by law. Such a meaning might almost seem to be favored by Gen. 1:11—"let the earth put forth grass"; 20—"let the waters bring forth aban-

handy the moving creature that hath life"; 2:7—"the Lord God formed man of the dust"; 9—"out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree"; cf. Mark 4:28—*αὐτοὶ ἄρα ἡ γῆ καρποφορεῖ*—"the earth brings forth fruit automatically." Goethe, Sprüche in Reimen: "Was wär ein Gott der nur von aussen stiesse, Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen liesse? Ihm ziemt's die Welt im Innern zu bewegen, Sich in Natur, Natur in sich zu hegen, So dass, was in Ihm lebt und webt und ist, Nie seine Kraft, nie seinen Geist vermisst"—"No, such a God my worship may not win, Who lets the world about his finger spin, A thing eternal; God must dwell within."

All the growth of a tree takes place in from four to six weeks in May, June and July. The addition of woody fibre between the bark and the trunk results, not by impartation into it of a new force from without, but by the awakening of the life within. Environment changes and growth begins. We may even speak of an immanent transcendence of God—an unexhausted vitality which at times makes great movements forward. This is what the ancients were trying to express when they said that trees were inhabited by dryads and so groaned and bled when wounded. God's life is in all. In evolution we cannot say, with LeConte, that the higher form of energy is "derived from the lower." Rather let us say that both the higher and the lower are constantly dependent for their being on the will of God. The lower is only God's preparation for his higher self-manifestation; see Upton, Hibbert Lectures, 165, 166.

Even Haeckel, Hist. Creation, 1:38, can say that in the Mosaic narrative "two great and fundamental ideas meet us—the idea of separation or differentiation, and the idea of progressive development or perfecting. We can bestow our just and sincere admiration on the Jewish lawgiver's grand insight into nature, and his simple and natural hypothesis of creation, without discovering in it a divine revelation." Henry Drummond, whose first book, Natural Law in the Spiritual World, he himself in his later days regretted as tending in a deterministic and materialistic direction, came to believe rather in "spiritual law in the natural world." His Ascent of Man regards evolution and law as only the methods of a present Deity. Darwinism seemed at first to show that the past history of life upon the planet was a history of heartless and cruel slaughter. The survival of the fittest had for its obverse side the destruction of myriads. Nature was "red in tooth and claw with ravine." But further thought has shown that this gloomy view results from a partial induction of facts. Palaeontological life was not only a struggle for life, but a struggle for the life of others. The beginnings of altruism are to be seen in the instinct of reproduction and in the care of offspring. In every lion's den and tiger's lair, in every mother-eagle's feeding of her young, there is a self-sacrifice which faintly shadows forth man's subordination of personal interests to the interests of others.

Dr. George Harris, in his Moral Evolution, has added to Drummond's doctrine the further consideration that the struggle for one's own life has its moral side as well as the struggle for the life of others. The instinct of self-preservation is the beginning of right, righteousness, justice and law upon earth. Every creature owes it to God to preserve its own being. So we can find an adumbration of morality even in the predatory and internecine warfare of the geologic ages. The immanent God was even then preparing the way for the rights, the dignity, the freedom of humanity. B. P. Bowne, in the Independent, April 19, 1900—"The Copernican system made men dizzy for a time, and they held on to the Ptolemaic system to escape vertigo. In like manner the conception of God, as revealing himself in a great historic movement and process, in the consciences and lives of holy men, in the unfolding life of the church, makes dizzy the believer in a dictated book, and he longs for some fixed word that shall be sure and steadfast." God is not limited to creating from without: he can also create from within; and development is as much a part of creation as is the origination of the elements. For further discussion of man's origin, see section on Man a Creation of God, in our treatment of Anthropology.

## 2. Its proper interpretation.

We adopt neither (a) the allegorical, or mythical, (b) the hyperliteral, nor (c) the hyperscientific interpretation of the Mosaic narrative; but rather (d) the pictorial-summary interpretation, — which holds that the account is a rough sketch of the history of creation, true in all its essential features, but presented in a graphic form suited to the common mind and to earlier as well as to later ages. While conveying to primitive man as accurate an idea of God's work as man was able to comprehend, the revela-

tion was yet given in pregnant language, so that it could expand to all the ascertained results of subsequent physical research. This general correspondence of the narrative with the teachings of science, and its power to adapt itself to every advance in human knowledge, differentiates it from every other cosmogony current among men.

(a) The *allegorical*, or *mythical interpretation* represents the Mosaic account as embodying, like the Indian and Greek cosmogonies, the poetic speculations of an early race as to the origin of the present system. We object to this interpretation upon the ground that the narrative of creation is inseparably connected with the succeeding history, and is therefore most naturally regarded as itself historical. This connection of the narrative of creation with the subsequent history, moreover, prevents us from believing it to be the description of a vision granted to Moses. It is more probably the record of an original revelation to the first man, handed down to Moses' time, and used by Moses as a proper introduction to his history.

We object also to the view of some higher critics that the book of Genesis contains two inconsistent stories. Marcus Dods, *Book of Genesis*, 2—"The compiler of this book . . . lays side by side two accounts of man's creation which no ingenuity can reconcile." Charles A. Briggs: "The doctrine of creation in Genesis 1 is altogether different from that taught in Genesis 2." W. N. Clarke, *Christian Theology*, 199-201—"It has been commonly assumed that the two are parallel, and tell one and the same story; but examination shows that this is not the case. . . . We have here the record of a tradition, rather than a revelation. . . . It cannot be taken as literal history, and it does not tell by divine authority how man was created." To these utterances we reply that the two accounts are not inconsistent but complementary, the first chapter of Genesis describing man's creation as the crown of God's general work, the second describing man's creation with greater particularity as the beginning of human history.

Canon Rawlinson, in *Aids to Faith*, 275, compares the Mosaic account with the cosmogony of Berosus, the Chaldean. Pfeiderer, *Philos. of Religion*, 1: 267-272, gives an account of heathen theories of the origin of the universe. Anaxagoras was the first who represented the chaotic first matter as formed through the ordering understanding (*noûs*) of God, and Aristotle for that reason called him "the first sober one among many drunken." Schurman, *Belief in God*, 128—"In these cosmogonies the world and the gods grow up together; cosmogony is, at the same time, theogony." Dr. E. G. Robinson: "The Bible writers believed and intended to state that the world was made in three literal days. But, on the principle that God may have meant more than they did, the doctrine of periods may not be inconsistent with their account." For comparison of the Biblical with heathen cosmogonies, see Blackie in *Theol. Eclectic*, 1: 77-87; Guyot, *Creation*, 58-63; Pope, *Theology*, 1: 401, 403; Bible Commentary, 1: 83, 43; Mollvaine, *Wisdom of Holy Scripture*, 1-54; J. F. Clarke, *Ten Great Religions*, 2: 193-221. For the theory of 'prophetic vision,' see Kurtz, *Hist. of Old Covenant*, *Introd.*, i-xxvii, civ-cxxx; and Hugh Miller, *Testimony of the Rocks*, 179-210; *Hastings, Dict. Bible*, art.: *Cosmogony*; Sayce, *Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, 372-397.

(b) The *hyperliteral interpretation* would withdraw the narrative from all comparison with the conclusions of science, by putting the ages of geological history between the first and second verses of Gen. 1, and by making the remainder of the chapter an account of the fitting up of the earth, or of some limited portion of it, in six days of twenty-four hours each. Among the advocates of this view, now generally discarded, are Chalmers, *Natural Theology*, *Works*, 1: 223-253, and John Pye Smith, *Mosaic Account of Creation, and Scripture and Geology*. To this view we object that there is no indication, in the Mosaic narrative, of so vast an interval between the first and the second verses; that there is no indication, in the geological history, of any such break between the ages of preparation and the present time (see Hugh Miller, *Testimony of the Rocks*, 141-175); and that there are indications in the Mosaic record itself that the word "day" is not used in its literal sense; while the other Scriptures unquestionably employ it to designate a period of indefinite duration (Gen. 1: 5—"God called the light Day"—a day before there was a sun; 8—"there was evening and there was morning, a second day"; 2: 2—God "rested on the seventh day"; cf. Heb. 4: 3-10—where God's day of rest seems to continue, and his people are exhorted to enter into it; Gen. 2: 4—"the day that Jehovah made earth and heaven"—"day" here covers all the seven days; cf. Is. 2: 12—"a day of Jehovah of hosts"; Zech. 14: 7—"it shall be one day which is known unto Jehovah; not day, and not night"; 2 Pet. 3: 8—"one day is with the Lord as

a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day"). Guyot, *Creation*, 34, objects also to this interpretation, that the narrative purports to give a history of the making of the heavens as well as of the earth (Gen. 1:4—"these are the generations of the heavens and of the earth"), whereas this interpretation confines the history to the earth. On the meaning of the word "day," as a period of indefinite duration, see Dana, *Manual of Geology*, 744; LeConte, *Religion and Science*, 262.

(c) The *hyperscientific interpretation* would find in the narrative a minute and precise correspondence with the geological record. This is not to be expected, since it is foreign to the purpose of revelation to teach science. Although a general concord between the Mosaic and geological histories may be pointed out, it is a needless embarrassment to compel ourselves to find in every detail of the former an accurate statement of some scientific fact. Far more probable we hold to be

(d) The *pictorial-summary interpretation*. Before explaining this in detail, we would premise that we do not hold this or any future scheme of reconciling Genesis and geology to be a finality. Such a settlement of all the questions involved would presuppose not only a perfected science of the physical universe, but also a perfected science of hermeneutics. It is enough if we can offer tentative solutions which represent the present state of thought upon the subject. Remembering, then, that any such scheme of reconciliation may speedily be outgrown without prejudice to the truth of the Scripture narrative, we present the following as an approximate account of the coincidences between the Mosaic and the geological records. The scheme here given is a combination of the conclusions of Dana and Guyot, and assumes the substantial truth of the nebular hypothesis. It is interesting to observe that Augustine, who knew nothing of modern science, should have reached, by simple study of the text, some of the same results. See his *Confessions*, 12:8—"First God created a chaotic matter, which was next to nothing. This chaotic matter was made from nothing, before all days. Then this chaotic, amorphous matter was subsequently arranged, in the succeeding six days"; *De Genes. ad Lit.*, 4:27—"The length of these days is not to be determined by the length of our week-days. There is a series in both cases, and that is all." We proceed now to the scheme:

1. The earth, if originally in the condition of a gaseous fluid, must have been void and formless as described in *Genesis* 1:2. Here the earth is not yet separated from the condensing nebula, and its fluid condition is indicated by the term "waters."

2. The beginning of activity in matter would manifest itself by the production of light, since light is a resultant of molecular activity. This corresponds to the statement in *verse* 3. As the result of condensation, the nebula becomes luminous, and this process from darkness to light is described as follows: "there was evening and there was morning, one day." Here we have a day without a sun—a feature in the narrative quite consistent with two facts of science: first, that the nebula would naturally be self-luminous, and, secondly, that the earth proper, which reached its present form before the sun, would, when it was thrown off, be itself a self-luminous and molten mass. The day was therefore continuous—day without night.

3. The development of the earth into an independent sphere and its separation from the fluid around it answers to the dividing of "the waters under the firmament from the waters above," in *verse* 7. Here the word "waters" is used to designate the "primordial cosmic material" (Guyot, *Creation*, 35-37), or the molten mass of earth and sun united, from which the earth is thrown off. The term "waters" is the best which the Hebrew language affords to express this idea of a fluid mass. Ps. 148 seems to have this meaning, where it speaks of the "waters that are above the heavens" (*verse* 4)—waters which are distinguished from the "deeps" below (*verse* 7), and the "vapor" above (*verse* 8).

4. The production of the earth's physical features by the partial condensation of the vapors which enveloped the igneous sphere, and by the consequent outlining of the continents and oceans, is next described in *verse* 9 as the gathering of the waters into one place and the appearing of the dry land.

5. The expression of the idea of life in the lowest plants, since it was in type and effect the creation of the vegetable kingdom, is next described in *verse* 11 as a bringing into existence of the characteristic forms of that kingdom. This precedes all mention of animal life, since the vegetable kingdom is the natural basis of the animal. If it be said that our earliest fossils are animal, we reply that the earliest vegetable forms, the *algæ*, were easily dissolved, and might as easily disappear; that graphite and bog-iron ore, appearing lower down than any animal remains, are the result of preceding vegetation; that animal forms, whenever and wherever existing, must subsist upon and presuppose the vegetable. The Eozoön is of necessity preceded by the Eophyte. If it

be said that fruit-trees could not have been created on the third day, we reply that since the creation of the vegetable kingdom was to be described at one stroke and no mention of it was to be made subsequently, this is the proper place to introduce it and to mention its main characteristic forms. See Bible Commentary, 1:36; LeConte, Elements of Geology, 136, 285.

6. The vapors which have hitherto shrouded the planet are now cleared away as preliminary to the introduction of life in its higher animal forms. The consequent appearance of solar light is described in verses 16 and 17 as a making of the sun, moon, and stars, and a giving of them as luminaries to the earth. Compare Gen. 1:13—"I do set my bow in the cloud." As the rainbow had existed in nature before, but was now appointed to serve a peculiar purpose, so in the record of creation sun, moon and stars, which existed before, were appointed as visible lights for the earth,—and that for the reason that the earth was no longer self-luminous, and the light of the sun struggling through the earth's encompassing clouds was not sufficient for the higher forms of life which were to come.

7. The exhibition of the four grand types of the animal kingdom (radiate, molluscan, articulate, vertebrate), which characterizes the next stage of geological progress, is represented in verses 20 and 21 as a creation of the lower animals—those that swarm in the waters, and the creeping and flying species of the land. Huxley, in his American Addresses, objects to this assigning of the origin of birds to the fifth day, and declares that terrestrial animals exist in lower strata than any form of bird,—birds appearing only in the Oolitic, or New Red Sandstone. But we reply that the fifth day is devoted to sea-productions, while land-productions belong to the sixth. Birds, according to the latest science, are sea-productions, not land-productions. They originated from Saurians, and were, at the first, flying lizards. There being but one mention of sea-productions, all these, birds included, are crowded into the fifth day. Thus Genesis anticipates the latest science. On the ancestry of birds, see Pop. Science Monthly, March, 1884: 606; Baptist Magazine, 1877: 505.

8. The introduction of mammals—viviparous species, which are eminent above all other vertebrates for a quality prophetic of a high moral purpose, that of suckling their young—is indicated in verses 24 and 25 by the creation, on the sixth day, of cattle and beasts of prey.

9. Man, the first being of moral and intellectual qualities, and the first in whom the unity of the great design has full expression, forms in both the Mosaic and geologic record the last step of progress in creation (see verses 26-31). With Prof. Dana, we may say that "in this succession we observe not merely an order of events like that deduced from science; there is a system in the arrangement, and a far-reaching prophecy, to which philosophy could not have attained, however instructed." See Dana, Manual of Geology, 741-746, and Bib. Sac., April, 1885: 201-224. Richard Owen: "Man from the beginning of organisms was ideally present upon the earth"; see Owen, Anatomy of Vertebrates, 3:796; Louis Agassiz: "Man is the purpose toward which the whole animal creation tends from the first appearance of the first palaeozoic fish."

Prof. John M. Taylor: "Man is not merely a mortal but a moral being. If he sinks below this plane of life he misses the path marked out for him by all his past development. In order to progress, the higher vertebrate had to subordinate everything to mental development. In order to become human it had to develop the rational intelligence. In order to become higher man, present man must subordinate everything to moral development. This is the great law of animal and human development clearly revealed in the sequence of physical and psychical functions." W. E. Gladstone in S. S. Times, April 28, 1890, calls the Mosaic days "chapters in the history of creation." He objects to calling them epochs or periods, because they are not of equal length, and they sometimes overlap. But he defends the general correspondence of the Mosaic narrative with the latest conclusions of science, and remarks: "Any man whose labor and duty for several scores of years has included as their central point the study of the means of making himself intelligible to the mass of men, is in a far better position to judge what would be the forms and methods of speech proper for the Mosaic writer to adopt, than the most perfect Hebraist as such, or the most consummate votary of physical science as such."

On the whole subject, see Guyot, Creation; Review of Guyot, in N. Eng., July, 1884: 591-594; Taylor Lewis, Six Days of Creation; Thompson, Man in Genesis and in Geology; Agassiz, in Atlantic Monthly, Jan. 1874; Dawson, Story of the Earth and Man, 82, and in Expositor, Apl. 1886; LeConte, Science and Religion, 234; Hill, in Bib. Sac., April, 1875; Peirce, Ideality in the Physical Sciences, 38-72; Boardman, The Creative Week;

Godet, *Bib. Studies of O. T.*, 65-138; Bell, in *Nature*, Nov. 24 and Dec. 1, 1882; W. E. Gladstone, in *Nineteenth Century*, Nov. 1885: 685-707, Jan. 1886: 1, 176; reply by Huxley, in *Nineteenth Century*, Dec. 1885, and Feb. 1886; Schmid, *Theories of Darwin*; Bartlett, *Sources of History in the Pentateuch*, 1-35; Cotterill, *Does Science Aid Faith in regard to Creation?* Cox, *Miracles*, 1-69—chapter I, on the Original Miracle—that of Creation; Zöckler, *Theologie und Naturwissenschaft, and Urgeschichte*, 1-77; Reusch, *Bib. Schöpfungsgeschichte. On difficulties of the nebular hypothesis, see Stallo, Modern Physics*, 277-293.

#### V. GOD'S END IN CREATION.

Infinite wisdom must, in creating, propose to itself the most comprehensive and the most valuable of ends,—the end most worthy of God, and the end most fruitful in good. Only in the light of the end proposed can we properly judge of God's work, or of God's character as revealed therein.

It would seem that Scripture should give us an answer to the question: Why did God create? The great Architect can best tell his own design. Ambrose: "To whom shall I give greater credit concerning God than to God himself?" George A. Gordon, *New Epoch for Faith*, 15—"God is necessarily a being of ends. Teleology is the warp and woof of humanity; it must be in the warp and woof of Deity. Evolutionary science has but strengthened this view. Natural science is but a mean disguise for ignorance if it does not imply cosmical purpose. The movement of life from lower to higher is a movement upon ends. Will is the last account of the universe, and will is the faculty for ends. The moment one concludes that God is, it appears certain that he is a being of ends. The universe is alive with desire and movement. Fundamentally it is throughout an expression of will. And it follows, that the ultimate end of God in human history must be worthy of himself."

In determining this end, we turn first to :

##### 1. *The testimony of Scripture.*

This may be summed up in four statements. God finds his end (*a*) in himself; (*b*) in his own will and pleasure; (*c*) in his own glory; (*d*) in the making known of his power, his wisdom, his holy name. All these statements may be combined in the following, namely, that God's supreme end in creation is nothing outside of himself, but is his own glory—in the revelation, in and through creatures, of the infinite perfection of his own being.

(*a*) Rom. 11:36—"unto him are all things"; Col. 1:16—"all things have been created . . . unto him" (Christ); compare Is. 48:11—"for mine own sake, for mine own sake, will I do it . . . and my glory will I not give to another"; and 1 Cor. 15:23—"subject all things unto him, that God may be all in all." Proverbs 16:4—"not 'The Lord hath made all things for himself' (A. V.) but 'Jehovah hath made every-thing for its own end' (Rev. Vers.)."

(*b*) Eph. 1:5, 9—"having foreordained us . . . according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace . . . mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he purposed in him"; Rev. 4:11—"thou didst create all things, and because of thy will they were, and were created."

(*c*) Is. 43:7—"whom I have created for my glory"; 60:21 and 61:3—the righteousness and blessedness of the redeemed are secured, that "he may be glorified"; Luke 2:14—the angels' song at the birth of Christ expressed the design of the work of salvation: "Glory to God in the highest," and only through, and for its sake, "on earth peace among men in whom he is well pleased."

(*d*) Ps. 148:11—"In thy righteousness bring my soul out of trouble"; Ex. 36:21, 22—"I do not this for your sake . . . but for mine holy name"; 39:7—"my holy name will I make known"; Rom. 9:17—to Pharaoh: "For this very purpose did I raise thee up, that I might show in thee my power, and that my name might be published abroad in all the earth"; 22, 23—"riches of his glory" made known in vessels of wrath, and in vessels of mercy; Eph. 3:9, 10—"created all things; to the intent that now unto the principalities and the powers in the heavenly places might be made known through the church the manifold wisdom of God." See Godet, on *Ultimate Design of Man*; "God in man and man in God," in *Princeton Rev.*, Nov. 1880; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 1: 436, 535, 565, 568. *Per contra*, see Miller, *Fetich in Theology*, 19, 36-45, 86-88, 143-146.

Since holiness is the fundamental attribute in God, to make himself, his own pleasure, his own glory, his own manifestation, to be his end in creation, is to find his chief end in his own holiness, its maintenance, expression, and communication. To make this his chief end, however, is not to exclude certain subordinate ends, such as the revelation of his wisdom, power, and love, and the consequent happiness of innumerable creatures to whom this revelation is made.

God's glory is that which makes him glorious. It is not something without, like the praise and esteem of men, but something within, like the dignity and value of his own attributes. To a noble man, praise is very distasteful unless he is conscious of something in himself that justifies it. We must be like God to be self-respecting. Pythagoras said well: "Man's end is to be like God." And so God must look within, and find his honor and his end in himself. Robert Browning, Hohenstiel-Schwangau: "This is the glory, that in all conceived Or felt or known, I recognize a Mind, Not mine but like mine,—for the double joy Making all things for me, and me for Him." Schurman, *Belief in God*, 214-216—"God glorifies himself in communicating himself." The object of his love is the exercise of his holiness. Self-affirmation conditions self-communication.

E. G. Robinson, *Christian Theology*, 94, 196—"Law and gospel are only two sides of the one object, the highest glory of God in the highest good of man . . . Nor is it unworthy of God to make himself his own end: (a) It is both unworthy and criminal for a finite being to make himself his own end, because it is an end that can be reached only by degrading self and wronging others; but (b) For an infinite Creator not to make himself his own end would be to dishonor himself and wrong his creatures; since, thereby, (c) he must either act without an end, which is irrational, or from an end which is impossible without wronging his creatures; because (d) the highest welfare of his creatures, and consequently their happiness, is impossible except through the subordination and conformity of their wills to that of their infinitely perfect Ruler; and (e) without this highest welfare and happiness of his creatures God's own end itself becomes impossible, for he is glorified only as his character is reflected in, and recognized by, his intelligent creatures." Creation can add nothing to the essential wealth or worthiness of God. If the end were outside himself, it would make him dependent and a servant. The old theologians therefore spoke of God's "declarative glory," rather than God's "essential glory," as resulting from man's obedience and salvation.

## 2. *The testimony of reason.*

That his own glory, in the sense just mentioned, is God's supreme end in creation, is evident from the following considerations:

(a) God's own glory is the only end actually and perfectly attained in the universe. Wisdom and omnipotence cannot choose an end which is destined to be forever unattained; for "what his soul desireth, even that he doeth" (Job 23:18). God's supreme end cannot be the happiness of creatures, since many are miserable here and will be miserable forever. God's supreme end cannot be the holiness of creatures, for many are unholy here and will be unholy forever. But while neither the holiness nor the happiness of creatures is actually and perfectly attained, God's glory is made known and will be made known in both the saved and the lost. This then must be God's supreme end in creation.

This doctrine teaches us that none can frustrate God's plan. God will get glory out of every human life. Man may glorify God voluntarily by love and obedience, but if he will not do this he will be compelled to glorify God by his rejection and punishment. Better be the molten iron that runs freely into the mold prepared by the great Designer, than be the hard and cold iron that must be hammered into shape. Cleanthes, quoted by Seneca: "Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt." W. O. Wilkinson, *Epistle of Paul*, 271—"But some are tools, and others ministers, Of God, who works his holy will with all." Christ baptizes "in the Holy Spirit and in fire" (Mat. 3:11). Alexander

McLaren: "There are two fires, to one or other of which we must be delivered. Either we shall gladly accept the purifying fire of the Spirit which burns sin out of us, or we shall have to meet the punitive fire which burns up us and our sins together. To be cleansed by the one or to be consumed by the other is the choice before each one of us." Here, Mission of the Comforter, on John 16:8, shows that the Holy Spirit either convinces those who yield to his influence, or convicts those who resist -- the word *ἀεὶ* having this double significance.

(b) God's glory is the end intrinsically most valuable. The good of creatures is of insignificant importance compared with this. Wisdom dictates that the greater interest should have precedence of the less. Because God can choose no greater end, he must choose for his end himself. But this is to choose his holiness, and his glory in the manifestation of that holiness.

Is. 40:15, 16--"Behold, the nations are as a drop of a bucket, and are counted as the small dust of the balance" -- like the drop that falls unobserved from the bucket, like the fine dust of the scales which the tradesman takes no notice of in weighing, so are all the combined millions of earth and heaven before God. He created, and he can in an instant destroy. The universe is but a drop of dew upon the fringe of his garment. It is more important that God should be glorified than that the universe should be happy. As we read in Job. 6:13 -- "since he could swear by some greater, he swears by himself" -- so here we may say: Because he could choose no greater end in creating, he chose himself. But to swear by himself is to swear by his holiness (Ps. 89:35). We infer that to find his end in himself is to find that end in his holiness. See Martineau on Malebranche, in *Types*, 177.

The stick or the stone does not exist for itself, but for some consciousness. The soul of man exists in part for itself. But it is conscious that in a more important sense it exists for God. "Modern thought," it is said, "worships and serves the creature more than the Creator; indeed, the chief end of the Creator seems to be to glorify man and to enjoy him forever." So the small boy said his Catechism: "Man's chief end is to glorify God and to annoy him forever." Prof. Clifford: "The kingdom of God is obsolete; the kingdom of man has now come." All this is the insanity of sin. *Per contra*, see Allen, Jonathan Edwards, 229, 230--"Two things are plain in Edwards's doctrine: first, that God cannot love anything other than himself: he is so great, so preponderating an amount of being, that what is left is hardly worth considering; secondly, so far as God has any love for the creature, it is because he is himself diffused therein: the fulness of his own essence has overflowed into an outer world, and that which he loves in created beings is his essence imparted to them." But we would add that Edwards does not say they are themselves of the essence of God; see his Works, 3: 216, 211.

(c) His own glory is the only end which consists with God's independence and sovereignty. Every being is dependent upon whomsoever or whatsoever he makes his ultimate end. If anything in the creature is the last end of God, God is dependent upon the creature. But since God is dependent only on himself, he must find in himself his end.

To create is not to increase his blessedness, but only to reveal it. There is no need or deficiency which creation supplies. The creatures who derive all from him can add nothing to him. All our worship is only the rendering back to him of that which is his own. He notices us only for his own sake and not because our little rivulets of praise add anything to the ocean-like fulness of his joy. For his own sake, and not because of our misery or our prayers, he redeems and exalts us. To make our pleasure and welfare his ultimate end would be to abdicate his throne. He creates, therefore, only for his own sake and for the sake of his glory. To this reasoning the London Spectator replies: "The glory of God is the splendor of a manifestation, not the intrinsic splendor manifested. The splendor of a manifestation, however, consists in the effect of the manifestation on those to whom it is given. Precisely because the manifestation of God's goodness can be useful to us and cannot be useful to him, must its manifestation be intended for our sake and not for his sake. We gain everything by it -- he nothing, except so far as it is his own will that we should gain what he desires to bestow upon

us." In this last clause we find the acknowledgment of weakness in the theory that God's supreme end is the good of his creatures. God does not gain the fulfilment of his plan, the doing of his will, the manifestation of himself. The great painter loves his picture less than he loves his ideal. He paints in order to express himself. God loves each soul which he creates, but he loves yet more the expression of his own perfections in it. And this self-expression is his end. Robert Browning, *Paracelsus*, 54—"God is the perfect Poet, Who in creation acts his own conceptions." Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 1:357, 358; Shairp, *Province of Poetry*, 11, 12.

God's love makes him a self-expressing being. Self-expression is an inborn impulse in his creatures. All genius partakes of this characteristic of God. Sin substitutes concealment for outflow, and stops this self-communication which would make the good of each the good of all. Yet even sin cannot completely prevent it. The wicked man is impelled to confess. By natural law the secrets of all hearts will be made manifest at the judgment. Regeneration restores the freedom and joy of self-manifestation. Christianity and confession of Christ are inseparable. The preacher is simply a Christian further advanced in this divine privilege. We need utterance. Prayer is the most complete self-expression, and God's presence is the only land of perfectly free speech.

The great poet comes nearest, in the realm of secular things, to realizing this privilege of the Christian. No great poet ever wrote his best work for money, or for fame, or even for the sake of doing good. Hawthorne was half-humorous and only partially sincere, when he said he would never have written a page except for pay. The hope of pay may have set his pen a-going, but only love for his work could have made that work what it is. Motley more truly declared that it was all up with a writer when he began to consider the money he was to receive. But Hawthorne needed the money to live on, while Motley had a rich father and uncle to back him. The great writer certainly absorbs himself in his work. With him necessity and freedom combine. He sings as the bird sings, without dogmatic intent. Yet he is great in proportion as he is moral and religious at heart. "Arma virumque cano" is the only first person singular in the *Aeneid* in which the author himself speaks, yet the whole *Aeneid* is a revelation of Virgil. So we know little of Shakespeare's life, but much of Shakespeare's genius.

Nothing is added to the tree when it blossoms and bears fruit; it only reveals its own inner nature. But we must distinguish in man his true nature from his false nature. Not his private peculiarities, but that in him which is permanent and universal, is the real treasure upon which the great poet draws. Longfellow: "He is the greatest artist then, Whether of pencil or of pen, Who follows nature. Never man, as artist or as artizan, Pursuing his own fantasies, Can touch the human heart or please, Or satisfy our nobler needs." Tennyson, after observing the subaqueous life of a brook, exclaimed: "What an imagination God has!" Caird, *Philos. Religion*, 245—"The world of finite intelligences, though distinct from God, is still in its ideal nature one with him. That which God creates, and by which he reveals the hidden treasures of his wisdom and love, is still not foreign to his own infinite life, but one with it. In the knowledge of the minds that know him, in the self-surrender of the hearts that love him, it is no paradox to affirm that he knows and loves himself."

(d) His own glory is an end which comprehends and secures, as a subordinate end, every interest of the universe. The interests of the universe are bound up in the interests of God. There is no holiness or happiness for creatures except as God is absolute sovereign, and is recognized as such. It is therefore not selfishness, but benevolence, for God to make his own glory the supreme object of creation. Glory is not vain-glory, and in expressing his ideal, that is, in expressing himself, in his creation, he communicates to his creatures the utmost possible good.

This self-expression is not selfishness but benevolence. As the true poet forgets himself in his work, so God does not manifest himself for the sake of what he can make by it. Self-manifestation is an end in itself. But God's self-manifestation comprises all good to his creatures. We are bound to love ourselves and our own interests just in proportion to the value of those interests. The monarch of a realm or the general of an army must be careful of his life, because the sacrifice of it may involve the loss of thousands of lives of soldiers or subjects. So God is the heart of the great system. Only by being tributary to the heart can the members be supplied with streams of

holiness and happiness. And so for only one Being in the universe is it safe to live for himself. Man should not live for himself, because there is a higher end. But there is no higher end for God. "Only one being in the universe is excepted from the duty of subordination. Man must be subject to the 'higher powers' (Rom. 13:1). But there are no higher powers to God." See Park, Discourses, 181-208.

Bismarck's motto: "Ohne Kaiser, kein Reich"—"Without an emperor, there can be no empire"—applies to God, as Von Moltke's motto: "Erst wägen, dann wagen"—"First weigh, then dare"—applies to man. Edwards, Works, 2:215—"Selfishness is no otherwise vicious or unbecoming than as one is less than a multitude. The public weal is of greater value than his particular interest. It is fit and suitable that God should value himself infinitely more than his creatures." Shakespeare, Hamlet, 3:3—"The single and peculiar life is bound With all the strength and armor of the mind To keep itself from noyance; but much more That spirit upon whose weal depends and rests The lives of many. The cease of majesty Dies not alone, but like a gulf doth draw What's near it with it: it is a massy wheel Fixed on the summit of the highest mount, To whose huge spokes ten thousand lesser things Are mortis'd and adjoined; which, when it falls, Each small annexment, petty consequence, Attends the bolsterous ruin. Never alone did the king sigh, But with a general groan."

(e) God's glory is the end which in a right moral system is proposed to creatures. This must therefore be the end which he in whose image they are made proposes to himself. He who constitutes the centre and end of all his creatures must find his centre and end in himself. This principle of moral philosophy, and the conclusion drawn from it, are both explicitly and implicitly taught in Scripture.

The beginning of all religion is the choosing of God's end as our end—the giving up of our preference of happiness, and the entrance upon a life devoted to God. That happiness is not the ground of moral obligation, is plain from the fact that there is no happiness in seeking happiness. That the holiness of God is the ground of moral obligation, is plain from the fact that the search after holiness is not only successful in itself, but brings happiness also in its train. Archbishop Leighton, Works, 685—"It is a wonderful instance of wisdom and goodness that God has so connected his own glory with our happiness, that we cannot properly intend the one, but that the other must follow as a matter of course, and our own felicity is at last resolved into his eternal glory." That God will certainly secure the end for which he created, his own glory, and that his end is our end, is the true source of comfort in affliction, of strength in labor, of encouragement in prayer. See Psalm 25:11—"For thy name's sake . . . Pardon mine iniquity, for it is great"; 115:1—"Not unto us, O Jehovah, not unto us, But unto thy name give glory"; Mat. 6:33—"Seek ye first his kingdom, and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you"; 1 Cor. 10:31—"Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God"; 1 Pet. 2:9—"ye are an elect race . . . that ye may show forth the excellencies of him who called you out of darkness into his marvelous light"; 4:11—"speaking, ministering, 'that in all things God may be glorified through Jesus Christ, whose is the glory and the dominion for ever and ever. Amen.'" On the whole subject, see Edwards, Works, 2:188-257; Janet, Final Causes, 442-455; Princeton Theol. Essays, 2:15-32; Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 358-362.

It is a duty to make the most of ourselves, but only for God's sake. Jer. 45:5—"seekest thou great things for thyself? seek them not!" But it is nowhere forbidden us to seek great things for God. Rather we are to "desire earnestly the greater gifts" (1 Cor. 12:31). Self-realization as well as self-expression is native to humanity. Kant: "Man, and with him every rational creature, is an end in himself." But this seeking of his own good is to be subordinated to the higher motive of God's glory. The difference between the regenerate and the unregenerate may consist wholly in motive. The latter lives for self, the former for God. Illustrate by the young man in Yale College who began to learn his lessons for God instead of for self, leaving his salvation in Christ's hands. God requires self-renunciation, taking up the cross, and following Christ, because the first need of the sinner is to change his centre. To be self-centered is to be a savage. The struggle for the life of others is better. But there is something higher still. Life has dignity according to the worth of the object we install in place of self. Follow Christ, make God the center of your life,—so shall you achieve the best; see Colestock, Changing Viewpoint, 113-123.

George A. Gordon, *The New Epoch for Faith*, 11-13—"The ultimate view of the universe is the religious view. Its worth is ultimately worth for the supreme Being. Here is the note of permanent value in Edwards's great essay on *The End of Creation*. The final value of creation is its value for God. . . . Men are men in and through society—here is the truth which Aristotle teaches—but Aristotle fails to see that society attains its end only in and through God." Hovey, *Studies*, 65—"To manifest the glory or perfection of God is therefore the chief end of our existence. To live in such a manner that his life is reflected in ours; that his character shall reappear, at least faintly, in ours; that his holiness and love shall be recognized and declared by us, is to do that for which we are made. And so, in requiring us to glorify himself, God simply requires us to do what is absolutely right, and what is at the same time indispensable to our highest welfare. Any lower aim could not have been placed before us, without making us content with a character unlike that of the First Good and the First Fair." See statement and criticism of Edwards's view in Allen, *Jonathan Edwards*, 227-233.

## VI. RELATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION TO OTHER DOCTRINES.

### 1. *To the holiness and benevolence of God.*

Creation, as the work of God, manifests of necessity God's moral attributes. But the existence of physical and moral evil in the universe appears, at first sight, to impugn these attributes, and to contradict the Scripture declaration that the work of God's hand was "very good" (Gen. 1:31). This difficulty may be in great part removed by considering that:

(a) At its first creation, the world was good in two senses: first, as free from moral evil, — sin being a later addition, the work, not of God, but of created spirits; secondly, as adapted to beneficent ends, — for example, the revelation of God's perfection, and the probation and happiness of intelligent and obedient creatures.

(b) Physical pain and imperfection, so far as they existed before the introduction of moral evil, are to be regarded: first, as congruous parts of a system of which sin was foreseen to be an incident; and secondly, as constituting, in part, the means of future discipline and redemption for the fallen.

The coprolites of Saurians contain the scales and bones of fish which they have devoured. Rom. 8:20-22—"For the creation was subjected to vanity, not of its own will, but by reason of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation [the irrational creation] groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now"; 23—"our mortal body, as a part of nature, participates in the same groaning." 2 Cor. 4:17—"our light affliction, which is for the moment, worketh for us more and more exceedingly an eternal weight of glory." Bowne, *Philosophy of Theism*, 224-240—"How explain our rather shabby universe? Pessimism assumes that perfect wisdom is compatible only with a perfect work, and that we know the universe to be truly worthless and insignificant." John Stuart Mill, *Essays on Religion*, 29, brings in a fearful indictment of nature, her storms, lightnings, earthquakes, blight, decay, and death. Christianity however regards these as due to man, not to God; as incidents of sin; as the groans of creation, crying out for relief and liberty. Man's body, as a part of nature, waits for the adoption, and resurrection of the body is to accompany the renewal of the world.

It was Darwin's judgment that in the world of nature and of man, on the whole, "happiness decidedly prevails." Wallace, *Darwinism*, 36-40—"Animals enjoy all the happiness of which they are capable." Drummond, *Ascent of Man*, 203 sq.—"In the struggle for life there is no hate—only hunger." Martineau, *Study*, 1:330—"Waste of life is simply nature's exuberance." Newman Smyth, *Place of Death in Evolution*, 44-55—"Death simply buries the useless waste. Death has entered for life's sake." These utterances, however, come far short of a proper estimate of the evils of the world, and they ignore the Scriptural teaching with regard to the connection between

death and sin. A future world into which sin and death do not enter shows that the present world is abnormal, and that morality is the only cure for mortality. Nor can the imperfections of the universe be explained by saying that they furnish opportunity for struggle and for virtue. Robert Browning, *Ring and Book*, Pope, 1375—"I can believe this dread machinery Of sin and sorrow, would confound me else, Devised,—all pain, at most expenditure Of pain by Who devised pain,—to evolve, By new machinery in counterpart, The moral qualities of man—how else?—To make him love in turn and be beloved, Creative and self-sacrificing too, And thus eventually godlike." This seems like doing evil that good may come. We can explain mortality only by immortality, and that not in God but in man. Fairbairn: "Suffering is God's protest against sin."

Wallace's theory of the survival of the fittest was suggested by the prodigal destructiveness of nature. Tennyson: "Finding that of fifty seeds She often brings but one to bear." William James: "Our dogs are *in* our human life, but not *of* it. The dog, under the knife of vivisection, cannot understand the purpose of his suffering. For him it is only pain. So we may be soaking in a spiritual atmosphere, a dimension of being which we have at present no organ for apprehending. If we knew the purpose of our life, all that is heroic in us would religiously acquiesce." Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 73—"Love is prepared to take deeper and sterner measures than benevolence, which is by itself a shallow thing." The Lakes of Killarney in Ireland show what a paradise this world might be if war had not desolated it, and if man had properly cared for it. Our moral sense cannot justify the evil in creation except upon the hypothesis that this has some cause and reason in the misconduct of man.

This is not a perfect world. It was not perfect even when originally constituted. Its imperfection is due to sin. God made it with reference to the Fall,—the stage was arranged for the great drama of sin and redemption which was to be enacted thereon. We accept Bushnell's idea of "anticipative consequences," and would illustrate it by the building of a hospital-room while yet no member of the family is sick, and by the salvation of the patriarchs through a Christ yet to come. If the earliest vertebrates of geological history were types of man and preparations for his coming, then pain and death among these same vertebrates may equally have been a type of man's sin and its results of misery. If sin had not been an incident, foreseen and provided for, the world might have been a paradise. As a matter of fact, it will become a paradise only at the completion of the redemptive work of Christ. Kreisbig, *Versöhnung*, 399—"The death of Christ was accompanied by startling occurrences in the outward world, to show that the effects of his sacrifice reached even into nature." Perowne refers Ps. 96:10—"The world also is established that it cannot be moved"—to the restoration of the inanimate creation; cf. Job. 12:27—"And this word, Yet once more, signifieth the removing of those things that are shaken, as of things that have been made, that these things which are not shaken may remain"; Rev. 21:1, 5—"a new heaven and a new earth . . . Behold, I make all things new."

Much sport has been made of this doctrine of anticipative consequences. James D. Dana: "It is funny that the sin of Adam should have killed those old trilobites! The blunderbuss must have kicked back into time at a tremendous rate to have hit those poor innocents!" Yet every insurance policy, every taking out of an umbrella, every buying of a wedding ring, is an anticipative consequence. To deny that God made the world what it is in view of the events that were to take place in it, is to concede to him less wisdom than we attribute to our fellow-man. The most rational explanation of physical evil in the universe is that of Rom. 8:20, 21—"the creation was subjected to vanity . . . by reason of him who subjected it"—i. e., by reason of the first man's sin—"in hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered."

Martineau, *Types*, 2:151—"What meaning could Pity have in a world where suffering was not meant to be?" Hicks, *Critique of Design Arguments*, 386—"The very badness of the world convinces us that God is good." And Sir Henry Taylor's words: "Pain in man Bears the high mission of the flail and fan; In brutes 't is surely piteous"—receive their answer: The brute is but an appendage to man, and like inanimate nature it suffers from man's fall—suffers not wholly in vain, for even pain in brutes serves to illustrate the malign influence of sin and to suggest motives for resisting it. Pascal: "Whatever virtue can be bought with pain is cheaply bought." The pain and imperfection of the world are God's frown upon sin and his warning against it. See Bushnell, chapter on Anticipative Consequences, in *Nature and the Supernatural*, 194-219. Also McCoah, *Divine Government*, 26-35, 249-261; Farrar, *Science and Theology*, 88-106; Johnson, in *Bap. Rev.*, 6:141-154; Fairbairn, *Philos. Christ. Religion*, 94-103.

2. *To the wisdom and free-will of God.*

No plan whatever of a finite creation can fully express the infinite perfection of God. Since God, however, is immutable, he must always have had a plan of the universe; since he is perfect, he must have had the best possible plan. As wise, God cannot choose a plan less good, instead of one more good. As rational, he cannot between plans equally good make a merely arbitrary choice. Here is no necessity, but only the certainty that infinite wisdom will act wisely. As no compulsion from without, so no necessity from within, moves God to create the actual universe. Creation is both wise and free.

As God is both rational and wise, his having a plan of the universe must be better than his not having a plan would be. But the universe once was not; yet without a universe God was blessed and sufficient to himself. God's perfection therefore requires, not that he have a universe, but that he have a plan of the universe. Again, since God is both rational and wise, his actual creation cannot be the worst possible, nor one arbitrarily chosen from two or more equally good. It must be, all things considered, the best possible. We are optimists rather than pessimists.

But we reject that form of optimism which regards evil as the indispensable condition of the good, and sin as the direct product of God's will. We hold that other form of optimism which regards sin as naturally destructive, but as made, in spite of itself, by an overruling providence, to contribute to the highest good. For the optimism which makes evil the necessary condition of finite being, see Leibnitz, *Opera Philosophica*, 468, 624; Hedge, *Ways of the Spirit*, 241; and Pope's *Essay on Man*. For the better form of optimism, see Herzog, *Encyclopædie*, art.: *Schöpfung*, 18: 651-653; Chalmers, *Works*, 2: 286; Mark Hopkins, in *Andover Rev.*, March, 1885: 197-210; Luthardt, *Lehre des freien Willens*, 9, 16—"Calvin's *Quia voluit* is not the last answer. We could have no heart for such a God, for he would himself have no heart. Formal will alone has no heart. In God real freedom controls formal, as in fallen man, formal controls real."

Janet, in his *Final Causes*, 429 sq. and 490-503, claims that optimism subjects God to fate. We have shown that this objection mistakes the certainty which is consistent with freedom for the necessity which is inconsistent with freedom. The opposite doctrine attributes an irrational arbitrariness to God. We are warranted in saying that the universe at present existing, considered as a partial realization of God's developing plan, is the best possible for this particular point of time,—in short, that all is for the best,—see Rom. 8: 28—"to them that love God all things work together for good"; 1 Cor. 3: 21—"All things are yours."

For denial of optimism in any form, see Watson, *Theol. Institutes*, 1: 419; Hovey, *God with Us*, 204-208; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 1: 418, 432, 566, and 2: 145; Lipsius, *Dogmatik*, 234-235; Flint, *Theism*, 227-256; Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 397-406, and esp. 405—"A wisdom the resources of which have been so expended that it cannot equal its past achievements is a finite capacity, and not the boundless depth of the infinite God." But we reply that a wisdom which does not do that which is best is not wisdom. The limit is not in God's abstract power, but in his other attributes of truth, love, and holiness. Hence God can say in Is. 5: 4—"what could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it?"

The perfect antithesis to an ethical and theistic optimism is found in the non-moral and atheistic pessimism of Schopenhauer (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*) and Hartmann (*Philosophie des Unbewussten*). "All life is summed up in effort, and effort is painful; therefore life is pain." But we might retort: "Life is active, and action is always accompanied with pleasure; therefore life is pleasure." See Frances Power Cobbe, *Peak in Darien*, 95-134, for a graphic account of Schopenhauer's heartlessness, cowardice and arrogance. Pessimism is natural to a mind soured by disappointment and forgetful of God: Eccl. 2: 11—"all was vanity and a striving after wind." Homer: "There is nothing whatever more wretched than man." Seneca praises death as the best invention of nature. Byron: "Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen, Count o'er thy days from anguish free, And know, whatever thou hast been, 'T is something better not to be." But it has been left to Schopenhauer and Hartmann to define will as unsatisfied yearning, to regard life itself as a huge blunder, and to urge upon the human race, as the only measure of permanent relief, a united and universal act of suicide.

G. H. Beard, in *Andover Rev.*, March, 1892—"Schopenhauer utters one New Testament truth: the utter delusiveness of self-indulgence. Life which is dominated by the desires, and devoted to mere getting, is a pendulum swinging between pain and ennui." Bowne, *Philos. of Theism*, 124—"For Schopenhauer the world-ground is pure will, without intellect or personality. But pure will is nothing. Will itself, except as a function of a conscious and intelligent spirit, is nothing." Royce, *Spirit of Mod. Philos.*, 253-280—"Schopenhauer united Kant's thought, 'The inmost life of all things is one,' with the Hindoo insight, 'The life of all these things, That art Thou.' To him music shows best what the will is: passionate, struggling, wandering, restless, ever returning to itself, full of longing, vigor, majesty, caprice. Schopenhauer condemns individual suicide, and counsels resignation. That I must ever desire yet never fully attain, leads Hegel to the conception of the absolutely active and triumphant spirit. Schopenhauer finds in it proof of the totally evil nature of things. Thus while Hegel is an optimist, Schopenhauer is a pessimist."

Winwood Reade, in the title of his book, *The Martyrdom of Man*, intends to describe human history. O. W. Holmes says that Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* "represents the universe as a trap which catches most of the human vermin that have its bait dangled before them." Strauss: "If the prophets of pessimism prove that man had better never have lived, they thereby prove that themselves had better never have prophesied." Hawthorne, *Note-book*: "Curious to imagine what mournings and discontent would be excited, if any of the great so-called calamities of human beings were to be abolished,—as, for instance, death."

On both the optimism of Leibnitz and the pessimism of Schopenhauer, see Bowen, *Modern Philosophy*; Tulloch, *Modern Theories*, 169-221; Thompson, on *Modern Pessimism*, in *Present Day Tracts*, 6: no. 34; Wright, on *Ecclesiastes*, 141-216; Barlow, *Ultimatum of Pessimism*: Culture tends to misery; God is the most miserable of beings; creation is a plaster for the sore. See also Mark Hopkins, in *Princeton Review*, Sept. 1882: 197—"Disorder and misery are so mingled with order and beneficence, that both optimism and pessimism are possible." Yet it is evident that there must be more construction than destruction, or the world would not be existing. Buddhism, with its Nirvana-refuge, is essentially pessimistic.

### 3. To Christ as the Revealer of God.

Since Christ is the Revealer of God in creation as well as in redemption, the remedy for pessimism is (1) the recognition of God's transcendence—the universe at present not fully expressing his power, his holiness or his love, and nature being a scheme of progressive evolution which we imperfectly comprehend and in which there is much to follow; (2) the recognition of sin as the free act of the creature, by which all sorrow and pain have been caused, so that God is in no proper sense its author; (3) the recognition of Christ *for* us on the Cross and Christ *in* us by his Spirit, as revealing the age-long sorrow and suffering of God's heart on account of human transgression, and as manifested, in self-sacrificing love, to deliver men from the manifold evils in which their sins have involved them; and (4) the recognition of present probation and future judgment, so that provision is made for removing the scandal now resting upon the divine government and for justifying the ways of God to men.

Christ's Cross is the proof that God suffers more than man from human sin, and Christ's judgment will show that the wicked cannot always prosper. In Christ alone we find the key to the dark problems of history and the guarantee of human progress. *Rom.* 3: 26—"whom God set forth to be a propitiation, through faith, in his blood, to show his righteousness because of the passing over of the sins done aforetime in the forbearance of God"; 8: 32—"He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not also with him freely give us all things?" *Heb.* 2: 9—"we see not yet all things subjected to him. But we behold . . . Jesus . . . crowned with glory and honor"; *Acts* 17: 31—"he hath appointed a day in which he will judge the earth in righteousness by the man whom he hath ordained." See Hill, *Psychology*, 283; Bradford, *Heredity and Christian Problems*, 240, 241; Bruce, *Providential Order*, 71-88; J. M. Whiton, in *Am. Jour. Theology*, April, 1901: 818.

G. A. Gordon, *New Epoch of Faith*, 199—"The book of Job is called by Huxley the classic of pessimism." Dean Swift, on the successive anniversaries of his own birth,

was accustomed to read the third chapter of Job, which begins with the terrible "Let the day perish wherein I was born" (3:3). But predestination and election are not arbitrary. Wisdom has chosen the best possible plan, has ordained the salvation of all who could wisely have been saved, has permitted the least evil that it was wise to permit. Rev. 4:11—"Thou didst create all things, and because of thy will they were, and were created." Mason, Faith of the Gospel, 79—"All things were present to God's mind because of his will, and then, when it pleased him, had being given to them." Pfleiderer, Grundriss, 38, advocates a realistic idealism. Christianity, he says, is not abstract optimism, for it recognizes the evil of the actual and regards conflict with it as the task of the world's history; it is not pessimism, for it regards the evil as not unconquerable, but regards the good as the end and the power of the world.

Jones, Robert Browning, 103, 311—"Pantheistic optimism asserts that all things are good; Christian optimism asserts that all things are *working together* for good. Reverie in Asolando: 'From the first Power was—I knew. Life has made clear to me That, strive but for closer view, Love were as plain to see.' Balaustion's Adventure: 'Gladness be with thee, Helper of the world! I think this is the authentic sign and seal Of Godship, that it ever waxes glad, And more glad, until gladness blossoms, bursts Into a rage to suffer for mankind And recommence at sorrow.' Browning endeavored to find God in man, and still to leave man free. His optimistic faith sought reconciliation with morality. He abhorred the doctrine that the evils of the world are due to merely arbitrary sovereignty, and this doctrine he has satirized in the monologue of Caliban on Setebos: 'Loving not, hating not, just choosing so.' Pippa Passes: 'God's in his heaven—All's right with the world.' But how is this consistent with the guilt of the sinner? Browning does not say. He leaves the antinomy unsolved, only striving to hold both truths in their fulness. Love demands distinction between God and man, yet love unites God and man. Saul: 'All's love, but all's law.' Carlyle forms a striking contrast to Browning. Carlyle was a pessimist. He would renounce happiness for duty, and as a means to this end would suppress, not idle speech alone, but thought itself. The battle is fought moreover in a foreign cause. God's cause is not ours. Duty is a menace, like the duty of a slave. The moral law is not a beneficent revelation, reconciling God and man. All is fear, and there is no love." Carlyle took Emerson through the London slums at midnight and asked him: "Do you believe in a devil now?" But Emerson replied: "I am more and more convinced of the greatness and goodness of the English people." On Browning and Carlyle, see A. H. Strong, Great Poets and their Theology, 373-447.

Henry Ward Beecher, when asked whether life was worth living, replied that that depended very much upon the liver. Optimism and pessimism are largely matters of digestion. President Mark Hopkins asked a bright student if he did not believe this the best possible system. When the student replied in the negative, the President asked him how he could improve upon it. He answered: "I would kill off all the bed-bugs, mosquitoes and fleas, and make oranges and bananas grow further north." The lady who was bitten by a mosquito asked whether it would be proper to speak of the creature as "a depraved little insect." She was told that this would be improper, because depravity always implies a previous state of innocence, whereas the mosquito has always been as bad as he now is. Dr. Lyman Beecher, however, seems to have held the contrary view. When he had captured the mosquito who had bitten him, he crushed the insect, saying: "There! I'll show you that there is a God in Israel!" He identified the mosquito with all the corporate evil of the world. Allen, Religious Progress, 22—"Wordsworth hoped still, although the French Revolution depressed him; Macaulay, after reading Ranke's History of the Popes, denied all religious progress." On Huxley's account of evil, see Upton, Hibbert Lectures, 265 sq.

Pfleiderer, Philos. Religion, 1: 301, 302—"The Greeks of Homer's time had a naive and youthful optimism. But they changed from an optimistic to a pessimistic view. This change resulted from their increasing contemplation of the moral disorder of the world." On the melancholy of the Greeks, see Butcher, Aspects of Greek Genius, 130-165. Butcher holds that the great difference between Greeks and Hebrews was that the former had no hope or ideal of progress. A. H. Bradford, Age of Faith, 74-102—"The voluptuous poets are pessimistic, because sensual pleasure quickly passes, and leaves lassitude and enervation behind. Pessimism is the basis of Stoicism also. It is inevitable where there is no faith in God and in a future life. The life of a seed underground is not inspiring, except in prospect of sun and flowers and fruit." Bradley, Appearance and Reality, xiv, sums up the optimistic view as follows: "The world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil." He should

have added that pain is the exception in the world, and finite free will is the cause of the trouble. Pain is made the means of developing character, and, when it has accomplished its purpose, pain will pass away.

Jackson, James Martineau, 380—"All is well, says an American preacher, for if there is anything that is not well, it is well that it is not well. It is well that falsity and hate are not well, that malice and envy and cruelty are not well. What hope for the world or what trust in God, if they were well?" *Love spells Evil*, only when we read it the wrong way. James Russell Lowell, Letters, 2:61—"The more I learn . . . the more my confidence in the general good sense and honest intentions of mankind increases. . . . The signs of the times cease to alarm me, and seem as natural as to a mother the teething of her seventh baby. I take great comfort in God. I think that he is considerably amused with us sometimes, and that he likes us on the whole, and would not let us get at the matchbox so carelessly as he does, unless he knew that the frame of his universe was fireproof."

Compare with all this the hopeless pessimism of Omar Khayyám, *Rubáiyát*, stanza 99—"Ah Love! could you and I with Him conspire To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire, Would not we shatter it to bits—and then Remould it nearer to the heart's desire?" Royce, *Studies of Good and Evil*, 14, in discussing the Problem of Job, suggests the following solution: "When you suffer, your sufferings are God's sufferings, not his external work, not his external penalty, not the fruit of his neglect, but identically his own personal woe. In you God himself suffers, precisely as you do, and has all your concern in overcoming this grief." F. H. Johnson, *What is Reality*, 349, 506—"The Christian ideal is not maintainable, if we assume that God could as easily develop his creation without conflict. . . . Happiness is only one of his ends; the evolution of moral character is another." A. E. Waffle, *Uses of Moral Evil*: "(1) It aids development of holy character by opposition; (2) affords opportunity for ministering; (3) makes known to us some of the chief attributes of God; (4) enhances the blessedness of heaven."

#### 4. *To Providence and Redemption.*

Christianity is essentially a scheme of supernatural love and power. It conceives of God as above the world, as well as in it,—able to manifest himself, and actually manifesting himself, in ways unknown to mere nature.

But this absolute sovereignty and transcendence, which are manifested in providence and redemption, are inseparable from creatorship. If the world be eternal, like God, it must be an efflux from the substance of God and must be absolutely equal with God. Only a proper doctrine of creation can secure God's absolute distinctness from the world and his sovereignty over it.

The logical alternative of creation is therefore a system of pantheism, in which God is an impersonal and necessary force. Hence the pantheistic *diota* of Fichte: "The assumption of a creation is the fundamental error of all false metaphysics and false theology"; of Hegel: "God evolves the world out of himself, in order to take it back into himself again in the Spirit"; and of Strauss: "Trinity and creation, speculatively viewed, are one and the same,—only the one is viewed absolutely, the other empirically."

Sterrett, *Studies*, 155, 156—"Hegel held that it belongs to God's nature to create. Creation is God's positing an *other* which is not an *other*. The creation is *his*, belongs to his being or essence. This involves the finite as his own self-positing object and self-revelation. It is necessary for God to create. Love, Hegel says, is only another expression of the eternally Triune God. Love must create and love *another*. But in loving this *other*, God is only loving himself." We have already, in our discussion of the theory of creation from eternity, shown the insufficiency of creation to satisfy either the love or the power of God. A proper doctrine of the Trinity renders the hypothesis of an eternal creation unnecessary and irrational. That hypothesis is pantheistic in tendency

Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 97 — "Dualism might be called a logical alternative of creation, but for the fact that its notion of two gods is self-contradictory, and leads to the lowering of the idea of the Godhead, so that the impersonal god of pantheism takes its place." Dörner, *System of Doctrine*, 2:11 — "The world cannot be necessitated in order to satisfy either want or over-fulness in God. . . . The doctrine of absolute creation prevents the *confounding* of God with the world. The declaration that the Spirit brooded over the formless elements, and that life was developed under the continuous operation of God's laws and presence, prevents the *separation* of God from the world. Thus pantheism and deism are both avoided." See Kant and Spinoza contrasted in Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 1:468, 469. The unusually full treatment of the doctrine of creation in this chapter is due to a conviction that the doctrine constitutes an antidote to most of the false philosophy of our time.

##### 5. *To the Observance of the Sabbath.*

We perceive from this point of view, moreover, the importance and value of the Sabbath, as commemorating God's act of creation, and thus God's personality, sovereignty, and transcendence.

(a) The Sabbath is of perpetual obligation as God's appointed memorial of his creating activity. The Sabbath requisition antedates the decalogue and forms a part of the moral law. Made at the creation, it applies to man as man, everywhere and always, in his present state of being.

Gen. 2:3 — "And God blessed the seventh day, and hallowed it; because that in it he rested from all his work which God had created and made." Our rest is to be a miniature representation of God's rest. As God worked six divine days and rested one divine day, so are we in imitation of him to work six human days and to rest one human day. In the Old Testament there are indications of an observance of the Sabbath day before the Mosaic legislation: Gen. 4:3 — "And in process of time [lit. 'at the end of days'] it came to pass that Cain brought of the fruit of the ground as offering unto Jehovah"; Gen. 8:10, 12 — Noah twice waited seven days before sending forth the dove from the ark; Gen. 29:27, 28 — "fulfil the week"; cf. Judges 14:12 — "the seven days of the feast"; Ex. 16:5 — double portion of manna promised on the sixth day, that none be gathered on the Sabbath (cf. verses 20, 30). This division of days into weeks is best explained by the original institution of the Sabbath at man's creation. Moses in the fourth commandment therefore speaks of it as already known and observed: Ex. 20:8 — "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy."

The Sabbath is recognized in Assyrian accounts of the Creation; see *Trans. Soc. Bib. Arch.*, 5:427, 428; Schrader, *Keilinschriften*, ed. 1883:18-22. Professor Sayce: "Seven was a sacred number descended to the Semites from their Accadian predecessors. Seven by seven had the magic knots to be tied by the witch; seven times had the body of the sick man to be anointed by the purifying oil. As the Sabbath of rest fell on each seventh day of the week, so the planets, like the demon-messengers of Anu, were seven in number, and the gods of the number seven received a particular honor." But now the discovery of a calendar tablet in Mesopotamia shows us the week of seven days and the Sabbath in full sway in ancient Babylon long before the days of Moses. In this tablet the seventh, the fourteenth, the twenty-first and the twenty-eighth days are called Sabbaths, the very word used by Moses, and following it are the words: 'A day of rest.' The restrictions are quite as rigid in this tablet as those in the law of Moses. This institution must have gone back to the Accadian period, before the days of Abraham. In one of the recent discoveries this day is called 'the day of rest for the heart,' but of the gods, on account of the propitiation offered on that day, their heart being put at rest. See Jastrow, in *Am. Jour. Theol.*, April, 1898.

*S. S. Times*, Jan. 1892, art. by Dr. Jensen of the University of Strassburg on the Biblical and Babylonian Week: *Subattu* in Babylonia means day of propitiation, implying a religious purpose. A week of seven days is implied in the Babylonian Flood-Story, the rain continuing six days and ceasing on the seventh, and another period of seven days intervening between the cessation of the storm and the disembarking of Noah, the dove, swallow and raven being sent out again on the seventh day. Sabbaths are called days of rest for the heart, days of the completion of labor." Hutton, *Essays*, 2:239 — "Because there is in God's mind a spring of eternal rest as well as of creative energy, we are enjoined to respect the law of rest as well as the law of labor." We

may question, indeed, whether this doctrine of God's rest does not of itself refute the theory of eternal, continuous, and necessary creation.

(b) Neither our Lord nor his apostles abrogated the Sabbath of the decalogue. The new dispensation does away with the Mosaic prescriptions as to the method of keeping the Sabbath, but at the same time declares its observance to be of divine origin and to be a necessity of human nature.

Not everything in the Mosaic law is abrogated in Christ. Worship and reverence, regard for life and purity and property, are binding still. Christ did not nail to his cross every commandment of the decalogue. Jesus does not defend himself from the charge of Sabbath-breaking by saying that the Sabbath is abrogated, but by asserting the true idea of the Sabbath as fulfilling a fundamental human need. Mark 2:27—"The Sabbath was made [by God] for man, and not man for the Sabbath." The Puritan restrictions are not essential to the Sabbath, nor do they correspond even with the methods of later Old Testament observance. The Jewish Sabbath was more like the New England Thanksgiving than like the New England Fast-day. Nehemiah 8:12, 13—"And all the people went their way to eat, and to drink, and to send portions, and to make great mirth. . . . And they kept the feast seven days; and on the eighth day was a solemn assembly, according unto the ordinance"—seems to include the Sabbath day as a day of gladness.

Origen, in Homily 28 on Numbers (Migne, II:356): "Leaving therefore the Jewish observances of the Sabbath, let us see what ought to be for a Christian the observance of the Sabbath. On the Sabbath day nothing of all the actions of the world ought to be done." Christ walks through the cornfield, heals a paralytic, and dines with a Pharisee, all on the Sabbath day. John Milton, in his *Christian Doctrine*, is an extreme anti-sabbatarian, maintaining that the decalogue was abolished with the Mosaic law. He thinks it uncertain whether "the Lord's day" was weekly or annual. The observance of the Sabbath, to his mind, is a matter not of authority, but of convenience. Archbishop Paley: "In my opinion St. Paul considered the Sabbath a sort of Jewish ritual, and not obligatory on Christians. A cessation on that day from labor beyond the time of attending public worship is not intimated in any part of the New Testament. The notion that Jesus and his apostles meant to retain the Jewish Sabbath, only shifting the day from the seventh to the first, prevails without sufficient reason."

According to Guizot, Calvin was so pleased with a play to be acted in Geneva on Sunday, that he not only attended but deferred his sermon so that his congregation might attend. When John Knox visited Calvin, he found him playing a game of bowls on Sunday. Martin Luther said: "Keep the day holy for its use's sake, both to body and soul. But if anywhere the day is made holy for the mere day's sake, if any one set up its observance on a Jewish foundation, then I order you to work on it, to ride on it, to dance on it, to do anything that shall reprove this encroachment on the Christian spirit and liberty." But the most liberal and even radical writers of our time recognize the economic and patriotic uses of the Sabbath. R. W. Emerson said that its observance is "the core of our civilization." Charles Sumner: "If we would perpetuate our Republic, we must sanctify it as well as fortify it, and make it at once a temple and a citadel." Oliver Wendell Holmes: "He who ordained the Sabbath loved the poor." In Pennsylvania they bring up from the mines every Sunday the mules that have been working the whole week in darkness,—otherwise they would become blind. So men's spiritual sight will fail them if they do not weekly come up into God's light.

(c) The Sabbath law binds us to set apart a seventh portion of our time for rest and worship. It does not enjoin the simultaneous observance by all the world of a fixed portion of absolute time, nor is such observance possible. Christ's example and apostolic sanction have transferred the Sabbath from the seventh day to the first, for the reason that this last is the day of Christ's resurrection, and so the day when God's spiritual creation became in Christ complete.

No exact portion of absolute time can be simultaneously observed by men in different longitudes. The day in Berlin begins six hours before the day in New York, so that a whole quarter of what is Sunday in Berlin is still Saturday in New York. Crossing the 180th degree of longitude from West to East we gain a day, and a seventh-day

Sabbatarian who circumnavigated the globe might thus return to his starting point observing the same Sabbath with his fellow Christians. A. S. Carman, in the *Examiner*, Jan. 4, 1894, asserts that *Lev. 4:5-9* alludes to the change of day from the seventh to the first, in the references to "a Sabbath rest" that "remaineth," and to "another day" taking the place of the original promised day of rest. Teaching of the Twelve Apostles: "On the Lord's Day assemble ye together, and give thanks, and break bread."

The change from the seventh day to the first seems to have been due to the resurrection of Christ upon "the first day of the week" (*Mat. 28:1*), to his meeting with the disciples upon that day and upon the succeeding Sunday (*Joh. 20:26*), and to the pouring out of the Spirit upon the Pentecostal Sunday seven weeks after (*Acts 2:1*—see *Bap. Quar. Rev.*, 185:229-232). Thus by Christ's own example and by apostolic sanction the first day became "the Lord's day" (*Rev. 1:10*), on which believers met regularly each week with their Lord (*Acts 20:7*—"the first day of the week, when we were gathered together to break bread") and brought together their benevolent contributions (*1 Cor. 16:1, 2*—"Now concerning the collection for the saints . . . Upon the first day of the week let each one of you lay by him in store, as he may prosper, that no collections be made when I come"). Eusebius, *Com. on Pa. 23* (Migne, V:1191, C): "Wherefore those things [the Levitical regulations] having been already rejected, the Logos through the new Covenant transferred and changed the festival of the Sabbath to the rising of the sun . . . the Lord's day . . . holy and spiritual Sabbaths."

Justin Martyr, *First Apology*: "On the day called Sunday all who live in city or country gather together in one place, and the memoirs of the apostles or the writings of the prophets are read. . . . Sunday is the day on which we all hold our common assembly, because it is the first day on which God made the world and Jesus our Savior on the same day rose from the dead. For he was crucified on the day before, that of Saturn (Saturday); and on the day after that of Saturn, which is the day of the Sun (Sunday), having appeared to his apostles and disciples he taught them these things which we have submitted to you for your consideration." This seems to intimate that Jesus between his resurrection and ascension gave command respecting the observance of the first day of the week. He was "raised up" only after "he had given commandment through the Holy Spirit unto the apostles whom he had chosen" (*Acts 1:2*).

The Christian Sabbath, then, is the day of Christ's resurrection. The Jewish Sabbath commemorated only the beginning of the world; the Christian Sabbath commemorates also the new creation of the world in Christ, in which God's work in humanity first becomes complete. C. H. M. on *Gen. 2*: "If I celebrate the seventh day it marks me as an earthly man, inasmuch as that day is clearly the rest of earth—creation-rest; if I intelligently celebrate the first day of the week, I am marked as a heavenly man, believing in the new creation in Christ." (*Gal. 4:10, 11*—"Ye observe days, and months, and seasons, and years. I am afraid of you, lest by any means I have bestowed labor upon you in vain"; *Col. 2:16, 17*—"Let no man therefore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of a feast day or a sabbath day: which are a shadow of the things to come; but the body is Christ's.") See George S. Gray, *Eight Studies on the Lord's Day*; Hesse, *Hampton Lectures on the Sunday*; Gillilan, *The Sabbath*; Wood, *Sabbath Essays*; Bacon, *Sabbath Observance*; Hadley, *Essays Philological and Critical*, 325-345; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 3: 321-348; Lotz, *Questiones de Historia Sabbati*; Maurice, *Sermons on the Sabbath*; *Prize Essays on the Sabbath*; Crafts, *The Sabbath for Man*; A. E. Waffle, *The Lord's Day*; Alvah Hovey, *Studies in Ethics and Religion*, 271-320; Guirey, *The Hallowed Day*; Gamble, *Sunday and the Sabbath*; Driver, *art.: Sabbath*, in *Hastings' Bible Dictionary*; Broadus, *Am. Com. on Mat. 23:2*. For the seventh-day view, see T. B. Brown, *The Sabbath*; J. N. Andrews, *History of the Sabbath*. *Per contra*, see Prof. A. Rauschenbusch, *Saturday or Sunday?*

## SECTION II.—PRESERVATION.

### 1. DEFINITION OF PRESERVATION.

Preservation is that continuous agency of God by which he maintains in existence the things he has created, together with the properties and powers with which he has endowed them. As the doctrine of creation is

our attempt to explain the existence of the universe, so the doctrine of Preservation is our attempt to explain its continuance.

In explanation we remark :

(a) Preservation is not creation, for preservation presupposes creation. That which is preserved must already exist, and must have come into existence by the creative act of God.

(b) Preservation is not a mere negation of action, or a refraining to destroy, on the part of God. It is a positive agency by which, at every moment, he sustains the persons and the forces of the universe.

(c) Preservation implies a natural concurrence of God in all operations of matter and of mind. Though personal beings exist and God's will is not the sole force, it is still true that, without his concurrence, no person or force can continue to exist or to act.

Dorner, *System of Doctrine*, 2:40-42—"Creation and preservation cannot be the same thing, for then man would be only the product of natural forces supervised by God,—whereas, man is above nature and is inexplicable from nature. Nature is not the whole of the universe, but only the preliminary basis of it. . . . The rest of God is not cessation of activity, but is a new exercise of power." Nor is God "the soul of the universe." This phrase is pantheistic, and implies that God is the only agent.

It is a wonder that physical life continues. The pumping of blood through the heart, whether we sleep or wake, requires an expenditure of energy far beyond our ordinary estimates. The muscle of the heart never rests except between the beats. All the blood in the body passes through the heart in each half-minute. The grip of the heart is greater than that of the fist. The two ventricles of the heart hold on the average ten ounces or five-eighths of a pound, and this amount is pumped out at each beat. At 72 per minute, this is 45 pounds per minute, 2,700 pounds per hour, and 64,800 pounds or 32 and four tenths tons per day. *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11:554—"The heart does about one-fifth of the whole mechanical work of the body—a work equivalent to raising its own weight over 13,000 feet an hour. It takes its rest only in short snatches, as it were, its action as a whole being continuous. It must necessarily be the earliest sufferer from any improvidence as regards nutrition, mental emotion being in this respect quite as potential a cause of constitutional bankruptcy as the most violent muscular exertion."

Before the days of the guillotine in France, when the criminal to be executed sat in a chair and was decapitated by one blow of the sharp sword, an observer declared that the blood spouted up several feet into the air. Yet this great force is exerted by the heart so noiselessly that we are for the most part unconscious of it. The power at work is the power of God, and we call that exercise of power by the name of preservation. Crane, *Religion of To-morrow*, 130—"We do not get bread because God instituted certain laws of growing wheat or of baking dough, he leaving these laws to run of themselves. But God, personally present in the wheat, makes it grow, and in the dough turns it into bread. He does not make gravitation or cohesion, but these are phases of his present action. Spirit is the reality, matter and law are the modes of its expression. So in redemption it is not by the working of some perfect plan that God saves. He is the immanent God, and all of his benefits are but phases of his person and immediate influence."

## II. PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRESERVATION.

### 1. *From Scripture.*

In a number of Scripture passages, preservation is expressly distinguished from creation. Though God rested from his work of creation and established an order of natural forces, a special and continuous divine activity is declared to be put forth in the upholding of the universe and its

powers. This divine activity, moreover, is declared to be the activity of Christ; as he is the mediating agent in creation, so he is the mediating agent in preservation.

Nehemiah 9: 6—"Thou art Jehovah, even thou alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth and all things that are thereon, the seas and all that is in them, and thou preservest them all"; Job 7: 20—"O thou watcher [ marg. 'preserver' ] of men!" Ps. 36: 6—"thou preservest man and beast"; 104: 29, 30—"Thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they are created, and thou renewest the face of the ground." See Perowne on Ps. 104—"A psalm to the God who is in and with nature for good." Humboldt, *Cosmos*, 2: 413—"Psalm 104 presents an image of the whole Cosmos." Acts 17: 28—"in him we live, and move, and have our being"; Col. 1: 17—"in him all things consist"; Heb. 1: 3—"upholding all things by the word of his power." John 5: 17—"My Father worketh even until now, and I work"—refers most naturally to preservation, since creation is a work completed; compare Gen. 2: 2—"on the seventh day God finished his work which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made." God is the upholder of physical life; see Ps. 88: 3, 9—"O bless our God . . . who holdeth our soul in life." God is also the upholder of spiritual life; see 1 Tim. 6: 13—"I charge thee in the sight of God who preserveth all things alive" (*ζωογονουντος να πάντα*)—the great Preserver enables us to persist in our Christian course. Mat. 4: 4—"Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God"—though originally referring to physical nourishment is equally true of spiritual sustentation. In Ps. 104: 26—"There go the ships," Dawson, *Mod. Ideas of Evolution*, thinks the reference is not to man's works but to God's, as the parallelism: "There is leviathan" would indicate, and that by "ships" are meant "floaters" like the nautilus, which is a "little ship." The 104th Psalm is a long hymn to the preserving power of God, who keeps alive all the creatures of the deep, both small and great.

## 2. From Reason.

We may argue the preserving agency of God from the following considerations:

(a) Matter and mind are not self-existent. Since they have not the cause of their being in themselves, their continuance as well as their origin must be due to a superior power.

Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*: "Were the world self-existent, it would be God, not world, and no religion would be possible. . . . The world has receptivity for new creations; but these, once introduced, are subject, like the rest, to the law of preservation"—*i. e.*, are dependent for their continued existence upon God.

(b) Force implies a will of which it is the direct or indirect expression. We know of force only through the exercise of our own wills. Since will is the only cause of which we have direct knowledge, second causes in nature may be regarded as only secondary, regular, and automatic workings of the great first Cause.

For modern theories identifying force with divine will, see Herschel, *Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects*, 460; Murphy, *Scientific Bases*, 13-15, 29-36, 42-52; Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, 121-127; Wallace, *Natural Selection*, 363-371; Bowen, *Metaphysics and Ethics*, 146-162; Martineau, *Essays*, 1: 63, 265, and *Study*, 1: 214—"Second causes in nature bear the same relation to the First Cause as the automatic movement of the muscles in walking bears to the first decision of the will that initiated the walk." It is often objected that we cannot thus identify force with will, because in many cases the effort of our will is fruitless for the reason that nervous and muscular force is lacking. But this proves only that force cannot be identified with human will, not that it cannot be identified with the divine will. To the divine will no force is lacking; in God will and force are one.

We therefore adopt the view of Maine de Biran, that causation pertains only to spirit. Porter, *Human Intellect*, 582-583, objects to this view as follows: "This implies, first, that the conception of a material cause is self-contradictory. But the mind recognizes in itself spiritual energies that are not voluntary; because we derive our notion of cause from will, it does not follow that the causal relation always involves will; it

would follow that the universe, so far as it is not intelligent, is impossible. It implies, secondly, that there is but one agent in the universe, and that the phenomena of matter and mind are but manifestations of one single force—the Creator's." We reply to this reasoning by asserting that no dead thing can act, and that what we call involuntary spiritual energies are really unconscious or unremembered activities of the will.

From our present point of view we would also criticize Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, I: 596—"Because we get our idea of force from mind, it does not follow that mind is the only force. That mind is a cause is no proof that electricity may not be a cause. If matter is force and nothing but force, then matter is nothing, and the external world is simply God. In spite of such argument, men will believe that the external world is a reality—that matter is, and that it is the cause of the effects we attribute to its agency." *New Englander*, Sept. 1833: 552—"Man in early time used second causes, *i. e.*, machines, very little to accomplish his purposes. His usual mode of action was by the direct use of his hands, or his voice, and he naturally ascribed to the gods the same method as his own. His own use of second causes has led man to higher conceptions of the divine action." *Donner*: "If the world had no independence, it would not reflect God, nor would creation mean anything." But this independence is not absolute. Even man lives, moves and has his being in God (*Acts 17:28*), and whatever has come into being, whether material or spiritual, has life only in Christ (*Joh 1:3, 4*, marginal reading).

Preservation is God's continuous willing. *Bowne*, *Introd. to Psych. Theory*, 306, speaks of "a kind of wholesale willing." *Augustine*: "Dei voluntas est rerum natura." *Principal Fairbairn*: "Nature is spirit." *Tennyson*, *The Ancient Sage*: "Force is from the heights." *Lord Gifford*, quoted in *Max Müller*, *Anthropological Religion*, 362—"The human soul is neither self-derived nor self-subsisting. It would vanish if it had not a substance, and its substance is God." *Upton*, *Hibbert Lectures*, 284, 285—"Matter is simply spirit in its lowest form of manifestation. The absolute Cause must be that deeper Self which we find at the heart of our own self-consciousness. By self-differentiation God creates both matter and mind."

(c) God's sovereignty requires a belief in his special preserving agency; since this sovereignty would not be absolute, if anything occurred or existed independent of his will.

*James Martineau*, *Seat of Authority*, 29, 30—"All cosmic force is will. . . . This identification of nature with God's will would be pantheistic only if we turned the proposition round and identified God with no more than the life of the universe. But we do not deny transcendency. Natural forces are God's will, but God's will is more than they. He is not the equivalent of the All, but its directing Mind. God is not the rage of the wild beast, nor the sin of man. There are things and beings objective to him. . . . He puts his power into that which is *other than himself*, and he parts with *other use of it* by preengagement to an end. Yet he is the continuous source and supply of power to the system."

Natural forces are generic volitions of God. But human wills, with their power of alternative, are the product of God's self-limitation, even more than nature is, for human wills do not always obey the divine will,—they may even oppose it. Nothing finite is only finite. In it is the Infinite, not only as immanent, but also as transcendent, and in the case of sin, as opposing the sinner and as punishing him. This continuous willing of God has its analogy in our own subconscious willing. *J. M. Whiton*, in *Am. Jour. Theol.*, *Apl. 1901*: 320—"Our own will, when we walk, does not put forth a separate volition for every step, but depends on the automatic action of the lower nerve-centres, which it both sets in motion and keeps to their work. So the divine Will does not work in innumerable separate acts of volition." *A. R. Wallace*: "The whole universe is not merely dependent on, but actually is, the will of higher intelligences or of one supreme Intelligence. . . . Man's free will is only a larger artery for the controlling current of the universal Will, whose time-long evolutionary flow constitutes the self-revelation of the Infinite One." This latter statement of Wallace merges the finite will far too completely in the will of God. It is true of nature and of all holy beings, but it is untrue of the wicked. These are indeed upheld by God in their being, but opposed by God in their conduct. Preservation leaves room for human freedom, responsibility, sin, and guilt.

All natural forces and all personal beings therefore give testimony to the will of God which originated them and which continually sustains them. The physical universe, indeed, is in no sense independent of God, for its forces are only the constant willing

of God, and its laws are only the habits of God. Only in the free will of intelligent beings has God disjoined from himself any portion of force and made it capable of contradicting his holy will. But even in free agents God does not cease to uphold. The being that sins can maintain its existence only through the preserving agency of God. The doctrine of preservation therefore holds a middle ground between two extremes. It holds that finite personal beings have a real existence and a relative independence. On the other hand it holds that these persons retain their being and their powers only as they are upheld by God.

God is the soul, but not the sum, of things. Christianity holds to God's transcendence as well as to God's immanence. Immanence alone is God imprisoned, as transcendence alone is God banished. Gore, *Incarnation*, 136 sq.—"Christian theology is the harmony of pantheism and deism." It maintains transcendence, and so has all the good of pantheism without its limitations. It maintains immanence, and so has all the good of deism without its inability to show how God could be blessed without creation. Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 367— "The dynamical theory of nature as a plastic organism, pervaded by a system of forces uniting at last in one supreme Force, is altogether more in harmony with the spirit and teaching of the Gospel than the mechanical conceptions which prevailed a century ago, which insisted on viewing nature as an intricate machine, fashioned by a great Artificer who stood wholly apart from it." On the persistency of force, *super cuncta, subter cuncta*, see *Bib. Sac.*, Jan. 1881:1-24; Coker, *Theistic Conception of the World*, 172-243, esp. 236. The doctrine of preservation therefore holds to a God both in nature and beyond nature. According as the one or the other of these elements is exclusively regarded, we have the error of Deism, or the error of Continuous Creation— theories which we now proceed to consider.

### III. THEORIES WHICH VIRTUALLY DENY THE DOCTRINE OF PRESERVATION.

#### 1. *Deism*.

This view represents the universe as a self-sustained mechanism, from which God withdrew as soon as he had created it, and which he left to a process of self-development. It was held in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the English Herbert, Collins, Tindal, and Bolingbroke.

Lord Herbert of Cherbury was one of the first who formed deism into a system. His book *De Veritate* was published in 1633. He argues against the probability of God's revealing his will to only a portion of the earth. This he calls "particular religion." Yet he sought, and according to his own account he received, a revelation from heaven to encourage the publication of his work in disproof of revelation. He "asked for a sign," and was answered by a "loud though gentle noise from the heavens." He had the vanity to think his book of such importance to the cause of truth as to extort a declaration of the divine will, when the interests of half mankind could not secure any revelation at all; what God would not do for a nation, he would do for an individual. See Leslie and Leland, *Method with the Deists*. Deism is the exaggeration of the truth of God's transcendence. See Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, 190-209. Melancthon illustrates by the shipbuilder: "Ut faber discedit a navi exstructa et relinquit eam nautis." God is the maker, not the keeper, of the watch. In Sartor Resartus, Carlyle makes Teufelsdröckh speak of "An absentee God, sitting idle ever since the first Sabbath at the outside of the universe, and seeing it go." Blunt, *Dict. Doct. and Hist. Theology*, art.: Deism.

"Deism emphasized the inviolability of natural law, and held to a mechanical view of the world" (Ten Broeke). Its God is a sort of Hindu Brahma, "as idle as a painted ship upon a painted ocean"—mere being, without content or movement. Bruce, *Apologetics*, 115-181—"God made the world so good at the first that the best he can do is to let it alone. Prayer is inadmissible. Deism implies a Pelagian view of human nature. Death redeems us by separating us from the body. There is natural immortality, but no resurrection. Lord Herbert of Cherbury, the brother of the poet George Herbert of Bemerton, represents the rise of Deism; Lord Bolingbroke its decline. Blount assailed the divine Person of the founder of the faith; Collins its foundation in prophecy; Woolston its miraculous attestation; Toland its canonical literature. Tindal took more general ground, and sought to show that a special revelation was unnecessary, impossible, unverifiable, the religion of nature being sufficient and superior to all religions of positive institution."

We object to this view that :

(a) It rests upon a false analogy. — Man is able to construct a self-moving watch only because he employs preëxisting forces, such as gravity, elasticity, cohesion. But in a theory which likens the universe to a machine, these forces are the very things to be accounted for.

Deism regards the universe as a "perpetual motion." Modern views of the dissipation of energy have served to discredit it. Will is the only explanation of the forces in nature. But according to deism, God builds a house, shuts himself out, locks the door, and then ties his own hands in order to make sure of never using the key. John Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, 114-188 — "A made mind, a spiritual nature created by an external omnipotence, is an impossible and self-contradictory notion. . . . The human contriver or artist deals with materials prepared to his hand. Deism reduces God to a finite anthropomorphic personality, as pantheism annuls the finite world or absorbs it in the Infinite." Hence Spinoza, the pantheist, was the great antagonist of 18th century deism. See Woods, *Works*, 2: 40.

(b) It is a system of anthropomorphism, while it professes to exclude anthropomorphism. — Because the upholding of all things would involve a multiplicity of minute cares if man were the agent, it conceives of the upholding of the universe as involving such burdens in the case of God. Thus it saves the dignity of God by virtually denying his omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence.

The infinity of God turns into sources of delight all that would seem care to man. To God's inexhaustible fulness of life there are no burdens involved in the upholding of the universe he has created. Since God, moreover, is a perpetual observer, we may alter the poet's verse and say: "There 's not a flower that 's born to blush unseen And waste its sweetness on the desert air." God does not expose his children as soon as they are born. They are not only his offspring; they also live, move and have their being in him, and are partakers of his divine nature. Gordon, *Christ of To-day*, 200 — "The worst person in all history is something to God, if he be nothing to the world." See Chalmers, *Astronomical Discourses*, in *Works*, 7: 68. Kurtz, *The Bible and Astronomy*, in *Introd. to History of Old Covenant*, lxxxii — xeviii.

(c) It cannot be maintained without denying all providential interference, in the history of creation and the subsequent history of the world. — But the introduction of life, the creation of man, incarnation, regeneration, the communion of intelligent creatures with a present God, and interpositions of God in secular history, are matters of fact.

Deism therefore continually tends to atheism. Upton, *Hibbert Lectures*, 287 — "The defect of deism is that, on the human side, it treats all men as isolated individuals, forgetful of the immanent divine nature which interrelates them and in a measure unifies them; and that, on the divine side, it separates men from God and makes the relation between them a purely external one." Ruskin: "The divine mind is as visible in its full energy of operation on every lowly bank and mouldering stone as in the lifting of the pillars of heaven and settling the foundations of the earth; and to the rightly perceiving mind there is the same majesty, the same power, the same unity, and the same perfection manifested in the casting of the clay as in the scattering of the cloud, in the mouldering of dust as in the kindling of the day-star." See Pearson, *Infidelity*, 87; Hanne, *Idee der absoluten Persönlichkeit*, 76.

## 2. Continuous Creation.

This view regards the universe as from moment to moment the result of a new creation. It was held by the New England theologians Edwards, Hopkins, and Emmons, and more recently in Germany by Rothe.

Edwards, Works, 2: 486-490, quotes and defends Dr. Taylor's utterance: "God is the original of all being, and the only cause of all natural effects." Edwards himself says: "God's upholding created substance, or causing its existence in each successive moment, is altogether equivalent to an immediate production out of nothing at each moment." He argues that the past existence of a thing cannot be the cause of its present existence, because a thing cannot act at a time and place where it is not. "This is equivalent to saying that God cannot produce an effect which shall last for one moment beyond the direct exercise of his creative power. What man can do, God, it seems, cannot" (A. S. Carman). Hopkins, Works, 1: 164-167—Preservation "is really continued creation." Emmons, Works, 4: 363-389, esp. 381—"Since all men are dependent agents, all their motions, exercises, or actions must originate in a divine efficiency." 2: 683—"There is but one true and satisfactory answer to the question which has been agitated for centuries: 'Whence came evil?' and that is: It came from the first great Cause of all things. . . . It is as consistent with the moral rectitude of the Deity to produce sinful as holy exercises in the minds of men. He puts forth a positive influence to make moral agents act, in every instance of their conduct, as he pleases." God therefore creates all the volitions of the soul, as he effects by his almighty power all the changes of the material world. Rothe also held this view. To his mind external expression is necessary to God. His maxim was: "Kein Gott ohne Welt"—"There can be no God without an accompanying world." See Rothe, Dogmatik, 1: 128-160, esp. 150, and Theol. Ethik, 1: 186-190; also in Bib. Sac., Jan. 1875: 144. See also Lotze, Philos. of Religion, 81-94.

The element of truth in Continuous Creation is its assumption that all force is will. Its error is in maintaining that all force is *divine* will, and divine will in *direct* exercise. But the human will is a force as well as the divine will, and the forces of nature are secondary and automatic, not primary and immediate, workings of God. These remarks may enable us to estimate the grain of truth in the following utterances which need important qualification and limitation. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, 202, likens the universe to the musical note, which exists only on condition of being incessantly reproduced. Herbert Spencer says that "ideas are like the successive chords and cadences brought out from a piano, which successively die away as others are produced." Maudsley, Physiology of Mind, quotes this passage, but asks quite pertinently: "What about the performer, in the case of the piano and in the case of the brain, respectively? Where in the brain is the equivalent of the harmonic conceptions in the performer's mind?" Professor Fitzgerald: "All nature is living thought—the language of One in whom we live and move and have our being." Dr. Oliver Lodge, to the British Association in 1891: "The barrier between matter and mind may melt away, as so many others have done."

To this we object, upon the following grounds:

(a) It contradicts the testimony of consciousness that regular and executive activity is not the mere repetition of an initial decision, but is an exercise of the will entirely different in kind.

Ladd, in his Philosophy of Mind, 144, indicates the error in Continuous Creation as follows: "The whole world of things is momentarily quenched and then replaced by a similar world of actually new realities." The words of the poet would then be literally true: "Every fresh and new creation, A divine improvisation, From the heart of God proceeds." Ovid, Metaph., 1: 15—"Instabilis tellus, innabilis unda." Seth, Hegelianism and Personality, 60, says that, to Fichte, "the world was thus perpetually created anew in each finite spirit,—revelation to intelligence being the only admissible meaning of that much abused term, creation." A. L. Moore, Science and the Faith, 184, 185—"A theory of occasional intervention implies, as its correlate, a theory of ordinary absence. . . . For Christians the facts of nature are the acts of God. Religion relates these facts to God as their author; science relates them to one another as parts of a visible order. Religion does not tell of this interrelation; science cannot tell of their relation to God."

Continuous creation is an erroneous theory because it applies to human wills a principle which is true only of irrational nature and which is only partially true of that. I know that I am not God acting. My will is proof that not all force is divine will. Even on the monistic view, moreover, we may speak of second causes in nature, since God's regular and habitual action is a second and subsequent thing, while his act of initiation

and organization is the first. Neither the universe nor any part of it is to be identified with God, any more than my thoughts and acts are to be identified with me. Martineau, in *Nineteenth Century*, April, 1835: 559—"What is *nature*, but the promise of God's pledged and habitual causality? And what is *spirit*, but the province of his free causality responding to needs and affections of his free children? . . . God is not a retired architect who may now and then be called in for repairs. Nature is not self-active, and God's agency is not intrusive." William Watson, *Poems*, 88—"If nature be a phantasm, as thou say'st, A splendid fiction and prodigious dream, To reach the real and true I'll make no haste, More than content with worlds that only seem."

(b) It exaggerates God's power only by sacrificing his truth, love, and holiness;—for if finite personalities are not what they seem—namely, objective existences—God's veracity is impugned; if the human soul has no real freedom and life, God's love has made no self-communication to creatures; if God's will is the only force in the universe, God's holiness can no longer be asserted, for the divine will must in that case be regarded as the author of human sin.

Upon this view personal identity is inexplicable. Edwards bases identity upon the arbitrary decree of God. God can therefore, by so decreeing, make Adam's posterity one with their first father and responsible for his sin. Edwards's theory of continuous creation, indeed, was devised as an explanation of the problem of original sin. The divinely appointed union of acts and exercises with Adam was held sufficient, without union of substance, or natural generation from him, to explain our being born corrupt and guilty. This view would have been impossible, if Edwards had not been an idealist, making far too much of acts and exercises and far too little of substance.

It is difficult to explain the origin of Jonathan Edwards's idealism. It has sometimes been attributed to the reading of Berkeley. Dr. Samuel Johnson, afterwards President of King's College in New York City, a personal friend of Bishop Berkeley and an ardent follower of his teaching, was a tutor in Yale College while Edwards was a student. But Edwards was in Weathersfield while Johnson remained in New Haven, and was among those disaffected towards Johnson as a tutor. Yet Edwards, *Original Sin*, 479, seems to allude to the Berkeleyan philosophy when he says: "The course of nature is demonstrated by recent improvements in philosophy to be indeed . . . nothing but the established order and operation of the Author of nature" (see Allen, *Jonathan Edwards*, 16, 308, 309). President McCracken, in *Philos. Rev.*, Jan. 1892: 26-42, holds that Arthur Collier's *Clavis Universalis* is the source of Edwards's idealism. It is more probable that his idealism was the result of his own independent thinking, occasioned perhaps by mere hints from Locke, Newton, Cudworth, and Norris, with whose writings he certainly was acquainted. See E. C. Smyth, in *Am. Jour. Theol.*, Oct. 1897: 956; Prof. Gardiner, in *Philos. Rev.*, Nov. 1900: 573-596.

How thorough-going this idealism of Edwards was may be learned from Noah Porter's Discourse on Bishop George Berkeley, 71, and quotations from Edwards, in *Journ. Spec. Philos.*, Oct. 1883: 401-420—"Nothing else has a proper being but spirits, and bodies are but the shadow of being. . . . Seeing the brain exists only mentally, I therefore acknowledge that I speak improperly when I say that the soul is in the brain only, as to its operations. For, to speak yet more strictly and abstractedly, 't is nothing but the connection of the soul with these and those modes of its own ideas, or those mental acts of the Deity, seeing the brain exists only in idea. . . . That which truly is the substance of all bodies is the infinitely exact and precise and perfectly stable idea in God's mind, together with his stable will that the same shall be gradually communicated to us and to other minds according to certain fixed and established methods and laws; or, in somewhat different language, the infinitely exact and precise divine idea, together with an answerable, perfectly exact, precise, and stable will, with respect to correspondent communications to created minds and effects on those minds." It is easy to see how, from this view of Edwards, the "Exercise-system" of Hopkins and Emmons naturally developed itself. On Edwards's Idealism, see Frazer's *Berkeley* (*Blackwood's Philos. Classics*), 130, 140. On personal identity, see Bp. Butler, *Works* (Bohn's ed.), 327-334.

(c) As deism tends to atheism, so the doctrine of continuous creation tends to pantheism.—Arguing that, because we get our notion of force

from the action of our own wills, therefore all force must be will, and divine will, it is compelled to merge the human will in this all-comprehending will of God. Mind and matter alike become phenomena of one force, which has the attributes of both; and, with the distinct existence and personality of the human soul, we lose the distinct existence and personality of God, as well as the freedom and accountability of man.

Lotze tries to escape from *material* causes and yet hold to *second* causes, by intimating that these second causes may be spirits. But though we can see how there can be a sort of spirit in the brute and in the vegetable, it is hard to see how what we call insensate matter can have spirit in it. It must be a very peculiar sort of spirit—a deaf and dumb spirit, if any—and such a one does not help our thinking. On this theory the body of a dog would need to be much more highly endowed than its soul. James Seth, in *Philos. Rev.*, Jan. 1894: 73—“This principle of unity is a veritable lion’s den,—all the footprints are in one direction. Either it is a bare unity—the One annuls the many; or it is simply the All,—the ununited totality of existence.” Dorner well remarks that “Preservation is empowering of the creature and maintenance of its activity, not new bringing it into being.” On the whole subject, see Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 1: 220-225; Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 258-273; Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 50; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 1: 577-581, 595; Dabney, *Theology*, 393, 399.

#### IV. REMARKS UPON THE DIVINE CONCURRENCE.

(a) The divine efficiency interpenetrates that of man without destroying or absorbing it. The influx of God’s sustaining energy is such that men retain their natural faculties and powers. God does not work all, but all in all.

Preservation, then, is midway between the two errors of denying the first cause (deism or atheism) and denying the second causes (continuous creation or pantheism). 1 Cor. 12: 6—“there are diversities of workings, but the same God, who worketh all things in all”; cf. Eph. 1: 23—the church, “which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all.” God’s action is no *actio in distans*, or action where he is not. It is rather action in and through free agents, in the case of intelligent and moral beings, while it is his own continuous willing in the case of nature. Men are second causes in a sense in which nature is not. God works through these human second causes, but he does not supersede them. We cannot see the line between the two—the action of the first cause and the action of second causes; yet both are real, and each is distinct from the other, though the method of God’s concurrence is inscrutable. As the pen and the hand together produce the writing, so God’s working causes natural powers to work with him. The natural growth indicated by the words “wherein is the seed thereof” (Gen. 1: 11) has its counterpart in the spiritual growth described in the words “his seed abideth in him” (1 John 3: 9). Paul considers himself a reproductive agency in the hands of God: he begets children in the gospel (1 Cor. 4: 15); yet the New Testament speaks of this begetting as the work of God (1 Pet. 1: 3). We are bidden to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling, upon the very ground that it is God who works in us both to will and to work (Phil. 2: 12, 13).

(b) Though God preserves mind and body in their working, we are ever to remember that God concurs with the evil acts of his creatures only as they are natural acts, and not as they are evil.

In holy action God gives the natural powers, and by his word and Spirit influences the soul to use these powers aright. But in evil action God gives only the natural powers; the evil direction of these powers is caused only by man. Jer. 44: 4—“Oh, do not this abominable thing that I hate”; Eze. 1: 18—“Thou that art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and that canst not look on perverseness, wherefore lookest thou upon them that deal treacherously, and holdest thy peace when the wicked swalloweth up the man that is more righteous than he?” James 1: 13, 14—“Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempteth no man: but each man is tempted, when he is drawn away by his own lust, and enticed.” Aaron excused himself for making an Egyptian idol by saying that the fire did it; he asked the people for gold; “so they gave it me; and I cast it into the fire, and there came out this calf” (Ex. 32: 24). Aaron leaves out one important point

— his own personal agency in it all. In like manner we lay the blame of our sins upon nature and upon God. Pym said of Strafford that God had given him great talents, of which the devil had given the application. But it is more true to say of the wicked man that he himself gives the application of his God-given powers. We are electric cars for which God furnishes the motive-power, but to which we the conductors give the direction. We are organs; the wind or breath of the organ is God's; but the fingering of the keys is ours. Since the maker of the organ is also present at every moment as its preserver, the shameful abuse of his instrument and the dreadful music that is played are a continual grief and suffering to his soul. Since it is Christ who upholds all things by the word of his power, preservation involves the suffering of Christ, and this suffering is his atonement, of which the culmination and demonstration are seen in the cross of Calvary (Heb. 1:3). On the importance of the idea of preservation in Christian doctrine, see Calvin, Institutes, I:182 (chapter 18).

### SECTION III.—PROVIDENCE.

#### I. DEFINITION OF PROVIDENCE.

Providence is that continuous agency of God by which he makes all the events of the physical and moral universe fulfill the original design with which he created it.

As Creation explains the existence of the universe, and as Preservation explains its continuance, so Providence explains its evolution and progress.

In explanation notice :

(a) Providence is not to be taken merely in its etymological sense of *foreseeing*. It is *forseeing* also, or a positive agency in connection with all the events of history.

(b) Providence is to be distinguished from preservation. While preservation is a maintenance of the existence and powers of created things, providence is an actual care and control of them.

(c) Since the original plan of God is all-comprehending, the providence which executes the plan is all-comprehending also, embracing within its scope things small and great, and exercising care over individuals as well as over classes.

(d) In respect to the good acts of men, providence embraces all those natural influences of birth and surroundings which prepare men for the operation of God's word and Spirit, and which constitute motives to obedience.

(e) In respect to the evil acts of men, providence is never the efficient cause of sin, but is by turns preventive, permissive, directive, and determinative.

(f) Since Christ is the only revealer of God, and he is the medium of every divine activity, providence is to be regarded as the work of Christ; see 1 Cor. 8:6 — "one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things"; cf. John 5:17 — "My Father worketh even until now, and I work."

The Germans have the word *Vorsicht*, *forseeing*, *looking out for*, as well as the word *Vorsehung*, *foreseeing*, *seeing beforehand*. Our word 'providence' embraces the meanings of both these words. On the general subject of providence, see Philippi.

Glaubenslehre, 2:272-284; Calvin, Institutes, 1:182-219; Dick, Theology, 1:416-446; Hodge, Syst. Theol., 1:581-616; Bib. Sac., 12:179; 21:584; 26:315; 30:502; N. W. Taylor, Moral Government, 2:204-226.

Providence is God's attention concentrated everywhere. His care is microscopic as well as telescopic. Robert Browning, Pippa Passes, *ad finem*: "All service is the same with God — With God, whose puppets, best and worst, Are we: there is no last nor first." Canon Farrar: "In one chapter of the Koran is the story how Gabriel, as he waited by the gates of gold, was sent by God to earth to do two things. One was to prevent king Solomon from the sin of forgetting the hour of prayer in exultation over his royal steeds; the other to help a little yellow ant on the slope of Ararat, which had grown weary in getting food for its nest, and which would otherwise perish in the rain. To Gabriel the one behest seemed just as kingly as the other, since God had ordered it. 'Silently he left The Presence, and prevented the king's sin, And help the little ant at entering in.' 'Nothing is too high or low, Too mean or mighty, if God wills it so.'" Yet a preacher began his sermon on Mat. 10:30 — "The very hairs of your head are all numbered" — by saying: "Why, some of you, my hearers, do not believe that even your heads are all numbered!"

A modern prophet of unbelief in God's providence is William Watson. In his poem entitled The Unknown God, we read: "When overarched by gorgeous night, I wave my trivial self away; When all I was to all men's sight Shares the erasure of the day; Then do I cast my cumbering load, Then do I gain a sense of God." Then he likens the God of the Old Testament to Odin and Zeus, and continues: "O streaming worlds, O crowded sky, O life, and mine own soul's abyss, Myself am scarce so small that I should bow to Deity like this! This my Begetter? This was what Man in his violent youth begot. The God I know of I shall ne'er know, though he dwells exceeding nigh. Raise thou the stone and find me there, Cleave thou the wood and there am I. Yea, in my flesh his Spirit doth flow, Too near, too far, for me to know. Whate'er my deeds, I am not sure That I can pleasure him or vex: I, that must use a speech so poor It narrows the Supreme with sex. Notes he the good or ill in man? To hope he cares is all I can. I hope with fear. For did I trust This vision granted me at birth, The sire of heaven would seem less just Than many a faulty son of earth. And so he seems indeed! But then, I trust it not, this bounded ken. And dreaming much, I never dare To dream that in my prisoned soul The flutter of a trembling prayer Can move the Mind that is the Whole. Though kneeling nations watch and yearn, Does the primeval Purpose turn? Best by remembering God, say some, We keep our high Imperial lot. Fortune, I fear, hath oftenest come When we forgot — when we forgot! A lovelier faith their happier crown, But history laughs and weeps it down: Know they not well how seven times seven, Wronging our mighty arms with rust, We dared not do the work of heaven, Lest heaven should hurl us in the dust? The work of heaven! 'Tis waiting still The sanction of the heavenly will. Unmeet to be profaned by praise Is he whose coils the world enfold; The God on whom I ever gaze, The God I never once behold: Above the cloud, above the clod, The unknown God, the unknown God."

In pleasing contrast to William Watson's Unknown God, is the God of Rudyard Kipling's Recessional: "God of our fathers, known of old — Lord of our far-flung battle-line — Beneath whose awful hand we hold Dominion over palm and pine — Lord God of hosts, be with us yet, Lest we forget — lest we forget! The tumult and the shouting dies — The captains and the kings depart — Still stands thine ancient Sacrifice, An humble and a contrite heart. Lord God of hosts, be with us yet, Lest we forget — lest we forget! Far-called our navies melt away — On dune and headland sinks the fire — So, all our pomp of yesterday Is one with Nineveh and Tyre! Judge of the nations, spare us yet, Lest we forget — lest we forget! If, drunk with sight of power, we loose Wild tongues that have not thee in awe — Such boasting as the Gentiles use, Or lesser breeds without the Law — Lord God of hosts, be with us yet, Lest we forget — lest we forget! For heathen heart that puts her trust In reeking tube and iron shard — All valiant dust that builds on dust, And guarding calls not thee to guard — For frantic boast and foolish word, Thy mercy on thy people, Lord!"

These problems of God's providential dealings are intelligible only when we consider that Christ is the revealer of God, and that his suffering for sin opens to us the heart of God. All history is the progressive manifestation of Christ's holiness and love, and in the cross we have the key that unlocks the secret of the universe. With the cross in view, we can believe that Love rules over all, and that "all things work together for good to them that love God" (Rom. 8:28).

## II. PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE.

## 1. Scriptural Proof.

The Scripture witnesses to

A. A general providential government and control (*a*) over the universe at large; (*b*) over the physical world; (*c*) over the brute creation; (*d*) over the affairs of nations; (*e*) over man's birth and lot in life; (*f*) over the outward successes and failures of men's lives; (*g*) over things seemingly accidental or insignificant; (*h*) in the protection of the righteous; (*i*) in the supply of the wants of God's people; (*j*) in the arrangement of answers to prayer; (*k*) in the exposure and punishment of the wicked.

(*a*) Ps. 103: 19 — "his kingdom ruleth over all"; Dan. 4: 35 — "doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth"; Eph. 1: 11 — "worketh all things after the counsel of his will."

(*b*) Job 37: 5, 10 — "God thundereth . . . By the breath of God ice is given"; Ps. 104: 14 — "causeth the grass to grow for the cattle"; 135: 6, 7 — "Whatever Jehovah pleased, that hath he done, in heaven and in earth, in the seas and in all deeps . . . vapors . . . lightnings . . . wind"; Mat. 5: 45 — "maketh his sun to rise . . . sendeth rain"; Ps. 104: 18 — "The trees of Jehovah are filled" — are planted and tended by God as carefully as those which come under human cultivation; cf. Mat. 6: 30 — "if God so clothe the grass of the field."

(*c*) Ps. 104: 21, 23 — "young lions roar . . . seek their food from God . . . that thou givest them they gather"; Mat. 6: 26 — "birds of the heaven . . . your heavenly Father feedeth them"; 10: 29 — "two sparrows . . . not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father."

(*d*) Job 12: 23 — "He increaseth the nations, and he destroyeth them; He enlargeth the nations, and he leadeth them captive"; Ps. 22: 28 — "the kingdom is Jehovah's; And he is the ruler over the nations"; 66: 7 — "He ruleth by his might for ever; His eyes observe the nations"; Acts 17: 26 — "made of one every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth, having determined their appointed seasons, and the bounds of their habitation" (instance Palestine, Greece, England).

(*e*) 1 Sam. 16: 1 — "fill thy horn with oil, and go: I will send thee to Jesse the Bethlehemite; for I have provided me a king among his sons"; Ps. 139: 16 — "Thine eyes did see mine unformed substance, and in thy book were all my members written"; Is. 45: 5 — "I will gird thee, though thou hast not known me"; Jer. 1: 5 — "Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee . . . sanctified thee . . . appointed thee"; Gal. 1: 15, 16 — "God, who separated me, even from my mother's womb, and called me through his grace, to reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the Gentiles."

(*f*) Ps. 75: 6, 7 — "neither from the east, nor from the west, nor yet from the south cometh lifting up. But God is the judge, He putteth down one, and lifteth up another"; Luke 1: 52 — "He hath put down princes from their thrones, and hath exalted them of low degree."

(*g*) Prov. 16: 33 — "The lot is cast into the lap; But the whole disposing thereof is of Jehovah"; Mat. 10: 30 — "the very hairs of your head are all numbered."

(*h*) Ps. 4: 8 — "In peace will I both lay me down and sleep; For thou, Jehovah, alone makest me dwell in safety"; 5: 12 — "thou wilt compass him with favor as with a shield"; 63: 8 — "Thy right hand upholdeth me"; 121: 3 — "He that keepeth thee will not slumber"; Rom. 8: 28 — "to them that love God all things work together for good."

(*i*) Gen. 22: 8, 14 — "God will provide himself the lamb . . . Jehovah-jireh" (marg.: that is, 'Jehovah will see, or 'provide'); Deut. 8: 3 — "man doth not live by bread only, but by every thing that proceedeth out of the mouth of Jehovah doth man live"; Phil. 4: 19 — "my God shall supply every need of yours."

(*j*) Ps. 68: 10 — "Thou, O God, didst prepare of thy goodness for the poor"; Is. 64: 4 — "neither hath the eye seen a God besides thee, who worketh for him that waiteth for him"; Mat. 6: 8 — "your Father knoweth what things ye have need of, before ye ask him"; 32, 33 — "all these things shall be added unto you."

(*k*) Ps. 7: 12, 13 — "If a man turn not, he will whet his sword; He hath bent his bow and made it ready; He hath also prepared for him the instruments of death; He maketh his arrows fiery shafts"; 11: 6 — "Upon the wicked he will rain snares; Fire and brimstone and burning wind shall be the portion of their cup."

The statements of Scripture with regard to God's providence are strikingly confirmed by recent studies in physiography. In the early stages of human development man was almost wholly subject to nature, and environment was a determining factor in his progress. This is the element of truth in Buckle's view. But Buckle ignored the fact that, as civilization advanced, ideas, at least at times, played a greater part than environment. Thermopylae cannot be explained by climate. In the later stages of human development, nature is largely subject to man, and environment counts for comparatively little. "There shall be no Alps!" says Napoleon. Charles Kingsley:

"The spirit of ancient tragedy was man conquered by circumstance; the spirit of modern tragedy is man conquering circumstance." Yet many national characteristics can be attributed to physical surroundings, and so far as this is the case they are due to the ordering of God's providence. Man's need of fresh water leads him to rivers,—hence the original location of London. Commerce requires seaports,—hence New York. The need of defense leads man to bluffs and hills,—hence Jerusalem, Athens, Rome, Edinburgh. These places of defense became also places of worship and of appeal to God.

Goldwin Smith, in his Lectures and Essays, maintains that national characteristics are not congenital, but are the result of environment. The greatness of Rome and the greatness of England have been due to position. The Romans owed their successes to being at first less warlike than their neighbors. They were traders in the centre of the Italian seacoast, and had to depend on discipline to make headway against marauders on the surrounding hills. Only when drawn into foreign conquest did the ascendancy of the military spirit become complete, and then the military spirit brought despotism as its natural penalty. Brought into contact with varied races, Rome was led to the founding of colonies. She adopted and assimilated the nations which she conquered, and in governing them learned organization and law. *Paxem subiecit* was her rule, as well as *debelleare superboe*. In a similar manner Goldwin Smith maintains that the greatness of England is due to position. Britain being an island, only a bold and enterprising race could settle it. Maritime migration strengthened freedom. Insular position gave freedom from invasion. Isolation however gave rise to arrogance and self-assertion. The island became a natural centre of commerce. There is a steadiness of political progress which would have been impossible upon the continent. Yet consolidation was tardy, owing to the fact that Great Britain consists of several islands. Scotland was always liberal, and Ireland foredoomed to subjection.

Isaac Taylor, Spirit of Hebrew Poetry, has a valuable chapter on Palestine as the providential theatre of divine revelation. A little land, yet a sample-land of all lands, and a thoroughfare between the greatest lands of antiquity, it was fitted by God to receive and to communicate his truth. George Adam Smith's Historical Geography of the Holy Land is a repository of information on this subject. Stanley, Life and Letters, 1: 269-271, treats of Greek landscape and history. Shaler, Interpretation of Nature, sees such difference between Greek curiosity and search for causes on the one hand, and Roman indifference to scientific explanation of facts on the other, that he cannot think of the Greeks and the Romans as cognate peoples. He believes that Italy was first peopled by Etrurians, a Semitic race from Africa, and that from them the Romans descended. The Romans had as little of the spirit of the naturalist as had the Hebrews. The Jews and the Romans originated and propagated Christianity, but they had no interest in science.

On God's pre-arrangement of the physical conditions of national life, striking suggestions may be found in Shaler, Nature and Man in America. Instance the settlement of Massachusetts Bay between 1629 and 1639, the only decade in which such men as John Winthrop could be found and the only one in which they actually emigrated from England. After 1639 there was too much to do at home, and with Charles II the spirit which animated the Pilgrims no longer existed in England. The colonists builded better than they knew, for though they sought a place to worship God themselves, they had no idea of giving this same religious liberty to others. R. E. Thompson, The Hand of God in American History, holds that the American Republic would long since have broken in pieces by its own weight and bulk, if the invention of steam-boat in 1807, railroad locomotive in 1825, telegraph in 1837, and telephone in 1877, had not bound the remote parts of the country together. A woman invented the reaper by combining the action of a row of scissors in cutting. This was as early as 1835. Only in 1855 the competition on the Emperor's farm at Compiègne gave supremacy to the reaper. Without it farming would have been impossible during our civil war, when our men were in the field and women and boys had to gather in the crops.

B. A government and control extending to the free actions of men —  
(a) to men's free acts in general; (b) to the sinful acts of men also.

(a) Ex. 12: 36 — "Jehovah gave the people favor in the sight of the Egyptians, so that they let them have what they asked. And they despoiled the Egyptians"; 1 Sam. 24: 18 — "Jehovah had delivered me up into thy hand (Saul to David)"; Ps. 33: 14, 15 — "He looketh forth Upon all the inhabitants of the earth, He that fashioneth the hearts of them all" (i. e., equally, one as well as another); Prov. 16: 1 — "The plans of the heart belong to man; But the answer of the tongue is from Jehovah"; 19: 21 — "There are many devices in a man's heart; But the counsel of Jehovah

that shall stand"; 80: 24—"A man's goings are of Jehovah; How then can man understand his way?" 81: 1—"The king's heart is in the hand of Jehovah as the watercourse: He turneth it whithersoever he will" (i. e., as easily as the rivulets of the eastern fields are turned by the slightest motion of the hand or the foot of the husbandman); Jer. 10: 23—"O Jehovah, I know that the way of man is not in himself; it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps"; Phil. 2: 13—"It is God who worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure"; Eph. 3: 10—"we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God afore prepared that we should walk in them"; James 4: 13-15—"If the Lord will, we shall both live, and do this or that."

(b) 2 Sam. 16: 10—"because Jehovah hath said unto him [Shimei]: Curse David"; 24: 1—"the anger of Jehovah was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them, saying, Go, number Israel and Judah"; Rom. 11: 30—"God hath shut up all unto disobedience, that he might have mercy upon all"; 2 Thes. 2: 11, 12—"God sendeth them a working of error, that they should believe a lie: that they all might be judged who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness."

Henry Ward Beecher: "There seems to be no order in the movements of the bees of a hive, but the honey-comb shows that there was a plan in them all." John Hunter compared his own brain to a hive in which there was a great deal of buzzing and apparent disorder, while yet a real order underlay it all. "As bees gather their stores of sweets against a time of need, but are colonized by man's superior intelligence for his own purposes, so men plan and work yet are overruled by infinite Wisdom for his own glory." Dr. Deems: "The world is wide In Time and Tide, And God is guide: Then do not hurry. That man is blest Who does his best And leaves the rest: Then do not worry." See Bruce, *Providential Order*, 183 sq.; *Providence in the Individual Life*, 231 sq.

God's providence with respect to men's evil acts is described in Scripture as of four sorts:

(a) Preventive,—God by his providence prevents sin which would otherwise be committed. That he thus prevents sin is to be regarded as matter, not of obligation, but of grace.

Gen. 20: 6—Of Abimelech: "I also withheld thee from sinning against me"; 31: 24—"And God came to Laban the Syrian in a dream of the night, and said unto him, Take heed to thyself that thou speak not to Jacob either good or bad"; Psalm 119: 13—"Keep back thy servant also from presumptuous sins; Let them not have dominion over me"; Hosea 2: 6—"Behold, I will hedge up thy way with thorns, and I will build a wall against her, that she shall not find her paths"—here the "thorns" and the "wall" may represent the restraints and sufferings by which God mercifully checks the fatal pursuit of sin (see Annotated Par. Bible *in loco*). Parents, government, church, traditions, customs, laws, age, disease, death, are all of them preventive influences. Man sometimes finds himself on the brink of a precipice of sin, and strong temptation hurries him on to make the fatal leap. Suddenly every nerve relaxes, all desire for the evil thing is gone, and he recoils from the fearful brink over which he was just now going to plunge. God has interfered by the voice of conscience and the Spirit. This too is a part of his preventive providence. Men at sixty years of age are eight times less likely to commit crime than at the age of twenty-five. Passion has subsided; fear of punishment has increased. The manager of a great department store, when asked what could prevent its absorbing all the trade of the city, replied: "Death!" Death certainly limits aggregations of property, and so constitutes a means of God's preventive providence. In the life of John G. Paton, the rain sent by God prevented the natives from murdering him and taking his goods.

(b) Permissive,—God permits men to cherish and to manifest the evil dispositions of their hearts. God's permissive providence is simply the negative act of withholding impediments from the path of the sinner, instead of preventing his sin by the exercise of divine power. It implies no ignorance, passivity, or indulgence, but consists with hatred of the sin and determination to punish it.

2 Chron. 32: 21—"God left him [Hezekiah], to try him, that he might know all that was in his heart"; cf. Deut. 8: 2—"that he might humble thee, to prove thee, to know what was in thine heart." Ps. 17: 13, 14—"Deliver my soul from the wicked, who is thy sword, from men who are thy hand, O Jehovah"; Ps. 81: 12, 13—"So I let them go after the stubbornness of their heart, that they might walk in their own counsels. Oh that my people would hearken unto me!" Is. 53: 4, 10—"Surely he hath borne our griefs. . . . Yet it pleased Jehovah to bruise him." Hosea 4:

17—"Ephraim is joined to idols; let him alone"; Acts 14: 16—"who in the generations gone by suffered all the nations to walk in their own ways"; Rom. 1: 24, 28—"God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts unto uncleanness. . . . God gave them up unto a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not fitting"; 3: 25—"to show his righteousness, because of the passing over of the sins done aforetime, in the forbearance of God." To this head of permissive providence is possibly to be referred 1 Sam. 18: 10—"an evil spirit from God came mightily upon Saul." As the Hebrew writers saw in second causes the operation of the great first Cause, and said: "The God of glory thundereth" (Ps. 29: 3), so, because even the acts of the wicked entered into God's plan, the Hebrew writers sometimes represented God as doing what he merely permitted finite spirits to do. In 2 Sam. 24: 1, God moves David to number Israel, but in 1 Chron. 21: 1 the same thing is referred to Satan. God's providence in these cases, however, may be directive as well as permissive.

Tennyson, *The Higher Pantheism*: "God is law, say the wise; O Soul, and let us rejoice, For if he thunder by law the thunder is yet his voice." Fisher, *Nature and Method of Revelation*, 56—"The clear separation of God's efficiency from God's permissive act was reserved to a later day. All emphasis was in the Old Testament laid upon the sovereign power of God." Coleridge, in his *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*, letter II, speaks of "the habit, universal with the Hebrew doctors, of referring all excellent or extraordinary things to the great first Cause, without mention of the proximate and instrumental causes—a striking illustration of which may be found by comparing the narratives of the same events in the Psalms and in the historical books. . . . The distinction between the providential and the miraculous did not enter into their forms of thinking—at any rate, not into their mode of conveying their thoughts." The woman who had been slandered rebelled when told that God had permitted it for her good; she maintained that Satan had inspired her accuser; she needed to learn that God had permitted the work of Satan.

(c) *Directive*.—God directs the evil acts of men to ends unforeseen and unintended by the agents. When evil is in the heart and will certainly come out, God orders its flow in one direction rather than in another, so that its course can be best controlled and least harm may result. This is sometimes called *overruling providence*.

Gen. 50: 20—"as for you, ye meant evil against me; but God meant it for good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive"; Ps. 78: 10—"the wrath of man shall praise thee: The residues of wrath shalt thou gird upon thee"—put on as an ornament—clothe thyself with it for thine own glory; Is. 10: 5—"Ho Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in whose hand is mine indignation"; John 13: 27—"What thou doest, do quickly"—do in a particular way what is actually being done (Westcott, *Bib. Com.*, *in loco*; Acts 4: 27, 28—"against thy holy Servant Jesus, whom thou didst anoint, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, were gathered together, to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel fore-ordained to come to pass."

To this head of directive providence should probably be referred the passages with regard to Pharaoh in Ex. 4: 21—"I will harden his heart, and he will not let the people go"; 7: 13—"and Pharaoh's heart was hardened"; 8: 15—"he hardened his heart"—i. e., Pharaoh hardened his own heart. Here the controlling agency of God did not interfere with the liberty of Pharaoh or oblige him to sin; but in judgment for his previous cruelty and impiety God withdrew the external restraints which had hitherto kept his sin within bounds, and placed him in circumstances which would have influenced to right action a well-disposed mind, but which God foresaw would lead a disposition like Pharaoh's to the peculiar course of wickedness which he actually pursued.

God hardened Pharaoh's heart, then, first, by permitting him to harden his own heart, God being the author of his sin only in the sense that he is the author of a free being who is himself the direct author of his sin; secondly, by giving to him the means of enlightenment, Pharaoh's very opportunities being perverted by him into occasions of more virulent wickedness, and good resisted being thus made to result in greater evil; thirdly, by judicially forsaking Pharaoh, when it became manifest that he would not do God's will, and thus making it morally certain, though not necessary, that he would do evil; and fourthly, by so directing Pharaoh's surroundings that his sin would manifest itself in one way rather than in another. Sin is like the lava of the volcano, which will certainly come out, but which God directs in its course down the mountain-side so that it will do least harm. The gravitation downward is due to man's evil will; the direction to this side or to that is due to God's providence. See Rom. 9: 17, 18—"For this very purpose did I raise thee up, that I might show in thee my power, and that my name might be published abroad in all the earth. So then he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth." Thus the very passions which

excite men to rebel against God are made completely subservient to his purposes; see Annotated Paragraph Bible, on Ps. 78:10.

God hardens Pharaoh's heart only after all the earlier plagues have been sent. Pharaoh had hardened his own heart before. God hardens no man's heart who has not first hardened it himself. Crane, Religion of To-morrow, 140—"Jehovah is never said to harden the heart of a good man, or of one who is set to do righteousness. It is always those who are bent on evil whom God hardens. Pharaoh hardens his own heart before the Lord is said to harden it. Nature is God, and it is the nature of human beings to harden when they resist softening influences." The Watchman, Dec. 5, 1901: 11—"God decreed to Pharaoh what Pharaoh had chosen for himself. Persistence in certain inclinations and volitions awakens within the body and soul forces which are not under the control of the will, and which drive the man on in the way he has chosen. After a time nature hardens the hearts of men to do evil."

(d) Determinative.—God determines the bounds reached by the evil passions of his creatures, and the measure of their effects. Since moral evil is a germ capable of indefinite expansion, God's determining the measure of its growth does not alter its character or involve God's complicity with the perverse wills which cherish it.

Job 1:12—"And Jehovah said unto Satan, Behold, all that he hath is in thy power; only upon himself put not forth thy hand"; 2:6—"Behold, he is in thy hand; only spare his life"; Ps. 124:3—"If it had not been Jehovah who was on our side, when men rose up against us; then had they swallowed us up alive"; 1 Cor. 10:13—"will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able; but will with the temptation make also the way of escape, that ye may be able to endure it"; 2 Thess. 2:7—"For the mystery of lawlessness doth already work; only there is one that restraineth now, until he be taken out of the way"; Rev. 20:2, 3—"And he laid hold on the dragon, the old serpent, which is the Devil and Satan, and bound him for a thousand years."

Pepper, Outlines of Syst. Theol., 76—"The union of God's will and man's will is such that, while in one view all can be ascribed to God, in another all can be ascribed to the creature. But how God and the creature are united in operation is doubtless known and knowable only to God. A very dim analogy is furnished in the union of the soul and body in men. The hand retains its own physical laws, yet is obedient to the human will. This theory recognizes the veracity of consciousness in its witness to personal freedom, and yet the completeness of God's control of both the bad and the good. Free beings are ruled, but are ruled as free and in their freedom. The freedom is not sacrificed to the control. The two coexist, each in its integrity. Any doctrine which does not allow this is false to Scripture and destructive of religion."

## 2. Rational proof.

A. Arguments *a priori* from the divine attributes. (a) From the immutability of God. This makes it certain that he will execute his eternal plan of the universe and its history. But the execution of this plan involves not only creation and preservation, but also providence. (b) From the benevolence of God. This renders it certain that he will care for the intelligent universe he has created. What it was worth his while to create, it is worth his while to care for. But this care is providence. (c) From the justice of God. As the source of moral law, God must assure the vindication of law by administering justice in the universe and punishing the rebellious. But this administration of justice is providence.

For heathen ideas of providence, see Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 11:30, where Balbus speaks of the existence of the gods as that, "quo concesso, confitendum est eorum consilio mundum administrari." Epictetus, sec. 41—"The principal and most important duty in religion is to possess your mind with just and becoming notions of the gods—to believe that there are such supreme beings, and that they govern and dispose of all the affairs of the world with a just and good providence." Marcus Antoninus: "If there are no gods, or if they have no regard for human affairs, why should I desire to live in a world without gods and without a providence? But gods undoubtedly there are, and they regard human affairs." See also Bib. Sac., 16:374. As we shall see, however, many of the heathen writers believed in a general, rather than in a particular, providence.

On the argument for providence derived from God's benevolence, see Appleton, Works, 1:146—"Is indolence more consistent with God's majesty than action would be? The happiness of creatures is a good. Does it honor God to say that he is indifferent to that which he knows to be good and valuable? Even if the world had come into existence without his agency, it would become God's moral character to pay some attention to creatures so numerous and so susceptible to pleasure and pain, especially when he might have so great and favorable an influence on their moral condition." John 5:17—"My Father worketh even until now, and I work"—is as applicable to providence as to preservation.

The complexity of God's providential arrangements may be illustrated by Tyndall's explanation of the fact that heartsease does not grow in the neighborhood of English villages: 1. In English villages dogs run loose. 2. Where dogs run loose, cats must stay at home. 3. Where cats stay at home, field mice abound. 4. Where field mice abound, the nests of bumble-bees are destroyed. 5. Where bumble-bees' nests are destroyed, there is no fertilization of pollen. Therefore, where dogs go loose, no heartsease grows.

B. Arguments *a posteriori* from the facts of nature and of history.

(a) The outward lot of individuals and nations is not wholly in their own hands, but is in many acknowledged respects subject to the disposal of a higher power. (b) The observed moral order of the world, although imperfect, cannot be accounted for without recognition of a divine providence. Vice is discouraged and virtue rewarded, in ways which are beyond the power of mere nature. There must be a governing mind and will, and this mind and will must be the mind and will of God.

The birthplace of individuals and of nations, the natural powers with which they are endowed, the opportunities and immunities they enjoy, are beyond their own control. A man's destiny for time and for eternity may be practically decided for him by his birth in a Christian home, rather than in a tenement-house at the Five Points, or in a kraal of the Hottentots. Progress largely depends upon "variety of environment" (H. Spencer). But this variety of environment is in great part independent of our own efforts.

"There's a Divinity that shapes our ends, Rough hew them how we will." Shakespeare here expounds human consciousness. "Man proposes and God disposes" has become a proverb. Experience teaches that success and failure are not wholly due to us. Men often labor and lose; they consult and nothing ensues; they "embattle and are broken." Providence is not always on the side of the heaviest battalions. Not arms but ideas have decided the fate of the world—as Xerxes found at Thermopylae, and Napoleon at Waterloo. Great movements are generally begun without consciousness of their greatness. Cf. Isa. 43:16—"I will bring the blind by a way that they know not"; 1 Cor. 5:37, 38—"thou sowest . . . a bare grain . . . but God giveth it a body even as it pleased him."

The deed returns to the doer, and character shapes destiny. This is true in the long run. Eternity will show the truth of the maxim. But here in time a sufficient number of apparent exceptions are permitted to render possible a moral probation. If evil were always immediately followed by penalty, righteousness would have a compelling power upon the will and the highest virtue would be impossible. Job's friends accuse Job of acting upon this principle. The Hebrew children deny its truth, when they say: "But if not"—even if God does not deliver us—"we will not serve thy gods, nor worship the golden image which thou hast set up" (Dan. 3:18).

Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, 298—"Through some misdirection or infirmity, most of the larger agencies in history have failed to reach their own ideal, yet have accomplished revolutions greater and more beneficent; the conquests of Alexander, the empire of Rome, the Crusades, the ecclesiastical persecutions, the monastic asceticism, the missionary zeal of Christendom, have all played a momentous part in the drama of the world, yet a part which is a surprise to each. All this shows the controlling presence of a Reason and a Will transcendent and divine." Kidd, *Social Evolution*, 99, declares that the progress of the race has taken place only under conditions which have had no sanction from the reason of the great proportion of the individuals who submit to them. He concludes that a rational religion is a scientific impossibility, and that the function of religion is to provide a super-rational sanction for social progress. We prefer to say that Providence pushes the race forward even against its will.

James Russell Lowell, *Letters*, 2:51, suggests that God's calm control of the forces

of the universe, both physical and mental, should give us confidence when evil seems impending: "How many times have I seen the fire-engines of church and state clanging and lumbering along to put out—a false alarm! And when the heavens are cloudy, what a glare can be cast by a burning shanty!" See Sermon on Providence in Political Revolutions, in Farrar's Science and Theology, 238. On the moral order of the world, notwithstanding its imperfections, see Butler, Analogy, Bohn's ed., 96; King, in Baptist Review, 1881: 202-222.

### III. THEORIES OPPOSING THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE.

#### 1. Fatalism.

Fatalism maintains the certainty, but denies the freedom, of human self-determination, — thus substituting fate for providence.

To this view we object that (a) it contradicts consciousness, which testifies that we are free; (b) it exalts the divine power at the expense of God's truth, wisdom, holiness, love; (c) it destroys all evidence of the personality and freedom of God; (d) it practically makes necessity the only God, and leaves the imperatives of our moral nature without present validity or future vindication.

The Mohammedans have frequently been called fatalists, and the practical effect of the teachings of the Koran upon the masses is to make them so. The ordinary Mohammedan will have no physician or medicine, because everything happens as God has before appointed. Smith, however, in his Mohammed and Mohammedanism, denies that fatalism is essential to the system. *Islam* — "submission," and the participle *Moslem* — "submitted," i. e., to God. Turkish proverb: "A man cannot escape what is written on his forehead." The Mohammedan thinks of God's dominant attribute as being greatness rather than righteousness, power rather than purity. God is the personification of arbitrary will, not the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. But there is in the system an absence of sacerdotalism, a jealousy for the honor of God, a brotherhood of believers, a reverence for what is considered the word of God, and a bold and habitual devotion of its adherents to their faith.

Stanley, Life and Letters, 1: 480, refers to the Mussulman tradition existing in Egypt that the fate of Islam requires that it should at last be superseded by Christianity. F. W. Sanders "denies that the Koran is peculiarly sensual. The Christian and Jewish religions," he says, "have their paradise also. The Koran makes this the reward, but not the ideal, of conduct; 'Grace from thy Lord — that is the grand bliss.' The emphasis of the Koran is upon right living. The Koran does not teach the propagation of religion by force. It declares that there shall be no compulsion in religion. The practice of converting by the sword is to be distinguished from the teaching of Mohammed, just as the Inquisition and the slave-trade in Christendom do not prove that Jesus taught them. The Koran did not institute polygamy. It found unlimited polygamy, divorce, and infanticide. The last it prohibited; the two former it restricted and ameliorated, just as Moses found polygamy, but brought it within bounds. The Koran is not hostile to secular learning. Learning flourished under the Bagdad and Spanish Caliphates. When Moslems oppose learning, they do so without authority from the Koran. The Roman Catholic church has opposed schools, but we do not attribute this to the gospel." See Zwemer, Moslem Doctrine of God.

Calvinists can assert freedom, since man's will finds its highest freedom only in submission to God. Islam also cultivates submission, but it is the submission not of love but of fear. The essential difference between Mohammedanism and Christianity is found in the revelation which the latter gives of the love of God in Christ — a revelation which secures from free moral agents the submission of love; see page 186. On fatalism, see McCosh, Intuitions, 286; Kant, Metaphysic of Ethics, 62-74, 98-108; Mill, Autobiography, 168-170, and System of Logic, 521-526; Hamilton, Metaphysics, 62; Stewart, Active and Moral Powers of Man, ed. Walker, 263-264.

#### 2. Casualism.

Casualism transfers the freedom of mind to nature, as fatalism transfers the fixity of nature to mind. It thus exchanges providence for chance.

Upon this view we remark :

(a) If chance be only another name for human ignorance, a name for the fact that there are trivial occurrences in life which have no meaning or relation to us, — we may acknowledge this, and still hold that providence arranges every so-called chance, for purposes beyond our knowledge. Chance, in this sense, is providential coincidence which we cannot understand, and do not need to trouble ourselves about.

Not all chances are of equal importance. The casual meeting of a stranger in the street need not bring God's providence before me, although I know that God arranges it. Yet I can conceive of that meeting as leading to religious conversation and to the stranger's conversion. When we are prepared for them, we shall see many opportunities which are now as unmeaning to us as the gold in the river-beds was to the early Indians in California. I should be an ingrate, if I escaped a lightning-stroke, and did not thank God; yet Dr. Arnold's saying that every school boy should put on his hat for God's glory, and with a high moral purpose, seems morbid. There is a certain room for the play of arbitrariness. We must not afflict ourselves or the church of God by requiring a Pharisaic punctiliousness in minutiae. Life is too short to debate the question which shoe we shall put on first. "Love God and do what you will," said Augustine; that is, Love God, and act out that love in a simple and natural way. Be free in your service, yet be always on the watch for indications of God's will.

(b) If chance be taken in the sense of utter absence of all causal connections in the phenomena of matter and mind, — we oppose to this notion the fact that the causal judgment is formed in accordance with a fundamental and necessary law of human thought, and that no science or knowledge is possible without the assumption of its validity.

In Luke 10:31, our Savior says: "By chance a certain priest was going down that way." Janet: "Chance is not a cause, but a coincidence of causes." Bowne, *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, 197 — "By chance is not meant lack of causation, but the coincidence in an event of mutually independent series of causation. Thus the unpurposed meeting of two persons is spoken of as a chance one, when the movement of neither implies that of the other. Here the antithesis of chance is purpose."

(c) If chance be used in the sense of undesigning cause, — it is evidently insufficient to explain the regular and uniform sequences of nature, or the moral progress of the human race. These things argue a superintending and designing mind — in other words, a providence. Since reason demands not only a cause, but a sufficient cause, for the order of the physical and moral world, casualism must be ruled out.

The observer at the signal station was asked what was the climate of Rochester. "Climate?" he replied; "Rochester has no climate, — only weather!" So Chauncey Wright spoke of the ups and downs of human affairs as simply "cosmical weather." But our intuition of design compels us to see mind and purpose in individual and national history, as well as in the physical universe. The same argument which proves the existence of God proves also the existence of a providence. See Farrar, *Life of Christ*, 1:155, note.

### 3. *Theory of a merely general providence.*

Many who acknowledge God's control over the movements of planets and the destinies of nations deny any divine arrangement of particular events. Most of the arguments against deism are equally valid against the theory of a merely general providence. This view is indeed only a form of deism, which holds that God has not wholly withdrawn himself from the universe, but that his activity within it is limited to the maintenance of general laws.

This appears to have been the view of most of the heathen philosophers. Cicero: "Magni dil curant; parva negligunt." "Even in kingdoms among men," he says, "kings do not trouble themselves with insignificant affairs." Fullerton, *Conceptions of the Infinite*, 9— "Plutarch thought there could not be an infinity of worlds, — Providence could not possibly take charge of so many. 'Troublesome and boundless infinity' could be grasped by no consciousness." The ancient Cretans made an image of Jove without ears, for they said: "It is a shame to believe that God would hear the talk of men." So Jerome, the church Father, thought it absurd that God should know just how many gnats and cockroaches there were in the world. David Harum is wiser when he expresses the belief that there is nothing wholly bad or useless in the world: "A reasonable amount of fleas is good for a dog, — they keep him from broodin' on bein' a dog." This has been paraphrased: "A reasonable number of beaux are good for a girl, — they keep her from brooding over her being a girl."

In addition to the arguments above alluded to, we may urge against this theory that:

(a) General control over the course of nature and of history is impossible without control over the smallest particulars which affect the course of nature and of history. Incidents so slight as well-nigh to escape observation at the time of their occurrence are frequently found to determine the whole future of a human life, and through that life the fortunes of a whole empire and of a whole age.

"Nothing great has great beginnings." "Take care of the pence, and the pounds will take care of themselves." "Care for the chain is care for the links of the chain." Instances in point are the sleeplessness of King Ahasuerus (*Ester 6:1*), and the seeming chance that led to the reading of the record of Mordecai's service and to the salvation of the Jews in Persia; the spider's web spun across the entrance to the cave in which Mohammed had taken refuge, which so deceived his pursuers that they passed on in a bootless chase, leaving to the world the religion and the empire of the Moslems; the preaching of Peter the Hermit, which occasioned the first Crusade; the chance shot of an archer, which pierced the right eye of Harold, the last of the purely English kings, gained the battle of Hastings for William the Conqueror, and secured the throne of England for the Normans; the flight of pigeons to the south-west, which changed the course of Columbus, hitherto directed towards Virginia, to the West Indies, and so prevented the dominion of Spain over North America; the storm that dispersed the Spanish Armada and saved England from the Papacy, and the storm that dispersed the French fleet gathered for the conquest of New England — the latter on a day of fasting and prayer appointed by the Puritans to avert the calamity; the settling of New England by the Puritans, rather than by French Jesuits; the order of Council restraining Cromwell and his friends from sailing to America; Major André's lack of self-possession in presence of his captors, which led him to ask an improper question instead of showing his passport, and which saved the American cause; the unusually early commencement of cold weather, which frustrated the plans of Napoleon and destroyed his army in Russia; the fatal shot at Fort Sumter, which precipitated the war of secession and resulted in the abolition of American slavery. Nature is linked to history; the breeze warps the course of the bullet; the worm perforates the plank of the ship. God must care for the least, or he cannot care for the greatest.

"Large doors swing on small hinges." The barking of a dog determined F. W. Robertson to be a preacher rather than a soldier. Robert Browning, *Mr. Sludge the Medium*: "We find great things are made of little things, And little things go lessening till at last Comes God behind them." E. G. Robinson: "We cannot suppose only a general outline to have been in the mind of God, while the filling-up is left to be done in some other way. The general includes the special." Dr. Lloyd, one of the Oxford Professors, said to Pusey, "I wish you would learn something about those German articles." "In the obedient spirit of those times," writes Pusey, "I set myself at once to learn German, and I went to Göttingen, to study at once the language and the theology. My life turned on that hint of Dr. Lloyd's."

Goldwin Smith: "Had a bullet entered the brain of Cromwell or of William III in his first battle, or had Gustavus not fallen at Lützen, the course of history apparently would have been changed. The course even of science would have been changed, if there had not been a Newton and a Darwin." The annexation of Corsica to France

gave to France a Napoleon, and to Europe a conqueror. Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, 101.—“Had the monastery at Erfurt deputed another than young Luther on its errand to paganized Rome, or had Leo X sent a less scandalous agent than Tetzel on his business to Germany, the seeds of the Reformation might have fallen by the wayside where they had no deepness of earth, and the Western revolt of the human mind might have taken another date and another form.” See Appleton, *Works*, 1:149 sq.; Lecky, *England in the Eighteenth Century*, chap. I.

(b) The love of God which prompts a general care for the universe must also prompt a particular care for the smallest events which affect the happiness of his creatures. It belongs to love to regard nothing as trifling or beneath its notice which has to do with the interests of the object of its affection. Infinite love may therefore be expected to provide for all, even the minutest things in the creation. Without belief in this particular care, men cannot long believe in God's general care. Faith in a particular providence is indispensable to the very existence of practical religion; for men will not worship or recognize a God who has no direct relation to them.

Man's care for his own body involves care for the least important members of it. A lover's devotion is known by his interest in the minutest concerns of his beloved. So all our affairs are matters of interest to God. Pope's *Essay on Man*: “All nature is but art unknown to thee; All chance, direction which thou canst not see; All discord, harmony not understood; All partial evil, universal good.” If harvests may be labored for and lost without any agency of God; if rain or sun may act like fate, sweeping away the results of years, and God have no hand in it all; if wind and storm may wreck the ship and drown our dearest friends, and God not care for us or for our loss, then all possibility of general trust in God will disappear also.

God's care is shown in the least things as well as in the greatest. In Gethsemane Christ says: “Let these go their way: that the word might be fulfilled which he spake, Of those whom thou hast given me I lost not one” (John 13:8, 9). It is the same spirit as that of his intercessory prayer: “I guarded them, and not one of them perished, but the son of perdition” (John 17:12). Christ gives himself as a prisoner that his disciples may go free, even as he redeems us from the curse of the law by being made a curse for us (Gal. 3:13). The dewdrop is moulded by the same law that rounds the planets into spheres. Gen. Grant said he had never but once sought a place for himself, and in that place he was a comparative failure; he had been an instrument in God's hand for the accomplishing of God's purposes, apart from any plan or thought or hope of his own.

Of his journey through the dark continent in search of David Livingston, Henry M. Stanley wrote in *Scribner's Monthly* for June, 1890: “Constrained at the darkest hour humbly to confess that without God's help I was helpless, I vowed a vow in the forest solitudes that I would confess his aid before men. Silence as of death was around me; it was midnight; I was weakened by illness, prostrated with fatigue, and wan with anxiety for my white and black companions, whose fate was a mystery. In this physical and mental distress I besought God to give me back my people. Nine hours later we were exulting with a rapturous joy. In full view of all was the crimson flag with the crescent, and beneath its waving folds was the long-lost rear column. . . . My own designs were frustrated constantly by unhappy circumstances. I endeavored to steer my course as direct as possible, but there was an unaccountable influence at the helm. . . . I have been conscious that the issues of every effort were in other hands. . . . Divinity seems to have hedged us while we journeyed, impelling us whither it would, effecting its own will, but constantly guiding and protecting us.” He refuses to believe that it is all the result of ‘luck’, and he closes with a doxology which we should expect from Livingston but not from him: “Thanks be to God, forever and ever!”

(c) In times of personal danger, and in remarkable conjunctures of public affairs, men instinctively attribute to God a control of the events which take place around them. The prayers which such startling emergencies force from men's lips are proof that God is present and active in human affairs. This testimony of our mental constitution must be regarded as virtually the testimony of him who framed this constitution.

No advance of science can rid us of this conviction, since it comes from a deeper source than mere reasoning. The intuition of design is awakened by the connection of events in our daily life, as much as by the useful adaptations which we see in nature. Ps. 107: 23-29 — "They that go down to the sea in ships . . . . mount up to the heavens, they go down again to the depths . . . . And are at their wits' end. Then they cry unto Jehovah in their trouble." A narrow escape from death shows us a present God and Deliverer. Instance the general feeling throughout the land, expressed by the press as well as by the pulpit, at the breaking out of our rebellion and at the President's subsequent Proclamation of Emancipation.

"Est deus in nobis; agitante calescimus illo." For contrast between Nansen's ignoring of God in his polar journey and Dr. Jacob Chamberlain's calling upon God in his strait in India, see *Missionary Review*, May, 1898. *Sunday School Times*, March 4, 1898 — "Benjamin Franklin became a deist at the age of fifteen. Before the Revolutionary War he was merely a shrewd and pushing business man. He had public spirit, and he made one happy discovery in science. But 'Poor Richard's' sayings express his mind at that time. The perils and anxieties of the great war gave him a deeper insight. He and others entered upon it 'with a rope around their necks.' As he told the Constitutional Convention of 1787, when he proposed that its daily sessions be opened with prayer, the experiences of that war showed him that 'God verily rules in the affairs of men.' And when the designs for an American coinage were under discussion, Franklin proposed to stamp on them, not 'A Penny Saved is a Penny Earned,' or any other piece of worldly prudence, but 'The Fear of the Lord is the Beginning of Wisdom.'"

(d) Christian experience confirms the declarations of Scripture that particular events are brought about by God with special reference to the good or ill of the individual. Such events occur at times in such direct connection with the Christian's prayers that no doubt remains with regard to the providential arrangement of them. The possibility of such divine agency in natural events cannot be questioned by one who, like the Christian, has had experience of the greater wonders of regeneration and daily intercourse with God, and who believes in the reality of creation, incarnation, and miracles.

Providence prepares the way for men's conversion, sometimes by their own partial reformation, sometimes by the sudden death of others near them. Instance Luther and Judson. The Christian learns that the same Providence that led him before his conversion is busy after his conversion in directing his steps and in supplying his wants. Daniel Defoe: "I have been fed more by miracle than Elijah when the angels were his purveyors." In Psalm 32, David celebrates not only God's pardoning mercy but his subsequent providential leading: "I will counsel thee with mine eyes upon thee" (verse 8). It may be objected that we often mistake the meaning of events. We answer that, as in nature, so in providence, we are compelled to believe, not that we *know* the design, but that there is a design. Instance Shelley's drowning, and Jacob Knapp's prayer that his opponent might be stricken dumb. Lyman Beecher's attributing the burning of the Unitarian church to God's judgment upon false doctrine was invalidated a little later by the burning of his own church.

Job 23: 10 — "He knoweth the way that is mine," or "the way that is with me," i. e., my inmost way, life, character: "When he hath tried me, I shall come forth as gold." 1 Cor. 10: 4 — "and the rock was Christ" — Christ was the ever present source of their refreshment and life, both physical and spiritual. God's providence is all exercised through Christ. 2 Cor. 2: 14 — "But thanks be unto God, who always leadeth us in triumph in Christ"; not, as in A. V., "consenteth us to triumph." Paul glories, not in conquering, but in being conquered. Let Christ triumph, not Paul. "Great King of grace, my heart subdue; I would be led in triumph too, A willing captive to my Lord, To own the conquests of his word." Therefore Paul can call himself "the prisoner of Christ Jesus" (Eph. 3: 1). It was Christ who had shut him up two years in Caesarea, and then two succeeding years in Rome.

#### IV. RELATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE.

##### 1. To miracles and works of grace.

Particular providence is the agency of God in what seem to us the minor affairs of nature and human life. Special providence is only an instance

of God's particular providence which has special relation to us or makes peculiar impression upon us. It is special, not as respects the means which God makes use of, but as respects the effect produced upon us. In special providence we have only a more impressive manifestation of God's universal control.

Miracles and works of grace like regeneration are not to be regarded as belonging to a different order of things from God's special providences. They too, like special providences, may have their natural connections and antecedents, although they more readily suggest their divine authorship. Nature and God are not mutually exclusive,—nature is rather God's method of working. Since nature is only the manifestation of God, special providence, miracle, and regeneration are simply different degrees of extraordinary nature. Certain of the wonders of Scripture, such as the destruction of Sennacherib's army and the dividing of the Red Sea, the plagues of Egypt, the flight of quails, and the draught of fishes, can be counted as exaggerations of natural forces, while at the same time they are operations of the wonder-working God.

The falling of snow from a roof is an example of ordinary (or particular) providence. But if a man is killed by it, it becomes a special providence to him and to others who are thereby taught the insecurity of life. So the providing of coal for fuel in the geologic ages may be regarded by different persons in the light either of a general or of a special providence. In all the operations of nature and all the events of life God's providence is exhibited. That providence becomes special, when it manifestly suggests some care of God for us or some duty of ours to God. Savage, *Life beyond Death*, 285—"Mary A. Livermore's life was saved during her travels in the West by her hearing and instantly obeying what seemed to her a voice. She did not know where it came from; but she leaped, as the voice ordered, from one side of a car to the other, and instantly the side where she had been sitting was crushed in and utterly demolished." In a similar way, the life of Dr. Oncken was saved in the railroad disaster at Norwalk.

Trench gives the name of "providential miracles" to those Scripture wonders which may be explained as wrought through the agency of natural laws (see Trench, *Miracles*, 19). Mozley also (*Miracles*, 117-120) calls these wonders miracles, because of the predictive word of God which accompanied them. He says that the difference in effect between miracles and special providences is that the latter give some warrant, while the former give full warrant, for believing that they are wrought by God. He calls special providences "invisible miracles." Bp. of Southampton, *Place of Miracles*, 12, 13—"The art of Bezaleel in constructing the tabernacle, and the plans of generals like Moses and Joshua, Gideon, Barak, and David, are in the Old Testament ascribed to the direct inspiration of God. A less religious writer would have ascribed them to the instinct of military skill. No miracle is necessarily involved, when, in devising the system of ceremonial law it is said: 'Jehovah spake unto Moses' (Num. 5:1). God is everywhere present in the history of Israel, but miracles are strikingly rare." We prefer to say that the line between the natural and the supernatural, between special providence and miracle, is an arbitrary one, and that the same event may often be regarded either as special providence or as miracle, according as we look at it from the point of view of its relation to other events or from the point of view of its relation to God.

E. G. Robinson: "If Vesuvius should send up ashes and lava, and a strong wind should scatter them, it could be said to rain fire and brimstone, as at Sodom and Gomorrah." There is abundant evidence of volcanic action at the Dead Sea. See article on the Physical Preparation for Israel in Palestine, by G. Frederick Wright, in *Bib. Sac.*, April, 1901:364. The three great miracles—the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the parting of the waters of the Jordan, the falling down of the walls of Jericho—are described as effect of volcanic eruption, elevation of the bed of the river by a landslide, and earthquake-shock overthrowing the walls. Salt slime thrown up may have enveloped Lot's wife and turned her into "a mound of salt" (Gen. 19:26). In like manner, some of Jesus' works of healing, as for instance those wrought upon paralytics and epileptics, may be susceptible of natural explanation, while yet they show

that Christ is absolute Lord of nature. For the naturalistic view, see Tyndall on Miracles and Special Providences, in *Fragments of Science*, 45, 418. *Per contra*, see Farrar, on Divine Providence and General Laws, in *Science and Theology*, 84-89; Row, *Bampton Lect. on Christian Evidences*, 109-115; Godet, *Defence of Christian Faith*, Chap. 2; Bowne, *The Immanence of God*, 58-65.

## 2. To prayer and its answer.

What has been said with regard to God's connection with nature suggests the question, how God can answer prayer consistently with the fixity of natural law.

Tyndall (see reference above), while repelling the charge of denying that God can answer prayer at all, yet does deny that he can answer it without a miracle. He says expressly "that without a disturbance of natural law quite as serious as the stoppage of an eclipse, or the rolling of the St. Lawrence up the falls of Niagara, no act of humiliation, individual or national, could call one shower from heaven or deflect toward us a single beam of the sun." In reply we would remark:

### A. Negatively, that the true solution is not to be reached:

(a) By making the sole effect of prayer to be its reflex influence upon the petitioner. — Prayer presupposes a God who hears and answers. It will not be offered, unless it is believed to accomplish objective as well as subjective results.

According to the first view mentioned above, prayer is a mere spiritual gymnastics—an effort to lift ourselves from the ground by tugging at our own boot-straps. David Hume said well, after hearing a sermon by Dr. Leechman: "We can make use of no expression or even thought in prayers and entreaties which does not imply that these prayers have an influence." See Tyndall on Prayer and Natural Law, in *Fragments of Science*, 35. Will men pray to a God who is both deaf and dumb? Will the sailor on the bowsprit whistle to the wind for the sake of improving his voice? Horace Bushnell called this perversion of prayer a "mere dumb-bell exercise." Baron Munchausen pulled himself out of the bog in China by tugging away at his own pigtail.

Hyde, *God's Education of Man*, 154, 155—"Prayer is not the reflex action of my will upon itself, but rather the communion of two wills, in which the finite comes into connection with the Infinite, and, like the trolley, appropriates its purpose and power." Harnack, *Wesen des Christenthums*, 42, apparently follows Schleiermacher in unduly limiting prayer to general petitions which receive only a subjective answer. He tells us that "Jesus taught his disciples the Lord's Prayer in response to a request for directions how to pray. Yet we look in vain therein for requests for special gifts of grace, or for particular good things, even though they are spiritual. The name, the will, the kingdom of God—these are the things which are the objects of petition." Harnack forgets that the same Christ said also: "All things whatsoever ye pray and ask for, believe that ye receive them, and ye shall have them" (*Mark 11: 24*).

(b) Nor by holding that God answers prayer simply by spiritual means, such as the action of the Holy Spirit upon the spirit of man. — The realm of spirit is no less subject to law than the realm of matter. Scripture and experience, moreover, alike testify that in answer to prayer events take place in the outward world which would not have taken place if prayer had not gone before.

According to this second theory, God feeds the starving Elijah, not by a distinct message from heaven but by giving a compassionate disposition to the widow of Zarephath so that she is moved to help the prophet. *1 K. 17: 9*—"behold, I have commanded a widow here to sustain thee." But God could also feed Elijah by the ravens and the angel (*1 K. 17: 4; 19: 15*), and the pouring rain that followed Elijah's prayer (*1 K. 18: 42-45*) cannot be explained as a subjective spiritual phenomenon. Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 208—"Our charts map out not only the solid shore but the windings of the ocean currents, and we look into the morning papers to ascertain the gathering of storms on the

slopes of the Rocky Mountains." But law rules in the realm of spirit as well as in the realm of nature. See Baden Powell, in *Essays and Reviews*, 106-163; Knight, *Studies in Philosophy and Literature*, 340-404; George I. Chace, discourse before the Porter Rhet. Soc. of Andover, August, 1864. Governor Rice in Washington is moved to send money to a starving family in New York, and to secure employment for them. Though he has had no information with regard to their need, they have knelt in prayer for help just before the coming of the aid.

(c) Nor by maintaining that God suspends or breaks in upon the order of nature, in answering every prayer that is offered. — This view does not take account of natural laws as having objective existence, and as revealing the order of God's being. Omnipotence might thus suspend natural law, but wisdom, so far as we can see, would not.

This third theory might well be held by those who see in nature no force but the all-working will of God. But the properties and powers of matter are revelations of the divine will, and the human will has only a relative independence in the universe. To desire that God would answer all our prayers is to desire omnipotence without omniscience. All true prayer is therefore an expression of the one petition: "Thy will be done" (Mat. 6:10). E. G. Robinson: "It takes much common sense to pray, and many prayers are destitute of this quality. Man needs to pray audibly even in his private prayers, to get the full benefit of them. One of the chief benefits of the English liturgy is that the individual minister is lost sight of. Protestantism makes you work; in Romanism the church will do it all for you."

(d) Nor by considering prayer as a physical force, linked in each case to its answer, as physical cause is linked to physical effect. — Prayer is not a force acting directly upon nature; else there would be no discretion as to its answer. It can accomplish results in nature, only as it influences God.

We educate our children in two ways: first, by training them to do for themselves what they can do; and, secondly, by encouraging them to seek our help in matters beyond their power. So God educates us, first, by impersonal law, and, secondly, by personal dependence. He teaches us both to work and to ask. Notice the "perfect unwisdom of modern scientists who place themselves under the training of impersonal law, to the exclusion of that higher and better training which is under personality" (Hopkins, *Sermon on Prayer-gauge*, 16).

It seems more in accordance with both Scripture and reason to say that:

B. God may answer prayer, even when that answer involves changes in the sequences of nature, —

(a) By new combinations of natural forces, in regions withdrawn from our observation, so that effects are produced which these same forces left to themselves would never have accomplished. As man combines the laws of chemical attraction and of combustion, to fire the gunpowder and split the rock asunder, so God may combine the laws of nature to bring about answers to prayer. In all this there may be no suspension or violation of law, but a use of law unknown to us.

Hopkins, *Sermon on the Prayer-gauge*: "Nature is uniform in her processes but not in her results. Do you say that water cannot run uphill? Yes, it can and does. Whenever man constructs a milldam the water runs up the adjoining hills till it reaches the top of the milldam. Man can make a spark of electricity do his bidding; why cannot God use a bolt of electricity? Laws are not our masters, but our servants. They do our bidding all the better because they are uniform. And our servants are not God's masters." Kendall Brooks: "The master of a musical instrument can vary without limit the combination of sounds and the melodies which these combinations can produce. The laws of the instrument are not changed, but in their unchanging steadfastness produce an infinite variety of tunes. It is necessary that they should be

unchanging in order to secure a desired result. So nature, which exercises the infinite skill of the divine Master, is governed by unvarying laws; but he, by these laws, produces an infinite variety of results."

Hodge, Popular Lectures, 45, 99—"The system of natural laws is far more flexible in God's hands than it is in ours. We act on second causes externally; God acts on them internally. We act upon them at only a few isolated points; God acts upon every point of the system at the same time. The whole of nature may be as plastic to his will as the air in the organs of the great singer who articulates it into a fit expression of every thought and passion of his soaring soul." Upton, Hibbert Lectures, 155—"If all the chemical elements of our solar system preëxisted in the fiery cosmic mist, there must have been a time when quite suddenly the attractions between these elements overcame the degree of caloric force which held them apart, and the rush of elements into chemical union must have been consummated with inconceivable rapidity. Uniformitarianism is not universal."

Shaler, Interpretation of Nature, chap. 2—"By a little increase of centrifugal force the elliptical orbit is changed into a parabola, and the planet becomes a comet. By a little reduction in temperature water becomes solid and loses many of its powers. So unexpected results are brought about and surprises as revolutionary as if a Supreme Power immediately intervened." William James, Address before Soc. for Psych. Research: "Thought-transference may involve a critical point, as the physicists call it, which is passed only when certain psychic conditions are realized, and otherwise not reached at all—just as a big conflagration will break out at a certain temperature, below which no conflagration whatever, whether big or little, can occur." Tennyson, Life, 1:334—"Prayer is like opening a sluice between the great ocean and our little channels, when the great sea gathers itself together and flows in at full tide."

Since prayer is nothing more nor less than appeal to a personal and present God, whose granting or withholding of the requested blessing is believed to be determined by the prayer itself, we must conclude that prayer moves God, or, in other words, induces the putting forth on his part of an imperative volition.

The view that in answering prayer God combines natural forces is elaborated by Chalmers, Works, 2:314, and 7:234. See Diman, Theistic Argument, III—"When laws are conceived of, not as single, but as combined, instead of being immutable in their operation, they are the agencies of ceaseless change. Phenomena are governed, not by invariable forces, but by *endlessly varying combinations of invariable forces.*" Diman seems to have followed Argyll, Reign of Law, 100.

Janet, Final Causes, 219—"I kindle a fire in my grate. I only intervene to produce and combine together the different agents whose natural action behooves to produce the effect I have need of; but the first step once taken, all the phenomena constituting combustion engender each other, conformably to their laws, without a new intervention of the agent; so that an observer who should study the series of these phenomena, without perceiving the first hand that had prepared all, could not seize that hand in any especial act, and yet there is a preconceived plan and combination."

Hopkins, Sermon on Prayer-gauge: Man, by sprinkling plaster on his field, may cause the corn to grow more luxuriantly; by kindling great fires and by firing cannon, he may cause rain; and God can surely, in answer to prayer, do as much as man can. Lewes says that the fundamental character of all theological philosophy is conceiving of phenomena as subject to supernatural volition, and consequently as eminently and irregularly variable. This notion, he says, is refuted, first, by exact and rational prevision of phenomena, and, secondly, by the possibility of our modifying these phenomena so as to promote our own advantage. But we ask in reply: If we can modify them, cannot God? But, lest this should seem to imply mutability in God or inconsistency in nature, we remark, in addition, that:

(b) God may have so prearranged the laws of the material universe and the events of history that, while the answer to prayer is an expression of his will, it is granted through the working of natural agencies, and in perfect accordance with the general principle that results, both temporal and spiritual, are to be attained by intelligent creatures through the use of the appropriate and appointed means.

J. P. Cooke, *Credentials of Science*, 194—"The Jacquard loom of itself would weave a perfectly uniform plain fabric; the perforated cards determine a selection of the threads, and through a combination of these variable conditions, so complex that the observer cannot follow their intricate workings, the pre-designed pattern appears." E. G. Robinson: "The most formidable objection to this theory is the apparent countenance it lends to the doctrine of necessitarianism. But if it presupposes that free actions have been taken into account, it cannot easily be shown to be false." The bishop who was asked by his curate to sanction prayers for rain was unduly sceptical when he replied: "First consult the barometer." Phillips Brooks: "Prayer is not the conquering of God's reluctance, but the taking hold of God's willingness."

The Pilgrims at Plymouth, somewhere about 1623, prayed for rain. They met at 9 A. M., and continued in prayer for eight or nine hours. While they were assembled clouds gathered, and the next morning began rains which, with some intervals, lasted fourteen days. John Easter was many years ago an evangelist in Virginia. A large out-door meeting was being held. Many thousands had assembled, when heavy storm clouds began to gather. There was no shelter to which the multitudes could retreat. The rain had already reached the adjoining fields when John Easter cried: "Brethren, be still, while I call upon God to stay the storm till the gospel is preached to this multitude!" Then he knelt and prayed that the audience might be spared the rain, and that after they had gone to their homes there might be refreshing showers. Behold, the clouds parted as they came near, and passed to either side of the crowd and then closed again, leaving the place dry where the audience had assembled, and the next day the postponed showers came down upon the ground that had been the day before omitted.

Since God is immanent in nature, an answer to prayer, coming about through the intervention of natural law, may be as real a revelation of God's personal care as if the laws of nature were suspended, and God interposed by an exercise of his creative power. Prayer and its answer, though having God's immediate volition as their connecting bond, may yet be provided for in the original plan of the universe.

The universe does not exist for itself, but for moral ends and moral beings, to reveal God and to furnish facilities of intercourse between God and intelligent creatures. Bishop Berkeley: "The universe is God's ceaseless conversation with his creatures." The universe certainly subserves moral ends—the discouragement of vice and the reward of virtue; why not spiritual ends also? When we remember that there is no true prayer which God does not inspire; that every true prayer is part of the plan of the universe linked in with all the rest and provided for at the beginning; that God is in nature and in mind, supervising all their movements and making all fulfill his will and reveal his personal care; that God can adjust the forces of nature to each other far more skilfully than can man when man produces effects which nature of herself could never accomplish; that God is not confined to nature or her forces, but can work by his creative and omnipotent will where other means are not sufficient,—we need have no fear, either that natural law will bar God's answers to prayer, or that these answers will cause a shock or jar in the system of the universe.

Matheson, *Messages of the Old Religions*, 321, 322—"Hebrew poetry never deals with outward nature for its own sake. The eye never rests on beauty for itself alone. The heavens are the work of God's hands, the earth is God's footstool, the winds are God's ministers, the stars are God's host, the thunder is God's voice. What we call Nature the Jew called God." Miss Heloise E. Hersey: "Plato in the *Phædrus* sets forth in a splendid myth the means by which the gods refresh themselves. Once a year, in a mighty host, they drive their chariots up the steep to the topmost vault of heaven. Thence they may behold all the wonders and the secrets of the universe; and, quickened by the sight of the great plain of truth, they return home replenished and made glad by the celestial vision." Abp. Trench, *Poems*, 134—"Lord, what a change within us one short hour spent in thy presence will prevail to make—What heavy burdens from our bosoms take, What parched grounds refresh as with a shower! We kneel, and all around us seems to lower; We rise, and all, the distant and the near, Stands forth in sunny outline, brave and clear; We kneel how weak, we rise how full of power! Why, therefore, should we do ourselves this wrong, Or others—that we are not always strong; That we are ever overborne with care; That we should ever weak

or heartless be, Anxious or troubled, when with us is prayer, And joy and strength and courage are with thee?" See Calderwood, *Science and Religion*, 299-309; McCosh, *Divine Government*, 215; Liddon, *Elements of Religion*, 175-203; Hamilton, *Autology*, 690-694. See also Jellett, *Donnellan Lectures on the Efficacy of Prayer*; Butterworth, *Story of Notable Prayers*; Patton, *Prayer and its Answers*; Monrad, *World of Prayer*; Prime, *Power of Prayer*; Phelps, *The Still Hour*; Haven, and Bickersteth, *on Prayer*; *Prayer for Colleges*; Cox, in *Expositor*, 1877: chap. 3; Faunce, *Prayer as a Theory and a Fact*; Trumbull, *Prayer, Its Nature and Scope*.

C. If asked whether this relation between prayer and its providential answer can be scientifically tested, we reply that it may be tested just as a father's love may be tested by a dutiful son.

(a) There is a general proof of it in the past experience of the Christian and in the past history of the church.

Ps. 116: 1-3—"I love Jehovah because he heareth my voice and my supplications." Luther prays for the dying Melancthon, and he recovers. George Müller trusts to prayer, and builds his great orphan-houses. For a multitude of instances, see Prime, *Answers to Prayer*. Charles H. Spurgeon: "If there is any fact that is proved, it is that God hears prayer. If there is any scientific statement that is capable of mathematical proof, this is." Mr. Spurgeon's language is rhetorical: he means simply that God's answers to prayer remove all reasonable doubt. Adoniram Judson: "I never was deeply interested in any object, I never prayed sincerely and earnestly for anything, but it came; at some time—no matter at how distant a day—somehow, in some shape, probably the last I should have devised—it came. And yet I have always had so little faith! May God forgive me, and while he condescends to use me as his instrument, wipe the sin of unbelief from my heart!"

(b) In condescension to human blindness, God may sometimes submit to a formal test of his faithfulness and power,—as in the case of Elijah and the priests of Baal.

Is. 7: 10-13—Aha is rebuked for not asking a sign,—in him it indicated unbelief. 1 K. 18: 36-38—Elijah said, "let it be known this day that thou art God in Israel. . . . Then the fire of Jehovah fell, and consumed the burnt offering." Romaine speaks of "a year famous for believing." Mat. 21: 21, 23—"even if ye shall say unto this mountain, Be thou taken up and cast into the sea, it shall be done. And all things, whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive." "Impossible?" said Napoleon; "then it shall be done!" Arthur Hallam, quoted in Tennyson's *Life*, 1: 44—"With respect to prayer, you ask how I am to distinguish the operations of God in me from the motions of my own heart. Why should you distinguish them, or how do you know that there is any distinction? Is God less God because he acts by general laws when he deals with the common elements of nature?" "Watch in prayer to see what cometh. Foolish boys that knock at a door in wantonness, will not stay till somebody open to them; but a man that hath business will knock, and knock again, till he gets his answer."

Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, 103, 108—"God is not beyond nature simply,—he is within it. In nature and in mind we must find the action of his power. There is no need of his being a third factor over and above the life of nature and the life of man." Hartley Coleridge: "Be not afraid to pray,—to pray is right. Pray if thou canst with hope, but ever pray, Though hope be weak, or sick with long delay; Pray in the darkness, if there be no light. Far is the time, remote from human sight, When war and discord on the earth shall cease; Yet every prayer for universal peace Avails the blessed time to expedite. Whate'er is good to wish, ask that of heaven, Though it be what thou canst not hope to see; Pray to be perfect, though the material heaven Forbid the spirit so on earth to be; But if for any wish thou dar'st not pray, Then pray to God to cast that wish away."

(c) When proof sufficient to convince the candid inquirer has been already given, it may not consist with the divine majesty to abide a test imposed by mere curiosity or scepticism,—as in the case of the Jews who sought a sign from heaven.

Mat. 12: 39—"An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and there shall no sign be given to it but the sign of Jonah the prophet." Tyndall's prayer-gauge would ensure a conflict of prayers. Since our present life is a moral probation, delay in the answer to our prayers, and even the denial of specific things for which we pray, may be only signs of God's faithfulness and love. George Müller: "I myself have been bringing certain requests before God now for seventeen years and six months, and never a day has passed without my praying concerning them all this time; yet the full answer has not come up to the present. But I look for it; I confidently expect it." Christ's prayer, "let this cup pass away from me" (Mat. 26: 39), and Paul's prayer that the "thorn in the flesh" might depart from him (2 Cor. 12: 7, 8), were not answered in the precise way requested. No more are our prayers always answered in the way we expect. Christ's prayer was not answered by the literal removing of the cup, because the drinking of the cup was really his glory; and Paul's prayer was not answered by the literal removal of the thorn, because the thorn was needful for his own perfecting. In the case of both Jesus and Paul, there were larger interests to be consulted than their own freedom from suffering.

(d) Since God's will is the link between prayer and its answer, there can be no such thing as a physical demonstration of its efficacy in any proposed case. Physical tests have no application to things into which free will enters as a constitutive element. But there are moral tests, and moral tests are as scientific as physical tests can be.

Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 376, alludes to Goldwin Smith's denial that any scientific method can be applied to history because it would make man a necessary link in a chain of cause and effect and so would deny his free will. But Diman says this is no more impossible than the development of the individual according to a fixed law of growth, while yet free will is sedulously respected. Froude says history is not a science, because no science could foretell Mohammedanism or Buddhism; and Goldwin Smith says that "prediction is the crown of all science." But, as Diman remarks: "geometry, geology, physiology, are sciences, yet they do not predict." Buckle brought history into contempt by asserting that it could be analyzed and referred solely to intellectual laws and forces. To all this we reply that there may be scientific tests which are not physical, or even intellectual, but only moral. Such a test God urges his people to use, in Mal. 3: 10—"Bring ye the whole tithes into the storehouse . . . and prove me now herewith, if I will not open you the windows of heaven, and pour you out a blessing, that there shall not be room enough to receive it." All such prayer is a reflection of Christ's words—some fragment of his teaching transformed into a supplication (John 15: 7; see Westcott, *Bib. Com.*, *in loco*); all such prayer is more-over the work of the Spirit of God (Rom. 8: 26, 27). It is therefore sure of an answer.

But the test of prayer proposed by Tyndall is not applicable to the thing to be tested by it. Hopkins, *Prayer and the Prayer-gauge*, 22 sq.—"We cannot measure wheat by the yard, or the weight of a discourse with a pair of scales. . . . God's wisdom might see that it was not best for the petitioners, nor for the objects of their petition, to grant their request. Christians therefore could not, without special divine authorization, rest their faith upon the results of such a test. . . . Why may we not ask for great changes in nature? For the same reason that a well-informed child does not ask for the moon as a plaything. . . . There are two limitations upon prayer. First, except by special direction of God, we cannot ask for a miracle, for the same reason that a child could not ask his father to burn the house down. Nature is the house we live in. Secondly, we cannot ask for anything under the laws of nature which would contravene the object of those laws. Whatever we can do for ourselves under these laws, God expects us to do. If the child is cold, let him go near the fire,—not beg his father to carry him."

Herbert Spencer's *Sociology* is only social physics. He denies freedom, and declares anyone who will affix D. V. to the announcement of the Millmay Conference to be incapable of understanding sociology. Prevision excludes divine or human will. But Mr. Spencer intimates that the evils of natural selection may be modified by artificial selection. What is this but the interference of will? And if man can interfere, cannot God do the same? Yet the wise child will not expect the father to give everything he asks for. Nor will the father who loves his child give him the razor to play with, or stuff him with unwholesome sweets, simply because the child asks these things. If the engineer of the ocean steamer should give me permission to press the lever that sets all the machinery in motion, I should decline to use my power and should prefer to leave such matters to him, unless he first suggested it and showed me how. So the Holy Spirit "helpeth our infirmity; for we knew not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit himself

maketh impression for us with groanings which cannot be uttered" (Rom. 8:26). And we ought not to talk of "submitting" to perfect Wisdom, or of "being resigned" to perfect Love. Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra, 2:1—"What they [the gods] do delay, they do not deny. . . . We, ignorant of ourselves, Beg often our own harms, which the wise powers Deny us for our good; so find we profit By losing of our prayers." See Thornton, Old-Fashioned Ethics, 286-297. *Per contra*, see Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty, 277-294.

### 3. To Christian activity.

Here the truth lies between the two extremes of quietism and naturalism.

(a) In opposition to the false abnegation of human reason and will which quietism demands, we hold that God guides us, not by continual miracle, but by his natural providence and the energizing of our faculties by his Spirit, so that we rationally and freely do our own work, and work out our own salvation.

Upham, Interior Life, 356, defines quietism as "cessation of wandering thoughts and discursive imaginations, rest from irregular desires and affections, and perfect submission of the will." Its advocates, however, have often spoken of it as a giving up of our will and reason, and a swallowing up of these in the wisdom and will of God. This phraseology is misleading, and savors of a pantheistic merging of man in God. Dornier: "Quietism makes God a monarch without living subjects." Certain English quietists, like the Mohammedans, will not employ physicians in sickness. They quote 2 Chron. 16:12, 13—Aha "sought not to Jehovah, but to the physicians. And Aha slept with his fathers." They forget that the "physicians" alluded to in Chronicles were probably heathen necromancers. Cromwell to his Ironsides: "Trust God, and keep your powder dry!"

Providence does not exclude, but rather implies the operation of natural law, by which we mean God's regular way of working. It leaves no excuse for the sarcasm of Robert Browning's Mr. Sludge the Medium, 233—"Saved your precious self from what befell The thirty-three whom Providence forgot." Schurman, Belief in God, 213—"The temples were hung with the votive offerings of those only who had escaped drowning." "So like Provvy!" Bentham used to say, when anything particularly unseemly occurred in the way of natural catastrophe. God reveals himself in natural law. Physicians and medicine are his methods, as well as the impartation of faith and courage to the patient. The advocates of faith-cure should provide by faith that no believing Christian should die. With the apostolic miracles should go inspiration, as Edward Irving declared. "Every man is as lazy as circumstances will admit." We throw upon the shoulders of Providence the burdens which belong to us to bear. "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure" (Phil. 2:12, 13).

Prayer without the use of means is an insult to God. "If God has decreed that you should live, what is the use of your eating or drinking?" Can a drowning man refuse to swim, or even to lay hold of the rope that is thrown to him, and yet ask God to save him on account of his faith? "Tie your camel," said Mohammed, "and commit it to God." Frederick Douglas used to say that when in slavery he often prayed for freedom, but his prayer was never answered till he prayed with his feet—and ran away. Whitney, Integrity of Christian Science, 68—"The existence of the dynamo at the power-house does not make unnecessary the trolley line, nor the secondary motor, nor the conductor's application of the power. True quietism is a resting in the Lord after we have done our part." Ps. 37:7—"Rest in Jehovah, and wait patiently for him"; Is. 57:2—"He entereth into peace; they rest in their beds, each one that walketh in his uprightness." Ian Maclaren, Cure of Souls, 147—"Religion has three places of abode: in the reason, which is theology; in the conscience, which is ethics; and in the heart, which is quietism." On the self-guidance of Christ, see Adamaon, The Mind in Christ, 202-233.

George Müller, writing about ascertaining the will of God, says: "I seek at the beginning to get my heart into such a state that it has no will of its own in regard to a given matter. Nine tenths of the difficulties are overcome when our hearts are ready to do the Lord's will, whatever it may be. Having done this, I do not leave the result to feeling or simple impression. If I do so, I make myself liable to a great delusion. I seek the will of the Spirit of God through, or in connection with, the Word of God. The Spirit and the Word must be combined. If I look to the Spirit alone, with,

out the Word, I lay myself open to great delusions also. If the Holy Ghost guides us at all, he will do it according to the Scriptures, and never contrary to them. Next I take into account providential circumstances. These often plainly indicate God's will in connection with his Word and his Spirit. I ask God in prayer to reveal to me his will aright. Thus through prayer to God, the study of the Word, and reflection, I come to a deliberate judgment according to the best of my knowledge and ability, and, if my mind is thus at peace, I proceed accordingly."

We must not confound rational piety with false enthusiasm. See Isaac Taylor, *Natural History of Enthusiasm*. "Not quiescence, but acquiescence, is demanded of us." As God feeds "the birds of the heaven" (Mat. 6:26), not by dropping food from heaven into their mouths, but by stimulating them to seek food for themselves, so God provides for his rational creatures by giving them a sanctified common sense and by leading them to use it. In a true sense Christianity gives us more will than ever. The Holy Spirit emancipates the will, sets it upon proper objects, and fills it with new energy. We are therefore not to surrender ourselves passively to whatever professes to be a divine suggestion; 1 John 4:1—"believe not every spirit, but prove the spirits, whether they are of God." The test is the revealed word of God: Is. 8:20—"To the law and to the testimony! if they speak not according to this word, surely there is no morning for them." See remarks on false Mysticism, pages 32, 33.

(b) In opposition to naturalism, we hold that God is continually near the human spirit by his providential working, and that this providential working is so adjusted to the Christian's nature and necessities as to furnish instruction with regard to duty, discipline of religious character, and needed help and comfort in trial.

In interpreting God's providences, as in interpreting Scripture, we are dependent upon the Holy Spirit. The work of the Spirit is, indeed, in great part an application of Scripture truth to present circumstances. While we never allow ourselves to act blindly and irrationally, but accustom ourselves to weigh evidence with regard to duty, we are to expect, as the gift of the Spirit, an understanding of circumstances—a fine sense of God's providential purposes with regard to us, which will make our true course plain to ourselves, although we may not always be able to explain it to others.

The Christian may have a continual divine guidance. Unlike the unfaithful and unbelieving, of whom it is said, in Ps. 106:13, "they waited not for his counsel," the true believer has wisdom given him from above. Ps. 32:8—"I will instruct thee and teach thee in the way which thou shalt go"; Prov. 3:6—"In all thy ways acknowledge him, and he will direct thy paths"; Phil. 1:9—"And this I pray, that your love may abound yet more and more in knowledge and all discernment" (*αισθησει*—spiritual discernment); James 1:5—"If any of you lacketh wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth (*τοῦ δωδωτος Θεου*) to all liberally and upbraideth not"; John 15:15—"No longer do I call you servants; for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth: but I have called you friends"; Col. 1:9, 10—"that ye may be filled with the knowledge of his will in all spiritual wisdom and understanding, to walk worthily of the Lord unto all pleasing."

God's Spirit makes Providence as well as the Bible personal to us. From every page of nature, as well as of the Bible, the living God speaks to us. Tholuck: "The more we recognize in every daily occurrence God's secret inspiration, guiding and controlling us, the more will all which to others wears a common and every-day aspect prove to us a sign and a wondrous work." Hutton, *Essays*: "Animals that are blind slaves of impulse, driven about by forces from within, have so to say fewer valves in their moral constitution for the entrance of divine guidance. But minds alive to every word of God give constant opportunity for his interference with suggestions that may alter the course of their lives. The higher the mind, the more it glides into the region of providential control. God turns the good by the slightest breath of thought." So the Christian hymn, "Guide me, O thou great Jehovah!" likens God's leading of the believer to that of Israel by the pillar of fire and cloud; and Paul in his dungeon calls himself "the prisoner of Christ Jesus" (Eph. 3:1). Affliction is the discipline of God's providence. Greek proverb: "He who does not get thrashed, does not get educated." On God's Leadings, see A. H. Strong, *Philosophy and Religion*, 560-562.

Abraham "went out, not knowing whither he went" (Gen. 12: 8). Not till he reached Canaan did he know the place of his destination. Like a child he placed his hand in the hand of his unseen Father, to be led whither he himself knew not. We often have guidance without discernment of that guidance. Is. 42: 16—"I will bring the blind by a way that they know not; in paths that they know not will I lead them." So we act more wisely than we ourselves understand, and afterwards look back with astonishment to see what we have been able to accomplish. Emerson: "Himself from God he could not free; He builded better than he knew." Disappointments? Ah, you make a mistake in the spelling; the D should be an H: His appointments. Melancthon: "Quem poetas fortunam, nos Deum appellamus." Chinese proverb: "The good God never smites with both hands." "Tact is a sort of psychical automatism" (Ladd). There is a Christian tact which is rarely at fault, because its possessor is "led by the Spirit of God" (Rom. 8: 14). Yet we must always make allowance, as Oliver Cromwell used to say, "for the possibility of being mistaken."

When Luther's friends wrote despairingly of the negotiations at the Diet of Worms, he replied from Coburg that he had been looking up at the night sky, spangled and studded with stars, and had found no pillars to hold them up. And yet they did not fall. God needs no props for his stars and planets. He hangs them on nothing. So, in the working of God's providence, the unseen is prop enough for the seen. Henry Drummond, *Life*, 127—"To find out God's will: 1. Pray. 2. Think. 3. Talk to wise people, but do not regard their decision as final. 4. Beware of the bias of your own will, but do not be too much afraid of it (God never unnecessarily thwarts a man's nature and likings, and it is a mistake to think that his will is always in the line of the disagreeable). 5. Meantime, do the next thing (for doing God's will in small things is the best preparation for knowing it in great things). 6. When decision and action are necessary, go ahead. 7. Never reconsider the decision when it is finally acted on; and 8. You will probably not find out until afterwards, perhaps long afterwards, that you have been led at all."

Amiel lamented that everything was left to his own responsibility and declared: "It is this thought that disgusts me with the government of my own life. To win true peace, a man needs to feel himself directed, pardoned and sustained by a supreme Power, to feel himself in the right road, at the point where God would have him be,—in harmony with God and the universe. This faith gives strength and calm. I have not got it. All that is seems to me arbitrary and fortuitous." How much better is Wordsworth's faith, *Excursion*, book 4: 581—"One adequate support For the calamities of mortal life Exists, one only: an assured belief That the procession of our fate, however sad or disturbed, is ordered by a Being Of infinite benevolence and power, Whose everlasting purposes embrace All accidents, converting them to good." Mrs. Browning, *De Profundis*, stanza xxiii—"I praise thee while my days go on; I love thee while my days go on! Through dark and dearth, through fire and frost, With emptied arms and treasure lost, I thank thee while my days go on!"

#### 4. *To the evil acts of free agents.*

(a) Here we must distinguish between the natural agency and the moral agency of God, or between acts of permissive providence and acts of efficient causation. We are ever to remember that God neither works evil, nor causes his creatures to work evil. All sin is chargeable to the self-will and perversity of the creature; to declare God the author of it is the greatest of blasphemies.

Bp. Wordsworth: "God foresees evil deeds, but never forces them." "God does not cause sin, any more than the rider of a limping horse causes the limping." Nor can it be said that Satan is the author of man's sin. Man's powers are his own. Not Satan, but the man himself, gives the wrong application to these powers. Not the cause, but the occasion, of sin is in the tempter; the cause is in the evil will which yields to his persuasions.

(b) But while man makes up his evil decision independently of God, God does, by his natural agency, order the method in which this inward evil shall express itself, by limiting it in time, place, and measure, or by guiding it to the end which his wisdom and love, and not man's intent, has

set. In all this, however, God only allows sin to develop itself after its own nature, so that it may be known, abhorred, and if possible overcome and forsaken.

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 272-284—"Judas's treachery works the reconciliation of the world, and Israel's apostasy the salvation of the Gentiles. . . . God smooths the path of the sinner, and gives him chance for the outbreak of the evil, like a wise physician who draws to the surface of the body the disease that has been raging within, in order that it may be cured, if possible, by mild means, or, if not, may be removed by the knife."

Christianity rises in spite of, nay, in consequence of opposition, like a kite against the wind. When Christ has used the sword with which he has girded himself, as he used Cyrus and the Assyrian, he breaks it and throws it away. He turns the world upside down that he may get it right side up. He makes use of every member of society, as the locomotive uses every cog. The sufferings of the martyrs add to the number of the church; the worship of relics stimulates the Crusades; the worship of the saints leads to miracle plays and to the modern drama; the worship of images helps modern art; monasticism, scholasticism, the Papacy, even sceptical and destructive criticism stir up defenders of the faith. Shakespeare, Richard III, 5: 1—"Thus doth he force the swords of wicked men To turn their own points on their masters' bosoms"; Hamlet, 1: 2—"Foul deeds will rise, though all the earth o'erwhelm them, to men's eyes"; Macbeth, 1: 7—"Even handed justice Commends the ingredients of the poisoned chalice To our own lips."

The Emperor of Germany went to Paris incognito and returned, thinking that no one had known of his absence. But at every step, going and coming, he was surrounded by detectives who saw that no harm came to him. The swallow dove again and again at the little struggling moth, but there was a plate glass window between them which neither one of them knew. Charles Darwin put his cheek against the plate glass of the cobra's cage, but could not keep himself from starting when the cobra struck. Tacitus, Annales, 14: 5—"Noctem sideribus illustrem, quasi convitendum ad soelus, dii præbuere"—"a night brilliant with stars, as if for the purpose of proving the crime, was granted by the gods." See F. A. Noble, Our Redemption, 58-74, on the self-registry and self-disclosure of sin, with quotation from Daniel Webster's speech in the case of Knapp at Salem: "It must be confessed. It will be confessed. There is no refuge from confession but suicide, and suicide is confession."

(c) In cases of persistent iniquity, God's providence still compels the sinner to accomplish the design with which he and all things have been created, namely, the manifestation of God's holiness. Even though he struggle against God's plan, yet he must by his very resistance serve it. His sin is made its own detector, judge, and tormentor. His character and doom are made a warning to others. Refusing to glorify God in his salvation, he is made to glorify God in his destruction.

Is. 10: 5, 7—"So Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, the staff in whose hand is mine indignation! . . . Rowlett, he meaneth not so." Charles Kingsley, Two Years Ago: "He [Treluddra] is one of those base natures, whom fact only lashes into greater fury,—a Pharaoh, whose heart the Lord himself can only harden"—here we would add the qualification: 'consistently with the limits which he has set to the operations of his grace.' Pharaoh's ordering the destruction of the Israelitish children (Ex. 1: 16) was made the means of putting Moses under royal protection, of training him for his future work, and finally of rescuing the whole nation whose sons Pharaoh sought to destroy. So God brings good out of evil; see Tyler, Theology of Greek Poets, 23-35. Emerson: "My will fulfilled shall be, For in daylight as in dark My thunderbolt has eyes to see His way home to the mark." See also Edwards, Works, 4: 300-312.

Gal. 2: 15—"having stripped off from himself the principalities and the powers"—the hosts of evil spirits that swarmed upon him in their final onset—"he made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it," i. e., in the cross, thus turning their evil into a means of good. Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, 443,—"Love, seeking for absolute evil, is like an electric light engaged in searching for a shadow,—when Love gets there, the shadow has disappeared." But this means, not that all things are good, but that "all things work together

"good" (Rom. 8: 28) — God overruling for good that which in itself is only evil. John Wesley: "God buries his workmen, but carries on his work." Sermon on "The Devil's Mistakes": Satan thought he could overcome Christ in the wilderness, in the garden, on the cross. He triumphed when he cast Paul into prison. But the cross was to Christ a lifting up, that should draw all men to him (John 12: 32), and Paul's imprisonment furnished his epistles to the New Testament.

"It is one of the wonders of divine love that even our blemishes and sins God will take when we truly repent of them and give them into his hands, and will in some way make them to be blessings. A friend once showed Ruskin a costly handkerchief on which a blot of ink had been made. 'Nothing can be done with that,' the friend said, thinking the handkerchief worthless and ruined now. Ruskin carried it away with him, and after a time sent it back to his friend. In a most skilful and artistic way, he had made a fine design in India ink, using the blot as its basis. Instead of being ruined, the handkerchief was made far more beautiful and valuable. So God takes the blots and stains upon our lives, the disfiguring blemishes, when we commit them to him, and by his marvellous grace changes them into marks of beauty. David's grievous sin was not only forgiven, but was made a transforming power in his life. Peter's pitiful fall became a step upward through his Lord's forgiveness and gentle dealing." So "men may rise on stepping stones Of their dead selves to higher things" (Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, I).

#### SECTION IV.—GOOD AND EVIL ANGELS.

As ministers of divine providence there is a class of finite beings, greater in intelligence and power than man in his present state, some of whom positively serve God's purpose by holiness and voluntary execution of his will, some negatively, by giving examples to the universe of defeated and punished rebellion, and by illustrating God's distinguishing grace in man's salvation.

The scholastic subtleties which encumbered this doctrine in the Middle Ages, and the exaggerated representations of the power of evil spirits which then prevailed, have led, by a natural reaction, to an undue depreciation of it in more recent times.

For scholastic discussions, see Thomas Aquinas, *Summa* (ed. Migne), 1: 833-993. The scholastics debated the questions, how many angels could stand at once on the point of a needle (relation of angels to space); whether an angel could be in two places at the same time; how great was the interval between the creation of angels and their fall; whether the sin of the first angel caused the sin of the rest; whether as many retained their integrity as fell; whether our atmosphere is the place of punishment for fallen angels; whether guardian-angels have charge of children from baptism, from birth, or while the infant is yet in the womb of the mother; even the excrements of angels were subjects of discussion, for if there was "angels' feet" (Ps. 78: 25), and if angels ate (Gen. 18: 8), it was argued that we must take the logical consequences.

Dante makes the creation of angels simultaneous with that of the universe at large. "The fall of the rebel angels he considers to have taken place within twenty seconds of their creation, and to have originated in the pride which made Lucifer unwilling to await the time prefixed by his Maker for enlightening him with perfect knowledge" — see Rossetti, *Shadow of Dante*, 14, 15. Milton, unlike Dante, puts the creation of angels ages before the creation of man. He tells us that Satan's first name in heaven is now lost. The sublime associations with which Milton surrounds the adversary diminish our abhorrence of the evil one. Satan has been called the hero of the *Paradise Lost*. Dante's representation is much more true to Scripture. But we must not go to the extreme of giving ludicrous designations to the devil. This indicates and causes scepticism as to his existence.

In mediæval times men's minds were weighed down by the terror of the spirit of evil. It was thought possible to sell one's soul to Satan, and such compacts were

written with blood. Goethe represents Mephistopheles as saying to Faust: "I to thy service here agree to bind me, To run and never rest at call of thee; When *over yonder* thou shalt find me, Then thou shalt do as much for me." The cathedrals cultivated and perpetuated this superstition, by the figures of malignant demons which griaened from the gargoyles of their roofs and the capitals of their columns, and popular preaching exalted Satan to the rank of a rival god—a god more feared than was the true and living God. Satan was pictured as having horns and hoofs—an image of the sensual and bestial—which led Cuvier to remark that the adversary could not devour, because horns and hoofs indicated not a carnivorous but a ruminant quadruped.

But there is certainly a possibility that the ascending scale of created intelligences does not reach its topmost point in man. As the distance between man and the lowest forms of life is filled in with numberless gradations of being, so it is possible that between man and God there exist creatures of higher than human intelligence. This possibility is turned to certainty by the express declarations of Scripture. The doctrine is interwoven with the later as well as with the earlier books of revelation.

Quenstedt (Theol., 1:629) regards the existence of angels as antecedently probable, because there are no gaps in creation; nature does not proceed *per saltum*. As we have (1) beings purely corporeal, as stones; (2) beings partly corporeal and partly spiritual, as men: so we should expect in creation (3) beings wholly spiritual, as angels. Godet, in his Biblical Studies of the O. T., 1-29, suggests another series of gradations. As we have (1) vegetables—species without individuality; (2) animals—individuality in bondage to species; and (3) men—species overpowered by individuality: so we may expect (4) angels—individuality without species.

If souls live after death, there is certainly a class of disembodied spirits. It is not impossible that God may have created spirits without bodies. E. G. Robinson, Christian Theology, 110—"The existence of lesser deities in all heathen mythologies, and the disposition of man everywhere to believe in beings superior to himself and inferior to the supreme God, is a presumptive argument in favor of their existence." Locke: "That there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us than there are of sensible and material below us, is probable to me from hence, that in all the visible and corporeal world we see no chasms and gaps." Foster, Christian Life and Theology, 183—"A man may certainly believe in the existence of angels upon the testimony of one who claims to have come from the heavenly world, if he can believe in the Ornithorhynchus upon the testimony of travelers." Tennyson, Two Voices: "This truth within thy mind rehearse, That in a boundless universe Is boundless better, boundless worse. Think you this world of hopes and fears Could find no statelier than his peers In yonder hundred million spheres?"

The doctrine of angels affords a barrier against the false conception of this world as including the whole spiritual universe. Earth is only part of a larger organism. As Christianity has united Jew and Gentile, so hereafter will it blend our own and other orders of creation: Col. 2:10—"who is the head of all principality and power"—Christ is the head of angels as well as of men; Eph. 1:10—"to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens, and the things upon the earth." On Christ and Angels, see Robertson Smith in The Expositor, second series, vols. 1, 2, 3. On the general subject of angels, see also Whately, Good and Evil Angels; Twisten, transl. in Bib. Sac., 1:763, and 2:106; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2:232-237, and 3:251-354; Birks, Difficulties of Belief, 78 sq.; Scott, Existence of Evil Spirits; Herzog, Encyclopædie, arts: Engel, Teufel; Jewett, Diabology,—the Person and Kingdom of Satan; Alexander, Demonic Possession.

#### I. SCRIPTURE STATEMENTS AND INTIMATIONS.

##### 1. As to the nature and attributes of angels.

###### (a) They are created beings.

Ps. 148:2-5—"Praise ye him, all his angels . . . For he commanded, and they were created"; Col. 1:16—"for in him were all things created . . . whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers"; cf. 1 Pet. 3:22—"angels and authorities and powers." God alone is uncreated and eternal. This is implied in 1 Tim. 6:16—"who only hath immortality."

(b) They are incorporeal beings.

In Heb. 1:14, where a single word is used to designate angels, they are described as "spirits" — "are they not all ministering spirits?" Men, with their twofold nature, material as well as immaterial, could not well be designated as "spirits." That their being characteristically "spirits" forbids us to regard angels as having a bodily organism, seems implied in Eph. 6:12 — "for our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against . . . the spiritual hosts [or 'things'] of wickedness in the heavenly places"; cf. Eph. 1:3; 2:6. In Gen. 6:2, "sons of God" —, not angels, but descendants of Seth and worshipers of the true God (see Murphy, *Com.*, *in loco*). In Pa. 78:25 (A. V.), "angels' food" — manna coming from heaven where angels dwell; better, however, read with Rev. Vers.: "bread of the mighty" — probably meaning angels, though the word "mighty" is nowhere else applied to them; possibly — "bread of princes or nobles," *i. e.*, the finest, most delicate bread. Mat. 22:30 — "neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as angels in heaven" — and Luke 20:36 — "neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels" — imply only that angels are without distinctions of sex. Saints are to be like angels, not as being incorporeal, but as not having the same sexual relations which they have here.

There are no "souls of angels," as there are "souls of men" (Rev. 18:13), and we may infer that angels have no bodies for souls to inhabit; see under Essential Elements of Human Nature. Nevius, *Demon-Possession*, 258, attributes to evil spirits an instinct or longing for a body to possess, even though it be the body of an inferior animal: "So in Scripture we have spirits represented as wandering about to seek rest in bodies, and asking permission to enter into swine" (Mat. 12:43; 8:31). Angels therefore, since they have no bodies, know nothing of growth, age, or death. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 133 — "It is precisely because the angels are only spirits, but not souls, that they cannot possess the same rich existence as man, whose soul is the point of union in which spirit and nature meet."

(c) They are personal — that is, intelligent and voluntary — agents.

2 Sam. 14:20 — "wise, according to the wisdom of an angel of God"; Luke 4:34 — "I know thee who thou art, the Holy One of God"; 2 Tim. 2:26 — "mare of the devil . . . taken captive by him unto his will"; Rev. 22:9 — "See thou do it not" — exercise of will; Rev. 12:12 — "The devil is gone down unto you, having great wrath" — set purpose of evil.

(d) They are possessed of superhuman intelligence and power, yet an intelligence and power that has its fixed limits.

Mat. 24:36 — "of that day and hour knoweth no one, not even the angels of heaven" — their knowledge, though superhuman, is yet finite. 1 Pet. 1:12 — "which things angels desire to look into"; Pa. 103:30 — "angels . . . mighty in strength"; 2 Thes. 1:7 — "the angels of his power"; 2 Pet. 2:11 — "angels, though greater [than men] in might and power"; Rev. 20:2, 10 — "laid hold on the dragon . . . and bound him . . . cast into the like of fire." Compare Pa. 72:18 — "God . . . Who only doeth wondrous things" — only God can perform miracles. Angels are imperfect compared with God (Job 4:18; 15:15; 35:5).

Power, rather than beauty or intelligence, is their striking characteristic. They are 'principalities and powers' (Col. 1:16). They terrify those who behold them (Mat. 28:4). The rolling away of the stone from the sepulchre took strength. A wheel of granite, eight feet in diameter and one foot thick, rolling in a groove, would weigh more than four tons. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 86 — "The spiritual might and burning indignation in the face of Stephen reminded the guilty Sanhedrin of an angelic vision." Even in their tenderest ministrations they strengthen (Luke 23:43; cf. Dan. 10:19). In 1 Tim. 6:15 — "King of kings and Lord of lords" — the words "kings" and "lords" (*βασιλευμένων* and *κυριευόντων*) may refer to angels. In the case of evil spirits especially, power seems the chief thing in mind, *e. g.*, "the prince of this world," "the strong man armed," "the power of darkness," "rulers of the darkness of this world," "the great dragon," "all the power of the enemy," "all these things will I give thee," "deliver us from the evil one."

(e) They are an order of intelligences distinct from man and older than man.

Angels are distinct from man. 1 Cor. 6:3 — "we shall judge angels"; Heb. 1:14 — "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to do service for the sake of them that shall inherit salvation?" They are not glorified human spirits; see Heb. 2:16 — "for verily not to angels doth he give help, but he giveth help to

the seed of Abraham"; also 12: 22, 23, where "the innumerable hosts of angels" are distinguished from "the church of the firstborn" and "the spirits of just men made perfect." In Rev. 22: 9—"I am a fellow-servant with thee"—"fellow-servant" intimates likeness to men, not in nature, but in service and subordination to God, the proper object of worship. Sunday School Times, Mch. 15, 1902: 146—"Angels are spoken of as greater in power and might than man, but that could be said of many a lower animal, or even of whirlwind and fire. Angels are never spoken of as a superior order of spiritual beings. We are to 'judge angels' (1 Cor. 6: 3), and inferiors are not to judge superiors."

Angels are an order of intelligences older than man. The Fathers made the creation of angels simultaneous with the original calling into being of the elements, perhaps basing their opinion on the apocryphal Ecclesiasticus, 18: 1—"he that liveth eternally created all things together." In Job 38: 7, the Hebrews parallelism makes "morning stars"—"sons of God," so that angels are spoken of as present at certain stages of God's creative work. The mention of "the serpent" in Gen. 3: 1 implies the fall of Satan before the fall of man. We may infer that the creation of angels took place before the creation of man—the lower before the higher. In Gen. 2: 1, "all the host of them," which God had created, may be intended to include angels. Man was the crowning work of creation, created after angels were created. Mason, Faith of the Gospel, 81—"Angels were perhaps created before the material heavens and earth—a spiritual substratum in which the material things were planted, a preparatory creation to receive what was to follow. In the vision of Jacob they ascend first and descend after; their natural place is in the world below."

The constant representation of angels as personal beings in Scripture cannot be explained as a personification of abstract good and evil, in accommodation to Jewish superstitions, without wresting many narrative passages from their obvious sense; implying on the part of Christ either dissimulation or ignorance as to an important point of doctrine; and surrendering belief in the inspiration of the Old Testament from which these Jewish views of angelic beings were derived.

Jesus accommodated himself to the popular belief in respect at least to "Abraham's bosom" (Luk. 16: 26), and he confessed ignorance with regard to the time of the end (Mark 13: 32); see Rush Rhees, Life of Jesus of Nazareth, 245-248. But in the former case his hearers probably understood him to speak figuratively and rhetorically, while in the latter case there was no teaching of the false but only limitation of knowledge with regard to the true. Our Lord did not hesitate to contradict Pharisaic belief in the efficacy of ceremonies, and Sadducean denial of resurrection and future life. The doctrine of angels had even stronger hold upon the popular mind than had these errors of the Pharisees and Sadducees. That Jesus did not correct or deny the general belief, but rather himself expressed and confirmed it, implies that the belief was rational and Scriptural. For one of the best statements of the argument for the existence of evil spirits, see Broadus, Com. on Mat. 8: 28.

Eph. 3: 10—"to the intent that now unto the principalities and the powers in the heavenly places might be made known through the church the manifold wisdom of God"—excludes the hypothesis that angels are simply abstract conceptions of good or evil. We speak of "moon-struck" people (lunatics), only when we know that nobody supposes us to believe in the power of the moon to cause madness. But Christ's contemporaries did suppose him to believe in angelic spirits, good and evil. If this belief was an error, it was by no means a harmless one, and the benevolence as well as the veracity of Christ would have led him to correct it. So too, if Paul had known that there were no such beings as angels, he could not honestly have contented himself with forbidding the Colossians to worship them (Col. 2: 18) but would have denied their existence, as he denied the existence of heathen gods (1 Cor. 8: 4).

Theodore Parker said it was very evident that Jesus Christ believed in a personal devil. Harnack, Wesen des Christenthums, 36—"There can be no doubt that Jesus shared with his contemporaries the representation of two kingdoms, the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the devil." Wendt, Teaching of Jesus, 1: 164—Jesus "makes it appear as if Satan was the immediate tempter. I am far from thinking that he does so in a merely figurative way. Beyond all doubt Jesus accepted the contemporary ideas as to the real existence of Satan, and accordingly, in the particular cases of disease referred to, he supposes a real Satanic temptation." Maurice, Theological Essays,

33, 34—"The acknowledgment of an evil spirit is characteristic of Christianity." H. B. Smith, *System*, 261—"It would appear that the power of Satan in the world reached its culminating point at the time of Christ, and has been less ever since."

The same remark applies to the view which regards Satan as but a collective term for all evil beings, human or superhuman. The Scripture representations of the progressive rage of the great adversary, from his first assault on human virtue in Genesis to his final overthrow in Revelation, join with the testimony of Christ just mentioned, to forbid any other conclusion than this, that there is a personal being of great power, who carries on organized opposition to the divine government.

Crane, *The Religion of To-morrow*, 299 sq.—"We well say 'personal devil,' for there is no devil but personality." We cannot deny the personality of Satan except upon principles which would compel us to deny the existence of good angels, the personality of the Holy Spirit, and the personality of God the Father,—we may add, even the personality of the human soul. Says Nigel Penruddock in Lord Beaconsfield's "Endymion": "Give me a single argument against his [Satan's] personality, which is not applicable to the personality of the Deity." One of the most ingenious devices of Satan is that of persuading men that he has no existence. Next to this is the device of substituting for belief in a personal devil the belief in a merely impersonal spirit of evil. Such a substitution we find in Pfeiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, 1: 311—"The idea of the devil was a welcome expedient for the need of advanced religious reflection, to put God out of relation to the evil and badness of the world." Pfeiderer tells us that the early optimism of the Hebrews, like that of the Greeks, gave place in later times to pessimism and despair. But the Hebrews still had hope of deliverance by the Messiah and an apocalyptic reign of good.

For the view that Satan is merely a collective term for all evil beings, see Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, 134-137. Bushnell, holding moral evil to be a necessary "condition privative" of all finite beings as such, believes that "good angels have all been passed through and helped up out of a fall, as the redeemed of mankind will be." "Electangels" (1 Tim. 5: 21) then would mean those saved *after* falling, not those saved *from* falling; and "Satan" would be, not the name of a particular person, but the all or total of all bad minds and powers. *Per contra*, see Smith's Bible Dictionary, arts.: Angels, Demons, Demoniacs, Satan; Trench, *Studies in the Gospels*, 16-26. For a comparison of Satan in the Book of Job, with Milton's Satan in "Paradise Lost," and Goethe's Mephistopheles in "Faust," see Maasson, *The Three Devils*. We may add to this list Dante's Satan (or Dis) in the "Divine Comedy," Byron's Lucifer in "Cain," and Mrs. Browning's Lucifer in her "Drama of Exile"; see Gregory, *Christian Ethics*, 219.

## 2. As to their number and organization.

### (a) They are of great multitude.

Deut. 33: 2—"Jehovah . . . came from the ten thousands of holy ones"; Ps. 68: 17—"The chariots of God are twenty thousand, even thousands upon thousands"; Dan. 7: 10—"thousands of thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him"; Rev. 5: 11—"I heard a voice of many angels . . . and the number of them was ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands." Anselm thought that the number of lost angels was filled up by the number of elect men. Savage, *Life after Death*, 61—The Pharisees held very exaggerated notions of the number of angelic spirits. They "said that a man, if he threw a stone over his shoulder or cast away a broken piece of pottery, asked pardon of any spirit that he might possibly have hit in so doing." So in W. H. Murray's time it was said to be dangerous in the Adirondack to fire a gun,—you might hit a man.

### (b) They constitute a company, as distinguished from a race.

Mat. 22: 30—"they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as angels in heaven"; Luke 20: 36—"neither can they die any more: for they are equal unto the angels; and are sons of God." We are called "sons of men," but angels are never called "sons of angels," but only "sons of God." They are not developed from one original stock, and no such common nature binds them together as binds together the race of man. They have no common character and history. Each was created separately, and each apostate angel fell by himself. Humanity fell all at

once in its first father. Cut down a tree, and you cut down its branches. But angels were so many separate trees. Some lapsed into sin, but some remained holy. See Godet, *Bib. Studies O. T.*, 1-29. This may be one reason why salvation was provided for fallen man, but not for fallen angels. Christ could join himself to humanity by taking the common nature of all. There was no common nature of angels which he could take. See *Isa. 3:16*—"not to angels doth he give help." The angels are "sons of God," as having no earthly parentage and no parentage at all except the divine. *Eph. 3:14, 15*—"the Father, of whom every fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named,"—not "every family," as in R. V., for there are no families among the angels. The marginal rendering "fatherhood" is better than "family,"—all the *seraphim* are named from the *seraph*. Dodge, *Christian Theology*, 172—"The bond between angels is simply a mental and moral one. They can gain nothing by inheritance, nothing through domestic and family life, nothing through a society held together by a bond of blood. . . . Belonging to two worlds and not simply to one, the human soul has in it the springs of a deeper and wider experience than angels can have. . . . God comes nearer to man than to his angels." Newman Smyth, *Through Science to Faith*, 181—"In the resurrection life of man, the species has died; man the individual lives on. Sex shall be no more needed for the sake of life; they shall no more marry, but men and women, the children of marriage, shall be as the angels. Through the death of the human species shall be gained, as the consummation of all, the immortality of the individuals."

(c) They are of various ranks and endowments.

*Gal. 1:16*—"thrones or dominions or principalities or powers"; *1 Thes. 4:16*—"the voice of the archangel"; *Jude 9*—"Michael the archangel." Michael (= who is like God?) is the only one expressly called an archangel in Scripture, although Gabriel (= God's hero) has been called an archangel by Milton. In Scripture, Michael seems the messenger of law and judgment; Gabriel, the messenger of mercy and promise. The fact that Scripture has but one archangel is proof that its doctrine of angels was not, as has sometimes been charged, derived from Babylonian and Persian sources; for there we find seven archangels instead of one. There, moreover, we find the evil spirit enthroned as a god, while in Scripture he is represented as a trembling slave.

Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus*, 1:51—"The devout and trustful consciousness of the immediate nearness of God, which is expressed in so many beautiful utterances of the Psalmist, appears to be supplanted in later Judaism by a belief in angels, which is closely analogous to the superstitious belief in the saints on the part of the Romish church. It is very significant that the Jews in the time of Jesus could no longer conceive of the promulgation of the law on Sinai, which was to them the foundation of their whole religion, as an immediate revelation of Jehovah to Moses, except as instituted through the mediation of angels (*Acts 7:38, 53; Gal. 3:19; Heb. 2:2; Josephus, Ant. 15:5, 3*).

(d) They have an organization.

*1 Sam. 1:11*—"Jehovah of hosts"; *1 K. 22:19*—"Jehovah sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left"; *Mat. 26:53*—"twelve legions of angels"—suggests the organization of the Roman army; *25:41*—"the devil and his angels"; *Eph. 2:2*—"the prince of the powers in the air"; *Rev. 2:13*—"Satan's throne" (not "seat"); *16:10*—"throns of the beast"—"a hellish parody of the heavenly kingdom" (Trench). The phrase "host of heaven," in *Deut. 4:19; 17:3; Acts 7:42*, probably = the stars; but in *Gen. 22:2*, "God's host" = angels, for when Jacob saw the angels he said "This is God's host." In general the phrases "God of hosts", "Lord of hosts" seem to mean "God of angels", "Lord of angels": compare *2 Chron. 18:18; Luke 2:13; Rev. 19:14*—"the armies which are in heaven." Yet in *Yeh. 9:6* and *Ps. 33:6* the word "host" seems to include both angels and stars.

Satan is "the ape of God." He has a throne. He is "the prince of the world" (*John 14:30; 16:11*), "the prince of the powers of the air" (*Eph. 2:2*). There is a cosmos and order of evil, as well as a cosmos and order of good, though Christ is stronger than the strong man armed (*Luke 11:21*) and rules even over Satan. On Satan in the Old Testament, see art. by T. W. Chambers, in *Presb. and Ref. Rev.*, Jan. 1892:22-34. The first mention of Satan is in the account of the Fall in *Gen. 3:1-6*; the second in *Lev. 16:8*, where one of the two goats on the day of atonement is said to be "for Azazel," or Satan; the third where Satan moved David to number Israel (*1 Chron. 21:1*); the fourth in the book of *Job 1:6-13*; the fifth in *Yeh. 3:1-3*, where Satan stands as the adversary of Joshua the high priest, but Jehovah addresses Satan and rebukes him. Cheyne, *Com. on Isaiah*, vol. 1, p. 11, thinks

that the stars were first called the hosts of God, with the notion that they were animated creatures. In later times the belief in angels threw into the background the belief in the stars as animated beings; the angels however were connected very closely with the stars. Marlowe, in his *Tamburlaine*, says: "The moon, the planets, and the meteors light, These angels in their crystal armor fight A doubtful battle."

With regard to the 'cherubim' of Genesis, Exodus, and Ezekiel, — with which the 'seraphim' of Isaiah and the 'living creatures' of the book of Revelation are to be identified, — the most probable interpretation is that which regards them, not as actual beings of higher rank than man, but as symbolic appearances, intended to represent redeemed humanity, endowed with all the creature perfections lost by the Fall, and made to be the dwelling-place of God.

Some have held that the cherubim are symbols of the divine attributes, or of God's government over nature; see Smith's *Bib. Dict.*, art.: Cherub; Alford, *Com. on Rev.* 4: 6-8, and Hulsean Lectures, 1841: vol. 1, Lect. 2; Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 1: 278. But whatever of truth belongs to this view may be included in the doctrine stated above. The cherubim are indeed symbols of nature pervaded by the divine energy and subordinated to the divine purposes, but they are symbols of nature only because they are symbols of man in his twofold capacity of *image of God* and *priest of nature*. Man, as having a body, is a part of nature; as having a soul, he emerges from nature and gives to nature a voice. Through man, nature, otherwise blind and dead, is able to appreciate and to express the Creator's glory.

The doctrine of the cherubim embraces the following points: 1. The cherubim are not personal beings, but are artificial, temporary, symbolic figures. 2. While they are not themselves personal existences, they are symbols of personal existence — symbols not of divine or angelic perfections but of human nature (Ex. 1: 5 — "they had the likeness of a man"; Rev. 5: 9 — A. V. — "thou hast redeemed us to God by thy blood" — so read N, B, and Tregelles; the King. and Am. Rev. Vers., however, follow A and Tischendorf, and omit the word "us"). 3. They are emblems of human nature, not in its present stage of development, but possessed of all its original perfections; for this reason the most perfect animal forms — the kingly courage of the lion, the patient service of the ox, the soaring insight of the eagle — are combined with that of man (Ex. 1 and 10; Rev. 4: 6-8). 4. These cherubic forms represent, not merely material or earthly perfections, but human nature spiritualized and sanctified. They are "living creatures" and their life is a holy life of obedience to the divine will (Ex. 1: 12 — "whither the spirit was to go, they went"). 5. They symbolize a human nature exalted to be the dwelling-place of God. Hence the inner curtains of the tabernacle were inwoven with cherubic figures, and God's glory was manifested on the mercy-seat between the cherubim (Ex. 37: 6-9). While the flaming sword at the gates of Eden was the symbol of justice, the cherubim were symbols of mercy — keeping the "way of the tree of life" for man, until by sacrifice and renewal Paradise should be regained (Gen. 3: 24).

In corroboration of this general view, note that angels and cherubim never go together; and that in the closing visions of the book of Revelation these symbolic forms are seen no longer. When redeemed humanity has entered heaven, the figures which typified that humanity, having served their purpose, finally disappear. For fuller elaboration, see A. H. Strong, *The Nature and Purpose of the Cherubim*, in *Philosophy and Religion*, 391-399; Fairbairn, *Typology*, 1: 185-208; Elliott, *Horæ Apocalypticæ*, 1: 87; *Bib. Sac.*, 1876: 32-51; *Bib. Com.*, 1: 49-52 — "The winged lions, eagles, and bulls, that guard the entrances of the palace of Nineveh, are worshippers rather than divinities." It has lately been shown that the winged bull of Assyria was called "Kerub" almost as far back as the time of Moses. The word appears in its Hebrew form 500 years before the Jews had any contact with the Persian dominion. The Jews did not derive it from any Aryan race. It belonged to their own language.

The variable form of the cherubim seems to prove that they are symbolic appearances rather than real beings. A parallel may be found in classical literature. In Horace, *Carmina*, 3: 11, 15, Cerberus has three heads; in 2: 13, 34, he has a hundred. Bréal, *Semantics* suggests that the three heads may be dog-heads, while the hundred heads may be snake-heads. But Cerberus is also represented in Greece as having only one head. Cerberus must therefore be a symbol rather than an actually existing creature. H. W. Congdon of Wyoming, N. Y., held, however, that the cherubim are symbols of

God's life in the universe as a whole. *Ex. 23: 14-18*—"the anointed cherub that covereth"—the power of the King of Tyre was so all-pervading throughout his dominion, his sovereignty so absolute, and his decrees so instantly obeyed, that his rule resembled the divine government over the world. Mr. Congdon regarded the cherubim as a proof of monism. See Margolouth, *The Lord's Prayer*, 158-180. On animal characteristics in man, see Hopkins, *Scriptural Idea of Man*, 106.

### 3. *As to their moral character.*

#### (a) They were all created holy.

*Gen. 1: 21*—"God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good"; *Jude 6*—"angels that kept not their own beginning"—ἀρχή seems here to mean their beginning in holy character, rather than their original lordship and dominion.

#### (b) They had a probation.

This we infer from *1 Tim. 5: 21*—"the elect angels"; cf. *1 Pet. 1: 1, 2*—"elect . . . unto obedience." It certain angels, like certain men, are "elect . . . unto obedience," it would seem to follow that there was a period of probation, during which their obedience or disobedience determined their future destiny; see *Ellicott* on *1 Tim. 5: 21*. *Mason, Faith of the Gospel*, 106-108—"Gen. 3: 14—"Because thou hast done this, cursed art thou"—in the sentence on the serpent, seems to imply that Satan's day of grace was ended when he seduced man. Thenceforth he was driven to live on dust, to triumph only in sin, to pick up a living out of man, to possess man's body or soul, to tempt from the good."

#### (c) Some preserved their integrity.

*Ps. 89: 7*—"the council of the holy ones"—a designation of angels; *Mark 8: 38*—"the holy angels." *Shakespeare, Macbeth, 4: 3*—"Angels are bright still, though the brightest fall."

#### (d) Some fell from their state of innocence.

*John 8: 44*—"He was a murderer from the beginning, and standeth not in the truth, because there is no truth in him"; *2 Pet. 2: 4*—"angels when they sinned"; *Jude 6*—"angels who kept not their own beginning, but left their proper habitation." *Shakespeare, Henry VIII, 3: 2*—"Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition; By that sin fell the angels; how can man then, The image of his Maker, hope to win by it? . . . How wretched is that poor man that hangs on princes' favors! . . . When he falls, he falls like Lucifer, Never to hope again."

#### (e) The good are confirmed in good.

*Mat. 6: 10*—"Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth"; *18: 10*—"in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven"; *2 Cor. 11: 14*—"an angel of light."

#### (f) The evil are confirmed in evil.

*Mat. 13: 19*—"the evil one"; *1 John 5: 18, 19*—"the evil one toucheth him not . . . the whole world lieth in the evil one"; cf. *John 8: 44*—"Ye are of your father the devil . . . When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar, and the father thereof"; *Mat. 6: 13*—"deliver us from the evil one."

From these Scriptural statements we infer that all free creatures pass through a period of probation; that probation does not necessarily involve a fall; that there is possible a sinless development of moral beings. Other Scriptures seem to intimate that the revelation of God in Christ is an object of interest and wonder to other orders of intelligence than our own; that they are drawn in Christ more closely to God and to us; in short, that they are confirmed in their integrity by the cross. See *1 Pet. 1: 12*—"which things angels desire to look into"; *Eph. 3: 10*—"that now unto the principalities and the powers in the heavenly places might be made known through the church the manifold wisdom of God"; *Col. 1: 20*—"through him to reconcile all things unto himself . . . whether things upon the earth, or things in the heavens"; *Eph. 1: 10*—"to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens, and the things upon the earth"—"the unification of the whole universe in Christ as the divine centre. . . . The great system is a harp all whose strings are in tune but one, and that one jarring string makes discord throughout the whole. The whole universe shall feel the influence, and shall be reduced to harmony, when that one string, the world in which we live, shall be put in tune by the hand of love and mercy"—freely quoted from *Leitch, God's Glory in the Heavens*, 327-330.

It is not impossible that God is using this earth as a breeding-ground from which to populate the universe. *Mark Hopkins, Life*, 317—"While there shall be gathered at

last and preserved, as Paul says, a holy church, and every man shall be perfect and the church shall be spotless. . . . there will be other forms of perfection in other departments of the universe. And when the great day of restitution shall come and God shall vindicate his government, there may be seen to be coming in from other departments of the universe a long procession of angelic forms, great white legions from Sirius, from Arcturus and the chambers of the South, gathering around the throne of God and that centre around which the universe revolves."

4. *As to their employments.*

A. *The employments of good angels.*

(a) *They stand in the presence of God and worship him.*

Ps. 29:1, 2—"Ascribe unto Jehovah, O ye sons of the mighty, Ascribe unto Jehovah glory and strength. Ascribe unto Jehovah the glory due unto his name. Worship Jehovah in holy array"—Perowne: "Heaven being thought of as one great temple, and all the worshippers therein as clothed in priestly vestments." Ps. 89:7—"a God very terrible in the council of the holy ones," *i. e.*, angels—Perowne: "Angels are called an assembly or congregation, as the church above, which like the church below worships and praises God." Mat. 18:10—"in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven." In apparent allusion to this text, Dante represents the saints as dwelling in the presence of God yet at the same time rendering humble service to their fellow men here upon the earth. Just in proportion to their nearness to God and the light they receive from him, is the influence they are able to exert over others.

(b) *They rejoice in God's works.*

Job 28:7—"all the sons of God shouted for joy"; Luke 15:10—"there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth"; cf. 2 Tim. 2:25—"if peradventure God may give them repentance." Dante represents the angels that are nearest to God, the infinite source of life, as ever advancing toward the spring-time of youth, so that the oldest angels are the youngest.

(c) *They execute God's will, — by working in nature ;*

Ps. 103:26—"Ye his angels . . . that fulfil his word, hearkening unto the voice of his word;" 104:4 marg—"Who maketh his angels winds; His ministers a flaming fire," *i. e.*, lightnings. See Alford on Heb. 1:7—"The order of the Hebrew words here [in Ps. 104:4] is not the same as in the former verses (see especially v. 3), where we have: 'Who maketh the clouds his chariot.' For this transposition, those who insist that the passage means 'he maketh winds his messengers' can give no reason."

Farrar on Heb. 1:7—"He maketh his angels winds": "The Rabbis often refer to the fact that God makes his angels assume any form he pleases, whether man (Gen. 18:2) or woman (Lech 5:9—"two women, and the wind was in their wings"), or wind or flame (Ex. 3:2—"angel . . . in a flame of fire"; 2 I 6:17). But that untenable and fleeting form of existence which is the glory of the angels would be an inferiority in the Son. He could not be clothed, as they are at God's will, in the fleeting robes of material phenomena." John Henry Newman, in his *Apologia*, sees an angel in every flower. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 82—"Origen thought not a blade of grass nor a fly was without its angel. Rev. 14:18—an angel 'that hath power over fire'; John 5:4—intermittent spring under charge of an angel; Mat. 28:2—descent of an angel caused earthquake on the morning of Christ's resurrection; Luke 13:11—control of diseases is ascribed to angels."

(d) *by guiding the affairs of nations ;*

Dan. 10:13, 13, 21—"I come for thy words' sake. But the prince of the kingdom of Persia withstood me . . . Michael, one of the chief princes, came to help me . . . Michael your prince"; 11:1—"And as for me, in the first year of Darius the Mede, I stood up to confirm and strengthen him"; 12:1—"at that time shall Michael stand up, the great prince who standeth for the children of thy people." Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 87, suggests the question whether "the spirit of the age" or "the national character" in any particular case may not be due to the unseen "principalities" under which men live. Paul certainly recognizes, in Eph. 2:2, "the princes of the powers of the air, . . . the spirits that now worketh in the sons of disobedience." May not good angels be entrusted with influence over nations' affairs to counteract the evil and help the good?

## (e) by watching over the interests of particular churches ;

1 Cor. 11:10—"for this cause ought the women to have a sign of authority [i. e., a veil] on her head, because of the angels"—who watch over the church and have care for its order. Matheson, *Spiritual Development of St. Paul*, 243—"Man's covering is woman's power. Ministration is her power and it allies her with a greater than man—the angel. Christianity is a feminine strength. Judaism had made woman only a means to an end—the multiplication of the race. So it had degraded her. Paul will restore woman to her original and equal dignity." Col. 2:18—"Let no man rob you of your prize by a voluntary humility and worshipping of the angels"—a false worship which would be very natural if angels were present to guard the meetings of the saints. 1 Tim. 5:21—"I charge thee in the sight of God, and Christ Jesus, and the elect angels, that thou observe these things"—the public duties of the Christian minister.

Alford regards "the angels of the seven churches" (Rev. 1:20) as superhuman beings appointed to represent and guard the churches, and that upon the grounds: (1) that the word is used elsewhere in the book of Revelation only in this sense; and (2) that nothing in the book is addressed to a teacher individually, but all to some one who reflects the complexion and fortunes of the church as no human person could. We prefer, however, to regard "the angels of the seven churches" as meaning simply the pastors of the seven churches. The word "angel" means simply "messenger," and may be used of human as well as of superhuman beings—see Hag. 1:13—"Haggai, Jehovah's messenger"—literally, "the angel of Jehovah." The use of the word in this figurative sense would not be incongruous with the mystical character of the book of Revelation (see Bib. Sac. 12:339). John Lightfoot, *Heb. and Talmud. Exerc.*, 2:90, says that "angel" was a term designating officer or elder of a synagogue. See also Bp. Lightfoot, *Com. on Philippians*, 187, 188; Jacobs, *Eccl. Polity*, 100 and note. In the Irvingite church, accordingly, "angels" constitute an official class.

## (f) by assisting and protecting individual believers ;

1 K. 19:5—"an angel touched him [Elijah], and said unto him, Arise and eat"; Pa. 91:11—"he will give his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. They shall bear thee up in their hands, lest thou dash thy foot against a stone"; Dan. 6:22—"My God hath sent his angel, and hath shut the lions' mouths, and they have not hurt me"; Mat. 4:11—"angels came and ministered unto him"—Jesus was the type of all believers; 18:10—"despise not one of these little ones, for I say unto you, that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father"; compare verse 6—"one of these little ones that believe on me"; see Meyer, *Com. in loco*, who regards these passages as proving the doctrine of guardian angels. Luke 16:22—"the beggar died, and . . . was carried away by the angels into Abraham's bosom"; Heb. 1:14—"Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to do service for the sake of them that shall inherit salvation?" Compare Acts 12:15—"And they said, It is his angel"—of Peter standing knocking; see Hackett, *Com. in loco*: the utterance "expresses a popular belief prevalent among the Jews, which is neither affirmed nor denied." Shakespeare, *Henry IV*, 2nd part, 2:2—"For the boy—there is a good angel about him." *Per contra*, see Broadus, *Com. on Mat. 18:10*—"It is simply said of believers as a class that there are angels which are 'their angels'; but there is nothing here or elsewhere to show that one angel has special charge of one believer."

## (g) by punishing God's enemies.

2 K. 19:35—"it came to pass that night, that the angel of Jehovah went forth, and smote in the camp of the Assyrians an hundred fourscore and five thousand"; Acts 12:23—"And immediately an angel of the Lord smote him, because he gave not God the glory: and he was eaten of worms, and gave up the ghost."

A general survey of this Scripture testimony as to the employments of good angels leads us to the following conclusions:

First,—that good angels are not to be considered as the mediating agents of God's regular and common providence, but as the ministers of his special providence in the affairs of his church. He 'maketh his angels winds' and 'a flaming fire,' not in his ordinary procedure, but in connection with special displays of his power for moral ends (Deut. 33:2; Acts 7:53; Gal. 3:19; Heb. 2:2). Their intervention is apparently occasional and exceptional—not at their own option, but only as it is permitted or commanded by God. Hence we are not to conceive of angels as coming

between us and God, nor are we, without special revelation of the fact, to attribute to them in any particular case the effects which the Scriptures generally ascribe to divine providence. Like miracles, therefore, angelic appearances generally mark God's entrance upon new epochs in the unfolding of his plans. Hence we read of angels at the completion of creation (Job 38 : 7) ; at the giving of the law (Gal. 3 : 19) ; at the birth of Christ (Luke 2 : 13) ; at the two temptations in the wilderness and in Gethsemane (Mat. 4 : 11, Luke 22 : 43) ; at the resurrection (Mat. 28 : 2) ; at the ascension (Acts 1 : 10) ; at the final judgment (Mat. 25 : 31).

The substance of these remarks may be found in Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 1 : 637-645. Milton tells us that "Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth Unseen, both when we wake and when we sleep." Whether this be true or not, it is a question of interest why such angelic beings as have to do with human affairs are not at present seen by men. Paul's admonition against the "worshiping of the angels" (Col. 2 : 18) seems to suggest the reason. If men have not abstained from *worshiping their fellow-men*, when these latter have been priests or media of divine communications, the danger of idolatry would be much greater if we came into close and constant contact with angels; see Rev. 22 : 8, 9—"I fall down to worship before the feet of the angel which showed me these things. And he saith unto me, See thou do it not."

The fact that we do not in our day see angels should not make us sceptical as to their existence any more than the fact that we do not in our day see miracles should make us doubt the reality of the New Testament miracles. As evil spirits were permitted to work most actively when Christianity began its appeal to men, so good angels were then most frequently recognized as executing the divine purposes. Nevius, *Demon-Possession*, 278, thinks that evil spirits are still at work where Christianity comes in conflict with heathenism, and that they retire into the background as Christianity triumphs. This may be true also of good angels. Otherwise we might be in danger of overestimating their greatness and authority. Father Taylor was right when he said: "Folks are better than angels." It is vain to sing: "I want to be an angel." We never shall be angels. Victor Hugo is wrong when he says: "I am the tadpole of an archangel." John Smith is not an angel, and he never will be. But he may be far greater than an angel, because Christ took, not the nature of angels, but the nature of man (Heb. 2 : 16).

As intimated above, there is no reason to believe that even the invisible presence of angels is a constant one. Doddridge's dream of accident prevented by angelic interposition seems to embody the essential truth. We append the passages referred to in the text. Job 38 : 7—"When the morning stars sang together, And all the sons of God shouted for joy"; Deut. 33 : 2—"Jehovah came from Sinai . . . he came from the ten thousands of holy ones: At his right hand was a fiery law for them"; Gal. 3 : 19—"it [the law] was ordained through angels by the hand of a mediator"; Heb. 2 : 2—"the word spoken through angels"; Acts 7 : 53—"who received the law as it was ordained by angels"; Luke 2 : 13—"suddenly there was with the angel a multitude of the heavenly host"; Mat. 4 : 11—"Then the devil leaveth him; and behold, angels came and ministered unto him"; Luke 22 : 43—"And there appeared unto him an angel from heaven, strengthening him"; Mat. 28 : 2—"an angel of the Lord descended from heaven, and came and rolled away the stone, and sat upon it"; Acts 1 : 10—"And while they were looking steadfastly into heaven as he went, behold, two men stood by them in white apparel"; Mat. 25 : 31—"when the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the angels with him, then shall he sit on the throne of his glory."

Secondly, — that their power, as being in its nature dependent and derived, is exercised in accordance with the laws of the spiritual and natural world. They cannot, like God, create, perform miracles, act without means, search the heart. Unlike the Holy Spirit, who can influence the human mind directly, they can influence men only in ways analogous to those by which men influence each other. As evil angels may tempt men to sin, so it is probable that good angels may attract men to holiness.

Recent psychical researches disclose almost unlimited possibilities of influencing other minds by suggestion. Slight physical phenomena, as the odor of a violet or the sight in a book of a crumpled roseleaf, may start trains of thought which change the whole course of a life. A word or a look may have great power over us. Fisher, *Nature*

and Method of Revelation, 276—"The facts of hypnotism illustrate the possibility of one mind falling into a strange thralldom under another." If other men can so powerfully influence us, it is quite possible that spirits which are not subject to limitations of the flesh may influence us yet more.

Binet, in his *Alterations of Personality*, says that experiments on hysterical patients have produced in his mind the conviction that, in them at least, "a plurality of persons exists. . . . We have established almost with certainty that in such patients, side by side with the principal personality, there is a secondary personality, which is unknown by the first, which sees, hears, reflects, reasons and acts"; see *Andover Review*, April, 1890: 422. Hudson, *Law of Psychic Phenomena*, 81-143, claims that we have two minds, the objective and conscious, and the subjective and unconscious. The latter works automatically upon suggestion from the objective or from other minds. In view of the facts referred to by Binet and Hudson, we claim that the influence of angelic spirits is no more incredible than is the influence of suggestion from living men. There is no need of attributing the phenomena of hypnotism to spirits of the dead. Our human nature is larger and more susceptible to spiritual influence than we have commonly believed. These psychical phenomena indeed furnish us with a corroboration of our Ethical Monism, for if in one human being there may be two or more consciousnesses, then in the one God there may be not only three infinite personalities but also multitudinous finite personalities. See T. H. Wright, *The Finger of God*, 124-133.

#### B. The employments of evil angels.

(a) They oppose God and strive to defeat his will. This is indicated in the names applied to their chief. The word "Satan" means "adversary"—primarily to God, secondarily to men; the term "devil" signifies "slanderer"—of God to men, and of men to God. It is indicated also in the description of the "man of sin" as "he that opposeth and exalteth himself against all that is called God."

Job 1:6—Satan appears among "the sons of God"; Zech. 3:1—"Joshua the high priest. . . . and Satan standing at his right hand to be his adversary"; Mat. 13:39—"the enemy that sowed them is the devil"; 1 Pet. 5:8—"your adversary the devil." Satan slanders God to men, in Gen. 3:1, 4—"Yes, hath God said? . . . Ye shall not surely die"; men to God, in Job 1:9, 11—"Dost Job fear God for naught? . . . put forth thy hand now, and touch all that he hath, and he will renounce thee to thy face"; 2:4, 5—"Skin for skin, yea, all that a man hath will he give for his life. But put forth thine hand now, and touch his bone and his flesh, and he will renounce thee to thy face"; Rev. 12:10—"the accuser of our brethren is cast down, who accuseth them before our God night and day."

Notice how, over against the evil spirit who thus accuses God to man and man to God, stands the Holy Spirit, the Advocate, who pleads God's cause with man and man's cause with God: John 16:8—"he, when he is come, will convict the world in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment"; Rom. 8:26—"the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity: for we know not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit himself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered." Hence Balaam can say: Num. 23:21, "He hath not beheld iniquity in Jacob, neither hath he seen perverseness in Israel"; and the Lord can say to Satan as he resists Joshua: "Jehovah rebuke thee, O Satan; yea, Jehovah that hath chosen Jerusalem rebuke thee" (Zech. 3:2). "Thus he puts himself between his people and every tongue that would accuse them" (C. H. M.). For the description of the "man of sin," see 2 Thess. 2:3, 4—"he that opposeth"; cf. verse 9—"whose coming is according to the working of Satan."

On the "man of sin," see Wm. Arnold Stevens, in *Bap. Quar. Rev.*, July, 1889: 328-330. As in Daniel 11:36, the great enemy of the faith, he who "shall exalt himself, and magnify himself above every God," is the Syrian King, Antiochus Epiphanes, so the man of lawlessness described by Paul in 2 Thess. 2:3, 4 was "the corrupt and impious Judaism of the apostolic age." This only had its seat in the temple of God. It was doomed to destruction when the Lord should come at the fall of Jerusalem. But this fulfillment does not preclude a future and final fulfillment of the prophecy.

Contrasts between the Holy Spirit and the spirit of evil: 1. The dove, and the serpent; 2. the father of lies, and the Spirit of truth; 3. men possessed by dumb spirits, and men given wonderful utterance in diverse tongues; 4. the murderer from the beginning, and the life-giving Spirit, who regenerates the soul and quickens our mortal bodies; 5. the adversary, and the Helper; 6. the slanderer, and the Advocate; 7. Satan's sifting, and the Master's winnowing; 8. the organizing intelligence and malignity of the evil one, and the Holy Spirit's combination of all the forces of matter and mind to build up

the kingdom of God; 9. the strong man fully armed, and a stronger than he; 10. the evil one who works only evil, and the holy One who is the author of holiness in the hearts of men. The opposition of evil angels, at first and ever since their fall, may be a reason why they are incapable of redemption.

(b) They hinder man's temporal and eternal welfare, — sometimes by exercising a certain control over natural phenomena, but more commonly by subjecting man's soul to temptation. Possession of man's being, either physical or spiritual, by demons, is also recognized in Scripture.

Control of natural phenomena is ascribed to evil spirits in Job 1:13, 16, 19 and 2:7—“all that he hath is in thy power”—and Satan uses lightning, whirlwind, disease, for his purposes; Luke 13:11, 16—“a woman that had a spirit of infirmity . . . whom Satan had bound, lo, these eighteen years”; Acts 10:38—“healing all that were oppressed of the devil”; 2 Cor. 12:7—“a thorn in the flesh, a messenger of Satan to buffet me”; 1 Thess. 2:18—“we would fain have come unto you, I Paul once and again; and Satan hindered us”; Heb. 2:14—“him that had the power of death, that is, the devil.” Temptation is ascribed to evil spirits in Gen. 3:1 sq.—“Now the serpent was more subtle”; cf. Rev. 20:2—“the old serpent, which is the Devil and Satan”; Mat. 4:3—“the tempter came”; John 13:27—“after the sop, then entered Satan into him”; Acts 5:3—“why hath Satan filled thy heart to lie to the Holy Spirit?” Eph. 2:2—“the spirit that now worketh in the sons of disobedience”; 1 Thess. 3:5—“lest by any means the tempter had tempted you”; 1 Pet. 5:8—“your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, walketh about, seeking whom he may devour.”

At the time of Christ, popular belief undoubtedly exaggerated the influence of evil spirits. *Savage, Life after Death*, 113—“While God was at a distance, the demons were very, very near. The air about the earth was full of these evil tempting spirits. They caused shipwreck at sea, and sudden death on land; they blighted the crops; they smote and blasted in the tempests; they took possession of the bodies and the souls of men. They entered into compacts, and took mortgages on men's souls.” If some good end has been attained in spite of them they feel that “Their labor must be to pervert that end, and out of good still to find means of evil.” In Goethe's *Faust*, Margaret detects the evil in Mephistopheles: “You see that he with no soul sympathizes. 'T is written on his face—he never loved. . . . Whenever he comes near, I cannot pray.” Mephistopheles describes himself as “Ein Theil von jener Kraft Die stüts das Böse will Und stüts das Gute schafft”—“Part of that power not understood, which always wills the bad, and always works the good”—through the overruling Providence of God. “The devil says his prayers backwards.” “He tried to learn the Basque language, but had to give it up, having learned only three words in two years.” Walter Scott tells us that a certain sulphur spring in Scotland was reputed to owe its quality to an ancient compulsory immersion of Satan in it.

Satan's temptations are represented as both negative and positive,—he takes away the seed sown, and he sows tares. He controls many subordinate evil spirits; there is only one devil, but there are many angels or demons, and through their agency Satan may accomplish his purposes.

Satan's negative agency is shown in Mark 4:15—“when they have heard, straightway cometh Satan, and taketh away the word which hath been sown in them”; his positive agency in Mat. 13:38, 39—“the tares are the sons of the evil one; and the enemy that sowed them is the devil.” One devil, but many angels: see Mat. 25:41—“the devil and his angels”; Mark 5:9—“My name is Legion, for we are many”; Eph. 2:2—“the prince of the powers of the air”; 6:12—“principalities . . . powers . . . world-rulers of this darkness . . . spiritual hosts of wickedness.” The mode of Satan's access to the human mind we do not know. It may be that by moving upon our physical organism he produces subtle signs of thought and so reaches the understanding and desires. He certainly has the power to present in captivating forms the objects of appetite and selfish ambition, as he did to Christ in the wilderness (Mat. 4:3, 6, 9), and to appeal to our love for independence by saying to us, as he did to our first parents—“ye shall be as God” (Gen. 3:5).

C. C. Everett, *Essays Theol. and Lit.*, 186-218, on *The Devil*: “If the supernatural powers would only hold themselves aloof and not interfere with the natural processes of the world, there would be no sickness, no death, no sorrow. . . . This shows a real, though perhaps unconscious, faith in the goodness and trustworthiness of nature. The world in itself is a source only of good. Here is the germ of a positive religion, though this religion when it appears, may adopt the form of supernaturalism.” If there was no Satan, then Christ's temptations came from within, and showed a predisposition to evil on his own part.

Possession is distinguished from bodily or mental disease, though such disease often accompanies possession or results from it. — The demons speak in their own persons, with supernatural knowledge, and they are directly addressed by Christ. Jesus recognizes Satanic agency in these cases of possession, and he rejoices in the casting out of demons, as a sign of Satan's downfall. These facts render it impossible to interpret the narratives of demoniac possession as popular descriptions of abnormal physical or mental conditions.

Possession may apparently be either physical, as in the case of the Gerasene demoniacs (Mark 5:2-4), or spiritual, as in the case of the "maid having a spirit of divination" (Act 16:16), where the body does not seem to have been affected. It is distinguished from bodily disease: see Mat 17:15, 18—"epileptic . . . the demon went out from him: and the boy was cured"; Mark 9:25—"Thou dumb and deaf spirit"; 3:11, 12—"the unclean spirits . . . cried, saying, Thou art the Son of God. And he charged them much that they should not make him known"; Luke 8:30, 31—"And Jesus asked him, What is thy name? And he said, Legion; for many demons were entered unto him. And they entreated him that he would not command them to depart into the abyss"; 10:17, 18—"And the seventy returned with joy, saying, Lord, even the demons are subject unto us in thy name. And he said unto them, I beheld Satan fallen as lightning from heaven."

These descriptions of personal intercourse between Christ and the demons cannot be interpreted as metaphorical. "In the temptation of Christ and in the possession of the swine, imagination could have no place. Christ was *above* its delusions; the brutes were *below* them." Farrar (Life of Christ, 1:337-341, and 2: excursus vii), while he admits the existence and agency of good angels, very inconsistently gives a metaphorical interpretation to the Scriptural accounts of evil angels. We find corroborative evidence of the Scripture doctrine in the domination which one wicked man frequently exercises over others; in the opinion of some modern physicians in charge of the insane, that certain phenomena in their patients' experience are best explained by supposing an actual subjection of the will to a foreign power; and, finally, in the influence of the Holy Spirit upon the human heart. See Trench, Miracles, 125-136; Smith's Bible Dictionary, 1:536—"Possession is distinguished from mere temptation by the complete or incomplete loss of the sufferer's reason or power of will; his actions, words, and almost his thoughts, are mastered by the evil spirit, till his personality seems to be destroyed, or at least so overborne as to produce the consciousness of a twofold will within him like that in a dream. In the ordinary assaults and temptations of Satan, the will itself yields consciously, and by yielding gradually assumes, without losing its apparent freedom of action, the characteristics of the Satanic nature. It is solicited, urged, and persuaded against the strivings of grace, but it is not overborne."

T. H. Wright, The Finger of God, argues that Jesus, in his mention of demoniacs, accommodated himself to the beliefs of his time. Fisher, Nature and Method of Revelation, 274, with reference to Weiss's Meyer on Mat. 4:24, gives Meyer's arguments against demoniacal possession as follows: 1. the absence of references to demoniacal possession in the Old Testament, and the fact that so-called demoniacs were cured by exorcists; 2. that no clear case of possession occurs at present; 3. that there is no notice of demoniacal possession in John's Gospel, though the overcoming of Satan is there made a part of the Messiah's work and Satan is said to enter into a man's mind and take control there (John 13:27); 4. and that the so-called demoniacs are not, as would be expected, of a diabolic temper and filled with malignant feelings toward Christ. Harnack, Wesen des Christenthums, 33—"The popular belief in demon-possession gave form to the conceptions of those who had nervous diseases, so that they expressed themselves in language proper only to those who were actually possessed. Jesus is no believer in Christian Science: he calls sickness sickness and health health; but he regards all disease as a proof and effect of the working of the evil one."

On Mark 1:21-24, see Maclaren in S. S. Times, Jan. 23, 1904—"We are told by some that this demoniac was an epileptic. Possibly; but, if the epilepsy was not the result of possession, why should it take the shape of violent hatred of Jesus? And what is there in epilepsy to give discernment of his character and the purpose of his mission?" Not Jesus' exorcism of demons as a fact, but his casting them out by a word, was our Lord's wonderful characteristic. Nevius, Demon-Possession, 240—"May not demon-possession be only a different, a more advanced, form of hypnotism? . . . It is possible that these evil spirits are familiar with the organism of the nervous system, and are capable

of acting upon and influencing mankind in accordance with physical and psychological laws. . . . The hypnotic trance may be effected, without the use of physical organs, by the mere force of will-power, spirit acting upon spirit." Nevius quotes F. W. A. Myers, *Fortnightly Rev.*, Nov. 1885—"One such discovery, that of telepathy, or the transference of thought and sensation from mind to mind without the agency of the recognized organs of sense, has, as I hold, been already achieved." See Bennet, *Diseases of the Bible*; Kedney, *Diabolology*; and references in Poole's *Synopsis*, 1:348; also Bramwell, *Hypnotism*, 358-366.

(c) Yet, in spite of themselves, they execute God's plans of punishing the ungodly, of chastening the good, and of illustrating the nature and fate of moral evil.

**Punishing the ungodly:** Ps. 78:49—"He cast upon them the fierceness of his anger, Wrath and indignation, and trouble, A band of angels of evil"; 1 K. 22:23—"Jehovah hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets; and Jehovah hath spoken evil concerning thee." In Luke 22:31, Satan's sifting accomplishes the opposite of the sifter's intention, and the same as the Master's winnowing (Maclaren).

**Chastening the good:** see Job, chapters 1 and 2; 1 Cor. 5:5—"deliver such a one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus"; cf. 1 Tim. 1:20—"Kymon and Alexander, whom I delivered unto Satan, that they might be taught not to blaspheme." This delivering to Satan for the destruction of the flesh seems to have involved four things: (1) excommunication from the church; (2) authoritative infliction of bodily disease or death; (3) loss of all protection from good angels, who minister only to saints; (4) subjection to the buffetings and tormentings of the great accuser. Gould, in *Am. Com.* on 1 Cor. 5:5, regards "delivering to Satan" as merely putting a man out of the church by excommunication. This of itself was equivalent to banishing him into "the world," of which Satan was the ruler.

Evil spirits illustrate the nature and fate of moral evil: see Mat. 8:29—"art thou come hither to torment us before the time?" 25:41—"eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels"; 2 Thess. 2:3—"then shall be revealed the lawless one"; James 3:19—"the demons also believe, and shudder"; Rev. 18:9, 12—"the Devil and Satan, the deceiver of the whole world . . . the devil is gone down unto you, having great wrath, knowing that he hath but a short time"; 20:10—"cast into the lake of fire . . . tormented day and night for ever and ever."

It is an interesting question whether Scripture recognizes any special connection of evil spirits with the systems of idolatry, witchcraft, and spiritualism which burden the world. 1 Cor. 10:20—"the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons, and not to God"; 2 Thess. 2:9—"the working of Satan with all power and signs of lying wonders"—would seem to favor an affirmative answer. But 1 Cor. 8:4—"concerning therefore the eating of things sacrificed to idols, we know that no idol is anything in the world"—seems to favor a negative answer. This last may, however, mean that "the beings whom the idols are designed to represent have no existence, although it is afterwards shown (10:20) that there are other beings connected with false worship" (*Ann. Par. Bible, in loco*). "Heathenism is the reign of the devil" (Meyer), and while the heathen think themselves to be sacrificing to Jupiter or Venus, they are really "sacrificing to demons" and are thus furthering the plans of a malignant spirit who uses these forms of false religion as a means of enslaving their souls. In like manner, the network of influences which support the papacy, spiritualism, modern unbelief, is difficult of explanation, unless we believe in a superhuman intelligence which organizes these forces against God. In these, as well as in heathen religions, there are facts inexplicable upon merely natural principles of disease and delusion.

Nevius, *Demon-Possession*, 204—"Paul teaches that the gods mentioned under different names are imaginary and non-existent; but that, behind and in connection with these gods, there are demons who make use of idolatry to draw men away from God; and it is to these that the heathen are unconsciously rendering obedience and service. . . . It is most reasonable to believe that the sufferings of people bewitched were caused by the devil, not by the so-called witches. Let us substitute 'devilcraft' for 'witchcraft.' . . . Had the courts in Salem proceeded on the Scriptural presumption that the testimony of those under the control of evil spirits would, in the nature of the case, be false, such a thing as the Salem tragedy would never have been known."

A survey of the Scripture testimony with regard to the employments of evil spirits leads to the following general conclusions:

First,—the power of evil spirits over men is not independent of the human will. This power cannot be exercised without at least the original

consent of the human will, and may be resisted and shaken off through prayer and faith in God.

Luke 22: 31, 40 — "Satan asked to have you, that he might sift you as wheat . . . Pray that ye enter not into temptation"; Eph. 6: 11 — "Put on the whole armor of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil"; 16 — "the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the evil one"; James 4: 7 — "resist the devil, and he will flee from you"; 1 Pet. 5: 9 — "whom withstand stedfast in your faith." The coals are already in the human heart, in the shape of corrupt inclinations; Satan only blows them into flame. The double source of sin is illustrated in Acts 5: 3, 4 — "Why hath Satan filled thy heart? . . . How is it that thou hast conceived this thing in thine heart?" The Satanic impulse could have been resisted, and "after it was" suggested, it was still "in his own power," as was the land that he had sold (Maclaren).

The soul is a castle into which even the king of evil spirits cannot enter without receiving permission from within. Ep. Wordsworth: "The devil may tempt us to fall, but he cannot make us fall; he may persuade us to cast ourselves down, but he cannot cast us down." E. G. Robinson: "It is left to us whether the devil shall get control of us. We pack off on the devil's shoulders much of our own wrong doing, just as Adam had the impertinence to tell God that the woman did the mischief." Both God and Satan stand at the door and knock, but neither heaven nor hell can come in unless we will. "We cannot prevent the birds from flying over our heads, but we can prevent them from making their nests in our hair." Mat. 23: 43-45 — "The unclean spirit, when he is gone out of a man" — suggests that the man who gets rid of one vice but does not occupy his mind with better things is ready to be repossessed. "Seven other spirits more evil than himself" implies that some demons are more wicked than others and so are harder to cast out (Mark 9: 26). The Jews had cast out idolatry, but other and worse sins had taken possession of them.

Hudson, Law of Psychic Phenomena, 129 — "The hypnotic subject cannot be controlled so far as to make him do what he knows to be wrong, unless he himself voluntarily assents." A. S. Hart: "Unless one is willing to be hypnotized, no one can put him under the influence. The more intelligent one is, the more susceptible. Hypnotism requires the subject to do two-thirds of the work, while the instructor does only one-third — that of telling the subject what to do. It is not an inherent influence, nor a gift, but can be learned by any one who can read. It is impossible to compel a person to do wrong while under the influence, for the subject retains a consciousness of the difference between right and wrong."

Höffding, Outlines of Psychology, 330-335 — "Some persons have the power of intentionally calling up hallucinations; but it often happens to them as to Goethe's Zauberschülerling, or apprentice-magician, that the phantoms gain power over them and will not be again dispersed. Goethe's Fischer — 'Half she drew him down and half he sank' — repeats the duality in the second term; for to sink is to let one's self sink." Manton, the Puritan: "A stranger cannot call off a dog from the flock, but the Shepherd can do so with a word; so the Lord can easily rebuke Satan when he finds him most violent." Spurgeon, the modern Puritan, remarks on the above: "O Lord, when I am worried by my great enemy, call him off, I pray thee! Let me hear a voice saying: 'Jehovah rebuke thee, O Satan; even Jehovah that hath chosen Jerusalem rebuke thee!' (Zech. 3: 2). By thine election of me, rebuke him, I pray thee, and deliver me from 'the power of the dog'! (Ps. 22: 20)."

Secondly,—their power is limited, both in time and in extent, by the permissive will of God. Evil spirits are neither omnipotent, omniscient, nor omnipresent. We are to attribute disease and natural calamity to their agency, only when this is matter of special revelation. Opposed to God as evil spirits are, God compels them to serve his purposes. Their power for harm lasts but for a season, and ultimate judgment and punishment will vindicate God's permission of their evil agency.

1 Cor. 10: 13 — "God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able; but will with the temptation make also the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it"; Jude 6 — "angels which kept not their own beginning, but left their proper habitation, he hath kept in everlasting bonds under darkness unto the judgment of the great day."

Luther saw Satan nearer to man than his coat, or his shirt, or even his skin. In all misfortune he saw the devil's work. Was there a conflagration in the town? By looking closely you might see a demon blowing upon the flame. Pestilence and storm he

attributed to Satan. All this was a relic of the mediæval exaggerations of Satan's power. It was then supposed that men might make covenants with the evil one, in which supernatural power was purchased at the price of final perdition (see Goethe's *Faust*).

Scripture furnishes no warrant for such representations. There seems to have been permitted a special activity of Satan in temptation and possession during our Saviour's ministry, in order that Christ's power might be demonstrated. By his death Jesus brought "to naught him that had the power of death, that is, the devil" (Heb. 2:14) and "having despoiled the principalities and the powers, he made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it," *i. e.*, in the Cross (Col. 2:15). 1 John 3:8—"To this end was the Son of God manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil." Evil spirits now exist and act only upon sufferance. McLeod, *Temptation of our Lord*, 24—"Satan's power is limited, (1) by the fact that he is a creature; (2) by the fact of God's providence; (3) by the fact of his own wickedness."

Genung, *Epic of the Inner Life*, 136—"Having neither fixed principle in himself nor connection with the source of order outside, Satan has not prophetic ability. He can appeal to chance, but he cannot foresee. So Goethe's Mephistopheles insolently boasts that he can lead Faust astray: 'What will you bet? There's still a chance to gain him, if unto me full leave you give Gently upon my road to train him!' And in Job 1:11; 2:9, Satan wagers: 'He will renounce thee to thy face.'" William Ashmore: "Is Satan omnipresent? No, but he is very spry. Is he bound? Yes, but with a rather loose rope." In the Persian story, God scattered seed. The devil buried it, and sent the rain to rot it. But soon it sprang up, and the wilderness blossomed as the rose.

## II. OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF ANGELS.

### 1. *To the doctrine of angels in general.* It is objected:

(a) That it is opposed to the modern scientific view of the world, as a system of definite forces and laws.—We reply that, whatever truth there may be in this modern view, it does not exclude the play of divine or human free agency. It does not, therefore, exclude the possibility of angelic agency.

Ladd, *Philosophy of Knowledge*, 322—"It is easier to believe in angels than in ether; in God rather than atoms; and in the history of his kingdom as a divine self-revelation rather than in the physicist's or the biologist's purely mechanical process of evolution."

(b) That it is opposed to the modern doctrine of infinite space above and beneath us—a space peopled with worlds. With the surrender of the old conception of the firmament, as a boundary separating this world from the regions beyond, it is claimed that we must give up all belief in a heaven of the angels.—We reply that the notions of an infinite universe, of heaven as a definite place, and of spirits as confined to fixed locality, are without certain warrant either in reason or in Scripture. We know nothing of the modes of existence of pure spirits.

What we know of the universe is certainly finite. Angels are apparently incorporeal beings, and as such are free from all laws of matter and space. Heaven and hell are essentially conditions, corresponding to character—conditions in which the body and the surroundings of the soul express and reflect its inward state. The main thing to be insisted on is therefore the state; place is merely incidental. The fact that Christ ascended to heaven with a human body, and that the saints are to possess glorified bodies, would seem to imply that heaven is a place. Christ's declaration with regard to him who is "able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Mat 10:28) affords some reason for believing that hell is also a place.

Where heaven and hell are, is not revealed to us. But it is not necessary to suppose that they are in some remote part of the universe; for aught we know, they may be right about us, so that if our eyes were opened, like those of the prophet's servant (2 Kings 6:17), we ourselves should behold them. Upon ground of Eph. 3:2—"prince of the

powers of the air"—and 3:10—"the principalities and the powers in the heavenly places"—some have assigned the atmosphere of the earth as the abode of angelic spirits, both good and evil. But the expressions "air" and "heavenly places" may be merely metaphorical designations of their spiritual method of existence.

The idealistic philosophy, which regards time and space as merely subjective forms of our human thinking and as not conditioning the thought of God, may possibly afford some additional aid in the consideration of this problem. If matter be only the expression of God's mind and will, having no existence apart from his intelligence and volition, the question of place ceases to have significance. Heaven is in that case simply the state in which God manifests himself in his grace, and hell is the state in which a moral being finds himself in opposition to God, and God in opposition to him. Christ can manifest himself to his followers in all parts of the earth and to all the inhabitants of heaven at one and the same time (John 4: 21; Mat. 23: 20; Rev. 1: 7). Angels in like manner, being purely spiritual beings, may be free from the laws of space and time, and may not be limited to any fixed locality.

We prefer therefore to leave the question of place undecided, and to accept the existence and working of angels both good and evil as a matter of faith, without professing to understand their relations to space. For the rationalistic view, see Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, 1: 670-675. *Per contra*, see Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, 1: 303-317; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 127-133.

2. *To the doctrine of evil angels in particular.* It is objected that:

(a) The idea of the fall of angels is self-contradictory, since a fall determined by pride presupposes pride—that is, a fall before the fall.—We reply that the objection confounds the occasion of sin with the sin itself. The outward motive to disobedience is not disobedience. The fall took place only when that outward motive was chosen by free will. When the motive of independence was selfishly adopted, only then did the innocent desire for knowledge and power become pride and sin. How an evil volition could originate in spirits created pure is an insoluble problem. Our faith in God's holiness, however, compels us to attribute the origin of this evil volition, not to the Creator, but to the creature.

There can be no sinful propensity before there is sin. The reason of the *first* sin can not be sin itself. This would be to make sin a necessary development; to deny the holiness of God the Creator; to leave the ground of theism for pantheism.

(b) It is irrational to suppose that Satan should have been able to change his whole nature by a single act, so that he thenceforth willed only evil.—But we reply that the circumstances of that decision are unknown to us; while the power of single acts permanently to change character is matter of observation among men.

Instance the effect, upon character and life, of a single act of falsehood or embezzlement. The first glass of intoxicating drink, and the first yielding to impure suggestion, often establish nerve-tracts in the brain and associations in the mind which are not reversed and overcome for a whole lifetime. "Sow an act, and you reap a habit; sow a habit, and you reap a character; sow a character, and you reap a destiny." And what is true of men, may be also true of angels.

(c) It is impossible that so wise a being should enter upon a hopeless rebellion.—We answer that no amount of mere knowledge ensures right moral action. If men gratify present passion, in spite of their knowledge that the sin involves present misery and future perdition, it is not impossible that Satan may have done the same.

Scherer, *Essays on English Literature*, 139, puts this objection as follows: "The idea of Satan is a contradictory idea; for it is contradictory to know God and yet attempt rivalry with him." But we must remember that understanding is the servant of will,

and is darkened by will. Many clever men fail to see what belongs to their peace. It is the very madness of sin, that it persists in iniquity, even when it sees and fears the approaching judgment of God. Jonathan Edwards: "Although the devil be exceedingly crafty and subtle, yet he is one of the greatest fools and blockheads in the world, as the subtlest of wicked men are. Sin is of such a nature that it strangely infatuates and stultifies the mind." One of Ben Jonson's plays has for its title: "The Devil is an Ass."

Schleiermacher, *Die Christliche Glaube*, 1:210, urges that continual wickedness must have weakened Satan's understanding, so that he could be no longer feared, and he adds: "Nothing is easier than to contend against emotional evil." On the other hand, there seems evidence in Scripture of a progressive rage and devastating activity in the case of the evil one, beginning in Genesis and culminating in the Revelation. With this increasing malignity there is also abundant evidence of his unwisdom. We may instance the devil's mistakes in misrepresenting 1. God to man (Gen. 3:1—"hath God said?"). 2. Man to himself (Gen. 3:4—"Ye shall not surely die"). 3. Man to God (Job 1:9—"hath Job feared God for naught?"). 4. God to himself (Mat. 4:3—"If thou art the Son of God"). 5. Himself to man (2 Cor. 11:14—"Satan fashioneth himself into an angel of light"). 6. Himself to himself (Rev. 12:12—"the devil is gone down unto you, having great wrath"—thinking he could successfully oppose God or destroy man).

(d) It is inconsistent with the benevolence of God to create and uphold spirits, who he knows will be and do evil.—We reply that this is no more inconsistent with God's benevolence than the creation and preservation of men, whose action God overrules for the furtherance of his purposes, and whose iniquity he finally brings to light and punishes.

Seduction of the pure by the impure, piracy, slavery, and war, have all been permitted among men. It is no more inconsistent with God's benevolence to permit them among angelic spirits. Caroline Fox tells of Emerson and Carlyle that the latter once led his friend, the serene philosopher, through the abominations of the streets of London at midnight, asking him with grim humor at every few steps: "Do you believe in the devil now?" Emerson replied that the more he saw of the English people, the greater and better he thought them. It must have been because with such depths beneath them they could notwithstanding reach such heights of civilization. Even vice and misery can be overruled for good, and the fate of evil angels may be made a warning to the universe.

(e) The notion of organization among evil spirits is self-contradictory, since the nature of evil is to sunder and divide.—We reply that such organization of evil spirits is no more impossible than the organization of wicked men, for the purpose of furthering their selfish ends. Common hatred to God may constitute a principle of union among them, as among men.

Wicked men succeed in their plans only by adhering in some way to the good. Even a robber-horde must have laws, and there is a sort of "honor among thieves." Else the world would be a pandemonium, and society would be what Hobbes called it: "bellum omnium contra omnes." See art. on Satan, by Whitehouse, in Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible*: "Some personalities are ganglionic centres of a nervous system, incarnations of evil influence. The Bible teaches that Satan is such a centre."

But the organizing power of Satan has its limitations. Nevius, *Demon-Possession*, 279—"Satan is not omniscient, and it is not certain that all demons are perfectly subject to his control. Want of vigilance on his part, and personal ambition in them, may obstruct and delay the execution of his plans, as among men." An English parliamentarian comforted himself by saying: "If the fleas were all of one mind, they would have us out of bed." Plato, *Lysis*, 214—"The good are like one another, and friends to one another, and the bad are never at unity with one another or with themselves; for they are passionate and restless, and anything which is at variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or harmony with any other thing."

(f) The doctrine is morally pernicious, as transferring the blame of human sin to the being or beings who tempt men thereto.—We reply that

neither conscience nor Scripture allows temptation to be an excuse for sin, or regards Satan as having power to compel the human will. The objection, moreover, contradicts our observation,—for only where the personal existence of Satan is recognized, do we find sin recognized in its true nature.

The diabolic character of sin makes it more guilty and abhorred. The immorality lies, not in the maintenance, but in the denial, of the doctrine. Giving up the doctrine of Satan is connected with laxity in the administration of criminal justice. Penalty comes to be regarded as only deterrent or reformatory.

(g) The doctrine degrades man, by representing him as the tool and slave of Satan. — We reply that it does indeed show his actual state to be degraded, but only with the result of exalting our idea of his original dignity, and of his possible glory in Christ. The fact that man's sin was suggested from without, and not from within, may be the one mitigating circumstance which renders possible his redemption.

It rather puts a stigma upon human nature to say that it is *not* fallen — that its present condition is its original and normal state. Nor is it worth while to attribute to man a dignity he does not possess, if thereby we deprive him of the dignity that may be his. Satan's sin was, in its essence, sin against the Holy Ghost, for which there can be no "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" (Luke 23: 34), since it was choosing evil with the *mala gaudia mentis*, or the clearest intuition that it was evil. If there be no devil, then man himself is devil. It has been said of Voltaire, that without believing in a devil, he saw him everywhere—even where he was not. Christian, in Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, takes comfort when he finds that the blasphemous suggestions which came to him in the dark valley were suggestions from the fiend that pursued him. If all temptation is from within, our case would seem hopeless. But if "an enemy hath done this" (Mat 18: 23), then there is hope. And so we may accept the maxim: "Nullus diabolus, nullus Redemptor." Unitarians have no Captain of their Salvation, and so have no Adversary against whom to contend. See Trench, *Studies in the Gospels*, 17; Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 78-100; Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 1: 291-293. Many of the objections and answers mentioned above have been taken from Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 8: 251-254, where a fuller statement of them may be found.

### III. PRACTICAL USES OF THE DOCTRINE OF ANGELS.

#### A. *Uses of the doctrine of good angels.*

(a) It gives us a new sense of the greatness of the divine resources, and of God's grace in our creation, to think of the multitude of unfallen intelligences who executed the divine purposes before man appeared.

(b) It strengthens our faith in God's providential care, to know that spirits of so high rank are deputed to minister to creatures who are environed with temptations and are conscious of sin.

(c) It teaches us humility, that beings of so much greater knowledge and power than ours should gladly perform these unnoticed services, in behalf of those whose only claim upon them is that they are children of the same common Father.

(d) It helps us in the struggle against sin, to learn that these messengers of God are near, to mark our wrong doing if we fall, and to sustain us if we resist temptation.

(e) It enlarges our conceptions of the dignity of our own being, and of the boundless possibilities of our future existence, to remember these forms of typical innocence and love, that praise and serve God unceasingly in heaven.

Instance the appearance of angels in Jacob's life at Bethel (Gen. 28: 12—Jacob's conversion?) and at Mahanaim (Gen. 32: 1, 2—two camps, of angels, on the right hand and on the left; cf. Ps. 34: 7—"The angel of Jehovah encampeth round about them that fear him, And delivereth them"); so too the Angel at Peniel that struggled with Jacob at his entering the promised land (Gen. 32: 24; cf. Hos. 12: 3, 4—"in his manhood he had power with God: yea, he had power over the angel, and prevailed"), and "the angel who hath redeemed me from all evil" (Gen. 48: 16) to whom Jacob refers on his dying bed. Edmund Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*: "And is there care in heaven? and is there love In heavenly spirits to these creatures base That may compassion of their evils move? There is; else much more wretched were the case Of men than beasts. But O, th' exceeding grace Of highest God that loves his creatures so, And all his works with mercy doth embrace, That blessed angels he sends to and fro To serve to wicked man, to serve his wicked foe! How oft do they their silver bowers leave And come to succor us who succor want! How oft do they with golden pinions cleave The fitting skies like flying pursuivant, Against foul fiends to aid us militant! They for us fight; they watch and duly ward, And their bright squadrons round about us plant; And all for love, and nothing for reward. Oh, why should heavenly God for men have such regard!"

It shows us that sin is not mere finiteness, to see these finite intelligences that maintained their integrity. Shakespeare, *Henry VIII*, 2: 2—"He counsels a divorce—a loss of her That, like a jewel, has hung twenty years About his neck, yet never lost her lustre; Of her that loves him with that excellence That angels love good men with; even of her That, when the greatest stroke of fortune falls, Will bless the king." Measure for Measure, 3: 2—"Man, proud man, Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven, As makes the angels weep."

#### B. *Uses of the doctrine of evil angels.*

(a) It illustrates the real nature of sin, and the depth of the ruin to which it may bring the soul, to reflect upon the present moral condition and eternal wretchedness to which these spirits, so highly endowed, have brought themselves by their rebellion against God.

(b) It inspires a salutary fear and hatred of the first subtle approaches of evil from within or from without, to remember that these may be the covert advances of a personal and malignant being, who seeks to overcome our virtue and to involve us in his own apostasy and destruction.

(c) It shuts us up to Christ, as the only Being who is able to deliver us or others from the enemy of all good.

(d) It teaches us that our salvation is wholly of grace, since for such multitudes of rebellious spirits no stonement and no renewal were provided—simple justice having its way, with no mercy to interpose or save.

Philippi, in his *Glaubenslehre*, 3: 151-284, suggests the following relations of the doctrine of Satan to the doctrine of sin: 1. Since Satan is a fallen angel, who once was pure, evil is not self-existent or necessary. Sin does not belong to the substance which God created, but is a later addition. 2. Since Satan is a purely spiritual creature, sin cannot have its origin in mere sensuousness, or in the mere possession of a physical nature. 3. Since Satan is not a weak and poorly endowed creature, sin is not a necessary result of weakness and limitation. 4. Since Satan is confirmed in evil, sin is not necessarily a transient or remediable act of will. 5. Since in Satan sin does not come to an end, sin is not a step of creaturely development, or a stage of progress to something higher and better. On the uses of the doctrine, see also Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, 1: 316; Robert Hall, *Works*, 3: 35-51; Brooks, *Satan and his Devices*.

"They never sank so low, They are not raised so high; They never knew such depths of woe, Such heights of majesty. The Savior did not join Their nature to his own; For them he shed no blood divine, Nor heaved a single groan." If no redemption has been provided for them, it may be because: 1. sin originated with them; 2. the sin which they committed was "an eternal sin" (cf. Mark 3: 29); 3. they sinned with clearer intellect and fuller knowledge than ours (cf. Luke 23: 34); 4. their incorporeal being aggravated their sin and made it analogous to our sinning against the Holy

Spirit (cf. Mat. 12:31, 32); 5. this incorporeal being gave no opportunity for Christ to objectify his grace and visibly to join himself to them (cf. Heb. 2:16); 6. their persistence in evil, in spite of their growing knowledge of the character of God as exhibited in human history, has resulted in a hardening of heart which is not susceptible of salvation.

Yet angels were created in Christ (Col. 1:16); they consist in him (Col. 1:17); he must suffer in their sin; God would save them, if he consistently could. Dr. G. W. Samson held that the Logos became an angel before he became man, and that this explains his appearances as "the angel of Jehovah" in the Old Testament (Gen. 22:11). It is not asserted that *all* fallen angels shall be eternally tormented (Rev. 14:10). In terms equally strong (Mat. 25:41; Rev. 20:10) the existence of a place of eternal punishment for wicked men is declared, but nevertheless we do not believe that all men will go there, in spite of the fact that all men are wicked. The silence of Scripture with regard to a provision of salvation for fallen angels does not prove that there is no such provision. 2 Pet. 2:4 shows that evil angels have not received *final* judgment, but are in a temporary state of existence, and their final state is yet to be revealed. If God has not already provided, may he not yet provide redemption for them, and the "lost angels" (1 Tim. 5:12) be those whom God has predestinated to stand this future probation and be saved, while only those who persist in their rebellion will be consigned to the lake of fire and brimstone (Rev. 20:10)?

The keeper of a young tigress patted her head and she licked his hand. But when she grew older she seized his hand with her teeth and began to craunch it. He pulled away his hand in shreds. He learned not to fondle a tigress. Let us learn not to fondle Satan. Let us not be "ignorant of his devices" (2 Cor. 2:11). It is not well to keep loaded firearms in the chimney corner. "They who fear the adder's sting will not come near her hissing." Talmage: "O Lord, help us to hear the serpent's rattle before we feel its fangs." Ian Maclaren, *Cure of Souls*, 215—The pastor trembles for a soul, "when he sees the destroyer hovering over it like a hawk poised in midair, and would have it gathered beneath Christ's wing."

Thomas K. Beecher: "Suppose I lived on Broadway where the crowd was surging past in both directions all the time. Would I leave my doors and windows open, saying to the crowd of strangers: 'Enter my door, pass through my hall, come into my parlor, make yourselves at home in my dining-room, go up into my bedchambers'? No! I would have my windows and doors barred and locked against intruders, to be opened only to me and mine and those I would have as companions. Yet here we see foolish men and women stretching out their arms and saying to the spirits of the vasty deep: 'Come in, and take possession of me. Write with my hands, think with my brain, speak with my lips, walk with my feet, use me as a medium for whatever you will.' God respects the sanctity of man's spirit. Even Christ stands at the door and knocks. Holy Spirit, fill me, so that there shall be room for no other!" (Rev. 3:20; Eph. 5:18.)

## PART V.

### ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.

#### CHAPTER I.

##### PRELIMINARY.

###### I. MAN A CREATION OF GOD AND A CHILD OF GOD.

The fact of man's creation is declared in Gen. 1: 27—“And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him”; 2: 7—“And Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.”

(a) The Scriptures, on the one hand, negative the idea that man is the mere product of unreasoning natural forces. They refer his existence to a cause different from mere nature, namely, the creative act of God.

Compare Hebrews 12: 9—“the Father of spirits”; Num. 16: 22—“the God of the spirits of all flesh”; 27: 16—“Jehovah, the God of the spirits of all flesh”; Rev. 22: 6—“the God of the spirits of the prophets.” Bruce, *The Providential Order*, 25—“Faith in God may remain intact, though we concede that man in all his characteristics, physical and psychical, is no exception to the universal law of growth, no breach in the continuity of the evolutionary process.” By “mere nature” we mean nature apart from God. Our previous treatment of the doctrine of creation in general has shown that the laws of nature are only the regular methods of God, and that the conception of a nature apart from God is an irrational one. If the evolution of the lower creation cannot be explained without taking into account the originating agency of God, much less can the coming into being of man, the crown of all created things. Hudson, *Divine Pedigree of Man*: “Spirit in man is linked with, because derived from, God, who is spirit.”

(b) But, on the other hand, the Scriptures do not disclose the method of man's creation. Whether man's physical system is or is not derived, by natural descent, from the lower animals, the record of creation does not inform us. As the command “Let the earth bring forth living creatures” (Gen. 1: 24) does not exclude the idea of mediate creation, through natural generation, so the forming of man “of the dust of the ground” (Gen. 2: 7) does not in itself determine whether the creation of man's body was mediate or immediate.

We may believe that man sustained to the highest preceding brute the same relation which the multiplied bread and fish sustained to the five loaves and two fishes (Mat. 14: 19), or which the wine sustained to the water which was transformed at Cana (John 4: 7-10), or which the multiplied oil sustained to the original oil in the O. T. miracle (1 K. 17: 1-7). The “dust” before the breathing of the spirit into it, may have been animated dust. Natural means may have been used, so far as they would go. Sterrett, *Reason and Authority in Religion*, 39—“Our heredity is from God, even though it be from lower forms of life, and our goal is also God, even though it be through imperfect manhood.”

Evolution does not make the idea of a Creator superfluous, because evolution is only the method of God. It is perfectly consistent with a Scriptural doctrine of Creation that man should emerge at the proper time, governed by different laws from the brute creation yet growing out of the brute, just as the foundation of a house built of stone is perfectly consistent with the wooden structure built upon it. All depends upon the plan. An atheistic and undesigned evolution cannot include man without excluding what Christianity regards as essential to man; see Griffith-Jones, *Ascent through Christ*, 42-73. But a theistic evolution can recognize the whole process of man's creation as equally the work of nature and the work of God.

Schurman, *Agnosticism and Religion*, 42—"You are not what you have come from, but what you have become." Huxley said of the brutes: "Whether from them or not, man is assuredly not of them." Pfeiderer, *Philos. Religion*, I:289—"The religious dignity of man rests after all upon what he is, not upon the mode and manner in which he has become what he is." Because he came from a beast, it does not follow that he is a beast. Nor does the fact that man's existence can be traced back to a brute ancestry furnish any proper reason why the brute should become man. Here is a teleology which requires a divine Creatorship.

J. M. Bronson: "The theist must accept evolution if he would keep his argument for the existence of God from the unity of design in nature. Unless man is an *end*, he is an *anomaly*. The greatest argument for God is the fact that all animate nature is one vast and connected unity. Man has developed not from the ape, but away from the ape. He was never anything but potential man. He did not, as man, come into being until he became a conscious moral agent." This conscious moral nature, which we call personality, requires a divine Author, because it surpasses all the powers which can be found in the animal creation. Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Animals*, tells us that: 1. Mollusca learn by experience; 2. Insects and spiders recognize offspring; 3. Fishes make mental association of objects by their similarity; 4. Reptiles recognize persons; 5. Hymenoptera, as bees and ants, communicate ideas; 6. Birds recognize pictorial representations and understand words; 7. Rodents, as rats and foxes, understand mechanisms; 8. Monkeys and elephants learn to use tools; 9. Anthropoid apes and dogs have indefinite morality.

But it is definite and not indefinite morality which differences man from the brute. Drummond, in his *Ascent of Man*, concedes that man passed through a period when he resembled the ape more than any known animal, but at the same time declares that no anthropoid ape could develop into a man. The brute can be defined in terms of man, but man cannot be defined in terms of the brute. It is significant that in insanity the higher endowments of man disappear in an order precisely the reverse of that in which, according to the development theory, they have been acquired. The highest part of man totters first. The last added is first to suffer. Man moreover can transmit his own acquisitions to his posterity, as the brute cannot. Weismann, *Heredity*, 2:69—"The evolution of music does not depend upon any increase of the musical faculty or any alteration in the inherent physical nature of man, but solely upon the power of transmitting the intellectual achievements of each generation to those which follow. This, more than anything, is the cause of the superiority of men over animals—this, and not merely human faculty, although it may be admitted that this latter is much higher than in animals." To this utterance of Weismann we would add that human progress depends quite as much upon man's power of reception as upon man's power of transmission. Interpretation must equal expression; and, in this interpretation of the past, man has a guarantee of the future which the brute does not possess.

(c) Psychology, however, comes in to help our interpretation of Scripture. The radical differences between man's soul and the principle of intelligence in the lower animals, especially man's possession of self-consciousness, general ideas, the moral sense, and the power of self-determination, show that that which chiefly constitutes him man could not have been derived, by any natural process of development, from the inferior creatures. We are compelled, then, to believe that God's "breathing into man's nostrils the breath of life" (Gen. 2:7), though it was a mediate creation as presupposing existing material in the shape of animal forms, was yet an immediate creation in the sense that only a divine reinforcement of the

process of life turned the animal into man. In other words, man came not from the brute, but *through* the brute, and the same immanent God who had previously created the brute created also the man.

Tennyson, In Memoriam, XLV—"The baby new to earth and sky, What time his tender palm is pressed Against the circle of the breast, Has never thought that 'this is I': But as he grows he gathers much, And learns the use of 'I' and 'me,' And finds 'I am not what I see, And other than the things I touch.' So rounds he to a separate mind From whence clear memory may begin, As thro' the frame that binds him in His isolation grows defined." Fichte called that the birthday of his child, when the child awoke to self-consciousness and said "I." Memory goes back no further than language. Knowledge of the ego is objective, before it is subjective. The child at first speaks of himself in the third person: "Henry did so and so." Hence most men do not remember what happened before their third year, though Samuel Miles Hopkins, Memoir, 20, remembered what must have happened when he was only 28 months old. Only a conscious person remembers, and he remembers only as his will exerts itself in attention.

Jean Paul Richter, quoted in Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, 110—"Never shall I forget the phenomenon in myself, never till now recited, when I stood by the birth of my own self-consciousness, the place and time of which are distinct in my memory. On a certain forenoon, I stood, a very young child, within the house-door, and was looking out toward the wood-pile, as in an instant the inner revelation 'I am I,' like lightning from heaven, flashed and stood brightly before me; in that moment I had seen myself as I, for the first time and forever."

Höffding, Outlines of Psychology, 3—"The beginning of conscious life is to be placed probably before birth. . . . Sensations only faintly and dimly distinguished from the general feeling of vegetative comfort and discomfort. Still the experiences undergone before birth perhaps suffice to form the foundation of the consciousness of an external world." Hill, Genetic Philosophy, 232, suggests that this early state, in which the child speaks of self in the third person and is devoid of self-consciousness, corresponds to the brute condition of the race, before it had reached self-consciousness, attained language, and become man. In the race, however, there was no heredity to predetermine self-consciousness—it was a new acquisition, marking transition to a superior order of being.

Connecting these remarks with our present subject, we assert that no brute ever yet said, or thought, "I." With this, then, we may begin a series of simple distinctions between man and the brute, so far as the immaterial principle in each is concerned. These are mainly compiled from writers hereafter mentioned.

1. The brute is conscious, but man is self-conscious. The brute does not objectify self. "If the pig could once say, 'I am a pig,' it would at once and thereby cease to be a pig." The brute does not distinguish itself from its sensations. The brute has perception, but only the man has apperception, *i. e.*, perception accompanied by reference of it to the self to which it belongs.

2. The brute has only percepts; man has also concepts. The brute knows white things, but not whiteness. It remembers things, but not thoughts. Man alone has the power of abstraction, *i. e.*, the power of deriving abstract ideas from particular things or experiences.

3. Hence the brute has no language. "Language is the expression of general notions by symbols" (Harris). Words are the symbols of concepts. Where there are no concepts there can be no words. The parrot utters cries; but "no parrot ever yet spoke a true word." Since language is a sign, it presupposes the existence of an intellect capable of understanding the sign,—in short, language is the effect of mind, not the cause of mind. See Mivart, in Brit. Quar., Oct. 1881:154-172. "The ape's tongue is eloquent in his own dispraise." James, Psychology, 2:366—"The notion of a sign as such, and the general purpose to apply it to everything, is the distinctive characteristic of man." Why do not animals speak? Because they have nothing to say, *i. e.*, have no general ideas which words might express.

4. The brute forms no judgments, *e. g.*, that *this* is like *that*, accompanied with belief. Hence there is no sense of the ridiculous, and no laughter. James, Psychology, 2:360—"The brute does not associate ideas by similarity. . . . Genius in man is the possession of this power of association in an extreme degree."

5. The brute has no reasoning—no sense that *this* follows from *that*, accompanied by a feeling that the sequence is necessary. Association of ideas without judgment is the

typical process of the brute mind, though not that of the mind of man. See *Mind*, 5:402-409, 575-581. Man's dream-life is the best analogue to the mental life of the brute.

6. The brute has no general ideas or intuitions, as of space, time, substance, cause, right. Hence there is no generalizing, and no proper experience or progress. There is no capacity for improvement in animals. The brute cannot be trained, except in certain inferior matters of association, where independent judgment is not required. No animal makes tools, uses clothes, cooks food, breeds other animals for food. No hunter's dog, however long its observation of its master, ever learned to put wood on a fire to keep itself from freezing. Even the rudest stone implements show a break in continuity and mark the introduction of man; see J. F. Cook, *Credentials of Science*, 14. "The dog can see the printed page as well as a man can, but no dog was ever taught to read a book. The animal cannot create in its own mind the thoughts of the writer. The physical in man, on the contrary, is only an aid to the spiritual. Education is a trained capacity to discern the inner meaning and deeper relations of things. So the universe is but a symbol and expression of spirit, a garment in which an invisible Power has robed his majesty and glory"; see *S. S. Times*, April 7, 1900. In man, mind first became supreme.

7. The brute has determination, but not self-determination. There is no freedom of choice, no conscious forming of a purpose, and no self-movement toward a predetermined end. The donkey is determined, but not self-determined; he is the victim of heredity and environment; he acts only as he is acted upon. Harris, *Philos. Basis of Theism*, 537-554 — "Man, though implicated in nature through his bodily organization, is in his personality supernatural; the brute is wholly submerged in nature. . . . Man is like a ship in the sea—in it, yet above it—guiding his course, by observing the heavens, even against wind and current. A brute has no such power; it is in nature like a balloon, wholly immersed in air, and driven about by its currents, with no power of steering." Calderwood, *Philosophy of Evolution*, chapter on Right and Wrong: "The grand distinction of human life is self-control in the field of action—control over all the animal impulses, so that these do not spontaneously and of themselves determine activity" [as they do in the brute]. By what Mivart calls a process of "inverse anthropomorphism," we clothe the brute with the attributes of freedom; but it does not really possess them. Just as we do not transfer to God all our human imperfections, so we ought not to transfer all our human perfections to the brute, "reading our full selves in life of lower forms." The brute has no power to choose between motives; it simply obeys motive. The necessitarian philosophy, therefore, is a correct and excellent philosophy for the brute. But man's power of initiative—in short, man's free will—renders it impossible to explain his higher nature as a mere natural development from the inferior creatures. Even Huxley has said that, taking mind into the account, there is between man and the highest beasts an "enormous gulf," a "divergence immeasurable" and "practically infinite."

8. The brute has no conscience and no religious nature. No dog ever brought back to the butcher the meat it had stolen. "The aspen trembles without fear, and dogs skulk without guilt." The dog mentioned by Darwin, whose behavior in presence of a newspaper moved by the wind seemed to testify to 'a sense of the supernatural,' was merely exhibiting the irritation due to the sense of an unknown future; see James, *Will to Believe*, 79. The bearing of flogged curs does not throw light upon the nature of conscience. If ethics is not hedonism, if moral obligation is not a refined utilitarianism, if the right is something distinct from the good we get out of it, then there must be a flaw in the theory that man's conscience is simply a development of brute instincts; and a reinforcement of brute life from the divine source of life must be postulated in order to account for the appearance of man. Upton, *Hibbert Lectures*, 165-167 — "Is the spirit of man derived from the soul of the animal? No, for neither one of these has self-existence. Both are self-differentiations of God. The latter is simply God's preparation for the former." Calderwood, *Evolution and Man's Place in Nature*, 337, speaks of "the impossibility of tracing the origin of man's rational life to evolution from a lower life. . . . There are no physical forces discoverable in nature sufficient to account for the appearance of this life." Shaler, *Interpretation of Nature*, 186 — "Man's place has been won by an entire change in the limitations of his psychic development. . . . The old bondage of the mind to the body is swept away. . . . In this new freedom we find the one dominant characteristic of man, the feature which entitles us to class him as an entirely new class of animal."

John Burroughs, *Ways of Nature*: "Animal life parallels human life at many points, but it is in another plane. Something guides the lower animals, but it is not thought; something restrains them, but it is not judgment; they are provident without prudence; they are active without industry; they are skilful without practice; they are wise without knowledge; they are rational without reason; they are deceptive without guile. . . . When they are joyful, they sing or they play; when they are distressed, they moan or they cry; . . . and yet I do not suppose they experience the emotion of joy or sorrow, or anger or love, as we do, because these feelings in them do not involve reflection, memory, and what we call the higher nature, as with us." Their instinct is intelligence directed outward, never inward, as in man. They share with man the emotions of his animal nature, but not of his moral or aesthetic nature; they know no altruism, no moral code." Mr. Burroughs maintains that we have no proof that animals in a state of nature can reflect, form abstract ideas, associate cause and effect. Animals, for instance, that store up food for the winter simply follow a provident instinct but do not take thought for the future, any more than does the tree that forms new buds for the coming season. He sums up his position as follows: "To attribute human motives and faculties to the animals is to caricature them; but to put us in such relation to them that we feel their kinship, that we see their lives embosomed in the same iron necessity as our own, that we see in their minds a humbler manifestation of the same psychic power and intelligence that culminates and is conscious of itself in man—that, I take it, is the true humanization." We assent to all this except the ascription to human life of the same iron necessity that rules the animal creation. Man is man, because his free will transcends the limitations of the brute.

While we grant, then, that man is the last stage in the development of life and that he has a brute ancestry, we regard him also as the offspring of God. The same God who was the author of the brute became in due time the creator of man. Though man came through the brute, he did not come from the brute, but from God, the Father of spirits and the author of all life. *Cædipus'* terrific oracle: "Mayst thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art!" might well be uttered to those who believe only in the brute origin of man. Pascal says it is dangerous to let man see too clearly that he is on a level with the animals unless at the same time we show him his greatness. The doctrine that the brute is imperfect man is logically connected with the doctrine that man is a perfect brute. Thomas Carlyle: "If this brute philosophy is true, then man should go on all fours, and not lay claim to the dignity of being moral." G. F. Wright, *Ant. and Origin of Human Race*, lecture IX—"One or other of the lower animals may exhibit all the faculties used by a child of fifteen months. The difference may seem very little, but what there is is very important. It is like the difference in direction in the early stages of two separating curves, which go on forever diverging. . . . The probability is that both in his bodily and in his mental development man appeared as a sport in nature, and leaped at once in some single pair from the plane of irrational being to the possession of the higher powers that have ever since characterized him and dominated both his development and his history."

Scripture seems to teach the doctrine that man's nature is the creation of God. Gen. 2:7—"Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul"—appears, says Hovey (*State of the Impen. Dead*, 14), "to distinguish the vital informing principle of human nature from its material part, pronouncing the former to be more directly from God, and more akin to him, than the latter." So in *Ezek. 37:1*—"Jehovah, who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundation of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him"—the soul is recognized as distinct in nature from the body, and of a dignity and value far beyond those of any material organism. *Job 32:8*—"there is a spirit in man, and the breath of the Almighty giveth them understanding"; *Neh. 9:7*—"the dust returneth to the earth as it was, and the spirit returneth unto God who gave it." A sober view of the similarities and differences between man and the lower animals may be found in Lloyd Morgan, *Animal Life and Intelligence*. See also Martineau, *Types*, 2:66, 140, and *Study*, 1:180; 2:9, 13, 164, 360; Hopkins, *Outline Study of Man*, 8:23; Chadbourne, *Instinct*, 187-211; Porter, *Hum. Intellect*, 384, 386, 387; Bascom, *Science of Mind*, 296-306; Mansel, *Metaphysics*, 49, 50; *Princeton Rev.*, Jan. 1881: 104-128; Henslow, in *Nature*, May 1, 1879: 21, 22; Ferrier, *Remains*, 2:39; Argyll, *Unity of Nature*, 117-119; *Bib. Sac.*, 29:275-283; Max Müller, *Lectures on Philos. of Language*, no. 1, 2, 3; F. W. Robertson, *Lectures on Genesis*, 21; Le Conte, in *Princeton Rev.*, May, 1884: 236-261; Lindsay, *Mind in Lower Animals*; Bonance, *Mental Evolution in Animals*; Fiske, *The Destiny of Man*.

(d) Comparative physiology, moreover, has, up to the present time, done nothing to forbid the extension of this doctrine to man's body. No single instance has yet been adduced of the transformation of one animal species into another, either by natural or artificial selection; much less has it been demonstrated that the body of the brute has ever been developed into that of man. All evolution implies progress and reinforcement of life, and is unintelligible except as the immanent God gives new impulses to the process. Apart from the direct agency of God, the view that man's physical system is descended by natural generation from some ancestral simian form can be regarded only as an irrational hypothesis. Since the soul, then, is an immediate creation of God, and the forming of man's body is mentioned by the Scripture writer in direct connection with this creation of the spirit, man's body was in this sense an immediate creation also.

For the theory of natural selection, see Darwin, *Origin of Species*, 266-424, and *Descent of Man*, 2: 263-267; Huxley, *Critiques and Addresses*, 241-260, *Man's Place in Nature*, 71-133, *Lay Sermons*, 323, and art.: *Biology*, in *Encyc. Britannica*, 9th ed.; Romanes, *Scientific Evidences of Organic Evolution*. The theory holds that, in the struggle for existence, the varieties best adapted to their surroundings succeed in maintaining and reproducing themselves, while the rest die out. Thus, by gradual change and improvement of lower into higher forms of life, man has been evolved. We grant that Darwin has disclosed one of the important features of God's method. We concede the partial truth of his theory. We find it supported by the vertebrate structure and nervous organization which man has in common with the lower animals; by the facts of embryonic development; of rudimentary organs; of common diseases and remedies; and of reversion to former types. But we refuse to regard natural selection as a complete explanation of the history of life, and that for the following reasons:

1. It gives no account of the origin of substance, nor of the origin of variations. Darwinism simply says that "round stones will roll down hill further than flat ones" (Gray, *Natural Science and Religion*). It accounts for the selection, not for the creation, of forms. "Natural selection originates nothing. It is a destructive, not a creative, principle. If we must idealize it as a positive force, we must think of it, not as the preserver of the fittest, but as the destroyer, that follows ever in the wake of creation and devours the failures; the scavenger of creation, that takes out of the way forms which are not fit to live and reproduce themselves" (Johnson, on *Theistic Evolution*, in *Andover Review*, April, 1884: 263-281). Natural selection is only unintelligent repression. Darwin's *Origin of Species* is in fact "not the Genesis, but the Exodus, of living forms." Schurman: "The *survival* of the fittest does nothing to explain the *arrival* of the fittest"; see also DeVries, *Species and Varieties, ad finem*. Darwin himself acknowledged that "Our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound. . . . The cause of each slight variation and of each monstrosity lies much more in the nature or constitution of the organism than in the nature of the surrounding conditions" (quoted by Mivart, *Lessons from Nature*, 280-301). Weismann has therefore modified the Darwinian theory by asserting that there would be no development unless there were a spontaneous, innate tendency to variation. In this innate tendency we see, not mere nature, but the work of an originating and superintending God. E. M. Caillard, in *Contemp. Rev.*, Dec. 1893: 873-881—"Spirit was the moulding power, from the beginning, of those lower forms which would ultimately become man. Instead of the physical derivation of the soul, we propose the spiritual derivation of the body."

2. Some of the most important forms appear suddenly in the geological record, without connecting links to unite them with the past. The first fishes are the Ganoid, large in size and advanced in type. There are no intermediate gradations between the ape and man. Huxley, in *Man's Place in Nature*, 94, tells us that the lowest gorilla has a skull capacity of 24 cubic inches, whereas the highest gorilla has 84. Over against this, the lowest man has a skull capacity of 62; though men with less than 65 are invariably idiotic; the highest man has 114. Professor Burt G. Wilder of Cornell University: "The largest ape-brain is only half as large as the smallest normal human." Wallace, *Darwinism*, 458—"The average human brain weighs 48 or 49 ounces; the average ape's brain is only 18 ounces." The brain of Daniel Webster weighed 53 ounces; but Dr.

Bastian tells of an imbecile whose intellectual deficiency was congenital, yet whose brain weighed 55 ounces. Large heads do not always indicate great intellect. Professor Virehow points out that the Greeks, one of the most intellectual of nations, are also one of the smallest-headed of all. Bain: "While the size of the brain increases in arithmetical proportion, intellectual range increases in geometrical proportion."

Respecting the Enghis and Neanderthal crania, Huxley says: "The fossil remains of man hitherto discovered do not seem to me to take us appreciably nearer to that lower pitheoid form by the modification of which he has probably become what he is. . . . In vain have the links which should bind man to the monkey been sought: not a single one is there to show. The so-called *Protanthropos* who should exhibit this link has not been found. . . . None have been found that stood nearer the monkey than the men of to-day." Huxley argues that the difference between man and the gorilla is smaller than that between the gorilla and some apes; if the gorilla and the apes constitute one family and have a common origin, may not man and the gorilla have a common ancestry also? We reply that the space between the lowest ape and the highest gorilla is filled in with numberless intermediate gradations. The space between the lowest man and the highest man is also filled in with many types that shade off one into the other. But the space between the highest gorilla and the lowest man is absolutely vacant; there are no intermediate types; no connecting links between the ape and man have yet been found.

Professor Virehow has also very recently expressed his belief that no relics of any predecessor of man have yet been discovered. He said: "In my judgment, no skull hitherto discovered can be regarded as that of a predecessor of man. In the course of the last fifteen years we have had opportunities of examining skulls of all the various races of mankind—even of the most savage tribes; and among them all no group has been observed differing in its essential characters from the general human type. . . . Out of all the skulls found in the lake-dwellings there is not one that lies outside the boundaries of our present population." Dr. Eugene Dubois has discovered in the Post-pliocene deposits of the island of Java the remains of a preeminently hominid anthropoid which he calls *Pithecanthropus erectus*. Its cranial capacity approaches the physiological minimum in man, and is double that of the gorilla. The thigh bone is in form and dimensions the absolute analogue of that of man, and gives evidence of having supported a habitually erect body. Dr. Dubois unhesitatingly places this extinct Javan ape as the intermediate form between man and the true anthropoid apes. Haeckel (in *The Nation*, Sept. 15, 1898) and Keane (in *Man Past and Present*, 8), regard the *Pithecanthropus* as a "missing link." But "Nature" regards it as the remains of a human microcephalous idiot. In addition to all this, it deserves to be noticed that man does not degenerate as we travel back in time. "The Enghis skull, the contemporary of the mammoth and the cave-bear, is as large as the average of to-day, and might have belonged to a philosopher." The monkey nearest to man in physical form is no more intelligent than the elephant or the bee.

3. There are certain facts which mere heredity cannot explain, such for example as the origin of the working-bee from the queen and the drone, neither of which produces honey. The working-bee, moreover, does not transmit the honey-making instinct to its posterity; for it is sterile and childless. If man had descended from the conscienceless brute, we should expect him, when degraded, to revert to his primitive type. On the contrary, he does not revert to the brute, but dies out instead. The theory can give no explanation of beauty in the lowest forms of life, such as molluscs and diatoms. Darwin grants that this beauty must be of use to its possessor, in order to be consistent with its origination through natural selection. But no such use has yet been shown; for the creatures which possess the beauty often live in the dark, or have no eyes to see. So, too, the large brain of the savage is beyond his needs, and is inconsistent with the principle of natural selection which teaches that no organ can permanently attain a size unrequired by its needs and its environment. See Wallace, *Natural Selection*, 328-360. G. F. Wright, *Man and the Glacial Epoch*, 242-301—"That man's bodily organization is in some way a development from some extinct member of the animal kingdom allied to the anthropoid apes is scarcely any longer susceptible of doubt. . . . But he is certainly not descended from any existing species of anthropoid apes. . . . When once *mind* became supreme, the bodily adjustment must have been rapid, if indeed it is not necessary to suppose that the bodily preparation for the highest mental faculties was instantaneous, or by what is called in nature a *sport*." With this statement of Dr. Wright we substantially agree, and therefore differ from

Shedd when he says that there is just as much reason for supposing that monkeys are degenerate men, as that men are improved monkeys. Shakespeare, *Timon of Athens*, 1:1:248, seems to have hinted the view of Dr. Shedd: "The strain of man's bred out into baboon and monkey." Bishop Wilberforce asked Huxley whether he was related to an ape on his grandfather's or grandmother's side. Huxley replied that he should prefer such a relationship to having for an ancestor a man who used his position as a minister of religion to ridicule truth which he did not comprehend. "Mamma, am I descended from a monkey?" "I do not know, William, I never met any of your father's people."

4. No species is yet known to have been produced either by artificial or by natural selection. Huxley, *Lay Sermons*, 323—"It is not absolutely proven that a group of animals having all the characters exhibited by species in nature has ever been originated by selection, whether artificial or natural"; *Man's Place in Nature*, 107—"Our acceptance of the Darwinian hypothesis must be provisional, so long as one link in the chain of evidence is wanting; and so long as all the animals and plants certainly produced by selective breeding from a common stock are fertile with one another, that link will be wanting." Huxley has more recently declared that the missing proof has been found in the descent of the modern horse with one toe, from *Hipparion* with two toes, *Anchitherium* with three, and *Orohippus* with four. Even if this were demonstrated, we should still maintain that the only proper analogue was to be found in that artificial selection by which man produces new varieties, and that natural selection can bring about no useful results and show no progress, unless it be the method and revelation of a wise and designing mind. In other words, selection implies intelligence and will, and therefore cannot be exclusively natural. Mivart, *Man and Apes*, 192—"If it is inconceivable and impossible for man's body to be developed or to exist without his informing soul, we conclude that, as no natural process accounts for the different kind of soul—one capable of articulately expressing general conceptions,—so no merely natural process can account for the origin of the body informed by it—a body to which such an intellectual faculty was so essentially and intimately related." Thus Mivart, who once considered that evolution could account for man's body, now holds instead that it can account neither for man's body nor for his soul, and calls natural selection "a puerile hypothesis" (*Lessons from Nature*, 300; *Essays and Criticisms*, 2:230-314).

(e) While we concede, then, that man has a brute ancestry, we make two claims by way of qualification and explanation: first, that the laws of organic development which have been followed in man's origin are only the methods of God and proofs of his creatorship; secondly, that man, when he appears upon the scene, is no longer brute, but a self-conscious and self-determining being, made in the image of his Creator and capable of free moral decision between good and evil.

Both man's original creation and his new creation in regeneration are creations from within, rather than from without. In both cases, God builds the new upon the basis of the old. Man is not a product of blind forces, but is rather an emanation from that same divine life of which the brute was a lower manifestation. The fact that God used preexisting material does not prevent his authorship of the result. The wine in the miracle was not water because water had been used in the making of it, nor is man a brute because the brute has made some contributions to his creation. Professor John H. Strong: "Some who freely allow the presence and power of God in the age-long process seem nevertheless not clearly to see that, in the final result of finished man, God successfully revealed himself. God's work was never really or fully done; man was a compound of brute and man; and a compound of two such elements could not be said to possess the qualities of either. God did not really succeed in bringing moral personality to birth. The evolution was incomplete; man is still on all fours; he cannot sin, because he was begotten of the brute; no fall, and no regeneration, is conceivable. We assert, on the contrary, that, though man came *through* the brute, he did not come *from* the brute. He came from God, whose immanent life he reveals, whose image he reflects in a finished moral personality. Because God succeeded, a fall was possible. We can believe in the age-long creation of evolution, provided only that this evolution completed itself. With that proviso, sin remains and the fall." See also A. H. Strong, *Christ in Creation*, 163-180.

An atheistic and unteleological evolution is a reversion to the savage view of animals as brethren, and to the heathen idea of a sphynx-man growing out of the brute. Darwin himself did not deny God's authorship. He closes his first great book with the declaration that life, with all its potencies, was originally breathed "by the Creator" into the first forms of organic being. And in his letters he refers with evident satisfaction to Charles Kingsley's finding nothing in the theory which was inconsistent with an earnest Christian faith. It was not Darwin, but disciples like Haeckel, who put forward the theory as making the hypothesis of a Creator superfluous. We grant the principle of evolution, but we regard it as only the method of the divine intelligence, and must moreover consider it as preceded by an original creative act, introducing vegetable and animal life, and as supplemented by other creative acts, at the introduction of man and at the incarnation of Christ. Chadwick, *Old and New Unitarianism*, 23— "What seemed to wreck our faith in human nature [its origin from the brute] has been its grandest confirmation. For nothing argues the essential dignity of man more clearly than his triumph over the limitations of his brute inheritance, while the long way that he has come is prophecy of the moral heights undreamed of that await his tireless feet." All this is true if we regard human nature, not as an undesigned result of atheistic evolution, but as the efflux and reflection of the divine personality. R. B. Thompson, in *S. S. Times*, Dec. 29, 1906—"The greatest fact in heredity is our descent from God, and the greatest fact in environment is his presence in human life at every point."

The atheistic conception of evolution is well satirized in the verse: "There was an ape in days that were earlier; Centuries passed and his hair became curlier; Centuries more and his thumb gave a twist, And he was a man and a Positivist." That this conception is not a necessary conclusion of modern science, is clear from the statements of Wallace, the author with Darwin of the theory of natural selection. Wallace believes that man's body was developed from the brute, but he thinks there have been three breaks in continuity: 1. the appearance of life; 2. the appearance of sensation and consciousness; and 3. the appearance of spirit. These seem to correspond to 1. vegetable; 2. animal; and 3. human life. He thinks natural selection may account for man's place *in* nature, but not for man's place *above* nature, as a spiritual being. See Wallace, *Darwinism*, 445-478—"I fully accept Mr. Darwin's conclusion as to the essential identity of man's bodily structure with that of the higher mammalia, and his descent from some ancestral form common to man and the anthropoid apes." But the conclusion that man's higher faculties have also been derived from the lower animals "appears to me not to be supported by adequate evidence, and to be directly opposed to many well-ascertained facts" (461). . . . The mathematical, the artistic and musical faculties, are results, not causes, of advancement, —they do not help in the struggle for existence and could not have been developed by natural selection. The introduction of life (vegetable), of consciousness (animal), of higher faculty (human), point clearly to a world of spirit, to which the world of matter is subordinate (474-476). . . . Man's intellectual and moral faculties could not have been developed from the animal, but must have had another origin; and for this origin we can find an adequate cause only in the world of spirit."

Wallace, *Natural Selection*, 338—"The average cranial capacity of the lowest savage is probably not less than five-sixths of that of the highest civilized races, while the brain of the anthropoid apes scarcely amounts to one-third of that of man, in both cases taking the average; or the proportions may be represented by the following figures: anthropoid apes, 10; savages, 25; civilized man, 32." *Ibid.*, 300—"The inference I would draw from this class of phenomena is, that a superior intelligence has guided the development of man in a definite direction and for a special purpose, just as man guides the development of many animal and vegetable forms. . . . The controlling action of a higher intelligence is a necessary part of the laws of nature, just as the action of all surrounding organisms is one of the agencies in organic development, —else the laws which govern the material universe are insufficient for the production of man." Sir Wm. Thompson; "That man could be evolved out of inferior animals is the wildest dream of materialism, a pure assumption which offends me alike by its folly and by its arrogance." Hartmann, in his *Anthropoid Apes*, 302-303, while not despairing of "the possibility of discovering the true link between the world of man and mammals," declares that "that purely hypothetical being, the common ancestor of man and apes, is still to be found," and that "man cannot have descended from any of the fossil species which have hitherto come to our notice, nor yet from any of the species of apes now extant." See Dana, *Amer. Journ. Science and Arts*, 1876: 261, and *Geology*, 608,

604; Lotze, Mikrokosmos, vol. I, bk. 3, chap. 1; Mivart, Genesis of Species, 202-222, 259-307, Man and Apes, 88, 149-192, Lessons from Nature, 123-242, 290-301, The Cat, and Encyclop. Britannica, art.: Apes; Quatrefages, Natural History of Man, 64-87; Bp. Temple, Bampton Lect., 1884: 161-189; Dawson, Story of the Earth and Man, 321-329; Duke of Argyll, Primeval Man, 38-75; Asa Gray, Natural Science and Religion; Schmid, Theories of Darwin, 115-140; Carpenter, Mental Physiology, 59; Mollvaine, Wisdom of Holy Scripture, 55-86; Bible Commentary, 1: 43; Martensen, Dogmatics, 186; Le Conte, in Princeton Rev., Nov. 1878: 774-803; Zöckler Urgeschichte, 81-105; Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 1: 499-515. Also, see this Compendium, pages 392, 393.

(f) The truth that man is the offspring of God implies the correlative truth of a common divine Fatherhood. God is Father of all men, in that he originates and sustains them as personal beings like in nature to himself. Even toward sinners God holds this natural relation of Father. It is his fatherly love, indeed, which provides the atonement. Thus the demands of holiness are met and the prodigal is restored to the privileges of sonship which have been forfeited by transgression. This natural Fatherhood, therefore, does not exclude, but prepares the way for, God's special Fatherhood toward those who have been regenerated by his Spirit and who have believed on his Son; indeed, since all God's creations take place in and through Christ, there is a natural and physical sonship of all men, by virtue of their relation to Christ, the eternal Son, which antedates and prepares the way for the spiritual sonship of those who join themselves to him by faith. Man's natural sonship underlies the history of the fall, and qualifies the doctrine of Sin.

Texts referring to God's natural and common Fatherhood are: Mal. 2: 10 — "Have we not all one father [Abraham]? hath not one God created us?" Luke 3: 38 — "Adam, the son of God"; 15: 11-32 — the parable of the prodigal son, in which the father is father even before the prodigal returns; John 3: 16 — "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son"; John 15: 6 — "If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered; and they gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned"; — these words imply a natural union of all men with Christ, — otherwise they would teach that those who are spiritually united to him can perish everlastingly. Acts 17: 28 — "For we are also his offspring" — words addressed by Paul to a heathen audience; Col. 1: 16, 17 — "in him were all things created . . . and in him all things consist"; Heb. 12: 9 — "the Father of spirits." Fatherhood, in this larger sense, implies: 1. Origination; 2. Impartation of life; 3. Sustentation; 4. Likeness in faculties and powers; 5. Government; 6. Care; 7. Love. In all these respects God is the Father of all men, and his fatherly love is both preserving and atoning. God's natural fatherhood is mediated by Christ, through whom all things were made, and in whom all things, even humanity, consist. We are naturally children of God, as we were created in Christ; we are spiritually sons of God, as we have been created anew in Christ Jesus. G. W. Northrop: "God never becomes Father to any men or class of men; he only becomes a reconciled and complacent Father to those who become ethically like him. Men are not sons in the full ideal sense until they comport themselves as sons of God." Chapman, Jesus Christ and the Present Age, 39 — "While God is the Father of all men, all men are not the children of God; in other words, God always realizes completely the idea of Father to every man; but the majority of men realize only partially the idea of sonship."

Texts referring to the special Fatherhood of grace are: John 1: 12, 13 — "as many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on his name; who were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God"; Rom. 8: 14 — "for as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God"; 15 — "ye received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father"; 2 Cor. 6: 17 — "Come ye out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch no unclean thing, and I will receive you, and will be to you a Father, and ye shall be to me sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty"; Eph. 1: 5, 6 — "having foreordained us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ unto himself"; 3: 14, 15 — "the Father, from whom every family [marg. 'fatherhood'] in heaven and on earth is named" (= every race among angels or men — so Meyer, Romans, 158, 159); Gal. 3: 26 — "for ye are all sons of God, through faith, in Christ Jesus"; 4: 6 — "And because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father"; 1 John 3: 1, 2 — "Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called children of God;

and such we are. . . Beloved, now are we children of God." The sonship of the race is only rudimentary. The actual realization of sonship is possible only through Christ. Gal. 4:1-7 intimates a universal sonship, but a sonship in which the child "differed nothing from a bondservant though he is lord of all," and needs still to "receive the adoption of sons." Simon, Reconciliation, 81—"It is one thing to be a father; another to discharge all the fatherly functions. Human fathers sometimes fail to behave like fathers for reasons lying solely in themselves; sometimes because of hindrances in the conduct or character of their children. No father can normally discharge his fatherly functions toward children who are unchild-like. So even the rebellious son is a son, but he does not act like a son." Because all men are naturally sons of God, it does not follow that all men will be saved. Many who are naturally sons of God are not spiritually sons of God; they are only "servants" who "abide not in the house forever" (John 8:35). God is their Father, but they have yet to "become" his children (Mat. 5:45).

The controversy between those who maintain and those who deny that God is the Father of all men is a mere logomachy. God is physically and naturally the Father of all men; he is morally and spiritually the Father only of those who have been renewed by his Spirit. All men are sons of God in a lower sense by virtue of their natural union with Christ; only those are sons of God in the higher sense who have joined themselves by faith to Christ in a spiritual union. We can therefore assent to much that is said by those who deny the universal divine fatherhood, as, for example, C. M. Mead, in Am. Jour. Theology, July, 1897: 577-600, who maintains that sonship consists in spiritual kinship with God, and who quotes, in support of this view, John 8:41-44—"If God were your Father, ye would love me. . . Ye are of your father, the devil"—the Fatherhood of God is not universal; Mat. 5:44, 45—"Love your enemies. . . in order that ye may become sons of your Father who is in heaven"; John 1:12—"as many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on his name." Gordon, Ministry of the Spirit, 108—"That God has created all men does not constitute them his sons in the evangelical sense of the word. The sonship on which the N. T. dwells so constantly is based solely on the experience of the new birth, while the doctrine of universal sonship rests either on a daring denial or a daring assumption—the denial of the universal fall of man through sin, or the assumption of the universal regeneration of man through the Spirit. In either case the teaching belongs to 'another gospel' (Gal. 1:7), the recompense of whose preaching is not a beatitude, but an anathema' (Gal. 1:8)."

But we can also agree with much that is urged by the opposite party, as for example, Wendt, Teaching of Jesus, 1:193—"God does not become the Father, but is the heavenly Father, even of those who become his sons. . . This Fatherhood of God, instead of the kingship which was the dominant idea of the Jews, Jesus made the primary doctrine. The relation is ethical, not the Fatherhood of mere origination, and therefore only those who live aright are true sons of God. . . 209—Mere kingship, or exaltation above the world, led to Pharisaic legal servitude and external ceremony and to Alexandrian philosophical speculation. The Fatherhood apprehended and announced by Jesus was essentially a relation of love and holiness." A. H. Bradford, Age of Faith, 116-120—"There is something sacred in humanity. But systems of theology once began with the essential and natural worthlessness of man. . . If there is no Fatherhood, then selfishness is logical. But Fatherhood carries with it identity of nature between the parent and the child. Therefore every laborer is of the nature of God, and he who has the nature of God cannot be treated like the products of factory and field. . . All the children of God are by nature partakers of the life of God. They are called 'children of wrath' (Eph. 2:3), or 'of perdition' (John 17:12), only to indicate that their proper relations and duties have been violated. . . Love for man is dependent on something worthy of love, and that is found in man's essential divinity." We object to this last statement, as attributing to man at the beginning what can come to him only through grace. Man was indeed created in Christ (Gal. 1:16) and was a son of God by virtue of his union with Christ (Luke 3:38; John 15:8). But since man has sinned and has renounced his sonship, it can be restored and realized, in a moral and spiritual sense, only through the atoning work of Christ and the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit (Eph. 2:10—"created in Christ Jesus for good works"; 2 Pet. 1:4—"his precious and exceeding great promises; that through these ye may become partakers of the divine nature").

Many who deny the universal Fatherhood of God refuse to carry their doctrine to its logical extreme. To be consistent they should forbid the unconverted to offer the Lord's Prayer or even to pray at all. A mother who did not believe God to be the Father of all actually said: "My children are not converted, and if I were to teach them the Lord's Prayer, I must teach them to say: 'Our father who art in hell'; for

they are only children of the devil." Papers on the question: Is God the Father of all Men? are to be found in the Proceedings of the Baptist Congress, 1896: 106-126. Among these the essay of F. H. Rowley asserts God's universal Fatherhood upon the grounds: 1. Man is created in the image of God; 2. God's fatherly treatment of man, especially in the life of Christ among men; 3. God's universal claim on man for his filial love and trust; 4. Only God's Fatherhood makes incarnation possible, for this implies oneness of nature between God and man. To these we may add: 5. The atoning death of Christ could be efficacious only upon the ground of a common nature in Christ and in humanity; and 6. The regenerating work of the Holy Spirit is intelligible only as the restoration of a filial relation which was native to man, but which his sin had put into abeyance. For denial that God is Father to any but the regenerate, see Candlish, Fatherhood of God; Wright, Fatherhood of God. For advocacy of the universal Fatherhood, see Crawford, Fatherhood of God; Lidgett, Fatherhood of God.

## II. UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

(a) The Scriptures teach that the whole human race is descended from a single pair.

Gen. 1:27, 28—"And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And God blessed them: and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it"; 2:7—"And Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul"; 2:22—"and the rib, which Jehovah God had taken from the man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man"; 3:20—"And the man called his wife's name Eve; because she was the mother of all living"—even Eve is traced back to Adam; 9:19—"These three were the sons of Noah; and of these was the whole earth overspread." Mason, Faith of the Gospel, 118—"Logically, it seems easier to account for the divergence of what was at first one, than for the union of what was at first heterogeneous."

(b) This truth lies at the foundation of Paul's doctrine of the organic unity of mankind in the first transgression, and of the provision of salvation for the race in Christ.

Rom. 5:12—"Therefore, as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned"; 19—"For as through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, even so through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous"; 1 Cor. 15:21, 22—"For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive"; Heb. 2:16—"For verily not of angels doth he take hold, but he taketh hold of the seed of Abraham." One of the most eminent ethnologists and anthropologists, Prof. D. G. Brinton, said not long before his death that all scientific research and teaching tended to the conviction that mankind has descended from one pair.

(c) This descent of humanity from a single pair also constitutes the ground of man's obligation of natural brotherhood to every member of the race.

Acts 17:26—"he made of one every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth"—here the Rev. Vers. omits the word "blood" ("made of one blood"—Auth. Vers.). The word to be supplied is possibly "father," but more probably "body"; cf. Heb. 2:11—"for both he that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of one [father or body]: for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying, I will declare thy name unto my brethren, in the midst of the congregation will I sing thy praise."

Winchell, in his Preadamites, has recently revived the theory broached in 1656 by Peyrerius, that there were men before Adam: "Adam is descended from a black race—not the black races from Adam." Adam is simply "the remotest ancestor to whom the Jews could trace their lineage. . . . The derivation of Adam from an older human stock is essentially the creation of Adam." Winchell does not deny the unity of the race, nor the retrospective effect of the atonement upon those who lived before Adam; he simply denies that Adam was the first man. 297—He "regards the Adamic stock as derived from an older and humbler human type," originally as low in the scale as the present Australian savages.

Although this theory furnishes a plausible explanation of certain Biblical facts, such as the marriage of Cain (Gen. 4:17), Cain's fear that men would slay him (Gen. 4:14), and the distinction between "the sons of God" and "the daughters of men" (Gen. 6:1, 2), it treats the

Mosaic narrative as legendary rather than historical. Shem, Ham, and Japheth, it is intimated, may have lived hundreds of years apart from one another (409). Upon this view, Eve could not be "the mother of all living" (Gen. 3:20), nor could the transgression of Adam be the cause and beginning of condemnation to the whole race (Rom. 5:12, 19). As to Cain's fear of other families who might take vengeance upon him, we must remember that we do not know how many children were born to Adam between Cain and Abel, nor what the age of Cain and Abel was, nor whether Cain feared only those that were then living. As to Cain's marriage, we must remember that even if Cain married into another family, his wife, upon any hypothesis of the unity of the race, must have been descended from some other original Cain that married his sister.

See Keil and Delitzsch, *Com. on Pentateuch*, 1:116—"The marriage of brothers and sisters was inevitable in the case of children of the first man, in case the human race was actually to descend from a single pair, and may therefore be justified, in the face of the Mosaic prohibition of such marriages, on the ground that the sons and daughters of Adam represented not merely the family but the genus, and that it was not till after the rise of several families that the bonds of fraternal and conjugal love became distinct from one another and assumed fixed and mutually exclusive forms, the violation of which is sin." Prof. W. H. Green: "Gen. 20:12 shows that Sarah was Abraham's half-sister; . . . the regulations subsequently ordained in the Mosaic law were not then in force." G. H. Darwin, son of Charles Darwin, has shown that marriage between cousins is harmless where there is difference of temperament between the parties. Modern paleontology makes it probable that at the beginning of the race there was greater differentiation of brothers and sisters in the same family than obtains in later times. See Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 1:375. For criticism of the doctrine that there were men before Adam, see *Methodist Quar. Rev.*, April, 1881: 205-231; *Presb. Rev.*, 1881: 440-444.

The Scripture statements are corroborated by considerations drawn from history and science. Four arguments may be briefly mentioned:

#### 1. The argument from history.

So far as the history of nations and tribes in both hemispheres can be traced, the evidence points to a common origin and ancestry in central Asia.

The European nations are acknowledged to have come, in successive waves of migration, from Asia. Modern ethnologists generally agree that the Indian races of America are derived from Mongoloid sources in Eastern Asia, either through Polynesia or by way of the Aleutian Islands. Bunsen, *Philos. of Universal History*, 2:112—the Asiatic origin of all the North American Indians "is as fully proved as the unity of family among themselves." Mason, *Origins of Invention*, 361—"Before the time of Columbus, the Polynesians made canoe voyages from Tahiti to Hawaii, a distance of 2300 miles." Keane, *Man Past and Present*, 1-15, 349-440, treats of the American Aborigines under two primitive types: Longheads from Europe and Roundheads from Asia. The human race, he claims, originated in Indomalaysia and spread thence by migration over the globe. The world was peopled from one center by Pleistocene man. The primary groups were evolved each in its special habitat, but all sprang from a Pleistocene precursor 100,000 years ago. W. T. Lopp, missionary to the Eskimos, at Port Clarence, Alaska, on the American side of Bering Strait, writes under date of August 21, 1862: "No thaws during the winter, and ice blocked in the Strait. This has always been doubted by whalers. Eskimos have told them that they sometimes crossed the Strait on ice, but they have never believed them. Last February and March our Eskimos had a tobacco famine. Two parties (five men) went with dogsleds to East Cape, on the Siberian coast, and traded some beaver, otter and marten skins for Russian tobacco, and returned safely. It is only during an occasional winter that they can do this. But every summer they make several trips in their big wolf-skin boats—forty feet long. These observations may throw some light upon the origin of the prehistoric races of America."

Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 1:48—"The semi-civilized nations of Java and Sumatra are found in possession of a civilization which at first glance shows itself to have been borrowed from Hindu and Moslem sources." See also Sir Henry Rawlinson, quoted in Burgess, *Antiquity and Unity of the Race*, 156, 157; Smyth, *Unity of Human Races*, 223-226; Pickering, *Races of Man*, *Introd.*, synopsis, and page 316; Guyot, *Earth and Man*, 228-234; Quatrefages, *Natural History of Man*, and *Unité de l'Espèce Humaine*;

Godron, *Unité de l'Espèce Humaine*, 2:412 sq. *Per contra*, however, see Prof. A. H. Sayce: "The evidence is now all tending to show that the districts in the neighborhood of the Baltic were those from which the Aryan languages first radiated, and where the race or races who spoke them originally dwelt. The Aryan invaders of Northwestern India could only have been a late and distant offshoot of the primitive stock, speedily absorbed into the earlier population of the country as they advanced southward; and to speak of 'our Indian brethren' is as absurd and false as to claim relationship with the negroes of the United States because they now use an Aryan language." Scribner, *Where Did Life Begin?* has lately adduced arguments to prove that life on the earth originated at the North Pole, and Prof. Asa Gray favors this view; see his *Darwiniana*, 205, and *Scientific Papers*, 2:152; so also Warren, *Paradise Found*; and Wieland, in *Am. Journal of Science*, Dec. 1903: 401-430. Dr. J. L. Wortman, in *Yale Alumni Weekly*, Jan. 14, 1903: 129—"The appearance of all these primates in North America was very abrupt at the beginning of the second stage of the Eocene. And it is a striking coincidence that approximately the same forms appear in beds of exactly corresponding age in Europe. Nor does this synchronism stop with the apes. It applies to nearly all the other types of Eocene mammals in the Northern Hemisphere, and to the accompanying flora as well. These facts can be explained only on the hypothesis that there was a common centre from which these plants and animals were distributed. Considering further that the present continental masses were essentially the same in the Eocene time as now, and that the North Polar region then enjoyed a subtropical climate, as is abundantly proved by fossil plants, we are forced to the conclusion that this common centre of dispersion lay approximately within the Arctic Circle. . . . The origin of the human species did not take place on the Western Hemisphere."

## 2. The argument from language.

Comparative philology points to a common origin of all the more important languages, and furnishes no evidence that the less important are not also so derived.

On Sanskrit as a connecting link between the Indo-Germanic languages, see Max Müller, *Science of Language*, 1:146-165, 326-342, who claims that all languages pass through the three stages: monosyllabic, agglutinative, inflectional; and that nothing necessitates the admission of different independent beginnings for either the material or the formal elements of the Turanian, Semitic, and Aryan branches of speech. The changes of language are often rapid. Latin becomes the Romance languages, and Saxon and Norman are united into English, in three centuries. The Chinese may have departed from their primitive abodes while their language was yet monosyllabic.

G. J. Romanes, *Life and Letters*, 195—"Children are the constructors of all languages, as distinguished from *language*." Instance Helen Keller's sudden acquisition of language, uttering publicly a long piece only three weeks after she first began to imitate the motions of the lips. G. F. Wright, *Man and the Glacial Period*, 242-301—"Recent investigations show that children, when from any cause isolated at an early age, will often produce at once a language *de novo*. Thus it would appear by no means improbable that various languages in America, and perhaps the earliest languages of the world, may have arisen in a short time where conditions were such that a family of small children could have maintained existence when for any cause deprived of parental and other fostering care. . . . Two or three thousand years of prehistoric time is perhaps all that would be required to produce the diversification of languages which appears at the dawn of history. . . . The prehistoric stage of Europe ended less than a thousand years before the Christian Era." In a people whose speech has not been fixed by being committed to writing, baby-talk is a great source of linguistic corruption, and the changes are exceedingly rapid. Humboldt took down the vocabulary of a South American tribe, and after fifteen years of absence found their speech so changed as to seem a different language.

Zückler, in *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie*, 8:68 sq., denies the progress from lower methods of speech to higher, and declares the most highly developed inflectional languages to be the oldest and most widespread. Inferior languages are a degeneration from a higher state of culture. In the development of the Indo-Germanic languages (such as the French and the English), we have instances of change from more full and luxuriant expression to that which is monosyllabic or agglutinative. The theory of Max Müller is also opposed by Pott, *Die Verschiedenheiten der menschlichen Rassen*.

203, 243. Pott calls attention to the fact that the Australian languages show unmistakable similarity to the languages of Eastern and Southern Asia, although the physical characteristics of these tribes are far different from the Asiatic.

On the old Egyptian language as a connecting link between the Indo-European and the Semitic tongues, see Bunsen, *Egypt's Place*, 1: preface, 10; also see Farrar, *Origin of Language*, 213. Like the old Egyptian, the Berber and the Touareg are Semitic in parts of their vocabulary, while yet they are Aryan in grammar. So the Tibetan and Burmese stand between the Indo-European languages, on the one hand, and the monosyllabic languages, as of China, on the other. A French philologist claims now to have interpreted the *Yh-King*, the oldest and most unintelligible monumental writing of the Chinese, by regarding it as a corruption of the old Assyrian or Accadian cuneiform characters, and as resembling the syllabaries, vocabularies, and bilingual tablets in the ruined libraries of Assyria and Babylon; see Terrien de Lacouperie, *The Oldest Book of the Chinese and its Authors*, and *The Languages of China before the Chinese*, II, note; he holds to "the non-indigenesness of the Chinese civilization and its derivation from the old Chaldeo-Babylonian focus of culture by the medium of Susiana." See also Sayce, in *Contemp. Rev.*, Jan. 1884: 934-936; also, *The Monist*, Oct. 1906: 532-536, on *The Ideograms of the Chinese and the Central American Calendars*. The evidence goes to show that the Chinese came into China from Susiana in the 23d century before Christ. Initial G wears down in time into a Y sound. Many words which begin with Y in Chinese are found in Accadian beginning with G, as Chinese Ye, 'night,' is in Accadian Ge, 'night.' The order of development seems to be: 1. picture writing; 2. syllabic writing; 3. alphabetic writing.

In a similar manner, there is evidence that the Pharaonic Egyptians were immigrants from another land, namely, Babylonia. Hommel derives the hieroglyphs of the Egyptians from the pictures out of which the cuneiform characters developed, and he shows that the elements of the Egyptian language itself are contained in that mixed speech of Babylonia which originated in the fusion of Sumerians and Semites. The Osiris of Egypt is the Asari of the Sumerians. Burial in brick tombs in the first two Egyptian dynasties is a survival from Babylonia, as are also the seal-cylinders impressed on clay. On the relations between Aryan and Semitic languages, see Renouf, *Hibbert Lectures*, 55-61; Murray, *Origin and Growth of the Psalms*, 7; *Bib. Sac.*, 1870: 162; 1876: 352-380; 1879: 674-706. See also Pezzi, *Aryan Philology*, 125; Sayce, *Principles of Comp. Philology*, 132-174; Whitney, art. on *Comp. Philology* in *Encyc. Britannica*, also *Life and Growth of Language*, 266, and *Study of Language*, 307, 308—"Language affords certain indications of doubtful value, which, taken along with certain other ethnological considerations, also of questionable pertinency, furnish ground for suspecting an ultimate relationship. . . . That more thorough comprehension of the history of Semitic speech will enable us to determine this ultimate relationship, may perhaps be looked for with hope, though it is not to be expected with confidence." See also Smyth, *Unity of Human Races*, 190-222; *Smith's Bib. Dict.*, art.: *Confusion of Tongues*.

We regard the facts as, on the whole, favoring an opposite conclusion from that in *Hastings's Bible Dictionary*, art.: *Flood*: "The diversity of the human race and of language alike makes it improbable that men were derived from a single pair." E. G. Robinson: "The only trustworthy argument for the unity of the race is derived from comparative philology. If it should be established that one of the three families of speech was more ancient than the others, and the source of the others, the argument would be unanswerable. Coloration of the skin seems to lie back of climatic influences. We believe in the unity of the race because in this there are the fewest difficulties. We would not know how else to interpret Paul in *Romans 5*." Max Müller has said that the fountain head of modern philology as of modern freedom and international law is the change wrought by Christianity, superseding the narrow national conception of patriotism by the recognition of all the nations and races as members of one great human family.

### 3. The argument from psychology.

The existence, among all families of mankind, of common mental and moral characteristics, as evinced in common maxims, tendencies and capacities, in the prevalence of similar traditions, and in the universal applicability of one philosophy and religion, is most easily explained upon the theory of a common origin.

Among the widely prevalent traditions may be mentioned the tradition of the fashioning of the world and man, of a primeval garden, of an original innocence and happiness, of a tree of knowledge, of a serpent, of a temptation and fall, of a division of time into weeks, of a flood, of sacrifice. It is possible, if not probable, that certain myths, common to many nations, may have been handed down from a time when the families of the race had not yet separated. See Zöckler, in *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie*, 8: 71-80; Max Müller, *Science of Language*, 2: 444-455; Prichard, *Nat. Hist. of Man*, 2: 657-714; Smyth, *Unity of Human Races*, 236-240; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 77-81; Gladstone, *Juventus Mundi*.

#### 4. The argument from physiology.

A. It is the common judgment of comparative physiologists that man constitutes but a single species. The differences which exist between the various families of mankind are to be regarded as varieties of this species. In proof of these statements we urge: (a) The numberless intermediate gradations which connect the so-called races with each other. (b) The essential identity of all races in cranial, osteological, and dental characteristics. (c) The fertility of unions between individuals of the most diverse types, and the continuous fertility of the offspring of such unions.

Huxley, *Critiques and Addresses*, 163—"It may be safely affirmed that, even if the differences between men are specific, they are so small that the assumption of more than one primitive stock for all is altogether superfluous. We may admit that Negroes and Australians are distinct species, yet be the strictest monogenists, and even believe in Adam and Eve as the primeval parents of mankind, *i. e.*, on Darwin's hypothesis"; *Origin of Species*, 118—"I am one of those who believe that at present there is no evidence whatever for saying that mankind sprang originally from more than a single pair; I must say that I cannot see any good ground whatever, or any tenable evidence, for believing that there is more than one species of man." Owen, quoted by Burgess, *Ant. and Unity of Race*, 185—"Man forms but one species, and differences are but indications of varieties. These variations merge into each other by easy gradations." Alex. von Humboldt: "The different races of men are forms of one sole species, — they are not different species of a genus."

Quatrefages, in *Revue d. deux Mondes*, Dec. 1880: 814—"If one places himself exclusively upon the plane of the natural sciences, it is impossible not to conclude in favor of the monogenist doctrine." Wagner, quoted in *Bib. Sac.*, 19: 607—"Species — the collective total of individuals which are capable of producing one with another an uninterruptedly fertile progeny." Pickering, *Races of Man*, 316—"There is no middle ground between the admission of eleven distinct species in the human family and their reduction to one. The latter opinion implies a central point of origin."

There is an impossibility of deciding how many races there are, if we once allow that there are more than one. While Pickering would say eleven, Agassiz says eight, Morton twenty-two, and Burke sixty-five. Modern science all tends to the derivation of each family from a single germ. Other common characteristics of all races of men, in addition to those mentioned in the text, are the duration of pregnancy, the normal temperature of the body, the mean frequency of the pulse, the liability to the same diseases. Meehan, State Botanist of Pennsylvania, maintains that hybrid vegetable products are no more sterile than are ordinary plants (*Independent*, Aug. 21, 1884).

E. B. Tylor, art.: *Anthropology*, in *Encyc. Britannica*: "On the whole it may be asserted that the doctrine of the unity of mankind now stands on a firmer basis than in previous ages." Darwin, *Animals and Plants under Domestication*, 1: 39—"From the resemblance in several countries of the half-domesticated dogs to the wild species still living there, from the facility with which they can be crossed together, from even half tamed animals being so much valued by savages, and from the other circumstances previously remarked on which favor domestication, it is highly probable that the domestic dogs of the world have descended from two good species of wolf (*viz.*, *Canis lupus* and *Canis latrans*), and from two or three other doubtful species of wolves (namely, the European, Indian and North American forms); from at least one or two South American canine species; from several races or species of the jackal; and perhaps

from one or more extinct species." Dr. E. M. Moore tried unsuccessfully to produce offspring by pairing a Newfoundland dog and a wolf-like dog from Canada. He only proved anew the repugnance of even slightly separated species toward one another.

B. Unity of species is presumptive evidence of unity of origin. Oneness of origin furnishes the simplest explanation of specific uniformity, if indeed the very conception of species does not imply the repetition and reproduction of a primordial type-idea impressed at its creation upon an individual empowered to transmit this type-idea to its successors.

Dana, quoted in Burgess, *Antiq. and Unity of Race*, 185, 186—"In the ascending scale of animals, the number of species in any genus diminishes as we rise, and should by analogy be smallest at the head of the series. Among mammals, the higher genera have few species, and the highest group next to man, the orang-outang, has only eight, and these constitute but two genera. Analogy requires that man should have preëminence and should constitute only one." 194—"A species corresponds to a specific amount or condition of concentrated force defined in the act or law of creation. . . . The species in any particular case began its existence when the first germ-cell or individual was created. When individuals multiply from generation to generation, it is but a repetition of the primordial type-idea. . . . The specific is based on a numerical unity, the species being nothing else than an enlargement of the individual." For full statement of Dana's view, see *Bib. Sac.*, Oct. 1867: 832-836. On the idea of species, see also Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 2: 63-74.

(a) To this view is opposed the theory, propounded by Agassiz, of different centres of creation, and of different types of humanity corresponding to the varying fauna and flora of each. But this theory makes the plural origin of man an exception in creation. Science points rather to a single origin of each species, whether vegetable or animal. If man be, as this theory grants, a single species, he should be, by the same rule, restricted to one continent in his origin. This theory, moreover, applies an unproved hypothesis with regard to the distribution of organized beings in general to the very being whose whole nature and history show conclusively that he is an exception to such a general rule, if one exists. Since man can adapt himself to all climes and conditions, the theory of separate centres of creation is, in his case, gratuitous and unnecessary.

Agassiz's view was first published in an essay on the Provinces of the Animal World, in Nott and Gliddon's *Types of Mankind*, a book gotten up in the interest of slavery. Agassiz held to eight distinct centres of creation, and to eight corresponding types of humanity—the Arctic, the Mongolian, the European, the American, the Negro, the Hottentot, the Malay, the Australian. Agassiz regarded Adam as the ancestor only of the white race, yet like Peyrerius and Winchell he held that man in all his various races constitutes but one species.

The whole tendency of recent science, however, has been adverse to the doctrine of separate centres of creation, even in the case of animal and vegetable life. In temperate North America there are two hundred and seven species of quadrupeds, of which only eight, and these polar animals, are found in the north of Europe or Asia. If North America be an instance of a separate centre of creation for its peculiar species, why should God create the same species of man in eight different localities? This would make man an exception in creation. There is, moreover, no need of creating man in many separate localities; for, unlike the polar bears and the Norwegian fir, which cannot live at the equator, man can adapt himself to the most varied climates and conditions. For replies to Agassiz, see *Bib. Sac.*, 19: 607-632; *Princeton Rev.*, 1862: 435-464.

(b) It is objected, moreover, that the diversities of size, color, and physical conformation, among the various families of mankind, are inconsistent with the theory of a common origin. But we reply that these diversities are of a superficial character, and can be accounted for by cor-

responding diversities of condition and environment. Changes which have been observed and recorded within historic times show that the differences alluded to may be the result of slowly accumulated divergences from one and the same original and ancestral type. The difficulty in the case, moreover, is greatly relieved when we remember (1) that the period during which these divergences have arisen is by no means limited to six thousand years (see note on the antiquity of the race, pages 224-226); and (2) that, since species in general exhibit their greatest power of divergence into varieties immediately after their first introduction, all the varieties of the human species may have presented themselves in man's earliest history.

Instances of physiological change as the result of new conditions: The Irish driven by the English two centuries ago from Armagh and the south of Down, have become prognathous like the Australians. The inhabitants of New England have descended from the English, yet they have already a physical type of their own. The Indians of North America, or at least certain tribes of them, have permanently altered the shape of the skull by bandaging the head in infancy. The Sikhs of India, since the establishment of Bāba Nānak's religion (1500 A. D.) and their consequent advance in civilization, have changed to a longer head and more regular features, so that they are now distinguished greatly from their neighbors, the Afghans, Tibetans, Hindus. The Oetiaq savages have become the Magyar nobility of Hungary. The Turks in Europe are, in cranial shape, greatly in advance of the Turks in Asia from whom they descended. The Jews are confessedly of one ancestry; yet we have among them the light-haired Jews of Poland, the dark Jews of Spain, and the Ethiopian Jews of the Nile Valley. The Portuguese who settled in the East Indies in the 16th century are now as dark in complexion as the Hindus themselves. Africans become lighter in complexion as they go up from the alluvial river-banks to higher land, or from the coast; and on the contrary the coast tribes which drive out the negroes of the interior and take their territory end by becoming negroes themselves. See, for many of the above facts, Burgess, *Antiquity and Unity of the Race*, 195-202.

The law of originally greater plasticity, mentioned in the text, was first hinted by Hall, the paleontologist of New York. It is accepted and defined by Dawson, *Story of the Earth and Man*, 360—"A new law is coming into view: that species when first introduced have an innate power of expansion, which enables them rapidly to extend themselves to the limit of their geographical range, and also to reach the limit of their divergence into races. This limit once reached, these races run on in parallel lines until they one by one run out and disappear. According to this law the most aberrant races of men might be developed in a few centuries, after which divergence would cease, and the several lines of variation would remain permanent, at least so long as the conditions under which they originated remained." See the similar view of Von Baer in Schmid, *Theories of Darwin*, 55, note. Joseph Cook: Variability is a lessening quantity; the tendency to change is greatest at the first, but, like the rate of motion of a stone thrown upward, it lessens every moment after. Kuskin, *Seven Lamps*, 125—"The life of a nation is usually, like the flow of a lava-stream, first bright and fierce, then languid and covered, at last advancing only by the tumbling over and over of its frozen blocks." Renouf, *Hibbert Lectures*, 54—"The further back we go into antiquity, the more closely does the Egyptian type approach the European." Rawlinson says that negroes are not represented in the Egyptian monuments before 1500 B. C. The influence of climate is very great, especially in the savage state.

In May, 1891, there died in San Francisco the son of an interpreter at the Merchants' Exchange. He was 21 years of age. Three years before his death his clear skin was his chief claim to manly beauty. He was attacked by "Addison's disease," a gradual darkening of the color of the surface of the body. At the time of his death his skin was as dark as that of a full-blooded negro. His name was George L. Sturtevant. Ratzel, *History of Mankind*, 1:9, 10—"As there is only one species of man, 'the reunion into one real whole of the parts which have diverged after the fashion of sports' is said to be 'the unconscious ultimate aim of all the movements' which have taken place since man began his wanderings. 'With Humboldt we can only hold fast to the external unity of the race.' See Sir Wm. Hunter, *The Indian Empire*, 233, 410; *Encyc. Britannica*, 12:808; 20:110; Zöckler, *Urgeschichte*, 109-132, and in *Jahrbuch für deutsche*

Theologie, 8: 51-71; Pritchard, *Researches*, 5: 547-552, and *Nat. Hist. of Man*, 2: 644-656; Duke of Argyll, *Primeval Man*, 96-108; Smith, *Unity of Human Races*, 255-288; Morris, *Conflict of Science and Religion*, 335-385; Rawlinson, in *Journ. Christ. Philosophy*, April, 1883: 350.

### III. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HUMAN NATURE.

#### I. *The Dichotomous Theory.*

Man has a two-fold nature, — on the one hand material, on the other hand immaterial. He consists of body, and of spirit, or soul. That there are two, and only two, elements in man's being, is a fact to which consciousness testifies. This testimony is confirmed by Scripture, in which the prevailing representation of man's constitution is that of dichotomy.

Dichotomous, from *δίχα*, 'in two,' and *τέμνω*, 'to cut,' — composed of two parts. Man is as conscious that his immaterial part is a unity, as that his body is a unity. He knows two, and only two, parts of his being — body and soul. So man is the true Janus (Martensen), Mr. Facing-both-ways (Bunyan). That the Scriptures favor dichotomy will appear by considering:

(a) The record of man's creation (Gen. 2:7), in which, as a result of the inbreathing of the divine Spirit, the body becomes possessed and vitalized by a single principle — the living soul.

Gen. 2:7 — "And Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul" — here it is not said that man was first a living soul, and that then God breathed into him a spirit; but that God inbreathed spirit, and man became a living soul — God's life took possession of clay, and as a result, man had a soul. Cf. Job 37:3 — "For my life is yet whole in me, and the spirit of God is in my nostrils"; 33:3 — "there is a spirit in man, and the breath of the Almighty giveth them understanding"; 33:4 — "The Spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty giveth me life."

(b) Passages in which the human soul, or spirit, is distinguished, both from the divine Spirit from whom it proceeded, and from the body which it inhabits.

Num. 16:22 — "O God, the God of the spirits of all flesh"; Zech. 12:1 — "Jehovah, who . . . formeth the spirit of man within him"; 1 Cor. 2:11 — "the spirit of the man which is in him . . . the Spirit of God"; Heb. 12:9 — "the Father of spirits." The passages just mentioned distinguish the spirit of man from the Spirit of God. The following distinguish the soul, or spirit, of man from the body which it inhabits: Gen. 35:18 — "it came to pass, as her soul was departing (for she died)"; 1 K. 17:21 — "O Jehovah my God, I pray thee, let this child's soul come into him again"; Ecol. 12:7 — "the dust returneth to the earth as it was, and the spirit returneth unto God who gave it"; James 2:26 — "the body apart from the spirit is dead." The first class of passages refutes pantheism; the second refutes materialism.

(c) The interchangeable use of the terms 'soul' and 'spirit.'

Gen. 41:8 — "his spirit was troubled"; cf. Ps. 42:6 — "my soul is cast down within me." John 12:27 — "Now is my soul troubled"; cf. 13:21 — "he was troubled in the spirit." Mat. 20:28 — "to give his life (*ψυχὴν*) a ransom for many"; cf. 27:50 — "yielded up his spirit (*πνεῦμα*)." Heb. 12:23 — "spirits of just men made perfect"; cf. Rev. 6:9 — "I saw underneath the altar the souls of them that had been slain for the word of God." In these passages "spirit" and "soul" seem to be used interchangeably.

(d) The mention of body and soul (or spirit) as together constituting the whole man.

Mat. 10:28 — "able to destroy both soul and body in hell"; 1 Cor. 5:3 — "absent in body but present in spirit"; 2 John 8 — "I pray that thou mayest prosper and be in health, even as thy soul prospereth." These texts imply that body and soul (or spirit) together constitute the whole man.

For advocacy of the dichotomous theory, see Goodwin, in *Journ. Society Bib. Exegesis*, 1861: 73-86; Godet, *Bib. Studies of the O. T.*, 32; Oehler, *Theology of the O. T.*, 1: 219; Hahn, *Bib. Theol. N. T.*, 380 *sq.*; Schmidt, *Bib. Theology N. T.*, 508; Weiss, *Bib. Theology N. T.*, 214; Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 112, 113; Hofmann, *Schrift-*

beweis, 1: 294-298; Kahnis, Dogmatik, 1: 549; 3: 249; Harless, Com. on Eph., 4: 23, and Christian Ethics, 23; Thomastus, Christi Person und Werk, 1: 184-188; Hodge, in Princeton Review, 1865: 116, and Systematic Theol., 2: 47-51; Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 281-283; Wm. H. Hodge, in Presb. and Ref. Rev., Apl. 1897.

## 2. The Trichotomous Theory.

Side by side with this common representation of human nature as consisting of two parts, are found passages which at first sight appear to favor trichotomy. It must be acknowledged that *πνεῦμα* (spirit) and *ψυχή* (soul), although often used interchangeably, and always designating the same indivisible substance, are sometimes employed as contrasted terms.

In this more accurate use, *ψυχή* denotes man's immaterial part in its inferior powers and activities;—as *ψυχή*, man is a conscious individual, and, in common with the brute creation, has an animal life, together with appetite, imagination, memory, understanding. *Πνεῦμα*, on the other hand, denotes man's immaterial part in its higher capacities and faculties;—as *πνεῦμα*, man is a being related to God, and possessing powers of reason, conscience, and free will, which difference him from the brute creation and constitute him responsible and immortal.

In the following texts, spirit and soul are distinguished from each other: 1 Thes. 5: 23—“And the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ”; Heb. 4: 12—“For the word of God is living, and active, and sharper than any two-edged sword, and piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit, of both joints and marrow, and quick to discern the thoughts and intents of the heart.” Compare 1 Cor. 2: 14—“Now the natural [Gr. ‘psychical’] man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God”; 15: 44—“It is sown a natural [Gr. ‘psychical’] body; it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a natural [Gr. ‘psychical’] body, there is also a spiritual body”; Eph. 4: 23—“that ye be renewed in the spirit of your mind”; Jude 19—“sensual [Gr. ‘psychical’], having not the Spirit.”

For the proper interpretation of these texts, see note on the next page. Among those who cite them as proofs of the trichotomous theory (trichotomous, from *τριχως*, ‘in three parts,’ and *τέμνω*, ‘to cut,’—composed of three parts, *i. e.*, spirit, soul, and body) may be mentioned Olshausen, *Opuscula*, 184, and Com. on 1 Thes., 5: 23; Beck, *Bibliche Seelenlehre*, 81; Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology*, 117, 118; Göschel, in Herzog, *Realencyclopädie*, art. Seele; also, art. by Auberien: *Geist des Menschen*; Cremer, *N. T. Lexicon*, on *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή*; Usteri, *Paulin. Lehrbegriff*, 384 sq.; Neander, *Planting and Training*, 384; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, 365, 366; Boardman, in *Bap. Quarterly*, 1: 177, 325, 426; Heard, *Tripartite Nature of Man*, 62-114; Ellicott, *Destiny of the Creature*, 106-126.

The element of truth in trichotomy is simply this, that man has a triplicity of endowment, in virtue of which the single soul has relations to matter, to self, and to God. The trichotomous theory, however, as it is ordinarily defined, endangers the unity and immateriality of our higher nature, by holding that man consists of three substances, or three component parts—body, soul, and spirit—and that soul and spirit are as distinct from each other as are soul and body.

The advocates of this view differ among themselves as to the nature of the *ψυχή* and its relation to the other elements of our being; some (as Delitzsch) holding that the *ψυχή* is an efflux of the *πνεῦμα*, distinct in substance, but not in essence, even as the divine Word is distinct from God, while yet he is God; others (as Göschel) regarding the *ψυχή*, not as a distinct substance, but as a resultant of the union of the *πνεῦμα* and the *σῶμα*. Still others (as Cremer) hold the *ψυχή* to be the subject of the personal life whose principle is the *πνεῦμα*. Heard, *Tripartite Nature of Man*, 106—“God is the Creator *ex traduce* of the animal and intellectual part of every man. . . . Not so with the spirit. . . . It proceeds from God, not by creation, but by emanation.”

We regard the trichotomous theory as untenable, not only for the reasons already urged in proof of the dichotomous theory, but from the following additional considerations:

(a) Πνεῦμα, as well as ψυχή, is used of the brute creation.

Gen. 1:21 — "Who knoweth the spirit of man, whether it goeth [ marg. 'that goeth' ] upward, and the spirit of the beast, whether it goeth [ marg. 'that goeth' ] downward to the earth?" Rev. 16:3 — "And the second poured out his bowl into the sea; and it became blood, as of a dead man; and every living soul died, even the things that were in the sea" — the fish.

(b) Ψυχή is ascribed to Jehovah.

Amos 8:3 — "The Lord Jehovah hath sworn by himself" (lit. 'by his soul,' LXX δαυδά); Is. 43:1 — "my chosen in whom my soul delighteth"; Jer. 9:9 — "Shall I not visit them for these things? saith Jehovah; shall not my soul be avenged?" Heb. 10:38 — "my righteous one shall live by faith: And if he shrink back, my soul hath no pleasure in him."

(c) The disembodied dead are called ψυχαί.

Rev. 6:9 — "I saw underneath the altar the souls of them that had been slain for the word of God"; cf. 20:4 — "souls of them that had been beheaded."

(d) The highest exercises of religion are attributed to the ψυχή.

Mark 12:30 — "thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . . with all thy soul"; Luke 1:46 — "My soul doth magnify the Lord"; Heb. 6:18, 19 — "the hope set before us: which we have as an anchor of the soul"; James 1:21 — "the implanted word, which is able to save your souls."

(e) To lose this ψυχή is to lose all.

Mark 8:36, 37 — "For what doth it profit a man, to gain the whole world, and forfeit his life [ or 'soul,' ψυχή ]? For what should a man give in exchange for his life [ or 'soul,' ψυχή ]?"

(f) The passages chiefly relied upon as supporting trichotomy may be better explained upon the view already indicated, that soul and spirit are not two distinct substances or parts, but that they designate the immaterial principle from different points of view.

1 Thess. 5:23 — "may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire" — not a scientific enumeration of the constituent parts of human nature, but a comprehensive sketch of that nature in its chief relations; compare Mark 12:30 — "thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength" — where none would think of finding proof of a fourfold division of human nature. On 1 Thess. 5:23, see Biggenbach (in Lange's Com.), and Commentary of Prof. W. A. Stevens. Heb. 4:12 — "piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit, of both joints and marrow" — not the dividing of soul from spirit, or of joints from marrow, but rather the piercing of the soul and of the spirit, even to their very joints and marrow; i. e., to the very depths of the spiritual nature. On Heb. 4:12, see Ebrard (in Olshausen's Com.), and Linemann (in Meyer's Com.); also Tholuck, Com. in loco. Jude 19 — "sensual, having not the spirit" (ψυχικοί, πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες) — even though πνεῦμα — the human spirit, need not mean that there is no spirit existing, but only that the spirit is torpid and inoperative — as we say of a weak man: 'he has no mind,' or of an unprincipled man: 'he has no conscience'; so Alford; see Nitzsch, Christian Doctrine, 302. But πνεῦμα here probably — the divine πνεῦμα. Meyer takes this view, and the Revised Version capitalizes the word "spirit." See Goodwin, Soc. Bib. Exegesis, 1881: 86. — "The distinction between ψυχή and πνεῦμα is a functional, and not a substantial, distinction." Moule, Outlines of Christian Doctrine, 161, 162 — "Soul = spirit organized, inseparably linked with the body; spirit = man's inner being considered as God's gift. Soul = man's inner being viewed as his own; spirit = man's inner being viewed as from God. They are not separate elements." See Lightfoot, Essay on St. Paul and Seneca, appended to his Com. on Philippians, on the influence of the ethical language of Stoicism on the N. T. writers. Martineau, Seat of Authority, 80 — "The difference between man and his companion creatures on this earth is not that his instinctive life is less than theirs, for in truth it goes far beyond them; but that in him it acts in the presence and under the eye of other powers which transform it, and by giving to it vision as well as light take its blindness away. He is let into his own secrets."

We conclude that the immaterial part of man, viewed as an individual and conscious life, capable of possessing and animating a physical organism, is called *ψυχή*; viewed as a rational and moral agent, susceptible of divine influence and indwelling, this same immaterial part is called *πνεῦμα*. The *πνεῦμα*, then, is man's nature looking Godward, and capable of receiving and manifesting the *Πνεῦμα ἁγίον*; the *ψυχή* is man's nature looking earthward, and touching the world of sense. The *πνεῦμα* is man's higher part, as related to spiritual realities or as capable of such relation; the *ψυχή* is man's higher part, as related to the body, or as capable of such relation. Man's being is therefore not trichotomous but dichotomous, and his immaterial part, while possessing duality of powers, has unity of substance.

Man's nature is not a three-storied house, but a two-storied house, with windows in the upper story looking in two directions—toward earth and toward heaven. The lower story is the physical part of us—the body. But man's "upper story" has two aspects; there is an outlook toward things below, and a skylight through which to see the stars. "Soul," says Hovey, "is spirit as modified by union with the body." Is man then the same in kind with the brute, but different in degree? No, man is different in kind, though possessed of certain powers which the brute has. The frog is not a magnified sensitive-plant, though his nerves automatically respond to irritation. The animal is different in kind from the vegetable, though he has some of the same powers which the vegetable has. God's powers include man's; but man is not of the same substance with God, nor could man be enlarged or developed into God. So man's powers include those of the brute, but the brute is not of the same substance with man, nor could he be enlarged or developed into man.

Porter, *Human Intellect*, 39—"The spirit of man, in addition to its higher endowments, may also possess the lower powers which vitalize dead matter into a human body." It does not follow that the soul of the animal or plant is capable of man's higher functions or developments, or that the subjection of man's spirit to body, in the present life, disproves his immortality. Porter continues: "That the soul begins to exist as a vital force, does not require that it should always exist as such a force or in connection with a material body. Should it require another such body, it may have the power to create it for itself, as it has formed the one it first inhabited; or it may have already formed it, and may hold it ready for occupation and use as soon as it sloughs off the one which connects it with the earth."

Harris, *Philos. Basis of Theism*, 547—"Brutes may have organic life and sensitivity, and yet remain submerged in nature. It is not life and sensitivity that lift man above nature, but it is the distinctive characteristic of personality." Parkhurst, *The Pattern in the Mount*, 17-30, on Prov. 20:27—"The spirit of man is the lamp of Jehovah"—not necessarily lighted, but capable of being lighted, and intended to be lighted, by the touch of the divine flame. Cf. Mat. 6:22, 23—"The lamp of the body . . . If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is the darkness."

Schleiermacher, *Christliche Glaube*, 2:487—"We think of the spirit as soul, only when in the body, so that we cannot speak of an immortality of the soul, in the proper sense, without bodily life." The doctrine of the spiritual body is therefore the complement to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. A. A. Hodge, *Pop. Lectures*, 221—"By soul we mean only one thing, *i. e.*, an incarnate spirit, a spirit with a body. Thus we never speak of the souls of angels. They are pure spirits, having no bodies." Lisle, *Evolution of Spiritual Man*, 72—"The animal is the foundation of the spiritual; it is what the cellar is to the house; it is the base of supplies." Ladd, *Philosophy of Mind*, 371-373—"Trichotomy is absolutely untenable on grounds of psychological science. Man's reason, or the spirit that is in man, is not to be regarded as a sort of Mansard roof, built on to one building in a block, all the dwellings in which are otherwise substantially alike. . . . On the contrary, in every set of characteristics, from those called lowest to those pronounced highest, the soul of man differences itself from the soul of any species of animals. . . . The highest has also the lowest. All must be assigned to one subject."

This view of the soul and spirit as different aspects of the same spiritual principle furnishes a refutation of six important errors:

- (a) That of the Gnostics, who held that the *πνεῦμα* is part of the divine essence, and therefore incapable of sin.
- (b) That of the Apollinarians, who taught that Christ's humanity embraced only *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*, while his divine nature furnished the *πνεῦμα*.
- (c) That of the Semi-Pelagians, who excepted the human *πνεῦμα* from the dominion of original sin.
- (d) That of Placeus, who held that only the *πνεῦμα* was directly created by God (see our section on Theories of Imputation).
- (e) That of Julius Müller, who held that the *ψυχή* comes to us from Adam, but that our *πνεῦμα* was corrupted in a previous state of being (see page 490).
- (f) That of the Annihilationists, who hold that man at his creation had a divine element breathed into him, which he lost by sin, and which he recovers only in regeneration; so that only when he has this *πνεῦμα* restored by virtue of his union with Christ does man become immortal, death being to the sinner a complete extinction of being.

Tacitus might almost be understood to be a trichotomist when he writes: "Si ut sapientibus placuit, non extinguuntur cum corpore *magna* animæ." Trichotomy allies itself readily with materialism. Many trichotomists hold that man can exist without a *πνεῦμα*, but that the *σῶμα* and the *ψυχή* by themselves are mere matter, and are incapable of eternal existence. Trichotomy, however, when it speaks of the *πνεῦμα* as the divine principle in man, seems to savor of emanation or of pantheism. A modern English poet describes the glad and winsome child as "A silver stream, Breaking with laughter from the lake divine, Whence all things flow." Another poet, Robert Browning, in his *Death in the Desert*, 107, describes body, soul, and spirit, as "What does, what knows, what is—three souls, one man."

The Eastern church generally held to trichotomy, and is best represented by John of Damascus (ii: 12) who speaks of the soul as the sensuous life-principle which takes up the spirit—the spirit being an efflux from God. The Western church, on the other hand, generally held to dichotomy, and is best represented by Anselm: "Constat homo ex duabus naturis, ex natura animæ et ex natura carnis."

Luther has been quoted upon both sides of the controversy: by Delitzsch, *Bib. Psych.*, 460-463, as trichotomous, and as making the Mosaic tabernacle with its three divisions an image of the tripartite man. "The first division," he says, "was called the holy of holies, since God dwelt there, and there was no light therein. The next was denominated the holy place, for within it stood a candlestick with seven branches and lamps. The third was called the atrium or court; this was under the broad heaven, and was open to the light of the sun. A regenerate man is depicted in this figure. His spirit is the holy of holies, God's dwelling-place, in the darkness of faith, without a light, for he believes what he neither sees, nor feels, nor comprehends. The *psyche* of that man is the holy place, whose seven lights represent the various powers of understanding, the perception and knowledge of material and visible things. His body is the atrium or court, which is open to everybody, so that all can see how he acts and lives."

Thomastus, however, in his *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 164-168, quotes from Luther the following statement, which is clearly dichotomous: "The first part, the spirit, is the highest, deepest, noblest part of man. By it he is fitted to comprehend eternal things, and it is, in short, the house in which dwell faith and the word of God. The other, the soul, is this same spirit, according to nature, but yet in another sort of activity, namely, in this, that it animates the body and works through it; and it is its method not to grasp things incomprehensible, but only what reason can search out, know, and measure." Thomastus himself says: "Trichotomy, I hold with Meyer, is not Scripturally sustained." Neander, sometimes spoken of as a trichotomist, says that spirit is soul in its elevated and normal relation to God and divine things; *ψυχή* is that same soul in its relation to the sensuous and perhaps sinful things of this world. Godet, *Bib. Studies of O. T.*, 82—"Spirit—the breath of God, considered as independent of the body; soul—that same breath, in so far as it gives life to the body."

The doctrine we have advocated, moreover, in contrast with the heathen view, puts honor upon man's body, as proceeding from the hand of God and as therefore originally pure (Gen. 1:31 — "And God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good"); as intended to be the dwelling place of the divine Spirit (1 Cor. 6:19 — "know ye not that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit which is in you, which ye have from God?"); and as containing the germ of the heavenly body (1 Cor. 15:44 — "it is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body"; Rom. 8:11 — "shall give life also to your mortal bodies through his Spirit that dwelleth in you" — here many ancient authorities read "because of his Spirit that dwelleth in you" — *διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν αὐτοῦ πνεῦμα*). Birks, in his Difficulties of Belief, suggests that man, unlike angels, may have been provided with a fleshly body, (1) to objectify sin, and (2) to enable Christ to unite himself to the race, in order to save it.

#### IV. ORIGIN OF THE SOUL.

Three theories with regard to this subject have divided opinion:

##### 1. *The Theory of Preexistence.*

This view was held by Plato, Philo, and Origen; by the first, in order to explain the soul's possession of ideas not derived from sense; by the second, to account for its imprisonment in the body; by the third, to justify the disparity of conditions in which men enter the world. We concern ourselves, however, only with the forms which the view has assumed in modern times. Kant and Julius Müller in Germany, and Edward Beecher in America, have advocated it, upon the ground that the inborn depravity of the human will can be explained only by supposing a personal act of self-determination in a previous, or timeless, state of being.

The truth at the basis of the theory of preexistence is simply the ideal existence of the soul, before birth, in the mind of God — that is, God's foreknowledge of it. The intuitive ideas of which the soul finds itself in possession, such as space, time, cause, substance, right, God, are evolved from itself; in other words, man is so constituted that he perceives these truths upon proper occasions or conditions. The apparent recollection that we have seen at some past time a landscape which we know to be now for the first time before us, is an illusory putting together of fragmentary concepts or a mistaking of a part for the whole; we have seen something like a part of the landscape, — we fancy that we have seen this landscape, and the whole of it. Our recollection of a past event or scene is one whole, but this one idea may have an indefinite number of subordinate ideas existing within it. The sight of something which is similar to one of these parts suggests the past whole. Coleridge: "The great law of the imagination that likeness in part tends to become likeness of the whole." Augustine hinted that this illusion of memory may have played an important part in developing the belief in metempsychosis.

Other explanations are those of William James, in his *Psychology*: The brain tracts excited by the event proper, and those excited in its recall, are different; Baldwin, *Psychology*, 268, 264: We may remember what we have seen in a dream, or there may be a revival of ancestral or race experiences. Still others suggest that the two hemispheres of the brain act asynchronously; self-consciousness or apperception is distinguished from perception; divorce, from fatigue, of the processes of sensation and perception, causes paramnesia. Sully, *Illusions*, 280, speaks of an organic or atavistic memory: "May it not happen that by the law of hereditary transmission . . . ancient experiences will now and then reflect themselves in our mental life, and so give rise to apparently personal recollections?" Letson, *The Crowd*, believes that the mob is atavistic and that it bases its action upon inherited impulses: "The inherited reflexes are atavistic memories" (quoted in Colegrove, *Memory*, 204).

Plato held that intuitive ideas are reminiscences of things learned in a previous state of being; he regarded the body as the grave of the soul; and urged the fact that the soul had knowledge before it entered the body, as proof that the soul would have knowledge after it left the body, that is, would be immortal. See Plato, *Meno*, 82-85, *Phædo*, 72-75, *Phædrus*, 245-250, *Republic*, 5:460 and 10:614. Alexander, *Theories of the Will*, 36, 37 — "Plato represents preexistent souls as having set before them a choice of virtue. The choice is free, but it will determine the destiny of each soul. Not God, but he who

chooses, is responsible for his choice. After making their choice, the souls go to the fates, who spin the threads of their destiny, and it is thenceforth irreversible. As Christian theology teaches that man was free but lost his freedom by the fall of Adam, so Plato affirms that the preëxistent soul is free until it has chosen its lot in life." See Introductions to the above mentioned works of Plato in Jowett's translation. Philo held that all souls are emanations from God, and that those who allowed themselves, unlike the angels, to be attracted by matter, are punished for this fall by imprisonment in the body, which corrupts them, and from which they must break loose. See Philo, *De Gigantibus*, Pfeiffer's ed., 3: 300-334. Origen accounted for disparity of conditions at birth by the differences in the conduct of these same souls in a previous state. God's justice at the first made all souls equal; condition here corresponds to the degree of previous guilt; Mat. 20: 3—"others standing in the market place idle"—souls not yet brought into the world. The Talmudists regarded all souls as created at once in the beginning, and as kept like grains of corn in God's granary, until the time should come for joining each to its appointed body. See Origen, *De Anima*, 7; *περί ἀρχῶν*, II:9:6; *cf.* I:1:3, 4, 13; 4:36. Origen's view was condemned at the Synod of Constantinople, 538. Many of the preceding facts and references are taken from Bruch, *Lehre der Präexistenz*, translated in *Bib. Sac.*, 20: 681-738.

For modern advocates of the theory, see Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, sec. 15; Religion in. d. Grenzen d. bl. Vernunft, 28, 27; Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 2: 367-401; Edward Beecher, *Conflict of Ages*. The idea of preëxistence has appeared to a notable extent in modern poetry. See Vaughan, *The Retreats* (1821); Wordsworth, *Intimations of Immortality in Early Childhood*; Tennyson, *Two Voices*, stanzas 106-119, and *Early Sonnets*, 25—"As when with downcast eyes we muse and brood, And ebb into a former life, or seem To lapse far back in some confused dream To states of mystical similitude; If one but speaks or hems or stirs his chair, Ever the wonder waxeth more and more, So that we say 'All this hath been before, All this hath been, I know not when or where.' So, friend, when first I looked upon your face, Our thought gave answer each to each, so true—Opposed mirrors each reflecting each—That though I knew not in what time or place, Methought that I had often met with you, And either lived in either's heart and speech." Robert Browning, *La Saisiaz*, and *Christina*: "Ages past the soul existed; Here an age 't is resting merely, And hence fleets again for ages." Rossetti, *House of Life*: "I have been here before, But when or how I cannot tell; I know the grass beyond the door, The sweet, keen smell, The sighing sound, the lights along the shore. You have been mine before, How long ago I may not know; But just when, at that swallow's soar, Your neck turned so, Some veil did fall—I knew it all of yore"; quoted in Colgrove, *Memory*, 106-106, who holds the phenomenon due to false induction and interpretation.

Briggs, *School, College and Character*, 95—"Some of us remember the days when we were on earth for the first time;"—which reminds us of the boy who remembered sitting in a corner before he was born and crying for fear he would be a girl. A more notable illustration is that found in the *Life of Sir Walter Scott*, by Lockhart, his son-in-law, 2: 274—"Yesterday, at dinner time, I was strangely haunted by what I would call the sense of preëxistence—viz., a confused idea that nothing that passed was said for the first time—that the same topics had been discussed and the same persons had started the same opinions on them. It is true there might have been some ground for recollections, considering that three at least of the company were old friends and had kept much company together. . . . But the sensation was so strong as to resemble what is called a mirage in the desert, or a calenture on board of ship, when lakes are seen in the desert and sylvan landscapes in the sea. It was very distressing yesterday and brought to mind the fancies of Bishop Berkeley about an ideal world. There was a vile sense of want of reality in all I did and said. . . . I drank several glasses of wine, but these only aggravated the disorder. I did not find the *in vino veritas* of the philosophers."

To the theory of preëxistence we urge the following objections:

(a) It is not only wholly without support from Scripture, but it directly contradicts the Mosaic account of man's creation in the image of God, and Paul's description of all evil and death in the human race as the result of Adam's sin.

Gen. 1:27 — "And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him"; 31 — "And God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good." Rom. 5:12 — "Therefore, as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned." The theory of preëxistence would still leave it doubtful whether all men are sinners, or whether God assembles only sinners upon the earth.

(b) If the soul in this preëxistent state was conscious and personal, it is inexplicable that we should have no remembrance of such preëxistence, and of so important a decision in that previous condition of being; — if the soul was yet unconscious and impersonal, the theory fails to show how a moral act involving consequences so vast could have been performed at all.

Christ remembered his preëxistent state; why should not we? There is every reason to believe that in the future state we shall remember our present existence; why should we not now remember the past state from which we came? It may be objected that Augustinians hold to a sin of the race in Adam — a sin which none of Adam's descendants can remember. But we reply that no Augustinian holds to a personal existence of each member of the race in Adam, and therefore no Augustinian needs to account for lack of memory of Adam's sin. The advocate of preëxistence, however, does hold to a personal existence of each soul in a previous state, and therefore needs to account for our lack of memory of it.

(c) The view sheds no light either upon the origin of sin, or upon God's justice in dealing with it, since it throws back the first transgression to a state of being in which there was no flesh to tempt, and then represents God as putting the fallen into sensuous conditions in the highest degree unfavorable to their restoration.

This theory only increases the difficulty of explaining the origin of sin, by pushing back its beginning to a state of which we know less than we do of the present. To say that the soul in that previous state was only potentially conscious and personal, is to deny any real probation, and to throw the blame of sin on God the Creator. Pfeifferer, *Philos. of Religion*, 1:238 — "In modern times, the philosophers Kant, Schelling and Schopenhauer have explained the bad from an intelligible act of freedom, which (according to Schelling and Schopenhauer) also at the same time effectuates the temporal existence and condition of the individual soul. But what are we to think of as meant by such a mystical deed or act through which the subject of it first comes into existence? Is it not this, that perhaps under this singular disguise there is concealed the simple thought that the origin of the bad lies not so much in a *doing* of the individual freedom as rather in the *rise* of it, — that is to say, in the process of development through which the natural man becomes a moral man, and the merely potentially rational man becomes an actually rational man?"

(d) While this theory accounts for inborn spiritual sin, such as pride and enmity to God, it gives no explanation of inherited sensual sin, which it holds to have come from Adam, and the guilt of which must logically be denied.

While certain forms of the preëxistence theory are exposed to the last objection indicated in the text, Julius Müller claims that his own view escapes it; see *Doctrine of Sin*, 2:393. His theory, he says, "would contradict holy Scripture if it derived inborn sinfulness *solely* from this extra-temporal act of the individual, without recognizing in this sinfulness the element of hereditary depravity in the sphere of the natural life, and its connection with the sin of our first parents." Müller, whose trichotomy here determines his whole subsequent scheme, holds only the *πνεῦμα* to have thus fallen in a preëxistent state. The *ψυχή* comes, with the body, from Adam. The tempter only brought man's latent perversity of will into open transgression. Sinfulness, as hereditary, does not involve guilt, but the hereditary principle is the "medium through which the transcendent self-perversion of the spiritual nature of man is transmitted to his whole temporal mode of being." While man is born guilty as to his *πνεῦμα*, for the reason that this *πνεῦμα* sinned in a preëxistent state, he is also born guilty as to his *ψυχή*, because this was one with the first man in his transgression.

Even upon the most favorable statement of Müller's view, we fail to see how it can consist with the organic unity of the race; for in that which chiefly constitutes us men — the *πνεῦμα* — we are as distinct and separate creations as are the angels. We also fail to see how, upon this view, Christ can be said to take our nature; or, if he takes it, how it can be without sin. See Ernesti, *Ursprung der Sünde*, 2:1-247; Frohschammer, *Ursprung der Seele*, 11-17; Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 3:92-123; Bruch, *Lehre der Präexistenz*, translated in *Bib. Sac.*, 20:681-733. Also *Bib. Sac.*, 11:186-191; 12:156; 17:419-427; 20:447; Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 3:250 — "This doctrine is inconsistent with the indisputable fact that the souls of children are like those of the parents; and it ignores the connection of the individual with the race."

## 2. *The Creation Theory.*

This view was held by Aristotle, Jerome, and Pelagius, and in modern times has been advocated by most of the Roman Catholic and Reformed theologians. It regards the soul of each human being as immediately created by God and joined to the body either at conception, at birth, or at some time between these two. The advocates of the theory urge in its favor certain texts of Scripture, referring to God as the Creator of the human spirit, together with the fact that there is a marked individuality in the child, which cannot be explained as a mere reproduction of the qualities existing in the parents.

Creationism, as ordinarily held, regards only the body as propagated from past generations. Creationists who hold to trichotomy would say, however, that the animal soul, the *ψυχή*, is propagated with the body, while the highest part of man, the *πνεῦμα*, is in each case a direct creation of God, — the *πνεῦμα* not being created, as the advocates of preexistence believe, ages before the body, but rather at the time that the body assumes its distinct individuality.

Aristotle (*De Anima*) first gives definite expression to this view. Jerome speaks of God as "making souls daily." The scholastics followed Aristotle, and through the influence of the Reformed church, creationism has been the prevailing opinion for the last two hundred years. Among its best representatives are Turretin, *Inst.*, 5:13 (vol. 1:425); Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2:65-76; Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 141-148; Liddon, *Elements of Religion*, 90-106. Certain Reformed theologians have defined very exactly God's method of creation. Polanus (5:31:1) says that God breathes the soul into boys, forty days, and into girls, eighty days, after conception. Göschel (in Herzog, *Encyclop.*, art.: Seele) holds that while dichotomy leads to traducianism, trichotomy allies itself to that form of creationism which regards the *πνεῦμα* as a direct creation of God, but the *ψυχή* as propagated with the body. To the latter answers the family name; to the former the Christian name. Shall we count George Macdonald as a believer in Preexistence or in Creationism, when he writes in his *Baby's Catechism*: "Where did you come from, baby dear? Out of the everywhere into here. Where did you get your eyes so blue? Out of the sky, as I came through. Where did you get that little tear? I found it waiting when I got here. Where did you get that pearly ear? God spoke, and it came out to hear. How did they all just come to be you? God thought about me, and so I grew."

Creationism is untenable for the following reasons:

(a) The passages adduced in its support may with equal propriety be regarded as expressing God's mediate agency in the origination of human souls; while the general tenor of Scripture, as well as its representations of God as the author of man's body, favor this latter interpretation.

Passages commonly relied upon by creationists are the following: *Ecl.* 12:7 — "the spirit returneth unto God who gave it"; *Is.* 57:16 — "the souls that I have made"; *Zech.* 12:1 — "Jehovah . . . who formeth the spirit of man within him"; *Job.* 32:9 — "the Father of spirits." But God is with equal clearness declared to be the former of man's body: see *Ps.* 139:13, 14 — "thou didst form my inward parts; thou didst cover me [margin, ' knit me together ' ] in my mother's womb. I will give thanks unto thee; for I am fearfully and wonderfully made: Wonderful are thy works"; *Jer.* 1:5 — "I formed thee in the belly." Yet we do not hesitate to interpret these latter passages as expressive of mediate, not immediate,

creatorship,—God works through natural laws of generation and development so far as the production of man's body is concerned. None of the passages first mentioned forbid us to suppose that he works through these same natural laws in the production of the soul. The truth in creatianism is the presence and operation of God in all natural processes. A transcendent God manifests himself in all physical begetting. Shakespeare: "There's a divinity that shapes our ends, Rough hew them how we will." Pfeiderer, *Grundriss*, 112—"Creatianism, which emphasizes the divine origin of man, is entirely compatible with Traducianism, which emphasizes the mediation of natural agencies. So for the race as a whole, its origin in a creative activity of God is quite consistent with its being a product of natural evolution."

(b) Creatianism regards the earthly father as begetting only the body of his child—certainly as not the father of the child's highest part. This makes the beast to possess nobler powers of propagation than man; for the beast multiplies himself after his own image.

The new physiology properly views soul, not as something added from without, but as the animating principle of the body from the beginning and as having a determining influence upon its whole development. That children are like their parents, in intellectual and spiritual as well as in physical respects, is a fact of which the creatian theory gives no proper explanation. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 115—"The love of parents to children and of children to parents protests against the doctrine that only the body is propagated." Aubrey Moore, *Science and the Faith*, 207,—quoted in *Contemp. Rev.*, Dec. 1893: 878—"Instead of the physical derivation of the soul, we stand for the spiritual derivation of the body." We would amend this statement by saying that we stand for the spiritual derivation of both soul and body, natural law being only the operation of spirit, human and divine.

(c) The individuality of the child, even in the most extreme cases, as in the sudden rise from obscure families and surroundings of marked men like Luther, may be better explained by supposing a law of variation impressed upon the species at its beginning—a law whose operation is foreseen and supervised by God.

The differences of the child from the parent are often exaggerated; men are generally more the product of their ancestry and of their time than we are accustomed to think. Dickens made angelic children to be born of depraved parents, and to grow up in the slums. But this writing belongs to a past generation, when the facts of heredity were unrecognized. George Eliot's school is nearer the truth; although she exaggerates the doctrine of heredity in turn, until all idea of free will and all hope of escaping our fate vanish. Shaier, *Interpretation of Nature*, 78, 80—"Separate motives, handed down from generation to generation, sometimes remaining latent for great periods, to become suddenly manifested under conditions the nature of which is not discernible. . . . Conflict of inheritances [from different ancestors] may lead to the institution of variety."

Sometimes, in spite of George Eliot, a lily grows out of a stagnant pool—how shall we explain the fact? We must remember that the paternal and the maternal elements are themselves unlike; the union of the two may well produce a third in some respects unlike either; as, when two chemical elements unite, the product differs from either of the constituents. We must remember also that *nature* is one factor; *nurture* is another; and that the latter is often as potent as the former (see Galton, *Inquiries into Human Faculty*, 77-81). Environment determines to a large extent both the fact and the degree of development. Genius is often another name for Providence. Yet before all and beyond all we must recognize a manifold wisdom of God, which in the very organization of species impresses upon it a law of variation, so that at proper times and under proper conditions the old is modified in the line of progress and advance to something higher. Dante, *Purgatory*, canto vii—"Rarely into the branches of the tree Doth human worth mount up; and so ordains He that bestows it, that as his free gift It may be called." Pompilius, the noblest character in Robert Browning's *Ring and the Book*, came of "a bad lot." Geo. A. Gordon, *Christ of To-day*, 123-126—"It is mockery to account for Abraham Lincoln and Robert Burns and William Shakespeare upon naked principles of heredity and environment. . . . All intelligence and all high character are

transcendent, and have their source in the mind and heart of God. It is in the range of Christ's transcendence of his earthly conditions that we note the complete uniqueness of his person."

(d) This theory, if it allows that the soul is originally possessed of depraved tendencies, makes God the direct author of moral evil; if it holds the soul to have been created pure, it makes God indirectly the author of moral evil, by teaching that he puts this pure soul into a body which will inevitably corrupt it.

The decisive argument against creatianism is this one, that it makes God the author of moral evil. See Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 3:250—"Creatianism rests upon a justly antiquated dualism between soul and body, and is irreconcilable with the sinful condition of the human soul. The truth in the doctrine is just this only, that generation can bring forth an immortal human life only according to the power imparted by God's word, and with the special coöperation of God himself." The difficulty of supposing that God immediately creates a pure soul, only to put it into a body that will infallibly corrupt it—"sicut vinum in vase acetoso"—has led many of the most thoughtful Reformed theologians to modify the creatian doctrine by combining it with traducianism.

Rothe, *Dogmatik*, 1:249-251, holds to creatianism in a wider sense—a union of the paternal and maternal elements under the express and determining efficiency of God. Howard, *Dogmatik*, 1:327-332, regards the soul as new-created, yet by a process of mediate creation according to law, which he calls 'metaphysical generation.' Dorner, *System of Doctrine*, 3:56, says that the individual is not simply a manifestation of the species; God applies to the origination of every single man a special creative thought and act of will; yet he does this through the species, so that it is creation by law,—else the child would be, not a continuation of the old species, but the establishment of a new one. So in speaking of the human soul of Christ, Dorner says (3:340-349) that the soul itself does not owe its origin to Mary nor to the species, but to the creative act of God. This soul appropriates to itself from Mary's body the elements of a human form, purifying them in the process so far as is consistent with the beginning of a life yet subject to development and human weakness.

Bowne, *Metaphysics*, 500—"The laws of heredity must be viewed simply as descriptions of a fact and never as its explanation. Not as if ancestors passed on something to posterity, but solely because of the inner consistency of the divine action" are children like their parents. We cannot regard either of these mediating views as self-consistent or intelligible. We pass on therefore to consider the traducian theory which we believe more fully to meet the requirements of Scripture and of reason. For further discussion of creatianism, see Frohschammer, *Ursprung der Seele*, 13-58; Alger, *Doctrine of a Future Life*, 1-17.

### 3. *The Traducian Theory.*

This view was propounded by Tertullian, and was implicitly held by Augustine. In modern times it has been the prevailing opinion of the Lutheran Church. It holds that the human race was immediately created in Adam, and, as respects both body and soul, was propagated from him by natural generation—all souls since Adam being only mediately created by God, as the upholder of the laws of propagation which were originally established by him.

Tertullian, *De Anima*: "Tradux peccati, tradux anime." Gregory of Nyssa: "Man being one, consisting of soul and body, the common beginning of his constitution must be supposed also one; so that he may not be both older and younger than himself—that in him which is bodily being first, and the other coming after" (quoted in Crippen, *Hist. of Christ. Doct.*, 80). Augustine, *De Pec. Mer. et Rem.*, 3:7—"In Adam all sinned, at the time when in his nature all were still that one man"; *De Civ. Dei*, 13:14—"For we all were in that one man, when we all were that one man. . . . The form in which we each should live was not as yet individually created and distributed to us, but there already existed the seminal nature from which we were propagated."

Augustine, indeed, wavered in his statements with regard to the origin of the soul, apparently fearing that an explicit and pronounced traducianism might involve materialistic consequences; yet, as logically lying at the basis of his doctrine of original sin, traducianism came to be the ruling view of the Lutheran reformers. In his *Table Talk*, Luther says: "The reproduction of mankind is a great marvel and mystery. Had God consulted me in the matter, I should have advised him to continue the generation of the species by fashioning them out of clay, in the way Adam was fashioned; as I should have counseled him also to let the sun remain always suspended over the earth, like a great lamp, maintaining perpetual light and heat."

Traducianism holds that man, as a species, was created in Adam. In Adam, the substance of humanity was yet undistributed. We derive our immaterial as well as our material being, by natural laws of propagation, from Adam,—each individual man after Adam possessing a part of the substance that was originated in him. Sexual reproduction has for its purpose the keeping of variations within limit. Every marriage tends to bring back the individual type to that of the species. The offspring represents not one of the parents but both. And, as each of these parents represents two grandparents, the offspring really represents the whole race. Without this conjugation the individual peculiarities would reproduce themselves in divergent lines like the shot from a shot-gun. Fission needs to be supplemented by conjugation. The use of sexual reproduction is to preserve the average individual in the face of a progressive tendency to variation. In asexual reproduction the offspring start on deviating lines and never mix their qualities with those of their mates. Sexual reproduction makes the individual the type of the species and gives solidarity to the race. See Maupas, quoted by Newman Smith, *Place of Death in Evolution*, 19-22.

John Milton, in his *Christian Doctrine*, is a Traducian. He has no faith in the notion of a soul separate from and inhabiting the body. He believes in a certain corporeity of the soul. Mind and thought are rooted in the bodily organism. Soul was not inhaled after the body was formed. The breathing of God into man's nostrils was only the quickening impulse to that which already had life. God does not create souls every day. Man is a body-and-soul, or a soul-body, and he transmits himself as such. Harris, *Moral Evolution*, 171—The individual man has a great number of ancestors as well as a great number of descendants. He is the central point of an hour-glass, or a strait between two seas which widen out behind and before. How then shall we escape the conclusion that the human race was most numerous at the beginning? We must remember that other children have the same great-grandparents with ourselves; that there have been inter-marriages; and that, after all, the generations run on in parallel lines, that the lines spread a little in some countries and periods, and narrow a little in other countries and periods. It is like a wall covered with paper in diamond pattern. The lines diverge and converge, but the figures are parallel. See Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 1: 7-94, *Hiet. Doctrine*, 2: 1-26, *Discourses and Essays*, 259; Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 137-151, 385-384; Edwards, *Works*, 2: 483; Hopkins, *Works*, 1: 289; Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 161; Delitzsch, *Bib. Psych.*, 128-142; Frohschammer, *Ursprung der Seele*, 59-224.

With regard to this view we remark:

(a) It seems best to accord with Scripture, which represents God as creating the species in Adam (Gen. 1:27), and as increasing and perpetuating it through secondary agencies (1:28; cf. 22). Only once is breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life (2:7, cf. 22; 1 Cor. 11:8. Gen. 4:1; 5:3; 46:26; cf. Acts 17:21-26; Heb. 7:10), and after man's formation God ceases from his work of creation (Gen. 2:2).

Gen. 1:27—"And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him: male and female created he them"; 28—"And God blessed them: and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth"; cf. 22—of the brute creation: "And God blessed them, saying, Be fruitful, and multiply, and fill the waters in the sea, and let birds multiply on the earth." Gen. 2:7—"And Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul"; cf. 22—"and the rib which Jehovah God had taken from the man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man"; 1 Cor. 11:8—"For the man is not of the woman; but the woman of the man" (*ἡ ἀνδρός*). Gen. 4:1—"Eve . . . bare Cain"; 5:3—"Adam . . . begat a son . . . Seth"; 46:26—"All the souls that came with Jacob into Egypt, that came out of his loins"; Acts 17:26—"he made of one ['father' or 'body'] every nation of men"; Heb. 7:10—Levi "was yet in the loins of his father, when Melchisedek met him"; Gen. 2:2—"And on the seventh day God finished his work which he had made;

and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made." Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2: 19-20, adduces also John 1: 13; 8: 6; Rom. 1: 13; 5: 12; 1 Cor. 15: 22; Eph. 2: 3; Heb. 12: 9; Pa. 139: 15, 16. Only Adam had the right to be a creatianist. Westcott, Com. on Hebrews, 114—"Levi paying tithes in Abraham implies that descendants are included in the ancestor so far that his acts have force for them. Physically, at least, the dead so rule the living. The individual is not a completely self-centred being. He is member in a body. So far traducianism is true. But, if this were all, man would be a mere result of the past, and would have no individual responsibility. There is an element not derived from birth, though it may follow upon it. Recognition of individuality is the truth in creatianism. Power of vision follows upon preparation of an organ of vision, modified by the latter but not created by it. So we have the social unity of the race, plus the personal responsibility of the individual, the influence of common thoughts plus the power of great men, the foundation of hope plus the condition of judgment."

(b) It is favored by the analogy of vegetable and animal life, in which increase of numbers is secured, not by a multiplicity of immediate creations, but by the natural derivation of new individuals from a parent stock. A derivation of the human soul from its parents no more implies a materialistic view of the soul and its endless division and subdivision, than the similar derivation of the brute proves the principle of intelligence in the lower animals to be wholly material.

God's method is not the method of endless miracle. God works in nature through second causes. God does not create a new vital principle at the beginning of existence of each separate apple, and of each separate dog. Each of these is the result of a self-multiplying force, implanted once for all in the first of its race. To say, with Moxom (Baptist Review, 1881:278), that God is the immediate author of each new individual, is to deny second causes, and to merge nature in God. The whole tendency of modern science is in the opposite direction. Nor is there any good reason for making the origin of the individual human soul an exception to the general rule. Augustine wavered in his traducianism because he feared the inference that the soul is divided and subdivided,—that is, that it is composed of parts, and is therefore material in its nature. But it does not follow that all separation is material separation. We do not, indeed, know how the soul is propagated. But we know that animal life is propagated, and still that it is not material, nor composed of parts. The fact that the soul is not material, nor composed of parts, is no reason why it may not be propagated also.

It is well to remember that *substance* does not necessarily imply either *extension* or *figure*. *Substantia* is simply that which stands under, underlies, supports, or in other words that which is the *ground* of phenomena. The propagation of mind therefore does not involve any dividing up, or splitting off, as if the mind were a material mass. Flame is propagated, but not by division and subdivision. Professor Ladd is a creatianist, together with Lotze, whom he quotes, but he repudiates the idea that the mind is susceptible of division; see Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, 206, 359-366—"The mind comes from nowhere, for it never was, as mind, in space, is not now in space, and cannot be conceived of as coming and going in space. . . . Mind is a growth. . . . Parents do not transmit their minds to their offspring. The child's mind does not exist before it acts. Its activities are its existence." So we might say that flame has no existence before it acts. Yet it may owe its existence to a preceding flame. The Indian proverb is: "No lotus without a stem." Hall Caine, in his novel *The Manxman*, tells us that the Deemster of the Isle of Man had two sons. These two sons were as unlike each other as are the inside and the outside of a bowl. But the bowl was old Deemster himself. Hartley Coleridge inherited his father's imperious desire for stimulants and with it his inability to resist their temptation.

(c) The observed transmission not merely of physical, but of mental and spiritual, characteristics in families and races, and especially the uniformly evil moral tendencies and dispositions which all men possess from their birth, are proof that in soul, as well as in body, we derive our being from our human ancestry.

Galton, in his *Hereditary Genius*, and *Inquiries into Human Faculty*, furnishes abundant proof of the transmission of mental and spiritual characteristics from father

to son. Illustrations, in the case of families, are the American Adamses, the English Georges, the French Bourbons, the German Bachs. Illustrations, in the case of races, are the Indians, the Negroes, the Chinese, the Jews. Hawthorne represented the introspection and the conscience of Puritan New England. Emerson had a minister among his ancestry, either on the paternal or the maternal side, for eight generations back. Every man is "a chip of the old block." "A man is an omnibus, in which all his ancestors are seated" (O. W. Holmes). Variation is one of the properties of living things, — the other is transmission. "On a dissecting table, in the membranes of a new-born infant's body, can be seen 'the drunkard's tinge.' The blotches on his grand-child's cheeks furnish a mirror to the old debauchee. Heredity is God's visiting of sin to the third and fourth generations." On heredity and depravity, see Phelps, in *Bib. Sac.*, Apr. 1884: 254—"When every molecule in the paternal brain bears the shape of a point of interrogation, it would border on the miraculous if we should find the exclamation-sign of faith in the brain-cells of the child."

Robert G. Ingersoll said that most great men have great mothers, and that most great women have great fathers. Most of the great are like mountains, with the valley of ancestors on one side and the depression of posterity on the other. Hawthorne's *House of the Seven Gables* illustrates the principle of heredity. But in his *Marble Faun* and *Transformation*, Hawthorne unwisely intimates that sin is a necessity to virtue, a background or condition of good. Dryden, *Absalom and Ahithophel*, i: 156—"Great wits are sure to madness near allied, And thin partitions do their bounds divide." Lombroso, *The Man of Genius*, maintains that genius is a mental disease allied to epileptiform mania or the dementia of cranks. If this were so, we should infer that civilization is the result of insanity, and that, so soon as Napoleons, Dantes and Newtons manifest themselves, they should be confined in *Genius Asylums*. Robert Browning, *Hohenstiel-Schwangau*, comes nearer the truth: "A solitary great man's worth the world. God takes the business into his own hands. At such time: Who creates the novel flower contrives to guard and give it breathing-room. . . . 'Tis the great Gardener grafts the excellence On wildlings, where he will."

(d) The traducian doctrine embraces and acknowledges the element of truth which gives plausibility to the creation view. Traducianism, properly defined, admits a divine concurrence throughout the whole development of the human species, and allows, under the guidance of a superintending Providence, special improvements in type at the birth of marked men, similar to those which we may suppose to have occurred in the introduction of new varieties in the animal creation.

Page-Roberts, *Oxford University Sermons*: "It is no more unjust that man should inherit evil tendencies, than that he should inherit good. To make the former impossible is to make the latter impossible. To object to the law of heredity, is to object to God's ordinance of society, and to say that God should have made men, like the angels, a company, and not a race." The common moral characteristics of the race can only be accounted for upon the Scriptural view that "that which is born of the flesh is flesh" (*John 3: 6*). Since propagation is a propagation of soul, as well as body, we see that to beget children under improper conditions is a crime, and that feticide is murder. Haeckel, *Evolution of Man*, 2: 3—"The human embryo passes through the whole course of its development in forty weeks. Each man is really older by this period than is usually assumed. When, for example, a child is said to be nine and a quarter years old, he is really ten years old." Is this the reason why Hebrews call a child a year old at birth? President Edwards prayed for his children and his children's children to the end of time, and President Woolsey congratulated himself that he was one of the inheritors of those prayers. R. W. Emerson: "How can a man get away from his ancestors?" Men of genius should select their ancestors with great care. When begin the instruction of a child? A hundred years before he is born. A lady whose children were noisy and troublesome said to a Quaker relative that she wished she could get a good Quaker governess for them, to teach them the quiet ways of the Society of Friends. "It would not do them that service," was the reply; "they should have been rocked in a Quaker cradle, if they were to learn Quakerly ways."

Galton, *Natural Inheritance*, 104—"The child inherits partly from his parents, partly from his ancestry. In every population that intermarries freely, when the genealogy of any man is traced far backwards, his ancestry will be found to consist of such varied

elements that they are indistinguishable from the sample taken at haphazard from the general population. Galton speaks of the tendency of peculiarities to revert to the general type, and says that a man's brother is twice as nearly related to him as his father is, and nine times as nearly as his cousin. The mean stature of any particular class of men will be the same as that of the race; in other words, it will be mediocre. This tells heavily against the full hereditary transmission of any rare and valuable gift, as only a few of the many children would resemble their parents." We may add to these thoughts of Galton that Christ himself, as respects his merely human ancestry, was not so much son of Mary, as he was Son of man.

Brooks, *Foundations of Zoology*, 144-157—In an investigated case, "in seven and a half generations the maximum ancestry for one person is 332, or for three persons 1146. The names of 453 of them, or nearly half, are recorded, and these 453 named ancestors are not 453 distinct persons, but only 143, many of them, in the remote generations, being common ancestors of all three in many lines. If the lines of descent from the unrecorded ancestors were interrelated in the same way, as they would surely be in an old and stable community, the total ancestry of these three persons for seven and a half generations would be 378 persons instead of 1146. The descendants of many die out. All the members of a species descend from a few ancestors in a remote generation, and these few are the common ancestors of all. Extinction of family names is very common. We must seek in the modern world and not in the remote past for an explanation of that diversity among individuals which passes under the name of variation. The genealogy of a species is not a tree, but a slender thread of very few strands, a little frayed at the near end, but of immeasurable length. A fringe of loose ends all along the thread may represent the animals which having no descendants are now as if they had never been. Each of the strands at the near end is important as a possible line of union between the thread of the past and that of the distant future."

Weismann, *Heredity*, 270, 272, 330, 334, denies Brooks's theory that the male element represents the principle of variation. He finds the cause of variation in the union of elements from the two parents. Each child unites the hereditary tendencies of two parents, and so must be different from either. The third generation is a compromise between four different hereditary tendencies. Brooks finds the cause of variation in sexual reproduction, but he bases his theory upon the transmission of acquired characters. This transmission is denied by Weismann, who says that the male germ-cell does not play a different part from that of the female in the construction of the embryo. Children inherit quite as much from the father as from the mother. Like twins are derived from the same egg-cell. No two germ-cells contain exactly the same combinations of hereditary tendencies. Changes in environment and organism affect posterity, not directly, but only through other changes produced in its germinal matter. Hence efforts to reach high food cannot directly produce the graffe. See Dawson, *Modern Ideas of Evolution*, 235-239; Bradford, *Heredity and Christian Problems*; Ribot, *Heredity*; Woods, *Heredity in Royalty*. On organic unity in connection with realism, see Hodge, in *Princeton Rev.*, Jan. 1865:126-135; Dabney, *Theology*, 317-321.

#### V. THE MORAL NATURE OF MAN.

By the moral nature of man we mean those powers which fit him for right or wrong action. These powers are intellect, sensibility, and will, together with that peculiar power of discrimination and impulsion, which we call conscience. In order to moral action, man has intellect or reason, to discern the difference between right and wrong; sensibility, to be moved by each of these; free will, to do the one or the other. Intellect, sensibility, and will, are man's three faculties. But in connection with these faculties there is a sort of activity which involves them all, and without which there can be no moral action, namely, the activity of conscience. Conscience applies the moral law to particular cases in our personal experience, and proclaims that law as binding upon us. Only a rational and sentient being can be truly moral; yet it does not come within our province to treat of man's intellect or sensibility in general. We speak here only of Conscience and of Will.

1. *Conscience.*

A. Conscience an accompanying knowledge. — As already intimated, conscience is not a separate faculty, like intellect, sensibility, and will, but rather a mode in which these faculties act. Like consciousness, conscience is an accompanying knowledge. Conscience is a knowing of self (including our acts and states) in connection with a moral standard, or law. Adding now the element of feeling, we may say that conscience is man's consciousness of his own moral relations, together with a peculiar feeling in view of them. It thus involves the combined action of the intellect and of the sensibility, and that in view of a certain class of objects, viz.: right and wrong.

There is no separate ethical faculty any more than there is a separate æsthetic faculty. Conscience is like taste: it has to do with moral being and relations, as taste has to do with æsthetic being and relations. But the ethical judgment and impulse are, like the æsthetic judgment and impulse, the mode in which intellect, sensibility and will act with reference to a certain class of objects. Conscience deals with the right, as taste deals with the beautiful. As consciousness (*con* and *acto*) is a con-knowing, a knowing of our thoughts, desires and volitions in connection with a knowing of the self that has these thoughts, desires and volitions; so conscience is a con-knowing, a knowing of our moral acts and states in connection with a knowing of some moral standard or law which is conceived of as our true self, and therefore as having authority over us. Ladd, *Philosophy of Mind*, 183-185 — "The condemnation of self involves self-diremption, double consciousness. Without it Kant's categorical imperative is impossible. The one self lays down the law to the other self, judges it, threatens it. This is what is meant, when the apostle says: 'It is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me' (Rom. 7:17)."

B. Conscience discriminative and impulsive. — But we need to define more narrowly both the intellectual and the emotional elements in conscience. As respects the intellectual element, we may say that conscience is a power of judgment, — it declares our acts or states to conform, or not to conform, to law; it declares the acts or states which conform to be obligatory, — those which do not conform, to be forbidden. In other words, conscience judges: (1) This is right (or, wrong); (2) I ought (or, I ought not). In connection with this latter judgment, there comes into view the emotional element of conscience, — we feel the claim of duty; there is an inner sense that the wrong must not be done. Thus conscience is (1) discriminative, and (2) impulsive.

Robinson, *Principles and Practice of Morality*, 173 — "The one distinctive function of conscience is that of authoritative self-judgments in the conscious presence of a supreme Personality to whom we as persons feel ourselves accountable. It is this twofold personal element in every judgment of conscience, viz., the conscious self-judgment in the presence of the all-judging Deity, which has led such writers as Bain and Spencer and Stephen to attempt the explanation of the origin and authority of conscience as the product of parental training and social environment. . . . Conscience is not prudential nor advisory nor executive, but solely judicial. Conscience is the moral reason, pronouncing upon moral actions. Consciousness furnishes law; conscience pronounces judgments; it says: Thou shalt, Thou shalt not. Every man must obey his conscience; if it is not enlightened, that is his look-out. The callousing of conscience in this life is already a penal infliction." *S. S. Times*, Apl. 5, 1902: 185 — "Doing as well as we know how is not enough, unless we know just what is right and then do that. God never tells us merely to do our best, or according to our knowledge. It is our duty to know what is right, and then to do it. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. We have responsibility for knowing preliminary to doing."

C. Conscience distinguished from other mental processes.—The nature and office of conscience will be still more clearly perceived if we distinguish it from other processes and operations with which it is too often confounded. The term conscience has been used by various writers to designate either one or all of the following: 1. *Moral intuition*—the intuitive perception of the difference between right and wrong, as opposite moral categories. 2. *Accepted law*—the application of the intuitive idea to general classes of actions, and the declaration that these classes of actions are right or wrong, apart from our individual relation to them. This accepted law is the complex product of (a) the intuitive idea, (b) the logical intelligence, (c) experiences of utility, (d) influences of society and education, and (e) positive divine revelation. 3. *Judgment*—applying this accepted law to individual and concrete cases in our own experience, and pronouncing our own acts or states either past, present, or prospective, to be right or wrong. 4. *Command*—authoritative declaration of obligation to do the right, or forbear the wrong, together with an impulse of the sensibility away from the one, and toward the other. 5. *Remorse or approval*—moral sentiments either of approbation or disapprobation, in view of past acts or states, regarded as wrong or right. 6. *Fear or hope*—instinctive disposition of disobedience to expect punishment, and of obedience to expect reward.

Ladd, *Philos. of Conduct*, 70—"The feeling of the ought is primary, essential, unique; the judgments as to what one ought are the results of environment, education and reflection." The sentiment of justice is not an inheritance of civilized man alone. No Indian was ever robbed of his lands or had his government allowance stolen from him who was not as keenly conscious of the wrong as in like circumstances we could conceive that a philosopher would be. The *oughtness* of the ought is certainly intuitive; the *whyness* of the ought (conformity to God) is possibly intuitive also; the *whatness* of the ought is less certainly intuitive. Cutler, *Beginnings of Ethics*, 163, 164—"Intuition tells us that we are obliged; *why* we are obliged, and *what* we are obliged to, we must learn elsewhere." *Obligation*—that which is binding on a man; *ought* is something owed; *duty* is something due. The intuitive notion of duty (intellect) is matched by the sense of obligation (feeling).

Bixby, *Crisis in Morals*, 203, 270—"All men have a sense of right,—of right to life, and contemporaneously perhaps, but certainly afterwards, of right to personal property. And my right implies duty in my neighbor to respect it. Then the sense of right becomes objective and impersonal. My neighbor's duty to me implies my duty to him. I put myself in his place." Bowne, *Principles of Ethics*, 156, 188—"First, the feeling of obligation, the idea of a right and a wrong with corresponding duties, is universal. . . . Secondly, there is a very general agreement in the formal principles of action, and largely in the virtues also, such as benevolence, justice, gratitude. . . . Whether we owe anything to our neighbor has never been a real question. The practical trouble has always lain in the other question: Who is my neighbor? Thirdly, the specific contents of the moral ideal are not fixed, but the direction in which the ideal lies is generally discernible. . . . We have in ethics the same fact as in intellect—a potentially infallible standard, with manifold errors in its apprehension and application. Lucretius held that degradation and paralysis of the moral nature result from religion. Many claim on the other hand that without religion morals would disappear from the earth."

Robinson, *Princ. and Prac. of Morality*, 173—"Fear of an omnipotent will is very different from remorse in view of the nature of the supreme Being whose law we have violated." A duty is to be settled in accordance with the standard of absolute right, not as public sentiment would dictate. A man must be ready to do right in spite of what everybody thinks. Just as the decisions of a judge are for the time binding on all good citizens, so the decisions of conscience, as relatively binding, must always be obeyed. They are presumptively right and they are the only present guide of action. Yet man's present state of sin makes it quite possible that the decisions which are rel-

atively right may be absolutely wrong. It is not enough to take one's time from the watch; the watch may go wrong; there is a prior duty of regulating the watch by astronomical standards. Bishop Gore: "Man's first duty is, not to follow his conscience, but to enlighten his conscience." Lowell says that the Scythians used to eat their grandfathers out of humanity. Paine, *Ethnic Trinities*, 300—"Nothing is so stubborn or so fanatical as a wrongly instructed conscience, as Paul showed in his own case by his own confession" (Acts 26: 9—"I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth").

D. Conscience the moral judiciary of the soul.—From what has been previously said, it is evident that only 3. and 4. are properly included under the term conscience. Conscience is the moral judiciary of the soul—the power within of judgment and command. Conscience must judge according to the law given to it, and therefore, since the moral standard accepted by the reason may be imperfect, its decisions, while relatively just, may be absolutely unjust.—1. and 2. belong to the *moral reason*, but not to conscience proper. Hence the duty of enlightening and cultivating the moral reason, so that conscience may have a proper standard of judgment.—5. and 6. belong to the sphere of *moral sentiment*, and not to conscience proper. The office of conscience is to "bear witness" (Rom. 2: 15).

In Rom. 2: 15—"they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them"—we have conscience clearly distinguished both from the law and the perception of law on the one hand, and from the moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation on the other. Conscience does not furnish the law, but it bears witness with the law which is furnished by other sources. It is not "that power of mind by which moral law is discovered to each individual" (Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 77), nor can we speak of "Conscience, the Law" (as Whewell does in his *Elements of Morality*, 1: 259-266). Conscience is not the law-book, in the court room, but it is the judge,—whose business is, not to make law, but to decide cases according to the law given to him.

As conscience is not legislative, so it is not retributive; as it is not the law-book, so it is not the sheriff. We say, indeed, in popular language, that conscience scourges or chastises, but it is only in the sense in which we say that the judge punishes,—i. e., through the sheriff. The moral sentiments are the sheriff,—they carry out the decisions of conscience, the judge; but they are not themselves conscience, any more than the sheriff is the judge.

Only this doctrine, that conscience does not discover law, can explain on the one hand the fact that men are bound to follow their consciences, and on the other hand the fact that their consciences so greatly differ as to what is right or wrong in particular cases. The truth is, that conscience is uniform and infallible, in the sense that it always decides rightly according to the law given it. Men's decisions vary, only because the moral reason has presented to the conscience different standards by which to judge.

Conscience can be educated only in the sense of acquiring greater facility and quickness in making its decisions. Education has its chief effect, not upon the conscience, but upon the moral reason, in rectifying its erroneous or imperfect standards of judgment. Give conscience a right law by which to judge, and its decisions will be uniform, and absolutely as well as relatively just. We are bound, not only to "follow our conscience," but to have a right conscience to follow,—and to follow it, not as one follows the beast he drives, but as the soldier follows his commander. Robert J. Burdette: "Following conscience as a guide is like following one's nose. It is important to get the nose pointed right before it is safe to follow it. A man can keep the approval of his own conscience in very much the same way that he can keep directly behind his nose, and go wrong all the time."

Conscience is the con-knowing of a particular act or state, as coming under the law accepted by the reason as to right and wrong; and the judgment of conscience assumes this act or state under that general standard. Conscience cannot include the law—cannot itself be the law,—because reason only knows, never con-knows. Reason says *scio*; only judgment says *conscio*,

This view enables us to reconcile the intuitional and the empirical theories of morals. Each has its element of truth. The original sense of right and wrong is intuitive, — no education could ever impart the idea of the difference between right and wrong to one who had it not. But what classes of things *are* right or wrong, we learn by the exercise of our logical intelligence, in connection with experiences of utility, influences of society and tradition, and positive divine revelation. Thus our moral reason, through a combination of intuition and education, of internal and external information as to general principles of right and wrong, furnishes the standard according to which conscience may judge the particular cases which come before it.

This moral reason may become depraved by sin, so that the light becomes darkness (Mat. 6:23, 23) and conscience has only a perverse standard by which to judge. The "weak" conscience (1 Cor. 8:12) is one whose standard of judgment is yet imperfect; the conscience "branded" (Rev. Vers.) or "seared" (A. V.) "as with a hot iron" (1 Tim. 4:2) is one whose standard has been wholly perverted by practical disobedience. The word and the Spirit of God are the chief agencies in rectifying our standards of judgment, and so of enabling conscience to make absolutely right decisions. God can so unite the soul to Christ, that it becomes partaker on the one hand of his satisfaction to justice and is thus "sprinkled from an evil conscience" (Eph. 10:23), and on the other hand of his sanctifying power and is thus enabled in certain respects to obey God's command and to speak of a "good conscience" (1 Pet. 3:16 — of single act; 3:21 — of state) instead of an "evil conscience" (Eph. 10:23) or a conscience "defiled" (Tit. 1:15) by sin. Here the "good conscience" is the conscience which has been obeyed by the will, and the "evil conscience" the conscience which has been disobeyed; with the result, in the first case, of approval from the moral sentiments, and, in the second case, of disapproval.

E. Conscience in its relation to God as law-giver. — Since conscience, in the proper sense, gives uniform and infallible judgment that the right is supremely obligatory, and that the wrong must be forborne at every cost, it can be called an echo of God's voice, and an indication in man of that which his own true being requires.

Conscience has sometimes been described as the voice of God in the soul, or as the personal presence and influence of God himself. But we must not identify conscience with God. D. W. Faunce: "Conscience is not God, — it is only a part of one's self. To build up a religion about one's own conscience, as if it were God, is only a refined selfishness — a worship of one part of one's self by another part of one's self." In *The Excursion*, Wordsworth speaks of conscience as "God's most intimate presence in the soul And his most perfect image in the world." But in his *Ode to Duty* he more discreetly writes: "Stern daughter of the voice of God! O Duty! if that name thou love, Who art a light to guide, a rod To check the erring, and reprove, Thou who art victory and law When empty terrors overawe, From vain temptations dost set free And calmst the weary strife of frail humanity!" Here is an allusion to the Hebrew Bath Kol. "The Jews say that the Holy Spirit spoke during the Tabernacle by Urim and Thummim, under the first Temple by the Prophets, and under the second Temple by the Bath Kol — a divine intimation as inferior to the oracular voice proceeding from the mercy seat as a daughter is supposed to be inferior to her mother. It is also used in the sense of an approving conscience. In this case it is the echo of the voice of God in those who by obeying hear" (Hershon's *Talmudic Miscellany*, 2, note). This phrase, "the echo of God's voice," is a correct description of conscience, and Wordsworth probably had it in mind when he spoke of duty as "the daughter of the voice of God." Robert Browning describes conscience as "the great beacon-light God sets in all. . . . The worst man upon earth . . . knows in his conscience more Of what right is, than arrives at birth In the best man's acts that we bow before." Jackson, *James Martineau*, 154 — The sense of obligation is "a piercing ray of the great Orb of souls." On Wordsworth's conception of conscience, see A. H. Strong, *Great Poets*, 365-368.

Since the activity of the immanent God reveals itself in the normal operations of our own faculties, conscience might be also regarded as man's true self over against the false self which we have set up against it. Theodore Parker defines conscience as "our consciousness of the conscience of God." In his fourth year, says Chadwick, his biographer (pages 12, 13, 135), young Theodore saw a little spotted tortoise and lifted his hand to strike. All at once something checked his arm, and a voice within said clear and loud: "It is wrong." He asked his mother what it was that told him it was wrong.

She wiped a tear from her eye with her apron, and taking him in her arms said: "Some men call it conscience, but I prefer to call it the voice of God in the soul of man. If you listen and obey it, then it will speak clearer and clearer, and will always guide you right; but if you turn a deaf ear and disobey, then it will fade out little by little, and will leave you all in the dark and without a guide. Your life depends on your hearing this little voice." E. T. Smith, *Man's Knowledge of Man and of God*, 87, 171—"Man has conscience, as he has talents. Conscience, no more than talent, makes him good. He is good, only as he follows conscience and uses talent. . . . The relation between the terms consciousness and conscience, which are in fact but forms of the same word, testifies to the fact that it is in the action of conscience that man's consciousness of himself is chiefly experienced."

The conscience of the regenerate man may have such right standards, and its decisions may be followed by such uniformly right action, that its voice, though it is not itself God's voice, is yet the very echo of God's voice. The renewed conscience may take up into itself, and may express, the witness of the Holy Spirit (Rom. 9:1—"I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience bearing witness with me in the Holy Spirit"; cf. 8:16—"the Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are children of God"). But even when conscience judges according to imperfect standards, and is imperfectly obeyed by the will, there is a spontaneity in its utterances and a sovereignty in its commands. It declares that whatever is right must be done. The imperative of conscience is a "categorical imperative" (Kant). It is independent of the human will. Even when disobeyed, it still asserts its authority. Before conscience, every other impulse and affection of man's nature is called to bow.

F. Conscience in its relation to God as holy.—Conscience is not an original authority. It points to something higher than itself. The "authority of conscience" is simply the authority of the moral law, or rather, the authority of the personal God, of whose nature the law is but a transcript. Conscience, therefore, with its continual and supreme demand that the right should be done, furnishes the best witness to man of the existence of a personal God, and of the supremacy of holiness in him in whose image we are made.

In knowing self in connection with moral law, man not only gets his best knowledge of self, but his best knowledge of that other self opposite to him, namely, God. Gordon, *Christ of To-day*, 236—"The conscience is the true Jacob's ladder, set in the heart of the individual and reaching unto heaven; and upon it the angels of self-reproach and self-approval ascend and descend." This is of course true if we confine our thoughts to the mandatory element in revelation. There is a higher knowledge of God which is given only in grace. Jacob's ladder symbolizes the Christ who publishes not only the gospel but the law, and not only the law but the gospel. Dewey, *Psychology*, 344—"Conscience is intuitive, not in the sense that it enunciates universal laws and principles, for it lays down no laws. Conscience is a name for the experience of personality that any given act is in harmony or in discord with a truly realized personality." Because obedience to the dictates of conscience is always relatively right, Kant could say that "an erring conscience is a chimæra." But because the law accepted by conscience may be absolutely wrong, conscience may in its decisions greatly err from the truth. S. S. Times: "Saul before his conversion was a conscientious wrong doer. His spirit and character was commendable, while his conduct was reprehensible." We prefer to say that Saul's zeal for the law was a zeal to make the law subservient to his own pride and honor.

Horace Bushnell said that the first requirement of a great ministry is a great conscience. He did not mean the punitive, inhibitory conscience merely, but rather the discovering, arousing, inspiring conscience, that sees at once the great things to be done, and moves toward them with a shout and a song. This unbiased and pure conscience is inseparable from the sense of its relation to God and to God's holiness. Shakespeare, *Henry VI*, 2d Part, 3:2—"What stronger breastplate than a heart untainted? Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just; And he but naked, though locked up in steel, Whose conscience with injustice is corrupted." Huxley, in his lecture at Oxford in 1863, admits and even insists that ethical practice must be and should be in opposition to evolution; that the methods of evolution do not account for ethical man and his ethical progress. Morality is not a product of the same methods by which

lower orders have advanced in perfection of organization, namely, by the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest. Human progress is moral, is in freedom, is under the law of love, is different in kind from physical evolution. James Russell Lowell: "In vain we call old notions fudge, And bend our conscience to our dealing: The ten commandments will not budge, And stealing will continue stealing."

R. T. Smith, *Man's Knowledge of Man and of God*, 181— "Conscience lives in human nature like a rightful king, whose claim can never be forgotten by his people, even though they dethrone and misuse him, and whose presence on the seat of judgment can alone make the nation to be at peace with itself." Seth, *Ethical Principles*, 424— "The Kantian theory of autonomy does not tell the whole story of the moral life. Its unyielding Ought, its categorical Imperative, issues not merely from the depths of our own nature, but from the heart of the universe itself. We are self-legislative; but we reenact the law already enacted by God; we recognize, rather than constitute, the law of our own being. The moral law is an echo, within our own souls, of the voice of the Eternal, 'whose offspring we are' (Acts 17:28)."

Schenkel, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 1: 135-155— "The conscience is the organ by which the human spirit finds God in itself and so becomes aware of itself in him. Only in conscience is man conscious of himself as eternal, as distinct from God, yet as normally bound to be determined wholly by God. When we subject ourselves wholly to God, conscience gives us peace. When we surrender to the world the allegiance due only to God, conscience brings remorse. In this latter case we become aware that while God is in us, we are no longer in God. Religion is exchanged for ethics, the relation of communion for the relation of separation. In conscience alone man distinguishes himself absolutely from the brute. Man does not make conscience, but conscience makes man. Conscience feels every separation from God as an injury to self. Faith is the relating of the self-consciousness to the God-consciousness, the becoming sure of our own personality, in the absolute personality of God. Only in faith does conscience come to itself. But by sin this faith-consciousness may be turned into law-consciousness. Faith affirms God *in* us; Law affirms God *outside* of us." Schenkel differs from Schleiermacher in holding that religion is not feeling but conscience, and that it is not a sense of dependence on the world, but a sense of dependence on God. Conscience recognizes a God distinct from the universe, a moral God, and so makes an unmoral religion impossible.

Hopkins, *Outline Study of Man*, 233-235, *Moral Science*, 49, *Law of Love*, 41— "Conscience is the moral consciousness of man in view of his own actions as related to moral law. It is a double knowledge of self and of the law. Conscience is not the whole of the moral nature. It presupposes the moral reason, which recognizes the moral law and affirms its universal obligation for all moral beings. It is the office of conscience to bring man into personal relation to this law. It sets up a tribunal within him by which his own actions are judged. Not conscience, but the moral reason, judges of the conduct of others. This last is *science*, but not *conscience*."

Peabody, *Moral Philos.*, 41-60— "Conscience not a source, but a means, of knowledge. Analogous to consciousness. A judicial faculty. Judges according to the law before it. Verdict (*verum dictum*) always relatively right, although, by the absolute standard of right, it may be wrong. Like all perceptive faculties, educated by use (not by increase of knowledge only, for man may act worse, the more knowledge he has). For absolutely right decisions, conscience is dependent upon knowledge. To recognize conscience as *legislator* (as well as judge), is to fail to recognize any objective standard of right." *The Two Consciences*, 46, 47— "Conscience the Law, and Conscience the Witness. The latter is the true and proper Conscience."

H. B. Smith, *System of Christ. Theology*, 178-191— "The unity of conscience is not in its being one faculty or in its performing one function, but in its having one *object*, its relation to one idea, viz., *right*. . . . The term 'conscience' no more designates a special faculty than the term 'religion' does (or than the 'aesthetic sense'). . . . The existence of conscience proves a moral law above us; it leads logically to a Moral Governor; . . . it implies an essential distinction between right and wrong, an immutable morality; . . . yet needs to be enlightened; . . . men may be conscientious in iniquity; . . . conscience is not righteousness; . . . this may only show the greatness of the depravity, having conscience, and yet ever disobeying it."

On the New Testament passages with regard to conscience, see Hofmann, *Lehre von dem Gewissen*, 30-33; Kähler, *Das Gewissen*, 225-233. For the view that conscience is primarily the cognitive or intuitional power of the soul, see Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 77; Alexander, *Moral Science*, 20; McCosh, *Div. Govt.*, 297-312; Talbot, *Ethical*

Prolegomena, in *Bap. Quar.*, July, 1877: 267-274; Park, *Discourses*, 290-296; Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, 1: 259-266. On the whole subject of conscience, see Mansel, *Metaphysics*, 158-170; Martineau, *Religion and Materialism*, 45—"The discovery of duty is as distinctly relative to an objective Righteousness as the perception of form to an external space"; also Types, 2: 27-30—"We first judge ourselves; then others"; 53, 54, 74, 108—"Subjective morals are as absurd as subjective mathematics." The best brief treatment of the whole subject is that of E. G. Robinson, *Principles and Practice of Morality*, 26-78. See also Wayland, *Moral Science*, 49; Harless, *Christian Ethics*, 45, 60; H. N. Day, *Science of Ethics*, 17; Janet, *Theory of Morals*, 264, 348; Kant, *Metaphysics of Ethics*, 62; cf. Schwegler, *Hist. Philosophy*, 233; Haven, *Mor. Philos.*, 41; Fairchild, *Mor. Philos.*, 75; Gregory, *Christian Ethics*, 71; Passavant, *Das Gewissen*; Wm. Schmid, *Das Gewissen*.

## 2. Will.

A. Will-defined.—Will is the soul's power to choose between motives and to direct its subsequent activity according to the motive thus chosen,—in other words, the soul's power to choose both an end and the means to attain it. The choice of an ultimate end we call immanent preference; the choice of means we call executive volition.

In this definition we part company with Jonathan Edwards, *Freedom of the Will*, in *Works*, vol. 2. He regards the will as the soul's power to act according to motive, *i. e.*, to act out its nature, but he denies the soul's power to choose between motives, *i. e.*, to initiate a course of action contrary to the motive which has been previously dominant. Hence he is unable to explain how a holy being, like Satan or Adam, could ever fall. If man has no power to change motives, to break with the past, to begin a new course of action, he has no more freedom than the brute. The younger Edwards (*Works*, 1: 428) shows what his father's doctrine of the will implies, when he says: "Beasts therefore, according to the measure of their intelligence, are as free as men. Intelligence, and not liberty, is the only thing wanting to constitute them moral agents." Yet Jonathan Edwards, determinist as he was, in his sermon on *Pressing into the Kingdom of God* (*Works*, 4: 381), urges the use of means, and appeals to the sinner as if he had the power of choosing between the motives of self and of God. He was unconsciously making a powerful appeal to the will, and the human will responded in prolonged and mighty efforts; see Allen, *Jonathan Edwards*, 109.

For references, and additional statements with regard to the will and its freedom, see chapter on *Decrees*, pages 361, 362, and article by A. H. Strong, in *Baptist Review*, 1883: 219-242, and reprinted in *Philosophy and Religion*, 114-123. In the remarks upon the *Decrees*, we have intimated our rejection of the Arminian liberty of indifference, or the doctrine that the will can act without motive. See this doctrine advocated in Peabody, *Moral Philosophy*, 1-9. But we also reject the theory of determinism propounded by Jonathan Edwards (*Freedom of the Will*, in *Works*, vol. 2), which, as we have before remarked, identifies sensibility with the will, regards affections as the efficient causes of volitions, and speaks of the connection between motive and action as a necessary one. Hazard, *Man a Creative First Cause*, and *The Will*, 407—"Edwards gives to the controlling cause of volition in the past the name of motive. He treats the inclination as a motive, but he also makes inclination synonymous with choice and will, which would make will to be only the soul willing—and therefore the cause of its own act." For objections to the Arminian theory, see H. B. Smith, *Review of Whedon*, in *Faith and Philosophy*, 359-399; McCosh, *Divine Government*, 263-313, esp. 312; E. G. Robinson, *Principles and Practice of Morality*, 109-137; Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 2: 115-147.

James, *Psychology*, 1: 139—"Consciousness is primarily a selecting agency." 2: 393—"Man possesses all the instincts of animals, and a great many more besides. Reason, *per se*, can inhibit no impulses; the only thing that can neutralize an impulse is an impulse the other way. Reason may however make an inference which will excite the imagination to let loose the impulse the other way." 549—"Ideal or moral action is action in the line of the greatest resistance." 562—"Effort of attention is the essential phenomenon of will." 567—"The terminus of the psychological process is volition; the point to which the will is directly applied is always an idea." 568—"Though attention is the first thing in volition, express consent to the reality of what is attended to is an additional and distinct phenomenon. We say not only: It is a real-

ity; but we also say: 'Let it be a reality.'" 371—"Are the duration and intensity of this effort fixed functions of the object, or are they not? We answer, No, and so we maintain freedom of the will." 384—"The soul presents nothing, creates nothing, is at the mercy of material forces for all possibilities, and, by reinforcing one and checking others, it figures not as an *epiphenomenon*, but as something from which the play gets moral support." Alexander, *Theories of the Will*, 201-214, finds in Reid's Active Powers of the Human Mind the most adequate empirical defense of indeterminism.

B. Will and other faculties.—(a) We accept the threefold division of human faculties into intellect, sensibility, and will. (b) Intellect is the soul knowing; sensibility is the soul feeling (desires, affections); will is the soul choosing (end or means). (c) In every act of the soul, all the faculties act. Knowing involves feeling and willing; feeling involves knowing and willing; willing involves knowing and feeling. (d) Logically, each latter faculty involves the preceding action of the former; the soul must know before feeling; must know and feel before willing. (e) Yet since knowing and feeling are activities, neither of these is possible without willing.

Socrates to Theaetetus: "It would be a singular thing, my lad, if each of us was, as it were, a wooden horse, and within us were seated many separate senses. For manifestly these senses unite into one nature, call it the soul or what you will. And it is with this central form, through the organs of sense, that we perceive sensible objects." Dewey, *Psychology*, 21—"Knowledge and feeling are partial aspects of the self, and hence more or less abstract, while will is complete, comprehending both aspects. . . . While the universal element is knowledge, the individual element is feeling, and the relation which connects them into one concrete content is will." 384—"There is conflict of desires or motives. Deliberation is the comparison of desires; choice is the decision in favor of one. This desire is then the strongest because the whole force of the self is thrown into it." 411—"The man determines himself by setting up either good or evil as a motive to himself, and he sets up either, as he will have himself be. There is no thought without will, for thought implies inhibition." Ribot, *Diseases of the Will*, 73, cites the case of Coleridge, and his lack of power to inhibit scattering and useless ideas; 114—"Volition plunges its roots into the profoundest depths of the individual, and beyond the individual, into the species and into all species."

As God is not mere nature but originating force, so man is chiefly will. Every other act of the soul has will as an element. Wundt: "Jedes Denken ist ein Wollen." There is no perception, and there is no thought, without attention, and attention is an act of the will. Hegelians and absolute idealists like Bradley, (see *Mind*, July, 1886), deny that attention is an active function of the self. They regard it as a necessary consequence of the more interesting character of preceding ideas. Thus all power to alter character is denied to the agent. This is an exact reversal of the facts of consciousness, and it would leave no will in God or man. T. H. Green says that the self makes the motives by identifying itself with one solicitation of desire rather than another, but that the self has no power of alternative choice in thus identifying itself with one solicitation of desire rather than another; see Upton, *Hibbert Lectures*, 310. James Seth, *Freedom of Ethical Postulate*: "The only hope of finding a place for real free will is in another than the Humeian, empirical or psychological account of the moral person or self. Hegel and Green bring will again under the law of necessity. But personality is ultimate. Absolute uniformity is entirely unproved. We contend for a power of free and incalculable initiation in the self, and this it is necessary to maintain in the interests of morality." Without will to attend to pertinent material and to reject the impertinent, we can have no *science*; without will to select and combine the elements of imagination, we can have no *art*; without will to choose between evil and good, we can have no *morality*. Alfvic, A. D. 900: "The verb 'to will' has no imperative, for that the will must be always free."

C. Will and permanent states.—(a) Though every act of the soul involves the action of all the faculties, yet in any particular action one faculty may be more prominent than the others. So we speak of acts of

intellect, of affection, of will. (b) This predominant action of any single faculty produces effects upon the other faculties associated with it. The action of will gives a direction to the intellect and to the affections, as well as a permanent bent to the will itself. (c) Each faculty, therefore, has its permanent states as well as its transient acts, and the will may originate these states. Hence we speak of voluntary affections, and may with equal propriety speak of voluntary opinions. These permanent voluntary states we denominate character.

I "make up" my mind. Ladd, *Philosophy of Conduct*, 152 — "I will the influential ideas, feelings and desires, rather than allow these ideas, feelings and desires to influence — not to say, determine me." All men can say with Robert Browning's Paracelsus: "I have subdued my life to the one purpose whereto I ordained it." "Sow an act, and you reap a habit; sow a habit, and you reap a character; sow a character, and you reap a destiny." Tito, in George Elliot's *Romola*, and Markheim in R. L. Stevenson's story of that name, are instances of the gradual and almost imperceptible fixation in evil ways which results from seemingly slight original decisions of the will; see art. on Tito Melema, by Julia H. Gulliver, in *New World*, Dec. 1895: 698 — "Sin lies in the choice of the ideas that shall frequent the moral life, rather than of the actions that shall form the outward life. . . . The pivotal point of the moral life is the intent involved in attention. . . . Sin consists, not only in the motive, but in the making of the motive." By every decision of the will in which we turn our thought either toward or away from an object of desire, we set nerve-tracts in operation, upon which thought may hereafter more or less easily travel. "Nothing makes an inroad, without making a road." By slight efforts of attention to truth which we know ought to influence us, we may "make level in the desert a highway for our God" (Is. 40: 3), or render the soul a hard trodden ground impervious to "the word of the kingdom" (Mat. 13: 19).

The word "character" meant originally the mark of the engraver's tool upon the metal or the stone. It came then to signify the collective result of the engraver's work. The use of the word in morals implies that every thought and act is chiseling itself into the imperishable substance of the soul. J. S. Mill: "A character is a completely fashioned will." We may talk therefore of a "generic volition" (Dewey). There is a permanent bent of the will toward good or toward evil. Reputation is man's shadow, sometimes longer, sometimes shorter, than himself. Character, on the other hand, is the man's true self — "what a man is in the dark" (Dwight L. Moody). In this sense, "purpose is the autograph of mind." Duke of Wellington: "Habit a second nature? Habit is ten times nature!" When Macbeth says: "If 't were done when 't is done, Then 't were well 't were done quickly," the trouble is that when 't is done, it is only begun. Robert Dale Owen gives us the fundamental principle of socialism in the maxim: "A man's character is made for him, not by him." Hence he would change man's diet or his environment, as a means of forming man's character. But Jesus teaches that what defiles comes not from without but from within (Mat. 15: 18). Because character is the result of will, the maxim of Heraclitus is true: ἦθος ἀνθρώπου βίαιον — man's character is his destiny. On habit, see James, *Psychology*, 1: 122-127.

D. Will and motives. — (a) The permanent states just mentioned, when they have been once determined, also influence the will. Internal views and dispositions, and not simply external presentations, constitute the strength of motives. (b) These motives often conflict, and though the soul never acts without motive, it does notwithstanding choose between motives, and so determines the end toward which it will direct its activities. (c) Motives are not *causes*, which compel the will, but *influences*, which persuade it. The power of these motives, however, is proportioned to the strength of will which has entered into them and has made them what they are.

"Incentives comes from the soul's self: the rest avail not." The same wind may drive two ships in opposite directions, according as they set their sails. The same external presentation may result in George Washington's refusing, and Benedict

Arnold's accepting, the bribe to betray his country. Richard Lovelace of Canterbury: "Stone walls do not a prison make, Nor iron bars a cage; Minds innocent and quiet take That for a hermitage." Jonathan Edwards made motives to be *efficient* causes, when they are only *final* causes. We must not interpret motives as if it were locomotive. It is always a man's fault when he becomes a drunkard: drink never takes to a man; the man takes to drink. Men who deny demerit are ready enough to claim merit. They hold others responsible, if not themselves. Bowne: "Pure arbitrariness and pure necessity are alike incompatible with reason. There must be a law of reason in the mind with which volition cannot tamper, and there must also be the power to determine ourselves accordingly." Bowne, Principles of Ethics, 135—"If necessity is a universal thing, then the belief in freedom is also necessary. All grant freedom of thought, so that it is only executive freedom that is denied." Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 239-244—"Every system of philosophy must invoke freedom for the solution of the problem of error, or make shipwreck of reason itself. . . . Our faculties are made for truth, but they may be carelessly used, or wilfully misused, and thus error is born. . . . We need not only laws of thought, but self-control in accordance with them."

The will, in choosing between motives, chooses with a motive, namely, the motive chosen. Fairbairn, Philos. Christian Religion, 76—"While motives may be necessary, they need not necessitate. The will selects motives; motives do not select the will. Heredity and environment do not cancel freedom, they only condition it. Thought is transcendence as regards the phenomena of space; will is transcendence as regards the phenomena of time; this double transcendence involves the complete supernatural character of man." New World, 1892:152—"It is not the character, but the self that has the character, to which the ultimate moral decision is due." William Ernest Henly, Poems, 119—"It matters not how strait the gate, How charged with punishments the scroll, I am the master of my fate, I am the captain of my soul."

Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 2:54—"A being is free, in so far as the inner centre of its life, from which it acts, is conditioned by self-determination. It is not enough that the deciding agent in an act be the man himself, his own nature, his distinctive character. In order to accountability, we must have more than this; we must prove that this, his distinctive nature and character, springs from his own volition, and that it is itself the product of freedom in moral development. Matt. 12:33—"make the tree good, and its fruit good"—combines both. Acts depend upon nature; but nature again depends upon the primary decisions of the will ("make the tree good"). Some determinism is not denied; but it is partly limited [by the will's remaining power of choice] and partly traced back to a former self-determining." *Ibid.*, 67—"If freedom be the self-determining of the will from that which is undetermined, Determinism is found wanting, — because in its most spiritual form, though it grants a self-determination of the will, it is only such a one as springs from a determinateness already present; and Indifferentism is found wanting too, because while it maintains indeterminateness as presupposed in every act of will, it does not recognize an actual self-determining on the part of the will, which, though it be a self-determining, yet begets determinateness of character. . . . We must, therefore, hold the doctrine of a *conditional and limited freedom*."

E. Will and contrary choice. — (a) Though no act of pure will is possible, the soul may put forth single volitions in a direction opposed to its previous ruling purpose, and thus far man has the power of a contrary choice (Rom. 7:18—"to will is present with me"). (b) But in so far as will has entered into and revealed itself in permanent states of intellect and sensibility and in a settled bent of the will itself, man cannot by a single act reverse his moral state, and in this respect has not the power of a contrary choice. (c) In this latter case he can change his character only indirectly, by turning his attention to considerations fitted to awaken opposite dispositions, and by thus summoning up motives to an opposite course.

There is no such thing as an act of pure will. Peters, Willenswelt, 126—"Jedes Wollen ist ein Etwas wollen"—"all willing is a willing of some thing"; it has an object which the mind conceives, which awakens the sensibility, and which the will strives

to realize. Cause without alternative is not true cause. J. F. Watts: "We know causality only as we know will, i. e., where of two possibles it makes one actual. A cause may therefore have more than one certain effect. In the external material world we cannot find *cause*, but only *antecedent*. To construct a theory of the will from a study of the material universe is to seek the living among the dead. Will is power to *make* a decision, not to *be made* by decisions, to decide between motives, and not to be determined by motives. Who conducts the trial between motives? Only the self." While we agree with the above in its assertion of the certainty of nature's sequences, we object to its attribution even to nature of anything like necessity. Since nature's laws are merely the habits of God, God's causality in nature is the regularity, not of necessity, but of freedom. We too are free at the strategic points. Automatic as most of our action is, there are times when we know ourselves to have power of initiative; when we put under our feet the motives which have dominated us in the past; when we mark out new courses of action. In these critical times we assert our manhood; but for them we would be no better than the beasts that perish. "Unless above himself he can erect himself, How mean a thing is man!"

Will, with no remaining power of contrary choice, may be brute will, but it is not free will. We therefore deny the relevancy of Herbert Spencer's argument, in his *Data of Ethics*, and in his *Psychology*, 2:503—"Psychical changes either conform to law, or they do not. If they do not conform to law, no science of Psychology is possible. If they do conform to law, there cannot be any such thing as free will." Spinoza also, in his *Ethics*, holds that the stone, as it falls, would if it were conscious think itself free, and with as much justice as man; for it is doing that to which its constitution leads it; but no more can be said for him. Fisher, *Nature and Method of Revelation*, xiii—"To try to collect the 'data of ethics' when there is no recognition of man as a personal agent, capable of freely originating the conduct and the states of will for which he is morally responsible, is labor lost." Fisher, chapter on the Personality of God, in *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief*—"Self-determination, as the very term signifies, is attended with an irresistible conviction that the direction of the will is self-imparted. . . . That the will is free, that is, not constrained by causes exterior, which is *fatalism*—and not a mere spontaneity, confined to one path by a force acting from within, which is *determinism*—is immediately evident to every unsophisticated mind. We can initiate action by an efficiency which is neither irresistibly controlled by motives, nor determined, without any capacity of alternative action, by a proneness inherent in its nature. . . . Motives have an *influence*, but influence is not to be confounded with *causal efficiency*."

Talbot, on Will and Free Will, *Bap. Rev.*, July, 1882—"Will is neither a power of unconditioned self-determination—which is not freedom, but an aimless, irrational, fatalistic power; nor pure spontaneity—which excludes from will all law but its own; but it is rather a power of originating action—a power which is limited however by inborn dispositions, by acquired habits and convictions, by feelings and social relations." Ernest Naville, in *Rev. Chrétienne*, Jan. 1878:7—"Our liberty does not consist in producing an action of which it is the only source. It consists in choosing between two pre-existent impulses. It is *choice*, not *creation*, that is our destiny—a drop of water that can choose whether it will go into the Rhine or the Rhone. Gravity carries it down,—it chooses only its direction. Impulses do not come from the will, but from the sensibility; but free will chooses between these impulses." Bowne, *Metaphysics*, 169—"Freedom is not a power of acting without, or apart from, motives, but simply a power of choosing an end or law, and of governing one's self accordingly." Porter, *Moral Science*, 77-111—"Will is 'not a power to choose without motive.' It 'does not exclude motives to the contrary.' Volition 'supposes two or more objects between which election is made. It is an act of preference, and to prefer implies that one motive is chosen to the exclusion of another. . . . To the conception and the act two motives at least are required.'" Lyall, *Intellect, Emotions, and Moral Nature*, 581, 592—"The will follows reasons, inducements—but it is not *caused*. It obeys or acts under inducement, but it does so sovereignly. It exhibits the phenomena of activity, in relation to the very motive it obeys. It obeys it, rather than another. It determines, in reference to it, that this is the very motive it will obey. There is undoubtedly this phenomenon exhibited: the will obeying—but elective, active, in its obedience. If it be asked how this is possible—how the will can be under the influence of motive, and yet possess an intellectual activity—we reply that this is one of those ultimate phenomena which must be admitted, while they cannot be explained."

F. Will and responsibility.—(a) By repeated acts of will put forth in a given moral direction, the affections may become so confirmed in evil or in good as to make previously certain, though not necessary, the future good or evil action of the man. Thus, while the will is free, the man may be the "bondservant of sin" (John 8:31-36) or the "servant of righteousness" (Rom. 6:15-23; cf. Heb. 12:23—"spirits of just men made perfect"). (b) Man is responsible for all effects of will, as well as for will itself; for voluntary affections, as well as for voluntary acts; for the intellectual views into which will has entered, as well as for the acts of will by which these views have been formed in the past or are maintained in the present (2 Pet. 3:5—"wilfully forget").

Ladd, *Philosophy of Knowledge*, 415—"The self stands between the two laws of Nature and of Conscience, and, under perpetual limitations from both, exercises its choice. Thus it becomes more and more enslaved by the one, or more and more free by habitually choosing to follow the other. Our conception of causality according to the laws of nature, and our conception of the other causality of freedom, are both derived from one and the same experience of the self. There arises a seeming antinomy only when we hypostatize each severally and apart from the other." R. T. Smith, *Man's Knowledge of Man and of God*, 69—"Making a will is significant. Here the action of will is limited by conditions: the amount of the testator's property, the number of his relatives, the nature of the objects of bounty within his knowledge."

Harris, *Philos. Basis of Theism*, 349-407—"Action without motives, or contrary to all motives, would be irrational action. Instead of being free, it would be like the convulsions of epilepsy. Motives—sensibilities. Motive is not cause; does not determine; is only influence. Yet determination is always made under the influence of motives. Uniformity of action is not to be explained by any law of uniform influence of motives, but by character in the will. By its choice, will forms in itself a character; by action in accordance with this choice, it confirms and develops the character. Choice modifies sensibilities, and so modifies motives. Volitional action expresses character, but also forms and modifies it. Man may change his choice; yet intellect, sensibility, motive, habit, remain. Evil choice, having formed intellect and sensibility into accord with itself, must be a powerful hindrance to fundamental change by new and contrary choice; and gives small ground to expect that man left to himself ever will make the change. After will has acquired character by choices, its determinations are not transitions from complete indeterminateness or indifference, but are more or less expressions of character already formed. The theory that indifference is essential to freedom implies that will never acquires character; that voluntary action is atomistic; that every act is disintegrated from every other; that character, if acquired, would be incompatible with freedom. Character is a choice, yet a choice which persists, which modifies sensibility and intellect, and which influences subsequent determinations."

My freedom then is freedom within limitations. Heredity and environment, and above all the settled dispositions which are the product of past acts of will, render a large part of human action practically automatic. The deterministic theory is valid for perhaps nine-tenths of human activity. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 118, 119—"We naturally will with a bias toward evil. To act according to the perfection of nature would be true freedom. And this man has lost. He recognizes that he is not his true self. It is only with difficulty that he works toward his true self again. By the fall of Adam, the will, which before was conditioned but free, is now not only conditioned but enslaved. Nothing but the action of grace can free it." Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, Introduction: "Our wills are ours, we know not how; Our wills are ours, to make them thine." Studying the action of the sinful will alone, one might conclude that there is no such thing as freedom. Christian ethics, in distinction from naturalistic ethics, reveals most clearly the degradation of our nature, at the same time that it discloses the remedy in Christ: "If therefore the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed" (John 8:36).

Mind, Oct. 1882: 567—"Kant seems to be in quest of the phantasmal freedom which is supposed to consist in the absence of determination by motives. The error of the determinists from which this idea is the recoil, involves an equal abstraction of the

man from his thoughts, and interprets the relation between the two as an instance of the mechanical causality which exists between two things in nature. The point to be grasped in the controversy is that a man and his motives are one, and that consequently he is in every instance self-determined. . . . Indeterminism is tenable only if an ego can be found which is not an ego already determinate; but such an ego, though it may be logically distinguished and verbally expressed, is not a factor in psychology." Morrell, *Mental Philosophy*, 300—"Motives determine the will, and so far the will is not free; but the man governs the motives, allowing them a less or a greater power of influencing his life, and so far the man is a free agent." Santayana: "A free man, because he is free, may make himself a slave; but once a slave, because he is a slave, he cannot make himself free." Sidgwick, *Method of Ethics*, 51, 65—"This almost overwhelming cumulative proof [of necessity] seems, however, more than balanced by a single argument on the other side: the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate volition. It is impossible for me to think, at each moment, that my volition is completely determined by my formed character and the motives acting upon it. The opposite conviction is so strong as to be absolutely unshaken by the evidence brought against it. I cannot believe it to be illusory."

G. Inferences from this view of the will.—(a) We can be responsible for the voluntary evil affections with which we are born, and for the will's inherited preference of selfishness, only upon the hypothesis that we originated these states of the affections and will, or had a part in originating them. Scripture furnishes this explanation, in its doctrine of Original Sin, or the doctrine of a common apostasy of the race in its first father, and our derivation of a corrupted nature by natural generation from him. (b) While there remains to man, even in his present condition, a natural power of will by which he may put forth transient volitions externally conformed to the divine law and so may to a limited extent modify his character, it still remains true that the sinful bent of his affections is not directly under his control; and this bent constitutes a motive to evil so constant, inveterate, and powerful, that it actually influences every member of the race to reaffirm his evil choice, and renders necessary a special working of God's Spirit upon his heart to ensure his salvation. Hence the Scripture doctrine of Regeneration.

There is such a thing as "psychical automatism" (Ladd, *Philos. Mind*, 169). Mother: "Oscar, why can't you be good?" "Mamma, it makes me so tired!" The wayward four-year-old is a type of universal humanity. Men are born morally tired, though they have energy enough of other sorts. The man who sins may lose all freedom, so that his soul becomes a seething mass of eructant evil. T. C. Chamberlain: "Conditions may make choices run rigidly in one direction and give as fixed uniformity as in physical phenomena. Put before a million typical Americans the choice between a quarter and a dime, and rigid uniformity of results can be safely predicted." Yet Dr. Chamberlain not only grants but claims liberty of choice. Romanes, *Mind and Motion*, 155-160—"Though volitions are largely determined by other and external causes, it does not follow that they are determined necessarily, and this makes all the difference between the theories of will as bond or free. Their intrinsic character as first causes protects them from being coerced by these causes and therefore from becoming only the mere effects of them. The condition to the effective operation of a motive—as distinguished from a motor—is the acquiescence of the first cause upon whom that motive is operating." Fichte: "If any one adopting the dogma of necessity should remain virtuous, we must seek the cause of his goodness elsewhere than in the innocuousness of his doctrine. Upon the supposition of free will alone can duty, virtue, and morality have any existence." Lessing: "Kein Mensch muss mtissen." Delitzsch: "Der Mensch, wie er jetzt ist, ist wahlfrei, aber nicht machtfrei."

Kant regarded freedom as an exception to the law of natural causality. But this freedom is not phenomenal but noumenal, for causality is not a category of noumena. From this freedom we get our whole idea of personality, for personality is freedom of the whole soul from the mechanism of nature. Kant treated scornfully the determin-

ism of Leibnitz. He said it was the freedom of a turnspit, which when once wound up directed its own movements, *i. e.*, was merely automatic. Compare with this the view of Baldwin, *Psychology, Feeling and Will*, 373—"Free choice is a synthesis, the outcome of which is in every case conditioned upon its elements, but in no case caused by them. A logical inference is conditioned upon its premises, but it is not caused by them. Both inference and choice express the nature of the conscious principle and the unique method of its life. . . . The motives do not grow into volitions, nor does the volition stand apart from the motives. The motives are partial expressions, the volition is a total expression, of the same existence. . . . Freedom is the expression of one's self conditioned by past choices and present environment." Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, 3:4—"Refrain to-night, And that shall lend a kind of easiness To the next abstinence: the next more easy: For use can almost change the stamp of nature, And either curb the devil or throw him out With wondrous potency." 3:2—"Purpose is but the slave to memory; Of violent birth but poor validity." 4:7—"That we would do, We should do when we would; for this *would* changes And hath abatements and delays as many As there are tongues, are hands, are accidents." Goethe: "Von der Gewalt die alle Wesen bindet, Befreit der Mensch sich der sich überwindet."

Scottus Novantius (Prof. Laurie of Edinburgh), *Ethica*, 237—"The chief good is fulness of life achieved through law by the action of will as reason on sensibility. . . . Immorality is the letting loose of feeling, in opposition to the idea and the law in it; it is individuality in opposition to personality. . . . In immorality, will is defeated, the personality overcomes, and the subject volitionizes just as a dog volitionizes. The subject takes possession of the personality and uses it for its natural desires." Maudsley, *Physiology of Mind*, 456, quotes Ribot, *Diseases of the Will*, 133—"Will is not the cause of anything. It is like the verdict of a jury, which is an effect, without being a cause. It is the highest force which nature has yet developed—the last consummate blossom of all her marvellous works." Yet Maudsley argues that the mind itself has power to prevent insanity. This implies that there is an owner of the instrument endowed with power and responsibility to keep it in order. Man can do much, but God can do more.

H. Special objections to the deterministic theory of the will.—Determinism holds that man's actions are uniformly determined by motives acting upon his character, and that he has no power to change these motives or to act contrary to them. This denial that the will is free has serious and pernicious consequences in theology. On the one hand, it weakens even if it does not destroy man's conviction with regard to responsibility, sin, guilt and retribution, and so obscures the need of atonement; on the other hand, it weakens if it does not destroy man's faith in his own power as well as in God's power of initiating action, and so obscures the possibility of atonement.

Determinism is exemplified in Omar Khayyám's *Rubáiyat*: "With earth's first clay they did the last man knead, And there of the last harvest sowed the seed; And the first morning of creation wrote What the last dawn of reckoning shall read." William James, *Will to Believe*, 145-188, shows that determinism involves pessimism or subjectivism—good and evil are merely means of increasing knowledge. The result of subjectivism is in theology antinomianism; in literature romanticism; in practical life sensuality or sensualism, as in Rousseau, Renan and Zola. Hutton, review of Clifford in *Contemp. Thoughts and Thinkers*, 1:254—"The determinist says there would be no moral quality in actions that did not express previous tendency, *i. e.*, a man is responsible only for what he cannot help doing. No effort against the grain will be made by him who believes that his interior mechanism settles for him whether he shall make it or no." Royce, *World and Individual*, 2:342—"Your unique voices in the divine symphony are no more the voices of moral agents than are the stones of a mosaic." The French monarch announced that all his subjects should be free to choose their own religion, but he added that nobody should choose a different religion from the king's. "Johnny, did you give your little sister the choice between those two apples?" "Yes, Mamma; I told her she could have the little one or none, and she chose the little one." Hobbes's choice was always the choice of the last horse in the

row. The bartender with revolver in hand met all criticisms upon the quality of his liquor with the remark: "You'll drink that whisky, and you'll like it too!"

Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*, 23— "There must be implicitly present to primitive man the sense of freedom, since his fetichism largely consists in attributing to inanimate objects the spontaneity which he finds in himself." Freedom does not contradict conservation of energy. Professor Lodge, in *Nature*, March 26, 1891— "Although expenditure of energy is needed to increase the speed of matter, none is needed to alter its direction. . . . The rails that guide a train do not propel it, nor do they retard it; they have no essential effect upon its energy but a guiding effect." J. J. Murphy, *Nat. Selection and Spir. Freedom*, 170-203— "Will does not create force but directs it. A very small force is able to guide the action of a great one, as in the steering of a modern steamship." James Seth, in *Philos. Rev.*, 3: 285, 286— "As life is not energy but a determiner of the paths of energy, so the will is a cause, in the sense that it controls and directs the channels which activity shall take." See also James Seth, *Ethical Principles*, 345-388, and *Freedom as Ethical Postulate*, 9— "The philosophical proof of freedom must be the demonstration of the inadequacy of the categories of science: its philosophical disproof must be the demonstration of the adequacy of such scientific categories." Shadworth Hodgson: "Either liberty is true, and then the categories are insufficient, or the categories are sufficient, and then liberty is a delusion." Wagner is the composer of determinism; there is no freedom or guilt; action is the result of influence and environment; a mysterious fate rules all. Life: "The views upon heredity Of scientists remind one That, shape one's conduct as one may, One's future is behind one."

We trace willing in God back, not to motives and antecedents, but to his infinite personality. If man is made in God's image, why we may not trace man's willing also back, not to motives and antecedents, but to his finite personality? We speak of God's fiat, but we may speak of man's fiat also. Napoleon: "There shall be no Alps!" Dutch William III: "I may fall, but shall fight every ditch, and die in the last one!" When God energizes the will, it becomes indomitable. Phil. 4:13— "I can do all things in him that strengtheneth me." Dr. E. G. Robinson was theoretically a determinist, and wrongly held that the highest conceivable freedom is to act out one's own nature. He regarded the will as only the nature in movement. Will is self-determining, not in the sense that will determines the self, but in the sense that self determines the will. The will cannot be compelled, for unless self-determined it is no longer will. Observation, history and logic, he thought, lead to necessitarianism. But consciousness, he conceded, testifies to freedom. Consciousness must be trusted, though we cannot reconcile the two. The will is as great a mystery as is the doctrine of the Trinity. Single volitions, he says, are often directly in the face of the current of a man's life. Yet he held that we have no consciousness of the power of a contrary choice. Consciousness can testify only to what springs out of the moral nature, not to the moral nature itself.

Lotze, *Religionsphilosophie*, section 61— "An indeterminate choice is of course incomprehensible and inexplicable, for if it were comprehensible and explicable by the human intellect, if, that is, it could be seen to follow necessarily from the preëxisting conditions, it from the nature of the case could not be a morally free choice at all. . . . But we cannot comprehend any more how the mind can move the muscles, nor how a moving stone can set another stone in motion, nor how the Absolute calls into existence our individual selves." Upton, *Hibbert Lectures*, 306-327, gives an able exposé of the deterministic fallacies. He cites Martineau and Balfour in England, Renouvier and Fonsegrive in France, Edward Zeller, Kuno Fischer and Saarschmidt in Germany, and William James in America, as recent advocates of free will.

Martineau, *Study*, 2: 227— "Is there not a Causal Self, over and above the Caused Self, or rather the Caused State and contents of the self left as a deposit from previous behavior? Absolute idealism, like Green's, will not recognize the existence of this Causal Self"; *Study of Religion*, 2: 195-324, and especially 240— "Where two or more rival preconceptions enter the field together, they cannot compare themselves *inter se*: they need and meet a superior: it rests with the mind itself to decide. The decision will not be *unmotivated*, for it will have its reasons. It will not be unconformable to the characteristics of the mind, for it will express its preferences. But none the less is it issued by a free cause that elects among the conditions, and is not elected by them." 241— "So far from admitting that different effects cannot come from the same cause. I even venture on the paradox that nothing is a proper cause which is limited to one effect." 300— "Freedom, in the sense of option, and will, as the power of deciding an alternative, have no place in the doctrines of the German schools." 311— "The whole

Illusion of Necessity springs from the attempt to fling out, for contemplation in the field of Nature, the creative new beginnings centered in personal subjects that transcend it."

See also H. B. Smith, *System of Christ. Theol.*, 226-231; Mansel, *Proleg. Log.*, 113-155, 270-273, and *Metaphysics*, 326; Gregory, *Christian Ethics*, 60; Abp. Manning, in *Contem. Rev.*, Jan. 1871: 468; Ward, *Philos. of Theism*, 1: 227-253; 2: 1-70, 274-349; Bp. Temple, *Bampton Lect.*, 1884: 69-96; Row, *Man not a Machine*, in *Present Day Tracts*, 5: no. 80; Richards, *Lectures on Theology*, 97-153; Solly, *The Will*, 167-208; William James, *The Dilemma of Determinism*, in *Unitarian Review*, Sept. 1884, and in *The Will to Believe*, 145-183; T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 90-150; Upton, *Hibbert Lectures*, 310; Bradley, in *Mind*, July, 1886; Bradford, *Heredity and Christian Problems*, 70-101; Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, 220-254; Ladd, *Philos. of Conduct*, 133-188. For Lotze's view of the Will, see his *Philos. of Religion*, 95-106, and his *Practical Philosophy*, 83-90.

\* If deny Scriptures, or regard indifferently, what standards remain? i.e. authoritative standards.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN.

\* In determining man's original state, we are wholly dependent upon Scripture. This represents human nature as coming from God's hand, and therefore "very good" (Gen. 1:31). It moreover draws a parallel between man's first state and that of his restoration (Col. 3:10; Eph. 4:24). In interpreting these passages, however, we are to remember the twofold danger, on the one hand of putting man so high that no progress is conceivable, on the other hand of putting him so low that he could not fall. We shall the more easily avoid these dangers by distinguishing between the essentials and the incidents of man's original state.

Gen. 1:31 — "And God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good"; Col. 3:10 — "the new man, that is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of him that created him"; Eph. 4:24 — "the new man that after God hath been created in righteousness and holiness of truth."

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 337-339 — "The original state must be (1) a contrast to sin; (2) a parallel to the state of restoration. Difficulties in the way of understanding it: (1) What lives in regeneration is something foreign to our present nature ("it is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me" — Gal. 2:20); but the original state was something native. (2) It was a state of childhood. We cannot fully enter into childhood, though we see it about us, and have ourselves been through it. The original state is yet more difficult to reproduce to reason. (3) Man's external circumstances and his organization have suffered great changes, so that the present is no sign of the past. We must recur to the Scriptures, therefore, as well-nigh our only guide." John Caird, Fund. Ideas of Christianity, 1: 164-186, points out that ideal perfection is to be looked for, not at the outset, but at the final stage of the spiritual life. If man were wholly finite, he would not know his finitude.

Lord Bacon: "The sparkle of the purity of man's first estate." Calvin: "It was monstrous impiety that a son of the earth should not be satisfied with being made after the similitude of God, unless he could also be equal with him." Prof. Hastings: "The truly natural is not the real, but the ideal. Made in the image of God — between that beginning and the end stands God made in the image of man." On the general subject of man's original state, see Zöckler, 2: 283-290; Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1: 315-343; Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 267-278; Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 374-375; Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 93-116.

#### I. ESSENTIALS OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE.

These are summed up in the phrase "the image of God." In God's image man is said to have been created (Gen. 1:26, 27). In what did this image of God consist? We reply that it consisted in 1. Natural likeness to God, or personality; 2. Moral likeness to God, or holiness.

Gen. 1:26, 27 — "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. . . . And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him." It is of great importance to distinguish clearly between the two elements embraced in this image of God, the natural and the moral. By virtue of the first, man possessed certain *faculties* (intellect, affection, will); by virtue of the second, he had *right tendencies* (bent, proclivity, disposition). By virtue of the first, he was invested with certain *powers*; by virtue of the second, a certain *direction* was imparted to these powers. As created in the natural image of God, man had a *moral nature*; as created in the moral image of God, man had a *holy character*. The first gave him *natural ability*; the second gave him *moral ability*. The Greek

Fathers emphasized the first element, or *personality*; the Latin Fathers emphasized the second element, or *holiness*. See Orr, *God's Image in Man*.

As the Logos, or divine Reason, Christ Jesus, dwells in humanity and constitutes the principle of its being, humanity shares with Christ in the image of God. That image is never wholly lost. It is completely restored in sinners when the Spirit of Christ gains control of their wills and they merge their life in his. To those who accused Jesus of blasphemy, he replied by quoting the words of Psalm 82: 6 — "I said, Ye are gods" — words spoken of imperfect earthly rulers. Thus, in John 10: 34-36, Jesus, who constitutes the very essence of humanity, justifies his own claim to divinity by showing that even men who represent God are also in a minor sense "partakers of the divine nature" (3 Pet. 1: 4). Hence the many legends, in heathen religions, of the divine descent of man. 1 Cor. 11: 3 — "the head of every man is Christ." In every man, even the most degraded, there is an image of God to be brought out, as Michael Angelo saw the angel in the rough block of marble. This natural *worth* does not imply *worthiness*; it implies only capacity for redemption. "The abysmal depths of personality," which Tennyson speaks of, are sounded, as man goes down in thought successively from individual sins to sin of the heart and to race-sin. But "the deeper depth is out of reach To all, O God, but thee." From this deeper depth, where man is rooted and grounded in God, rise aspirations for a better life. These are not due to the man himself, but to Christ, the immanent God, who ever works within him. Fanny J. Crosby: "Rescue the perishing, Care for the dying. . . . Down in the human heart, crushed by the tempter, Feelings lie buried that grace can restore; Touched by a loving heart, wakened by kindness, Chords that were broken will vibrate once more."

#### 1. *Natural likeness to God, or personality.*

Man was created a personal being, and was by this personality distinguished from the brute. By personality we mean the twofold power to know self as related to the world and to God, and to determine self in view of moral ends. By virtue of this personality, man could at his creation choose which of the objects of his knowledge — self, the world, or God — should be the norm and centre of his development. This natural likeness to God is inalienable, and as constituting a capacity for redemption gives value to the life even of the unregenerate (Gen. 9: 6; 1 Cor. 11: 7; James 3: 9).

For definitions of personality, see notes on the Anthropological Argument, page 82; on Pantheism, pages 104, 105; on the Attributes, pages 253-264; and on the Person of Christ, in Part VI. Here we may content ourselves with the formula: Personality = self-consciousness + self-determination. Self-consciousness and self-determination, as distinguished from the consciousness and determination of the brute, involve all the higher mental and moral powers which constitute us men. Conscience is but a mode of their activity. Notice that the term 'image' does not, in man, imply *perfect* representation. Only Christ is the "very image" of God (Heb. 1: 3), the "image of the invisible God" (Col. 1: 15 — on which see Lightfoot). Christ is the image of God, absolutely and archetypally; man, only relatively and derivatively. But notice also that, since God is Spirit, man made in God's image cannot be a material thing. By virtue of his possession of this first element of the image of God, namely, personality, materialism is excluded.

This first element of the divine image man can never lose until he ceases to be man. Even insanity can only obscure this natural image, — it cannot destroy it. St. Bernard well said that it could not be burned out, even in hell. The lost piece of money (Luke 15: 8) still bore the image and superscription of the king, even though it did not know it, and did not even know that it was lost. Human nature is therefore to be revered, and he who destroys human life is to be put to death: Gen. 9: 6 — "for in the image of God made he man"; 1 Cor. 11: 7 — "a man indeed ought not to have his head veiled, inasmuch as he is the image and glory of God"; James 3: 9 — even men whom we curse "are made after the likeness of God"; cf. Ps. 8: 5 — "thou hast made him but little lower than God"; 1 Pet. 2: 17 — "Honor all men." In the being of every man are continents which no Columbus has ever yet discovered, depths of possible joy or sorrow which no plummet has ever yet sounded. A whole heaven, a whole hell, may lie within the compass of his single soul. If we could see the meanest real Christian as he will be in the great hereafter, we should bow before him as John bowed before the angel in the Apocalypse, for we should not be able to distinguish him from God (Rev. 22: 3, 9).

Sir William Hamilton: "On earth there is nothing great but man; In man there is nothing great but mind." We accept this dictum only if "mind" can be understood to include man's moral powers together with the right direction of those powers. Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, 2: 2—"What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god!" Pascal: "Man is greater than the universe; the universe may crush him, but it does not know that it crushes him." Whiton, *Gloria Patri*, 94—"God is not only the Giver but the Sharer of my life. My natural powers are that part of God's power which is lodged with me in trust to keep and use." Man can be an *instrument* of God, without being an *agent* of God. "Each man has his place and value as a reflection of God and of Christ. Like a letter in a word, or a word in a sentence, he gets his meaning from his context; but the sentence is meaningless without him; rays from the whole universe converge in him." John Howe's *Living Temple* shows the greatness of human nature in its first construction and even in its ruin. Only a noble ship could make so great a wreck. Aristotle, *Problem*, sec. 80—"No excellent soul is exempt from a mixture of madness." Seneca, *De Tranquillitate Animi*, 15—"There is no great genius without a tincture of madness."

Kant: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an *end*, and never as a *means* only." If there is a divine element in every man, then we have no right to use a human being merely for our own pleasure or profit. In receiving him we receive Christ, and in receiving Christ we receive him who sent Christ (*Mat.* 10: 40). Christ is the vine and all men are his natural branches, cutting themselves off only when they refuse to bear fruit, and condemning themselves to the burning only because they destroy, so far as they can destroy, God's image in them, all that makes them worth preserving (*John* 15: 1-6). Cicero: "Homo mortalis deus." This possession of natural likeness to God, or personality, involves boundless possibilities of good or ill, and it constitutes the natural foundation of the love for man which is required of us by the law. Indeed it constitutes the reason why Christ should die. Man was worth redeeming. The woman whose ring slipped from her finger and fell into the heap of mud in the gutter, bared her white arm and thrust her hand into the slimy mass until she found her ring; but she would not have done this if the ring had not contained a costly diamond. The lost piece of money, the lost sheep, the lost son, were worth effort to seek and to save (*Luke* 15). But, on the other hand, it is folly when man, made in the image of God, "blinds himself with clay." The man on shipboard, who playfully tossed up the diamond ring which contained his whole fortune, at last to his distress tossed it overboard. There is a "merchandise of souls" (*Rev.* 18: 13) and we must not juggle with them.

Christ's death for man, by showing the worth of humanity, has recreated ethics. "Plato defended infanticide as under certain circumstances permissible. Aristotle viewed slavery as founded in the nature of things. The reason assigned was the essential inferiority of nature on the part of the enslaved." But the divine image in man makes these barbarities no longer possible to us. Christ sometimes looked upon men with anger, but he never looked upon them with contempt. He taught the woman, he blessed the child, he cleansed the leper, he raised the dead. His own death revealed the infinite worth of the meanest human soul, and taught us to count all men as brethren for whose salvation we may well lay down our lives. George Washington answered the salute of his slave. Abraham Lincoln took off his hat to a negro who gave him his blessing as he entered Richmond; but a lady who had been brought up under the old regime looked from a window upon the scene with unspeakable horror. Robert Burns, walking with a nobleman in Edinburgh, met an old townsfellow from Ayr and stopped to talk with him. The nobleman, kept waiting, grew restive, and afterward reproved Burns for talking to a man with so bad a coat. Burns replied: "I was not talking to the coat,—I was talking to the man." Jean Ingelow: "The street and market place Grow holy ground: each face—Pale faces marked with care, Dark, toilworn brows—grows fair. King's children are all these, though want and sin Have marred their beauty, glorious within. We may not pass them but with reverent eye." See Porter, *Human Intellect*, 393, 394, 401; Wuttke, *Christian Ethics*, 2: 42; Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 342.

## 2. Moral likeness to God, or holiness.

In addition to the powers of self-consciousness and self-determination just mentioned, man was created with such a direction of the affections and

the will, as constituted God the supreme end of man's being, and constituted man a finite reflection of God's moral attributes. Since holiness is the fundamental attribute of God, this must of necessity be the chief attribute of his image in the moral beings whom he creates. That original righteousness was essential to this image, is also distinctly taught in Scripture (Ecc. 7:29; Eph. 4:24; Col. 3:10).

Besides the possession of natural powers, the image of God involves the possession of right moral tendencies. It is not enough to say that man was created in a state of innocence. The Scripture asserts that man had a righteousness like God's: Ecc. 7:29 — "God made man upright"; Eph. 4:24 — "the new man, that after God hath been created in righteousness and holiness of truth" — here Meyer says: "*κατὰ Θεόν*, 'after God,' *i. e.*, *ad exemplum Dei*, after the pattern of God (Gal. 4:23 — *κατὰ Ἰσαάκ*, 'after Isaac' = as Isaac was). This phrase makes the creation of the new man a parallel to that of our first parents, who were created after God's image; they too, before sin came into existence through Adam, were sinless — 'in righteousness and holiness of truth.'" On N. T. "truth" = rectitude, see Wendt, Teaching of Jesus, 1:257-260.

Meyer refers also, as a parallel passage, to Col. 3:10 — "the new man, that is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of him that created him." Here the "knowledge" referred to is that knowledge of God which is the source of all virtue, and which is inseparable from holiness of heart. "Holiness has two sides or phases: (1) it is perception and knowledge; (2) it is inclination and feeling" (Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2:97). On Eph. 4:24 and Col. 3:10, the classical passages with regard to man's original state, see also the Commentaries of DeWette, Rückert, Ellicott, and compare Gen. 5:3 — "And Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his own likeness, after his image," *i. e.*, in his own sinful likeness, which is evidently contrasted with the "likeness of God" (verse 1) in which he himself had been created (An. Par. Bible), 3 Cor. 4:4 — "Christ, who is the image of God" — where the phrase "image of God" is not simply the natural, but also the moral, image. Since Christ is the image of God primarily in his holiness, man's creation in the image of God must have involved a holiness like Christ's, so far as such holiness could belong to a being yet untried, that is, so far as respects man's tastes and dispositions prior to moral action.

"Couldst thou in vision see Thyself the man God meant, Thou nevermore couldst be The man thou art — content." Newly created man had right moral tendencies, as well as freedom from actual fault. Otherwise the communion with God described in Genesis would not have been possible. Goethe: "Unless the eye were sunlike, how could it see the sun?" Because a holy disposition accompanied man's innocence, he was capable of obedience, and was guilty when he sinned. The loss of this moral likeness to God was the chief calamity of the Fall. Man is now "the glory and the scandal of the universe." He has defaced the image of God in his nature, even though that image, in its natural aspect, is inefaceable (E. H. Johnson).

The dignity of human nature consists, not so much in what man is, as in what God meant him to be, and in what God means him yet to become, when the lost image of God is restored by the union of man's soul with Christ. Because of his future possibilities, the meanest of mankind is sacred. The great sin of the second table of the decalogue is the sin of despising our fellow man. To cherish contempt for others can have its root only in idolatry of self and rebellion against God. Abraham Lincoln said well that "God must have liked common people, — else he would not have made so many of them." Regard for the image of God in man leads also to kind and reverent treatment even of those lower animals in which so many human characteristics are foreshadowed. Bradford, Heredity and Christian Problems, 186 — "The current philosophy says: The fittest will survive; let the rest die. The religion of Christ says: That maxim as applied to men is just, only as regards their characteristics, of which indeed only the fittest should survive. It does not and cannot apply to the men themselves, since all men, being children of God, are supremely fit. The very fact that a human being is sick, weak, poor, an outcast, and a vagabond, is the strongest possible appeal for effort toward his salvation. Let individuals look upon humanity from the point of view of Christ, and they will not be long in finding ways in which environment can be caused to work for righteousness."

This original righteousness, in which the image of God chiefly consisted, is to be viewed:

(a) Not as constituting the substance or essence of human nature, — for in this case human nature would have ceased to exist as soon as man sinned.

Men every day change their tastes and loves, without changing the essence or substance of their being. When sin is called a "nature," therefore (as by Shedd, in his Essay on "Sin a Nature, and that Nature Guilt"), it is only in the sense of being something inborn (*natura*, from *nascor*). Hereditary tastes may just as properly be denominated a "nature" as may the substance of one's being. Moehler, the greatest modern Roman Catholic critic of Protestant doctrine, in his Symbolism, 58, 59, absurdly holds Luther to have taught that by the Fall man lost his essential nature, and that another essence was substituted in its room. Luther, however, is only rhetorical when he says: "It is the nature of man to sin; sin constitutes the essence of man; the nature of man since the Fall has become quite changed; original sin is that very thing which is born of father and mother; the clay out of which we are formed is damnable; the fetus in the maternal womb is sin; man as born of his father and mother, together with his whole essence and nature, is not only a sinner but sin itself."

(b) Nor as a gift from without, foreign to human nature, and added to it after man's creation, — for man is said to have possessed the divine image by the fact of creation, and not by subsequent bestowal.

As men, since Adam, are born with a sinful nature, that is, with tendencies away from God, so Adam was created with a holy nature, that is, with tendencies toward God. Moehler says: "God cannot give a man actions." We reply: "No, but God can give man dispositions; and he does this at the first creation, as well as at the new creation (regeneration)."

(c) But rather, as an original direction or tendency of man's affections and will, still accompanied by the power of evil choice, and so, differing from the perfected holiness of the saints, as instinctive affection and child-like innocence differ from the holiness that has been developed and confirmed by experience of temptation.

Man's original righteousness was not immutable or indefectible; there was still the possibility of sinning. Though the first man was fundamentally good, he still had the power of choosing evil. There was a bent of the affections and will toward God, but man was not yet confirmed in holiness. Man's love for God was like the germinal filial affection in the child, not developed, yet sincere — "caritas puerilis, non virilis."

(d) As a moral disposition, moreover, which was propagable to Adam's descendants, if it continued, and which, though lost to him and to them, if Adam sinned, would still leave man possessed of a natural likeness to God which made him susceptible of God's redeeming grace.

Hooker (Works, ed. Keble, 2: 688) distinguishes between aptness and ableness. The latter, men have lost; the former, they retain, — else grace could not work in us, more than in the brutes. Hase: "Only enough likeness to God remained to remind man of what he had lost, and enable him to feel the hell of God's forsaking." The moral likeness to God can be restored, but only by God himself. God secures this to men by making "the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God, . . . dawn upon them" (2 Cor. 4: 4). Pusey made Ps. 78: 6 — "He will come down like rain upon the mown grass" — the image of a world hopelessly dead, but with a hidden capacity for receiving life. Dr. Daggett: "Man is a 'son of the morning' (Is. 14: 12), fallen, yet arrested midway between heaven and hell, a prize between the powers of light and darkness." See Edwards, Works, 2: 19, 20, 381-390; Hopkins, Works, 1: 162; Shedd, Hist. Doctrine, 2: 50-68; Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 14: 11.

In the light of the preceding investigation, we may properly estimate two theories of man's original state which claim to be more Scriptural and reasonable:

A. The image of God as including only personality.

This theory denies that any positive determination to virtue inhered originally in man's nature, and regards man at the beginning as simply possessed of spiritual powers, perfectly adjusted to each other. This is the view of Schleiermacher, who is followed by Nitzsch, Julius Müller, and Hofmann.

For the view here combated, see Schleiermacher, *Christl. Glaube*, sec. 60; Nitzsch, *System of Christian Doctrine*, 201; Julius Müller, *Doct. of Sin*, 2:113-133, 350-357; Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, 1:287-291; *Bib. Sac.*, 7:409-425. Julius Müller's theory of the Fall in a pre-existent state makes it impossible for him to hold here that Adam was possessed of moral likeness to God. The origin of his view of the image of God renders it liable to suspicion. Pfleiderer, *Grundriss*, 113—"The original state of man was that of child-like innocence or morally indifferent naturalness, which had in itself indeed the possibility (*Anlage*) of ideal development, but in such a way that its realization could be reached only by struggle with its natural opposite. The image of God was already present in the original state, but only as the possibility (*Anlage*) of real likeness to God—the endowment of reason which belonged to human personality. The *reality* of a spirit like that of God has appeared first in the *second* Adam, and has become the principle of the kingdom of God."

Raymond (*Theology*, 2:43, 132) is an American representative of the view that the image of God consists in mere personality; "The image of God in which man was created did not consist in an inclination and determination of the will to holiness." This is maintained upon the ground that such a moral likeness to God would have rendered it impossible for man to fall,—to which we reply that Adam's righteousness was not immutable, and the bias of his will toward God did not render it impossible for him to sin. Motives do not compel the will, and Adam at least had a certain power of contrary choice. E. G. Robinson, *Christ. Theology*, 119-122, also maintains that the image of God signified only that personality which distinguished man from the brute. Christ, he says, carries forward human nature to a higher point, instead of merely restoring what is lost. "Very good" (Gen. 1:31) does not imply moral perfection,—this cannot be the result of creation, but only of discipline and will. Man's original state was only one of untried innocence. Dr. Robinson is combating the view that the first man was at his creation possessed of a developed character. He distinguishes between character and the germs of character. These germs he grants that man possessed. And so he defines the image of God as a constitutional predisposition toward a course of right conduct. This is all the perfection which we claim for the first man. We hold that this predisposition toward the good can properly be called character, since it is the germ from which all holy action springs.

In addition to what has already been said in support of the opposite view, we may urge against this theory the following objections:

(a) It is contrary to analogy, in making man the author of his own holiness; our sinful condition is not the product of our individual wills, nor is our subsequent condition of holiness the product of anything but God's regenerating power.

To hold that Adam was created undecided, would make man, as Philippi says, in the highest sense his own creator. But morally, as well as physically, man is God's creature. In regeneration it is not sufficient for God to give *power* to decide for good; God must give new *love* also. If this be so in the new creation, God could give love in the first creation also. Holiness therefore is creatable. "Undertived holiness is possible only in God; in its origin, it is *given* both to angels and men." Therefore we pray: "Create in me a clean heart" (Ps. 51:10); "Incline my heart unto thy testimonies" (Ps. 119:36). See Edwards, *Eff. Grace*, sec. 43-51; Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, 290—"If Adam's perfection was not a moral perfection, then his sin was no real moral corruption." The *animus* of the theory we are combating seems to be an unwillingness to grant that man, either in his first creation or in his new creation, owes his holiness to God.

(b) The knowledge of God in which man was originally created logically presupposes a direction toward God of man's affections and will, since only the holy heart can have any proper understanding of the God of holiness.

"Ubi caritas, ibi claritas." Man's heart was originally filled with divine love, and out of this came the knowledge of God. We know God only as we love him, and this love comes not from our own single volition. No one loves by command, because no one can give himself love. In Adam love was an inborn impulse, which he could affirm or deny. Compare 1 Cor. 8:3—"if any man loveth God, the same [God] is known by him"; 1 John 4:3—"He that loveth not knoweth not God." See other Scripture references on pages 3, 4.

(c) A likeness to God in mere personality, such as Satan also possesses, comes far short of answering the demands of the Scripture, in which the ethical conception of the divine nature so overshadows the merely natural. The image of God must be, not simply ability to be like God, but actual likeness.

God could never create an intelligent being evenly balanced between good and evil—"on the razor's edge"—"on the fence." The preacher who took for his text "Adam, where art thou?" had for his first head: "It is every man's business to be somewhere;" for his second: "Some of you are where you ought not to be;" and for his third: "Get where you ought to be, as soon as possible." A simple capacity for good or evil is, as Augustine says, already sinful. A man who is neutral between good and evil is already a violator of that law, which requires likeness to God in the bent of his nature. Deitzsch, Bib. Psychol., 45-84—"Personality is only the basis of the divine image,—it is not the image itself." Bledsoe says there can be no created virtue or viciousness. Whedon (On the Will, 388) objects to this, and says rather: "There can be no created moral desert, good or evil. Adam's nature as created was pure and excellent, but there was nothing meritorious until he had freely and rightly exercised his will with full power to the contrary." We add: There was nothing meritorious even then. For substance of these objections, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2:348. Lessing said that the character of the Germans was to have no character. Goethe partook of this cosmopolitan characterlessness (Prof. Seely). Tennyson had Goethe in view when he wrote in The Palace of Art: "I sit apart, holding no form of creed, but contemplating all." And Goethe is probably still alluded to in the words: "A glorious devil, large in heart and brain, That did love beauty only, Or if good, good only for its beauty"; see A. H. Strong, The Great Poets and their Theology, 331; Robert Browning, Christmas Eve: "The truth in God's breast Lies trace for trace upon ours impressed: Though he is so bright, and we so dim, We are made in his image to witness him."

B. The image of God as consisting simply in man's natural capacity for religion.

This view, first elaborated by the scholastics, is the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. It distinguishes between the image and the likeness of God. The former (צֶלֶם—Gen. 1:26) alone belonged to man's nature at its creation. The latter (תְּמוּנָה) was the product of his own acts of obedience. In order that this obedience might be made easier and the consequent likeness to God more sure, a third element was added—an element not belonging to man's nature—namely, a supernatural gift of special grace, which acted as a curb upon the sensuous impulses, and brought them under the control of reason. Original righteousness was therefore not a natural endowment, but a joint product of man's obedience and of God's supernatural grace.

Roman Catholicism holds that the white paper of man's soul received two impressions instead of one. Protestantism sees no reason why both impressions should not have been given at the beginning. Kaftan, in Am. Jour. Theology, 4:708, gives a good statement of the Roman Catholic view. It holds that the supreme good transcends the finite mind and its powers of comprehension. Even at the first it was beyond man's created nature. The *donum superadditum* did not inwardly and personally belong to him. Now that he has lost it, he is entirely dependent on the church for truth and grace. He does not receive the truth because it is this, and no other, but because the church tells him that it is the truth.

The Roman Catholic doctrine may be roughly and pictorially stated as follows: As created, man was morally naked, or devoid of positive righteousness (*pura naturalia*, or *in puris naturalibus*). By obedience he obtained as a reward from God (*donum supernaturale*, or *superadditum*) a suit of clothes or robe of righteousness to protect him, so that he became clothed (*vestitus*). This suit of clothes, however, was a sort of magic spell of which he could be divested. The adversary attacked him and stripped him of his suit. After his sin he was one despoiled (*spoliatus*). But his condition after differed from his condition before this attack, only as a stripped man differs from a naked man (*spoliatus a nudo*). He was now only in the same state in which he was created, with the single exception of the weakness he might feel as the result of losing his customary clothing. He could still earn himself another suit,—in fact, he could earn two or more, so as to sell, or give away, what he did not need for himself. The phrase *in puris naturalibus* describes the original state, as the phrase *spoliatus a nudo* describes the difference resulting from man's sin.

Many of the considerations already adduced apply equally as arguments against this view. We may say, however, with reference to certain features peculiar to the theory:

(a) No such distinction can justly be drawn between the words  $\text{בְּצַלְמֵנוּ}$  and  $\text{כְּצֶלְמֵנוּ}$ . The addition of the synonym simply strengthens the expression, and both together signify "the very image."

(b) Whatever is denoted by either or both of these words was bestowed upon man in and by the fact of creation, and the additional hypothesis of a supernatural gift not originally belonging to man's nature, but subsequently conferred, has no foundation either here or elsewhere in Scripture. Man is said to have been created in the image and likeness of God, not to have been afterwards endowed with either of them.

(c) The concreated opposition between sense and reason which this theory supposes is inconsistent with the Scripture declaration that the work of God's hands "was very good" (Gen. 1:31), and transfers the blame of temptation and sin from man to God. To hold to a merely negative innocence, in which evil desire was only slumbering, is to make God author of sin by making him author of the constitution which rendered sin inevitable.

(d) This theory directly contradicts Scripture by making the effect of the first sin to have been a weakening but not a perversion of human nature, and the work of regeneration to be not a renewal of the affections but merely a strengthening of the natural powers. The theory regards that first sin as simply despoiling man of a special gift of grace and as putting him where he was when first created—still able to obey God and to cooperate with God for his own salvation,—whereas the Scripture represents man since the fall as "dead through . . . trespasses and sins" (Eph. 2:1), as incapable of true obedience (Rom. 8:7—"not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can it be"), and as needing to be "created in Christ Jesus for good works" (Eph. 2:10).

At few points in Christian doctrine do we see more clearly than here the large results of error which may ultimately spring from what might at first sight seem to be only a slight divergence from the truth. Augustine had rightly taught that in Adam the *posse non peccare* was accompanied by a *posse peccare*, and that for this reason man's holy disposition needed the help of divine grace to preserve its integrity. But the scholastics wrongly added that this original disposition to righteousness was not the outflow of man's nature as originally created, but was the gift of grace. As this later teaching, however, was by some disputed, the Council of Trent (sess. 5, cap. 1) left the matter

more indefinite, simply declaring man: "Sanctitatem et justitiam in qua constitutus fuerat, amisit." The Roman Catechism, however (1:2:19), explained the phrase "constitutus fuerat" by the words: "Tum originalis justitiæ admirabile donum addidit." And Bellarmine (De Gratia, 2) says plainly: "Imago, quæ est ipsa natura mentis et voluntatis, a solo Deo fieri potuit; similitudo autem, quæ in virtute et probitate consistit, a nobis quoque Deo adjuvante perficitur." . . . (5) "Integritas illa . . . non fuit naturalis ejus conditio, sed supernaturalis evectio. . . . Addidisse homini donum quoddam insigne, justitiam videlicet originalem, qua veluti aureo quodam freno pars inferior parti superiori subjecta contineretur."

Moehler (Symbolism, 21-35) holds that the religious faculty—the "image of God"; the pious exertion of this faculty—the "likeness of God." He seems to favor the view that Adam received "this supernatural gift of a holy and blessed communion with God at a later period than his creation, i. e., only when he had prepared himself for its reception and by his own efforts had rendered himself worthy of it." He was created "just" and acceptable to God, even without communion with God or help from God. He became "holy" and enjoyed communion with God, only when God rewarded his obedience and bestowed the *supernaturale donum*. Although Moehler favors this view and claims that it is permitted by the standards, he also says that it is not definitely taught. The quotations from Bellarmine and the Roman Catechism above make it clear that it is the prevailing doctrine of the Roman Catholic church.

So, to quote the words of Shedd, "the Tridentine theology starts with Pelagianism and ends with Augustinianism. Created without character, God subsequently endows man with character. . . . The Papal idea of creation differs from the Augustinian in that it involves imperfection. There is a disease and languor which require a subsequent and supernatural act to remedy." The Augustinian and Protestant conception of man's original state is far nobler than this. The ethical element is not a later addition, but is man's true nature—essential to God's idea of him. The normal and original condition of man (*pura naturalia*) is one of grace and of the Spirit's indwelling—hence, of direction toward God.

From this original difference between Roman Catholic and Protestant doctrine with regard to man's original state result diverging views as to sin and as to regeneration. The Protestant holds that, as man was possessed by creation of moral likeness to God, or holiness, so his sin robbed his nature of its integrity, deprived it of essential and concreated advantages and powers, and substituted for these a positive corruption and tendency to evil. Unpremeditated evil desire, or concupiscence, is original sin; as concreated love for God constituted man's original righteousness. No man since the fall has original righteousness, and it is man's sin that he has it not. Since without love to God no act, emotion, or thought of man can answer the demands of God's law, the Scripture denies to fallen man all power of himself to know, think, feel, or do aright. His nature therefore needs a new-creation, a resurrection from death, such as God only, by his mighty Spirit, can work; and to this work of God man can contribute nothing, except as power is first given him by God himself.

According to the Roman Catholic view, however, since the image of God in which man was created included only man's religious faculty, his sin can rob him only of what became subsequently and adventitiously his. Fallen man differs from unfallen only as *spoliatus a nudo*. He loses only a sort of magic spell, which leaves him still in possession of all his essential powers. Unpremeditated evil desire, or concupiscence, is not sin; for this belonged to his nature even before he fell. His sin has therefore only put him back into the natural state of conflict and concupiscence, ordered by God in the concreated opposition of sense and reason. The sole qualification is this, that, having made an evil decision, his will is weakened. "Man does not need resurrection from death, but rather a crutch to help his lameness, a tonic to reinforce his feebleness, a medicine to cure his sickness." He is still able to turn to God; and in regeneration the Holy Spirit simply awakens and strengthens the natural ability slumbering in the natural man. But even here, man must yield to the influence of the Holy Spirit; and regeneration is effected by uniting his power to the divine. In baptism the guilt of original sin is remitted, and everything called sin is taken away. No baptized person has any further process of regeneration to undergo. Man has not only strength to cooperate with God for his own salvation, but he may even go beyond the demands of the law and perform works of supererogation. And the whole sacramental system of the Roman Catholic Church, with its salvation by works, its purgatorial fires, and its invocation of the saints, connects itself logically with this erroneous theory of man's original state.

See Dorner's Augustinus, 118; Perrone, Prælectiones Theologicae, 1: 737-748; Winer, Confessions, 79, 80; Dorner, History Protestant Theology, 38, 39, and Glaubenslehre, 1: 51; Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 376; Cunningham, Historical Theology, 1: 516-566; Shedd, Hist. Doctrine, 2: 140-142.

## II. INCIDENTS OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE.

### 1. Results of man's possession of the divine image.

(a) Reflection of this divine image in man's physical form.— Even in man's body were typified those higher attributes which chiefly constituted his likeness to God. A gross perversion of this truth, however, is the view which holds, upon the ground of Gen. 2: 7, and 3: 8, that the image of God consists in bodily resemblance to the Creator. In the first of these passages, it is not the divine image, but the body, that is formed of dust, and into this body the soul that possesses the divine image is breathed. The second of these passages is to be interpreted by those other portions of the Pentateuch in which God is represented as free from all limitations of matter (Gen. 11: 5; 18: 15).

The spirit presents the divine image immediately; the body, mediately. The scholastics called the soul the image of God *proprie*; the body they called the image of God *significative*. Soul is the direct reflection of God; body is the reflection of that reflection. The *os sublime* manifests the dignity of the endowments within. Hence the word 'upright,' as applied to moral condition; one of the first impulses of the renewed man is to physical purity. Compare Ovid, *Metaph.*, bk. 1, Dryden's transl.: "Thus while the mute creation downward bend Their sight, and to their earthly mother tend, Man looks aloft, and with erected eyes Beholds his own hereditary skies." (*Ἀνθρώπος*, from *ἄνα*, *ἄνω*, suffix *tra*, and *ἄψ*, with reference to the upright posture.) Milton speaks of "the human face divine." *S. S. Times*, July 28, 1900—"Man is the only erect being among living creatures. He alone looks up naturally and without effort. He foregoes his birthright when he looks only at what is on a level with his eyes and occupies himself only with what lies in the plane of his own existence."

Bretschneider (*Dogmatik*, 1: 682) regards the Scripture as teaching that the image of God consists in bodily resemblance to the Creator, but considers this as only the imperfect method of representation belonging to an early age. So Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, 1: 687. They refer to Gen. 2: 7—"And Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground"; 3: 8—"Jehovah God walking in the garden." But see Gen. 11: 5—"And Jehovah came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men builded"; Is. 66: 1—"Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool"; 1 K. 8: 27—"behold, heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee." On the Anthropomorphites, see Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.*, 1: 103, 308, 491. For answers to Bretschneider and Strauss, see Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 364.

(b) Subjection of the sensuous impulses to the control of the spirit.— Here we are to hold a middle ground between two extremes. On the one hand, the first man possessed a body and a spirit so fitted to each other that no conflict was felt between their several claims. On the other hand, this physical perfection was not final and absolute, but relative and provisional. There was still room for progress to a higher state of being (Gen. 3: 22).

Sir Henry Watton's *Happy Life*: "That man was free from servile bands Of hope to rise or fear to fall, Lord of himself if not of lands, And having nothing yet had all." Here we hold to the *æquale temperamentum*. There was no disease, but rather the joy of abounding health. Labor was only a happy activity. God's infinite creatorship and fountainhead of being was typified in man's powers of generation. But there was no concreated opposition of sense and reason, nor an imperfect physical nature with whose impulses reason was at war. With this moderate Scriptural doctrine, contrast the exaggerations of the Fathers and of the scholastics. Augustine says that Adam's reason was to ours what the bird's is to that of the tortoise; propagation in the unfallen state would have been without concupiscence, and the new-born child would have attained

perfection at birth. Albertus Magnus thought the first man would have felt no pain, even though he had been stoned with heavy stones. Scotus Erigena held that the male and female elements were yet undistinguished. Others called sexuality the first sin. Jacob Boehme regarded the intestinal canal, and all connected with it, as the consequence of the Fall; he had the fancy that the earth was transparent at the first and cast no shadow,—sin, he thought, had made it opaque and dark; redemption would restore it to its first estate and make night a thing of the past. South, Sermons, 1: 24, 25—“Man came into the world a philosopher. . . . Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam.” Lyman Abbott tells us of a minister who assured his congregation that Adam was acquainted with the telephone. But God educates his children, as chemists educate their pupils, by putting them into the laboratory and letting them work. Scripture does not represent Adam as a walking encyclopaedia, but as a being yet inexperienced; see Gen. 3: 22—“Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil”; 1 Cor. 15: 46—“that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; then that which is spiritual.” On this last text, see Expositor's Greek Testament.

(c) Dominion over the lower creation.—Adam possessed an insight into nature analogous to that of susceptible childhood, and therefore was able to name and to rule the brute creation (Gen. 2: 19). Yet this native insight was capable of development into the higher knowledge of culture and science. From Gen. 1: 26 (cf. Ps. 8: 5-8), it has been erroneously inferred that the image of God in man consists in dominion over the brute creation and the natural world. But, in this verse, the words “let them have dominion” do not define the image of God, but indicate the result of possessing that image. To make the image of God consist in this dominion, would imply that only the divine omnipotence was shadowed forth in man.

Gen. 2: 19—“Jehovah God formed every beast of the field, and every bird of the heavens; and brought them unto the man to see what he would call them”; 20—“And the man gave names to all cattle”; Gen. 1: 26—“Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the heavens, and over the cattle”; cf. Ps. 8: 5-8—“thou hast made him but little lower than God, And crownest him with glory and honor. Thou makest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; Thou hast put all things under his feet: All sheep and oxen, Yea, and the beasts of the field.” Adam's naming the animals implied insight into their nature; see Porter, Hum. Intellect, 393, 394, 401. On man's original dominion over (1) self, (2) nature, (3) fellow-man, see Hopkins, Scriptural Idea of Man, 105.

Courage and a good conscience have a power over the brute creation, and unfallen man can well be supposed to have dominated creatures which had no experience of human cruelty. Rarey tamed the wildest horses by his steadfast and fearless eye. In Paris a young woman was hypnotized and put into a den of lions. She had no fear of the lions and the lions paid not the slightest attention to her. The little daughter of an English officer in South Africa wandered away from camp and spent the night among lions. “Katrina,” her father said when he found her, “were you not afraid to be alone here?” “No, papa,” she replied, “the big dogs played with me and one of them lay here and kept me warm.” MacLaren, in S. S. Times, Dec. 23, 1893—“The dominion over all creatures results from likeness to God. It is not then a mere right to use them for one's own material advantage, but a viceroy's authority, which the holder is bound to employ for the honor of the true King.” This principle gives the warrant and the limit to vivisection and to the killing of the lower animals for food (Gen. 9: 2, 3).

Socinian writers generally hold the view that the image of God consisted simply in this dominion. Holding a low view of the nature of sin, they are naturally disinclined to believe that the fall has wrought any profound change in human nature. See their view stated in the Racovian Catechism, 21. It is held also by the Arminian Limborch, Theol. Christ., II, 24: 2, 3, 11. Upon the basis of this interpretation of Scripture, the Encratites held, with Peter Martyr, that women do not possess the divine image at all.

(d) Communion with God.—Our first parents enjoyed the divine presence and teaching (Gen. 2: 16). It would seem that God manifested himself to them in visible form (Gen. 3: 8). This companionship was both in kind and degree suited to their spiritual capacity, and by no means

*for all practicable purposes some equivalent  
efficiency*

necessarily involved that perfected vision of God which is possible to beings of confirmed and unchangeable holiness (Mat. 5:8; 1 John 3:2).

Gen. 3:16—"And Jehovah God commanded the man"; 3:8—"And they heard the voice of Jehovah God walking in the garden in the cool of the day"; Mat. 5:8—"Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God"; 1 John 3:3—"We know that, if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; for we shall see him even as he is"; Rev. 22:4—"and they shall see his face."

## 2. Concomitants of man's possession of the divine image.

(a) Surroundings and society fitted to yield happiness and to assist a holy development of human nature (Eden and Eve). We append some recent theories with regard to the creation of Eve and the nature of Eden.

Eden—pleasure, delight. Tennyson: "When high in Paradise By the four rivers the first roses blew." Streams were necessary to the very existence of an oriental garden. Hopkins, *Script. Idea of Man*, 107—"Man includes woman. Creation of a man without a woman would not have been the creation of man. Adam called her name Eve but God called their name Adam." Mat. Henry: "Not out of his head to top him, nor out of his feet to be trampled on by him; but out of his side to be equal with him, under his arm to be protected by him, and near his heart to be beloved." Robert Burns says of nature: "Her 'prentice hand she tried on man, And then she made the lasses, O!" Stevens, *Pauline Theology*, 329—"In the natural relations of the sexes there is a certain reciprocal dependence, since it is not only true that woman was made from man, but that man is born of woman (1 Cor. 11:11, 12)." Of the Elgin marbles Boswell asked: "Don't you think them indecent?" Dr. Johnson replied: "No, sir; but your question is." Man, who in the adult state possesses twelve pairs of ribs, is found in the embryonic state to have thirteen or fourteen. Dawson, *Modern Ideas of Evolution*, 148—"Why does not the male man lack one rib? Because only the individual skeleton of Adam was affected by the taking of the rib. . . . The unfinished vertebral arches of the skin-fibrous layer may have produced a new individual by a process of budding or gemmation."

H. H. Bawden suggests that the account of Eve's creation may be the "pictorial summary" of an actual phylogenetic evolutionary process by which the sexes were separated or isolated from a common hermaphroditic ancestor or ancestry. The mesodermic portion of the organism in which the urinogenital system has its origin develops later than the ectodermic or the endodermic portions. The word "rib" may designate this mesodermic portion. Bayard Taylor, *John Godfrey's Fortunes*, 392, suggests that a genius is hermaphroditic, adding a male element to the woman, and a female element to the man. Professor Loeb, *Am. Journ. Physiology*, Vol. III, no. 3, has found that in certain chemical solutions prepared in the laboratory, approximately the concentration of sea-water, the unfertilized eggs of the sea-urchin will mature without the intervention of the spermatozoön. Perfect embryos and normal individuals are produced under these conditions. He thinks it probable that similar parthenogenesis may be produced in higher types of being. In 1900 he achieved successful results on Annelids, though it is doubtful whether he produced anything more than normal larvae. These results have been criticized by a European investigator who is also a Roman priest. Prof. Loeb wrote a rejoinder in which he expressed surprise that a representative of the Roman church did not heartily endorse his conclusions, since they afford a vindication of the doctrine of the immaculate conception.

H. H. Bawden has reviewed Prof. Loeb's work in the *Psychological Review*, Jan. 1900. Janósek has found segmentation in the unfertilized eggs of mammals. Prof. Loeb considers it possible that only the ions of the blood prevent the parthenogenetic origin of embryos in mammals, and thinks it not improbable that by a transitory change in these ions it will be possible to produce complete parthenogenesis in these higher types. Dr. Bawden goes on to say that "both parent and child are dependent upon a common source of energy. The universe is one great organism, and there is no inorganic or non-organic matter, but differences only in degrees of organization. Sex is designed only secondarily for the perpetuation of species; primarily it is the bond or medium for the connection and interaction of the various parts of this great organism, for maintaining that degree of heterogeneity which is the prerequisite of a high degree of organization. By means of the growth of a lifetime I have become an essential part in a great organic system. What I call my individual personality represents

simply the focusing, the flowering of the universe at one finite concrete point or centre. Must not then my personality continue as long as that universal system continues? And is immortality conceivable if the soul is something shut up within itself, unshareable and unique? Are not the many feet mutually interdependent, instead of mutually exclusive? We must not then conceive of an immortality which means the continued existence of an individual cut off from that social context which is really essential to his very nature."

J. H. Richardson suggests in the *Standard*, Sept. 10, 1901, that the first chapter of Genesis describes the creation of the spiritual part of man only—that part which was made in the image of God—while the second chapter describes the creation of man's body, the animal part, which may have been originated by a process of evolution. S. W. Howland, in *Bib. Soc.*, Jan. 1903; 121-123, supposes Adam and Eve to have been twins, joined by the ensiform cartilage or breast-bone, as were the Siamese Chang and Eng. By violence or accident this cartilage was broken before it hardened into bone, and the two were separated until puberty. Then Adam saw Eve coming to him with a bone projecting from her side corresponding to the hollow in his own side, and said: "She is bone of my bone; she must have been taken from my side when I slept." This tradition was handed down to his posterity. The Jews have a tradition that Adam was created double-sexed, and that the two sexes were afterwards separated. The Hindus say that man was at first of both sexes and divided himself in order to people the earth. In the Zodiac of Dendera, Castor and Pollux appear as man and woman, and these twins, some say, were called Adam and Eve. The Coptic name for this sign is *Pt Mahi*, "the United." Darwin, in the postscript to a letter to Lyell, written as early as July, 1850, tells his friend that he has "a pleasant genealogy for mankind," and describes our remotest ancestor as "an animal which breathed water, had a swim-bladder, a great swimming tail, an imperfect skull, and was undoubtedly a hermaphrodite."

Matthew Arnold speaks of "the freshness of the early world." Novalis says that "all philosophy begins in homesickness." Shelley, *Sky-lark*: "We look before and after, And pine for what is not; Our sincerest laughter With some pain is fraught; Our sweetest songs are those That tell of saddest thought."—"The golden conception of a Paradise is the poet's guiding thought." There is a universal feeling that we are not now in our natural state; that we are far away from home; that we are exiles from our true habitation. Keble, *Groans of Nature*: "Such thoughts, the wreck of Paradise, Through many a dreary age, Uphore whate'er of good or wise Yet lived in hard or sage." Poetry and music echo the longing for some possession lost. Jessica in Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*: "I am never merry when I hear sweet music." All true poetry is forward-looking or backward-looking prophecy, as sculpture sets before us the original or the resurrection body. See Isaac Taylor, *Hebrew Poetry*, 94-101; Tyler, *Theol. of Greek Poets*, 225, 226.

Wellhausen, on the legend of a golden age, says: "It is the yearning song which goes through all the peoples: having attained the historical civilization, they feel the worth of the goods which they have sacrificed for it." He regards the golden age as only an ideal image, like the millennial kingdom at the end. Man differs from the beast in this power to form ideals. His destination to God shows his descent from God. Hegel in a similar manner claimed that the Paradisaic condition is only an ideal conception underlying human development. But may not the traditions of the gardens of Brahma and of the Hesperides embody the world's recollection of an historical fact, when man was free from external evil and possessed all that could minister to innocent joy? The "golden age" of the heathen was connected with the hope of restoration. So the use of the doctrine of man's original state is to convince men of the high ideal once realized, properly belonging to man, now lost, and recoverable, not by man's own powers, but only through God's provision in Christ. For references in classic writers to a golden age, see Luthardt, *Compendium*, 115. He mentions the following: Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 109-208; Aratus, *Phenomena*, 100-184; Plato, *Tim.*, 233; Vergil, *Ec.*, 4, *Georgics*, 1: 136, *Aeneid*, 8: 314.

(b) Provisions for the trying of man's virtue.—Since man was not yet in a state of confirmed holiness, but rather of simple childlike innocence, he could be made perfect only through temptation. Hence the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil" (Gen. 2:9). The one slight command best tested the spirit of obedience. Temptation did not necessitate a fall,

If resisted, it would strengthen virtue. In that case, the *posse non peccare* would have become the *non posse peccare*.

Thomasius: "That evil is a necessary transition-point to good, is Satan's doctrine and philosophy." The tree was mainly a tree of probation. It is right for a father to make his son's title to his estate depend upon the performance of some filial duty, as Thaddeus Stevens made his son's possession of property conditional upon his keeping the temperance-pledge. Whether, besides this, the tree of knowledge was naturally hurtful or poisonous, we do not know.

(c) Opportunity of securing physical immortality. — The body of the first man was in itself mortal (1 Cor. 15: 45). Science shows that physical life involves decay and loss. But means were apparently provided for checking this decay and preserving the body's youth. This means was the "tree of life" (Gen. 2: 9). If Adam had maintained his integrity, the body might have been developed and transfigured, without intervention of death. In other words, the *posse non mori* might have become a *non posse mori*.

The tree of life was symbolic of communion with God and of man's dependence upon him. But this, only because it had a physical efficacy. It was sacramental and memorial to the soul, because it sustained the life of the body. Natural immortality without holiness would have been unending misery. Sinful man was therefore shut out from the tree of life, till he could be prepared for it by God's righteousness. Redemption and resurrection not only restore that which was lost, but give what man was originally created to attain: 1 Cor. 15: 45 — "The first man Adam became a living soul. The last man Adam became a life-giving spirit"; Rev. 22: 14 — "Blessed are they that wash their robes, that they may have the right to come to the tree of life."

The conclusions we have thus reached with regard to the incidents of man's original state are combated upon two distinct grounds:

1st. The facts bearing upon man's prehistoric condition point to a development from primitive savagery to civilization. Among these facts may be mentioned the succession of implements and weapons from stone to bronze and iron; the polyandry and communal marriage systems of the lowest tribes; the relics of barbarous customs still prevailing among the most civilized.

For the theory of an originally savage condition of man, see Sir John Lubbock, *Prehistoric Times, and Origin of Civilization*: "The primitive condition of mankind was one of utter barbarism"; but especially L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, who divides human progress into three great periods, the savage, the barbarian, and the civilized. Each of the two former has three states, as follows: I. Savage: 1. Lowest state, marked by attainment of speech and subsistence upon roots. 2. Middle state, marked by fish-food and fire. 3. Upper state, marked by use of the bow and hunting. II. Barbarian: 1. Lower state, marked by invention and use of pottery. 2. Middle state, marked by use of domestic animals, maize, and building stone. 3. Upper state, marked by invention and use of iron tools. III. Civilized man next appears, with the introduction of the phonetic alphabet and writing. J. S. Stuart-Glennie, *Contemp. Rev.*, Dec. 1892: 844, defines civilization as "enforced social organization, with written records, and hence intellectual development and social progress."

With regard to this view we remark:

(a) It is based upon an insufficient induction of facts. — History shows a law of degeneration supplementing and often counteracting the tendency to development. In the earliest times of which we have any record, we find nations in a high state of civilization; but in the case of every nation whose history runs back of the Christian era — as for example, the Romans,

the Greeks, the Egyptians—the subsequent progress has been downward, and no nation is known to have recovered from barbarism except as the result of influence from without.

Lubbock seems to admit that cannibalism was not primeval; yet he shows a general tendency to take every brutal custom as a sample of man's first state. And this, in spite of the fact that many such customs have been the result of corruption. Bride-catching, for example, could not possibly have been primeval, in the strict sense of that term. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 1: 48, presents a far more moderate view. He favors a theory of development, but with degeneration "as a secondary action largely and deeply affecting the development of civilization." So the Duke of Argyll, *Unity of Nature*: "Civilization and savagery are both the results of evolutionary development; but the one is a development in the upward, the latter in the downward direction; and for this reason, neither civilization nor savagery can rationally be looked upon as the primitive condition of man." Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 1: 467—"As plausible an argument might be constructed out of the deterioration and degradation of some of the human family to prove that man may have evolved downward into an anthropoid ape, as that which has been constructed to prove that he has been evolved upward from one."

Modern nations fall far short of the old Greek perception and expression of beauty. Modern Egyptians, Bushmen, Australians, are unquestionably degenerate races. See Lankester, *Degeneration*. The same is true of Italians and Spaniards, as well as of Turks. Abyssinians are now polygamists, though their ancestors were Christians and monogamists. The physical degeneration of portions of the population of Ireland is well known. See Mivart, *Lessons from Nature*, 146-160, who applies to the savagery the tests of language, morals, and religion, and who quotes Herbert Spencer as saying: "Probably most of them [savages], if not all of them, had ancestors in higher states, and among their beliefs remain some which were evolved during those higher states. . . . It is quite possible, and I believe highly probable, that retrogression has been as frequent as progression." Spencer, however, denies that savagery is always caused by lapse from civilization.

Bib. Sac., 6: 715; 20: 282—"Man as a moral being does not tend to rise but to fall, and that with a geometric progress, except he be elevated and sustained by some force from without and above himself. While man once civilized may advance, yet moral ideas are apparently never developed from within." Had savagery been man's primitive condition, he never could have emerged. See Whately, *Origin of Civilization*, who maintains that man needed not only a divine Creator, but a divine Instructor. Seelye, *Introd. to A Century of Dishonor*, 3—"The first missionaries to the Indians in Canada took with them skilled laborers to teach the savages how to till their fields, to provide them with comfortable homes, clothing, and food. But the Indians preferred their wigwams, skins, raw flesh, and filth. Only as Christian influences taught the Indian his inner need, and how this was to be supplied, was he led to wish and work for the improvement of his outward condition and habits. Civilization does not reproduce itself. It must first be kindled, and it can then be kept alive only by a power genuinely Christian." So Wallace, in *Nature*, Sept. 7, 1876, vol. 14: 408-412.

Griffith-Jones, *Ascent through Christ*, 149-168, shows that evolution does not necessarily involve development as regards particular races. There is degeneration in all the organic orders. As regards man, he may be evolving in some directions, while in others he has degenerated. Lidgett, *Spir. Principle of the Atonement*, 245, speaks of "Prof. Clifford as pointing to the history of human progress and declaring that mankind is a risen and not a fallen race. There is no real contradiction between these two views. God has not let man go because man has rebelled against him. Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." The humanity which was created in Christ and which is upheld by his power has ever received reinforcements of its physical and mental life, in spite of its moral and spiritual deterioration. "Some shrimps, by the adjustment of their bodily parts, go onward to the higher structure of the lobsters and crabs; while others, taking up the habit of dwelling in the gills of fishes, sink downward into a state closely resembling that of the worms." Drummond, *Ascent of Man*: "When a boy's kite comes down in our garden, we do not hold that it originally came from the clouds. So nations went up, before they came down. There is a national gravitation. The stick age preceded the stone age, but has been lost." Tennyson: "Evolution ever climbing after some ideal good, And Reversion ever dragging Evolution in the mud." Evolution often becomes devolution, if not

civilization. A. J. Gordon, Ministry of the Spirit, 104—"The Jordan is the fitting symbol of our natural life, rising in a lofty elevation, and from pure springs, but plunging steadily down till it pours itself into that Dead Sea from which there is no outlet."

(b) Later investigations have rendered it probable that the stone age of some localities was contemporaneous with the bronze and iron ages of others, while certain tribes and nations, instead of making progress from one to the other, were never, so far back as we can trace them, without the knowledge and use of the metals. It is to be observed, moreover, that even without such knowledge and use man is not necessarily a barbarian, though he may be a child.

On the question whether the arts of civilization can be lost, see Arthur Mitchell, *Past in the Present*, 219: Rude art is often the debasement of a higher, instead of being the earlier; the rudest art in a nation may coexist with the highest; cave-life may accompany high civilization. Illustrations from modern Scotland, where burial of a cock for epilepsy, and sacrifice of a bull, were until very recently extant. Certain arts have unquestionably been lost, as glass-making and iron-working in Assyria (see Mivart, referred to above). The most ancient men do not appear to have been inferior to the latest, either physically or intellectually. Rawlinson: "The explorers who have dug deep into the Mesopotamian mounds, and have ransacked the tombs of Egypt, have come upon no certain traces of savage man in those regions which a wide-spread tradition makes the cradle of the human race." The Tyrolese peasants show that a rude people may be moral, and a very simple people may be highly intelligent. See Southall, *Recent Origin of Man*, 386-449; Schliemann, *Troy and her Remains*, 274.

Mason, *Origins of Invention*, 110, 124, 128—"There is no evidence that a stone age ever existed in some regions. In Africa, Canada, and perhaps Michigan, the metal age was as old as the stone age." An illustration of the mathematical powers of the savage is given by Rev. A. E. Hunt in an account of the native arithmetic of Murray Islands, Torres Straits. "Netat" (one) and "neis" (two) are the only numerals, higher numbers being described by combinations of these, as "neis-netat" for three, "neis-i-neis" for four, etc., or by reference to one of the fingers, elbows or other parts of the body. A total of thirty-one could be counted by the latter method. Beyond this all numbers were "many," as this was the limit reached in counting before the introduction of English numerals, now in general use in the islands.

Shaler, *Interpretation of Nature*, 171—"It is commonly supposed that the direction of the movement [in the variation of species] is ever upward. The fact is on the contrary that in a large number of cases, perhaps in the aggregate in more than half, the change gives rise to a form which, by all the canons by which we determine relative rank, is to be regarded as regressive or degradational. . . . Species, genera, families, and orders have all, like the individuals of which they are composed, a period of decay in which the gain won by infinite toil and pains is altogether lost in the old age of the group." Shaler goes on to say that in the matter of variation successes are to failures as 1 to 100,000, and if man be counted the solitary distinguished success, then the proportion is something like 1 to 100,000,000. No species that passes away is ever reinstated. If man were now to disappear, there is no reason to believe that by any process of change a similar creature would be evolved, however long the animal kingdom continued to exist. The use of these successive chances to produce man is inexplicable except upon the hypothesis of an infinite designing Wisdom.

(c) The barbarous customs to which this view looks for support may better be explained as marks of broken-down civilization than as relics of a primitive and universal savagery. Even if they indicated a former state of barbarism, that state might have been itself preceded by a condition of comparative culture.

Mark Hopkins, in *Princeton Rev.* Sept., 1832: 194—"There is no cruel treatment of females among animals. If man came from the lower animals, then he cannot have been originally savage; for you find the most of this cruel treatment among savages." Tylor instances "street Arabs." He compares street Arabs to a ruined house, but

savage tribes to a builder's yard. See Duke of Argyll, *Primeval Man*, 129, 123; Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, 223; McLennan, *Studies in Ancient History*. Gulick, in *Bib. Sac.*, July, 1892: 517— "Cannibalism and infanticide are unknown among the anthropoid apes. These must be the results of degradation. Pirates and slavetraders are not men of low and abortive intelligence, but men of education who deliberately throw off all restraint, and who use their powers for the destruction of society."

Keane, *Man, Past and Present*, 40, quotes Sir H. H. Johnston, an administrator who has had a wider experience of the natives of Africa than any man living, as saying that "the tendency of the negro for several centuries past has been an actual retrograde one—return toward the savage and even the brute. If he had been cut off from the immigration of the Arab and the European, the purely Negroid races, left to themselves, so far from advancing towards a higher type of humanity, might have actually reverted by degrees to a type no longer human." Ratzel's *History of Mankind*: "We assign no great antiquity to Polynesian civilization. In New Zealand it is a matter of only some centuries back. In newly occupied territories, the development of the population began upon a higher level and then fell off. The Maoris' decadence resulted in the rapid impoverishment of culture, and the character of the people became more savage and cruel. Captain Cook found objects of art worshiped by the descendants of those who produced them."

Recent researches have entirely discredited L. H. Morgan's theory of an original brutal promiscuity of the human race. Ritchie, Darwin and Hegel, 6, note—"The theory of an original promiscuity is rendered extremely doubtful by the habits of many of the higher animals." E. B. Tylor, in *19th Century*, July, 1906—"A sort of family life, lasting for the sake of the young, beyond a single pairing season, exists among the higher manlike apes. The male gorilla keeps watch and ward over his progeny. He is the antetype of the house-father. The matriarchal system is a later device for political reasons, to bind together in peace and alliance tribes that would otherwise be hostile. But it is an artificial system introduced as a substitute for and in opposition to the natural paternal system. When the social pressure is removed, the maternalized husband emancipates himself, and paternalism begins." Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*: "Marriage and the family are thus intimately connected with one another; it is for the benefit of the young that male and female continue to live together. Marriage is therefore rooted in the family, rather than the family in marriage. . . . There is not a shred of genuine evidence for the notion that promiscuity ever formed a general stage in the social history of mankind. The hypothesis of promiscuity, instead of belonging to the class of hypotheses which are scientifically permissible, has no real foundation, and is essentially unscientific." Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions*: "Marriage or pairing between one man and one woman, though the union be often transitory and the rule often violated, is the typical form of sexual union from the infancy of the human race."

(d) The well-nigh universal tradition of a golden age of virtue and happiness may be most easily explained upon the Scripture view of an actual creation of the race in holiness and its subsequent apostasy.

For references in classic writers to a golden age, see Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 115; Pfeleiderer, *Philos. Religion*, 1: 205—"In Hesiod we have the legend of a golden age under the lordship of Chronos, when man was free from cares and toils, in untroubled youth and cheerfulness, with a superabundance of the gifts which the earth furnished of itself; the race was indeed not immortal, but it experienced death even as a soft sleep." We may add that capacity for religious truth depends upon moral conditions. Very early races therefore have a purer faith than the later ones. Increasing depravity makes it harder for the later generations to exercise faith. The wisdom-literature may have been very early instead of very late, just as monotheistic ideas are clearer the further we go back. Hixby, *Crisis in Morals*, 171—"Precisely because such tribes [Australian and African savages] have been deficient in average moral quality, have they failed to march upward on the road of civilization with the rest of mankind, and have fallen into these bog holes of savage degradation." On petrified civilizations, see Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, 433-439—"The law of human progress, what is it but the moral law?" On retrogressive development in nature, see Weismann, *Heredity*, 2: 1-30. But see also Mary E. Case, "Did the Romans Degenerate?" in *Internat. Journ. Ethics*, Jan. 1893: 165-182, in which it is maintained that the Romans made constant advances rather. Henry Sumner Maine calls the Bible

the most important single document in the history of sociology, because it exhibits authentically the early development of society from the family, through the tribe, into the nation,—a progress learned only by glimpses, intervals, and survivals of old usages in the literature of other nations.

2nd. That the religious history of mankind warrants us in inferring a necessary and universal law of progress, in accordance with which man passes from fetichism to polytheism and monotheism,—this first theological stage, of which fetichism, polytheism, and monotheism are parts, being succeeded by the metaphysical stage, and that in turn by the positive.

This theory is propounded by Comte, in his *Positive Philosophy*, English transl., 26, 26, 515-686—“Each branch of our knowledge passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious; the Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or positive. . . . The first is the necessary point of departure of the human understanding; and the third is its fixed and definite state. The second is merely a state of transition. In the theological state, the human mind, seeking the essential nature of beings, the first and final causes, the origin and purpose, of all effects—in short, absolute knowledge—supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings. In the metaphysical state, which is only a modification of the first, the mind supposes, instead of supernatural beings, abstract forces, veritable entities, that is, personified abstractions, inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena. What is called the explanation of phenomena is, in this stage, a mere reference of each to its proper entity. In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws—that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance. . . . The theological system arrived at its highest perfection when it substituted the providential action of a single Being for the varied operations of numerous divinities. In the last stage of the metaphysical system, men substituted one great entity, Nature, as the cause of all phenomena, instead of the multitude of entities at first supposed. In the same way the ultimate perfection of the positive system would be to represent all phenomena as particular aspects of a single general fact—such as Gravitation, for instance.”

This assumed law of progress, however, is contradicted by the following facts:

(a) Not only did the monotheism of the Hebrews precede the great polytheistic systems of antiquity, but even these heathen religions are purer from polytheistic elements, the further back we trace them; so that the facts point to an original monotheistic basis for them all.

The gradual deterioration of all religions, apart from special revelation and influence from God, is proof that the purely evolutionary theory is defective. The most natural supposition is that of a primitive revelation, which little by little receded from human memory. In Japan, Shinto was originally the worship of Heaven. The worship of the dead, the deification of the Mikado, etc., were a corruption and aftergrowth. The Mikado's ancestors, instead of coming from heaven, came from Korea. Shinto was originally a form of monotheism. Not one of the first emperors was deified after death. Apotheosis of the Mikados dated from the corruption of Shinto through the importation of Buddhism. Andrew Lang, in his *Making of Religion*, advocates primitive monotheism. T. G. Pinches, of the British Museum, 1894, declares that, as in the earliest Egyptian, so in the early Babylonian records, there is evidence of a primitive monotheism. Nevins, *Demon-Possession*, 170-173, quotes W. A. P. Martin, President of the Peking University, as follows: “China, India, Egypt and Greece all agree in the monotheistic type of their early religion. The Orphic Hymns, long before the advent of the popular divinities, celebrated the *Pantheos*, the universal God. The odes compiled by Confucius testify to the early worship of Shangti, the Supreme Ruler. The Vedas speak of ‘one unknown true Being, all-present, all-powerful, the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer of the Universe.’ And in Egypt, as late as the time of Plutarch, there were still vestiges of a monotheistic worship.”

On the evidences of an original monotheism, see Max Müller, *Chips*, 1: 337; Rawlinson, in *Present Day Tracts*, 2: no. 11; Legge, *Religions of China*, 8, 11; Diestel, in *Jahrbuch*

für deutsche Theologie, 1860, and vol. 5: 609; Philip Smith, *Anc. Hist. of East*, 65, 135; Warren, on the Earliest Creed of Mankind, in the *Meth. Quar. Rev.*, Jan. 1894.

(b) "There is no proof that the Indo-Germanic or Semitic stocks ever practiced fetich worship, or were ever enslaved by the lowest types of mythological religion, or ascended from them to somewhat higher" (Fisher).

See Fisher, *Essays on Supernat. Origin of Christianity*, 545; Bartlett, *Sources of History in the Pentateuch*, 36-115. Herbert Spencer once held that fetichism was primordial. But he afterwards changed his mind, and said that the facts proved to be exactly the opposite when he had become better acquainted with the ideas of savages; see his *Principles of Sociology*, 1: 242. Mr. Spencer finally traced the beginnings of religion to the worship of ancestors. But in China no ancestor has ever become a god; see Hill, *Genetic Philosophy*, 304-312. And unless man had an inborn sense of divinity, he could deify neither ancestors nor ghosts. Professor Hilprecht of Philadelphia says: "As the attempt has recently been made to trace the pure monotheism of Israel to Babylonian sources, I am bound to declare this an absolute impossibility, on the basis of my fourteen years' researches in Babylonian cuneiform inscriptions. The faith of Israel's chosen people is: 'Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord.' And this faith could never have proceeded from the Babylonian mountain of gods, that charnel-house full of corruption and dead men's bones."

(c) Some of the earliest remains of man yet found show, by the burial of food and weapons with the dead, that there already existed the idea of spiritual beings and of a future state, and therefore a religion of a higher sort than fetichism.

Idolatry proper regards the idol as the symbol and representative of a spiritual being who exists apart from the material object, though he manifests himself through it. Fetichism, however, identifies the divinity with the material thing, and worships the stock or stone; spirit is not conceived of as existing apart from body. Belief in spiritual beings and a future state is therefore proof of a religion higher in kind than fetichism. See Lyell, *Antiquity of Man*, quoted in Dawson, *Story of Earth and Man*, 384; see also 368, 372, 386—"Man's capacities for degradation are commensurate with his capacities for improvement" (Dawson). Lyell, in his last edition, however, admits the evidence from the Aurignac cave to be doubtful. See art. by Dawkins, in *Nature*, 4: 208.

(d) The theory in question, in making theological thought a merely transient stage of mental evolution, ignores the fact that religion has its root in the intuitions and yearnings of the human soul, and that therefore no philosophical or scientific progress can ever abolish it. While the terms theological, metaphysical, and positive may properly mark the order in which the ideas of the individual and the race are acquired, positivism errs in holding that these three phases of thought are mutually exclusive, and that upon the rise of the later the earlier must of necessity become extinct.

John Stuart Mill suggests that "personifying" would be a much better term than "theological" to designate the earliest efforts to explain physical phenomena. On the fundamental principles of Positivism, see *New Englander*, 1873: 323-336; Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 333—"Three coexistent states are here confounded with three successive stages of human thought; three aspects of things with three epochs of time. Theology, metaphysics, and science must always exist side by side, for all positive science rests on metaphysical principles, and theology lies behind both. All are as permanent as human reason itself." Martineau, *Types*, 1: 487—"Comte sets up mediæval Christianity as the typical example of evolved monotheism, and develops it out of the Greek and Roman polytheism which it overthrew and dissipated. But the religion of modern Europe notoriously does not descend from the same source as its civilization and is no continuation of the ancient culture,"—it comes rather from Hebrew sources; *Essays, Philos. and Theol.*, 1: 24, 63—"The Jews were always a disobliging people; what business had they to be up so early in the morning, disturbing the house ever so long before M. Comte's bell rang to prayers?" See also Gillett, *God in Human Thought*, 1: 17-23; Rawlinson, in *Journ. Christ. Philos.*, April, 1883: 353; *Nineteenth Century*, Oct. 1886: 473-480.

## CHAPTER III.

### SIN, OR MAN'S STATE OF APOSTASY.

#### SECTION I.—THE LAW OF GOD.

As preliminary to a treatment of man's state of apostasy, it becomes necessary to consider the nature of that law of God, the transgression of which is sin. We may best approach the subject by inquiring what is the true conception of

#### I. LAW IN GENERAL.

##### 1. Law is an expression of *will*.

The essential idea of law is that of a general expression of will enforced by power. It implies: (a) A lawgiver, or authoritative will. (b) Subjects, or beings upon whom this will terminates. (c) A general command, or expression of this will. (d) A power, enforcing the command.

These elements are found even in what we call natural law. The phrase 'law of nature' involves a self-contradiction, when used to denote a mode of action or an order of sequence behind which there is conceived to be no intelligent and ordaining will. Physics derives the term 'law' from jurisprudence, instead of jurisprudence deriving it from physics. It is first used of the relations of voluntary agents. Causation in our own wills enables us to see something besides mere antecedence and consequence in the world about us. Physical science, in her very use of the word 'law,' implicitly confesses that a supreme Will has set general rules which control the processes of the universe.

Wayland, *Moral Science*, I, unwisely defines law as "a mode of existence or order of sequence," thus leaving out of his definition all reference to an ordaining will. He subsequently says that law presupposes an establisher, but in his definition there is nothing to indicate this. We insist, on the other hand, that the term 'law' itself includes the idea of force and cause. The word 'law' is from 'lay' (German *legen*), — something laid down; German *Gesetz*, from *setzen*, — something set or established; Greek *νόμος*, from *νέμω*, — something assigned or apportioned; Latin *lex*, from *lego*, — something said or spoken.

All these derivations show that man's original conception of law is that of something proceeding from volition. Lewes, in his *Problems of Life and Mind*, says that the term 'law' is so suggestive of a giver and impresser of law, that it ought to be dropped, and the word 'method' substituted. The merit of Austin's treatment of the subject is that he "rigorously limits the term 'Law' to the commands of a superior"; see John Austin, *Province of Jurisprudence*, I: 88-98, 210-223. The defects of his treatment we shall note further on.

J. S. Mill: "It is the custom, wherever they [scientific men] can trace regularity of any kind, to call the general proposition which expresses the nature of that regularity, a law; as when in mathematics we speak of the law of the successive terms of a converging series. But the expression 'law of nature' is generally employed by scientific men with a sort of tacit reference to the original sense of the word 'law,' namely, the expression of the will of a superior — the superior in this case being the Ruler of the

universe." Paley, Nat. Theology, chap. 1—"It is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient operative cause of anything. A law presupposes an agent; this is only the mode according to which an agent proceeds; it implies a power, for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does nothing." "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" "Rules do not fulfill themselves, any more than a statute-book can quell a riot" (Martineau, Types, 1:367).

Charles Darwin got the suggestion of natural selection, not from the study of lower plants and animals, but from Malthus on Population; see his Life and Letters, Vol. I, autobiographical chapter. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, 2:248-252—"The conception of natural law rests upon the analogy of civil law." Ladd, Philosophy of Knowledge, 333—"Laws are only the more or less frequently repeated and uniform modes of the behavior of things"; Philosophy of Mind, 123—"To be, to stand in relation, to be self-active, to act upon other being, to obey law, to be a cause, to be a permanent subject of states, to be the same to-day as yesterday, to be identical, to be one,—all these and all similar conceptions, together with the proofs that they are valid for real beings, are affirmed of physical realities, or projected into them, only on a basis of self-knowledge, envisaging and affirming the reality of mind. Without psychological insight and philosophical training, such terms or their equivalents are meaningless in physics. And because writers on physics do not in general have this insight and this training, in spite of their utmost endeavors to treat physics as an empirical science without metaphysics, they flounder and blunder and contradict themselves hopelessly whenever they touch upon fundamental matters." See President McGarvey's Criticism on James Lane Allen's Reign of Law: "It is not in the nature of law to reign. To reign is an act which can be literally affirmed only of persons. A man may reign; a God may reign; a devil may reign; but a law cannot reign. If a law could reign, we should have no gambling in New York and no open saloons on Sunday. There would be no false swearing in courts of justice, and no dishonesty in politics. It is men who reign in these matters—the judges, the grand jury, the sheriff and the police. They may reign according to law. Law cannot reign even over those who are appointed to execute the law."

### 2. Law is a *general* expression of will.

The characteristic of law is generality. It is addressed to substances or persons in classes. Special legislation is contrary to the true theory of law.

When the Sultan of Zanzibar orders his barber to be beheaded because the latter has cut his master, this order is not properly a law. To be a law it must read: "Every barber who cuts his majesty shall thereupon be decapitated." *Eternal est heinmal*.—"Once is no custom." Dr. Schurman suggests that the word *meal* (Mahl) means originally *time* (*mal* in *einmal*). The measurement of time among ourselves is astronomical; among our earliest ancestors it was gastronomical, and the reduplication *mealltime*—the ding-dong of the dinner bell. The Shah of Persia once asked the Prince of Wales to have a man put to death in order that he might see the English method of execution. When the Prince told him that this was beyond his power, the Shah wished to know what was the use of being a king if he could not kill people at his pleasure. Peter the Great suggested a way out of the difficulty. He desired to see keelhauling. When informed that there was no sailor liable to that penalty, he replied: "That does not matter,—take one of my suite." Amos, Science of Law, 33, 34—"Law eminently deals in general rules." It knows not persons or personality. It must apply to more than one case. "The characteristic of law is generality, as that of morality is individual application." Special legislation is the bane of good government; it does not properly fall within the province of the law-making power; it savors of the caprice of despotism, which gives commands to each subject at will. Hence our more advanced political constitutions check lobby influence and bribery, by prohibiting special legislation in all cases where general laws already exist.

### 3. Law implies *power to enforce*.

It is essential to the existence of law, that there be power to enforce. Otherwise law becomes the expression of mere wish or advice. Since physical substances and forces have no intelligence and no power to resist,

the four elements already mentioned exhaust the implications of the term 'law' as applied to nature. In the case of rational and free agents, however, law implies in addition: (e) Duty or obligation to obey; and (f) Sanctions, or pains and penalties for disobedience.

"Law that has no penalty is not law but advice, and the government in which infraction does not follow transgression is the reign of rogues or demons." On the question whether any of the punishments of civil law are legal sanctions, except the punishment of death, see N. W. Taylor, *Moral Govt.*, 2:367-367. Rewards are motives, but they are not sanctions. Since public opinion may be conceived of as inflicting penalties for violation of her will, we speak figuratively of the laws of society, of fashion, of etiquette, of honor. Only so far as the community of nations can and does by sanctions compel obedience, can we with propriety assert the existence of international law. Even among nations, however, there may be moral as well as physical sanctions. The decision of an international tribunal has the same sanction as a treaty, and if the former is impotent, the latter also is. Fines and imprisonment do not deter decent people from violations of law half so effectively as do the social penalties of ostracism and disgrace, and it will be the same with the findings of an international tribunal. Diplomacy without ships and armies has been said to be law without penalty. But exclusion from civilized society is penalty. "In the unquestioning obedience to fashion's decrees, to which we all quietly submit, we are simply yielding to the pressure of the persons about us. No one adopts a style of dress because it is reasonable, for the styles are often most unreasonable; but we meekly yield to the most absurd of them rather than resist this force and be called eccentric. So what we call public opinion is the most mighty power to-day known, whether in society or in politics."

#### 4. Law expresses and demands nature.

The will which thus binds its subjects by commands and penalties is an expression of the nature of the governing power, and reveals the normal relations of the subjects to that power. Finally, therefore, law (g) is an expression of the nature of the lawgiver; and (h) sets forth the condition or conduct in the subjects which is requisite for harmony with that nature. Any so-called law which fails to represent the nature of the governing power soon becomes obsolete. All law that is permanent is a transcript of the facts of being, a discovery of what is and must be, in order to harmony between the governing and the governed; in short, positive law is just and lasting only as it is an expression and republication of the law of nature.

Diman, *Theistic Argument*, 106, 107: John Austin, although he "rigorously limited the term law to the commands of a superior," yet "rejected Ulpian's explanation of the law of nature, and ridiculed as fustian the celebrated description in Hooker." This we conceive to be the radical defect of Austin's conception. The Will from which natural law proceeds is conceived of after a deistic fashion, instead of being immanent in the universe. Lightwood, in his *Nature of Positive Law*, 73-80, criticizes Austin's definition of law as command, and substitutes the idea of law as custom. Sir Henry Maine's *Ancient Law* has shown us that the early village communities had customs which only gradually took form as definite laws. But we reply that custom is not the ultimate source of anything. Repeated acts of will are necessary to constitute custom. The first customs are due to the commanding will of the father in the patriarchal family. So Austin's definition is justified. Collective morals (*mores*) come from individual duty (*due*); law originates in will; Martineau, *Types*, 2:18, 19. Behind this will, however, is something which Austin does not take account of, namely, the nature of things as constituted by God, as revealing the universal Reason, and as furnishing the standard to which all positive law, if it would be permanent, must conform.

See Montesquieu, *Spirit of Laws*, book I, sec. 14—"Laws are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things. . . . There is a primitive Reason, and laws are the relations subsisting between it and different beings, and the relations of these to one another. . . . These rules are a fixed and invariable relation. . . . Particular intelligent beings may have laws of their own making, but they have some likewise that they

never made. . . . To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is the same as saying that before the describing of a circle all the radii were not equal. We must therefore acknowledge relations antecedent to the positive law by which they were established." Kant, *Metaphysic of Ethics*, 169-172—"By the science of law is meant systematic knowledge of the principles of the law of nature—from which positive law takes its rise—which is forever the same, and carries its sure and unchanging obligations over all nations and throughout all ages."

It is true even of a despot's law, that it reveals his nature, and shows what is requisite in the subject to constitute him in harmony with that nature. A law which does not represent the nature of things, or the real relations of the governor and the governed, has only a nominal existence, and cannot be permanent. On the definition and nature of law, see also Pomeroy, in Johnson's *Encyclopædia*, art.: Law; Ahrens, *Cours de Droit Naturel*, book 1, sec. 14; Lorimer, *Institutes of Law*, 256, who quotes from Burke: "All human laws are, properly speaking, only declaratory. They may alter the mode and application, but have no power over the substance of original justice"; Lord Bacon: "Regula enim legem (ut acus nautica polos) indicat, non statuit." Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, 64; H. C. Carey, *Unity of Law*.

Fairbairn, in *Contemp. Rev.*, Apl. 1896: 473—"The Roman jurists draw a distinction between *jus naturale* and *jus civile*, and they used the former to affect the latter. The *jus civile* was statutory, established and fixed law, as it were, the actual legal environment; the *jus naturale* was ideal, the principle of justice and equity immanent in man, yet with the progress of his ethical culture growing ever more articulate." We add the fact that *jus* in Latin and *Recht* in German have ceased to mean merely abstract right, and have come to denote the legal system in which that abstract right is embodied and expressed. Here we have a proof that Christ is gradually moralizing the world and translating law into life. E. G. Robinson: "Never a government on earth made its own laws. Even constitutions simply declare laws already and actually existing. Where society falls into anarchy, the *lex talionis* becomes the prevailing principle."

## II. THE LAW OF GOD IN PARTICULAR.

The law of God is a general expression of the divine will enforced by power. It has two forms: Elemental Law and Positive Enactment.

1. *Elemental Law*, or law inwrought into the elements, substances, and forces of the rational and irrational creation. This is twofold:

A. The expression of the divine will in the constitution of the material universe;—this we call physical, or natural law. Physical law is not necessary. Another order of things is conceivable. Physical order is not an end in itself; it exists for the sake of moral order. Physical order has therefore only a relative constancy, and God supplements it at times by miracle.

Bowne, *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, 210—"The laws of nature represent no necessity, but are only the orderly forms of procedure of some Being back of them. . . . Cosmic uniformities are God's methods in freedom." *Philos. of Theism*, 73—"Any of the cosmic laws, from gravitation on, might conceivably have been lacking or altogether different. . . . No trace of necessity can be found in the Cosmos or in its laws." Seth, *Hegelianism and Personality*: "Nature is not necessary. Why put an island where it is, and not a mile east or west? Why connect the smell and shape of the rose, or the taste and color of the orange? Why do H<sub>2</sub>O form water? No one knows." William James: "The parts seem shot at us out of a pistol." Rather, we would say, out of a shotgun. Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, 33—"Why undulations in one medium should produce sound, and in another light; why one speed of vibration should give red color, and another blue, can be explained by no reason of necessity. Here is selecting will."

Brooks, *Foundations of Zoölogy*, 126—"So far as the philosophy of evolution involves belief that nature is determinate, or due to a necessary law of universal progress or evolution, it seems to me to be utterly unsupported by evidence and totally unscientific." There is no power to deduce anything whatever from homogeneity. Press the button and law does the rest? Yes, but what presses the button? The solution crys-

tales when shaken? Yes, but what shakes it? Ladd, *Philos. of Knowledge*, 810—  
 "The directions and velocities of the stars fall under no common principles that astronomy can discover. One of the stars—'1830 Groombridge'—is flying through space at a rate many times as great as it could attain if it had fallen through infinite space through all eternity toward the entire physical universe. . . . Fluids contract when cooled and expand when heated,—yet there is the well known exception of water at the degree of freezing." 263—"Things do not appear to be mathematical all the way through. The system of things may be a Life, changing its modes of manifestation according to immanent ideas, rather than a collection of rigid entities, blindly subject to a mechanical way to unchanging laws."

Augustine: "Dei voluntas rerum natura est." Joseph Cook: "The laws of nature are the habits of God." But Campbell, *Atonement*, *Introd.*, xxvi, says there is this difference between the laws of the moral universe and those of the physical, namely, that we do not trace the existence of the former to an act of will, as we do the latter. "To say that God has given existence to goodness, as he has to the laws of nature, would be equivalent to saying that he has given existence to himself." Pepper, *Outlines of Syst. Theol.*, 91—"Moral law, unlike natural law, is a standard of action to be adopted or rejected in the exercise of rational freedom, *i. e.*, of moral agency." See also Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 1: 581.

Mark Hopkins, in *Princeton Rev.*, Sept. 1882: 190—"In moral law there is enforcement by punishment only—never by power, for this would confound moral law with physical, and obedience can never be produced or secured by power. In physical law, on the contrary, enforcement is wholly by power, and punishment is impossible. So far as man is free, he is not subject to law at all, in its physical sense. Our wills are free *from* law, as enforced by power; but are free *under* law, as enforced by punishment. Where law prevails in the same sense as in the material world, there can be no freedom. Law does not prevail when we reach the region of choice. We hold to a power in the mind of man originating a free choice. Two objects or courses of action, between which choice is to be made, are presupposed: (1) A uniformity or set of uniformities implying a force by which the uniformity is produced [physical or natural law]; (2) A command, addressed to free and intelligent beings, that can be obeyed or disobeyed, and that has connected with it rewards or punishments" [moral law]. See also Wm. Arthur, *Difference between Physical and Moral Law*.

B. The expression of the divine will in the constitution of rational and free agents;—this we call moral law. This elemental law of our moral nature, with which only we are now concerned, has all the characteristics mentioned as belonging to law in general. It implies: (a) A divine Law-giver, or ordaining Will. (b) Subjects, or moral beings upon whom the law terminates. (c) General command, or expression of this will in the moral constitution of the subjects. (d) Power, enforcing the command. (e) Duty, or obligation to obey. (f) Sanctions, or pains and penalties for disobedience.

All these are of a loftier sort than are found in human law. But we need especially to emphasize the fact that this law (g) is an expression of the moral nature of God, and therefore of God's holiness, the fundamental attribute of that nature; and that it (h) sets forth absolute conformity to that holiness, as the normal condition of man. This law is inwrought into man's rational and moral being. Man fulfills it, only when in his moral as well as his rational being he is the image of God.

Although the will from which the moral law springs is an expression of the nature of God, and a necessary expression of that nature in view of the existence of moral beings, it is none the less a personal will. We should be careful not to attribute to law a personality of its own. When Plutarch says: "Law is king both of mortal and immortal beings," and when we say: "The law will take hold of you," "The criminal is in danger of the law," we are simply substituting the name of the agent for that of the principal. God is not subject to law; God is the source of law; and we may say: "If Jehovah be God, worship him; but if Law, worship it."

Since moral law merely reflects God, it is not a thing *made*. Men *discover* laws, but they do not *make* them, any more than the chemist makes the laws by which the elements combine. Instance the solidification of hydrogen at Geneva. Utility does not constitute law, although we test law by utility; see Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 56-71. The true nature of the moral law is set forth in the noble though rhetorical description of Hooker (*Ecol. Pol.*, 1: 194)—“Of law there can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is in the bosom of God; her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men, and creatures of what condition soever, though each in a different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy.” See also Martineau, *Types*, 2: 119, and *Study*, 1: 35.

Curtis, *Primitive Semitic Religions*, 66, 101—“The Oriental believes that God makes right by edict. Saladin demonstrated to Henry of Champagne the loyalty of his Assassins, by commanding two of them to throw themselves down from a lofty tower to certain and violent death.” H. B. Smith, *System*, 192—“Will implies personality, and personality adds to abstract truth and duty the element of authority. Law therefore has the force that a person has over and above that of an idea.” Human law forbids only those offences which constitute a breach of public order or of private right. God’s law forbids all that is an offence against the divine order, that is, all that is unlike God. The whole law may be summed up in the words: “Be like God.” Salter, *First Steps in Philosophy*, 101-126—“The realization of the nature of each being is the end to be striven for. Self-realization is an ideal end, not of one being, but of each being, with due regard to the value of each in the proper scale of worth. The beast can be sacrificed for man. All men are sacred as capable of unlimited progress. It is our duty to realize the capacities of our nature so far as they are consistent with one another and go to make up one whole.” This means that man fulfills the law only as he realizes the divine idea in his character and life, or, in other words, as he becomes a finite image of God’s infinite perfections.

Bixby, *Crisis in Morals*, 191, 201, 285, 296—“Morality is rooted in the nature of things. There is a universe. We are all parts of an infinite organism. Man is inseparably bound to man [and to God]. All rights and duties arise out of this common life. In the solidarity of social life lies the ground of Kant’s law: So will, that the maxim of thy conduct may apply to all. The planet cannot safely fly away from the sun, and the hand cannot safely separate itself from the heart. It is from the fundamental unity of life that our duties flow. . . . The infinite world-organism is the body and manifestation of God. And when we recognize the solidarity of our vital being with this divine life and embodiment, we begin to see into the heart of the mystery, the unquestionable authority and supreme sanction of duty. Our moral intuitions are simply the unchanging laws of the universe that have emerged to consciousness in the human heart. . . . The inherent principles of the universal Reason reflect themselves in the mirror of the moral nature. . . . The enlightened conscience is the expression in the human soul of the divine Consciousness. . . . Morality is the victory of the divine Life in us. . . . Solidarity of our life with the universal Life gives it unconditional sacredness and transcendental authority. . . . The microcosm must bring itself *en rapport* with the Macrocosm. Man must bring his spirit into resemblance to the World-essence, and into union with it.”

The law of God, then, is simply an expression of the nature of God in the form of moral requirement, and a necessary expression of that nature in view of the existence of moral beings (Pa. 19:7; cf. 1). To the existence of this law all men bear witness. The consciences even of the heathen testify to it (Rom. 2:14, 15). Those who have the written law recognize this elemental law as of greater compass and penetration (Rom. 7:14; 8:4). The perfect embodiment and fulfillment of this law is seen only in Christ (Rom. 10:4; Phil. 3:8, 9).

Pa. 19:7—“The law of Jehovah is perfect, restoring the soul”; cf. verse 1—“The heavens declare the glory of God”—two revelations of God—one in nature, the other in the moral law. Rom. 2:14, 15—“for when Gentiles that have not the law do by nature the things of the law, these, not having the law, are the law unto themselves; in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their consciences bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them”—here the “work of the law”—not the *ten*

commandments, for of these the heathen were ignorant, but rather the work corresponding to them, *i. e.*, the substance of them. Rom. 7:14 — "For we know that the law is spiritual" — this, says Meyer, is equivalent to saying "its essence is divine, of like nature with the Holy Spirit who gave it, a holy self-revelation of God," Rom. 8:4 — "that the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit"; 10:4 — "For Christ is the end of the law unto righteousness to every one that believeth"; Phil. 3:8, 9 — "that I may gain Christ, and be found in him, not having a righteousness of mine own, even that which is of the law, but that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is from God by faith"; Heb. 10:9 — "Lo, I am come to do thy will." In Christ "the law appears Drawn out in living characters." Just such as he was and is, we feel that we ought to be. Hence the character of Christ convicts us of sin, as does no other manifestation of God. See, on the passages from Romans, the Commentary of Philippi.

Fleming, Vocab. Philos., 286 — "Moral laws are derived from the nature and will of God, and the character and condition of man." God's nature is reflected in the laws of our nature. Since law is inwrought into man's nature, man is a law unto himself. To conform to his own nature, in which conscience is supreme, is to conform to the nature of God. The law is only the revelation of the constitutive principles of being, the declaration of what must be, so long as man is man and God is God. It says in effect: "Be like God, or you cannot be truly man." So moral law is not simply a test of obedience, but is also a revelation of eternal reality. Man cannot be lost to God, without being lost to himself. "The 'hands of the living God' (Heb. 10:8) into which we fall, are the laws of nature." In the spiritual world "the same wheels revolve, only there is no iron" (Drummond, Natural Law in the Spiritual World, 27). Wuttke, Christian Ethics, 2: 82-83 — "The totality of created being is to be in harmony with God and with itself. The idea of this harmony, as active in God under the form of will, is God's law." A manuscript of the U. S. Constitution was so written that when held at a little distance the shading of the letters and their position showed the countenance of George Washington. So the law of God is only God's face disclosed to human sight.

R. W. Emerson, Woodnotes, 87 — "Conscious Law is King of kings." Two centuries ago John Norton wrote a book entitled The Orthodox Evangelist, "designed for the begetting and establishing of the faith which is in Jesus," in which we find the following: "God doth not will things because they are just, but things are therefore just because God so willeth them. What reasonable man but will yield that the being of the moral law hath no necessary connection with the being of God? That the actions of men not conformable to this law should be sin, that death should be the punishment of sin, these are the constitutions of God, proceeding from him not by way of necessity of nature, but freely, as effects and products of his eternal good pleasure." This is to make God an arbitrary despot. We should not say that God makes law, nor on the other hand that God is subject to law, but rather that God is law and the source of law.

Bowne, Philos. of Theism, 161 — "God's law is organic — inwrought into the constitution of men and things. The chart however does not make the channel. . . . A law of nature is never the antecedent but the consequence of reality. What right has this consequence of reality to be personalized and made the ruler and source of reality? Law is only the fixed mode in which reality works. Law therefore can explain nothing. Only God, from whom reality springs, can explain reality." In other words, law is never an agent but always a method — the method of God, or rather of Christ who is the only Revealer of God. Christ's life in the flesh is the clearest manifestation of him who is the principle of law in the physical and moral universe. Christ is the Reason of God in expression. It was he who gave the law on Mount Sinai as well as in the Sermon on the Mount. For fuller treatment of the subject, see Bowen, Metaph. and Ethics, 321-344; Talbot, Ethical Prolegomena, in Bap. Quar., July, 1877: 257-274; Whewell, Elements of Morality, 2: 25; and especially E. G. Robinson, Principles and Practice of Morality, 79-108.

Each of the two last-mentioned characteristics of God's law is important in its implications. We treat of these in their order.

X First, the law of God as a transcript of the divine nature. — If this be the nature of the law, then certain common misconceptions of it are excluded. The law of God is

(a) Not arbitrary, or the product of arbitrary will. Since the will from which the law springs is a revelation of God's nature, there can be no rashness or unwisdom in the law itself.

E. G. Robinson, *Christ. Theology*, 193—“No law of God seems ever to have been arbitrarily enacted, or simply with a view to certain ends to be accomplished; it always represented some reality of life which it was inexorably necessary that those who were to be regulated should carefully observe.” The theory that law originates in arbitrary will results in an effeminate type of piety, just as the theory that legislation has for its sole end the greatest happiness results in all manner of compromises of justice. Jones, Robert Browning, 43—“He who cheats his neighbor believes in tortuosity, and, as Carlyle says, has the supreme Quack for his god.”

(b) Not temporary, or ordained simply to meet an exigency. The law is a manifestation, not of temporary moods or desires, but of the essential nature of God.

The great speech of Sophocles' *Antigone* gives us this conception of law: “The ordinances of the gods are unwritten, but sure. Not one of them is for to-day or for yesterday alone, but they live forever.” Moses might break the tables of stone upon which the law was inscribed, and Jehoiakim might cut up the scroll and cast it into the fire (*Ex. 32:19*; *Jr. 36:23*), but the law remained eternal as before in the nature of God and in the constitution of man. Prof. Walter Rauschenbusch: “The moral laws are just as stable as the law of gravitation. Every fuzzy human chicken that is hatched into this world tries to fool with those laws. Some grow wiser in the process and some do not. We talk about breaking God's laws. But after those laws have been broken several billion times since Adam first tried to play with them, those laws are still intact and no seam or fracture is visible in them,—not even a scratch on the enamel. But the lawbreakers—that is another story. If you want to find their fragments, go to the ruins of Egypt, of Babylon, of Jerusalem; study statistics; read faces; keep your eyes open; visit Blackwell's Island; walk through the graveyard and read the invisible inscriptions left by the Angel of Judgment, for instance: ‘Here lie the fragments of John Smith, who contradicted his Maker, played football with the ten commandments, and departed this life at the age of thirty-five. His mother and wife weep for him. Nobody else does. May he rest in peace!’”

(c) Not merely negative, or a law of mere prohibition,—since positive conformity to God is the inmost requisition of law.

The negative form of the commandments in the decalogue merely takes for granted the evil inclination in men's hearts and practically opposes its gratification. In the case of each commandment a whole province of the moral life is taken into the account, although the act expressly forbidden is the acme of evil in that one province. So the decalogue makes itself intelligible: it crosses man's path just where he most feels inclined to wander. But back of the negative and specific expression in each case lies the whole mass of moral requirement: the thin edge of the wedge has the positive demand of holiness behind it, without obedience to which even the prohibition cannot in spirit be obeyed. Thus “the law is spiritual” (*Rom. 7:14*), and requires likeness in character and life to the spiritual God; *John 4:24*—“God is spirit, and they that worship him must worship in spirit and truth.”

(d) Not partial, or addressed to one part only of man's being,—since likeness to God requires purity of substance in man's soul and body, as well as purity in all the thoughts and acts that proceed therefrom. As law proceeds from the nature of God, so it requires conformity to that nature in the nature of man.

Whatever God gave to man at the beginning he requires of man with interest; *cf. Mat. 25:27*—“thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the bankers, and at my coming I should have received back mine own with interest.” Whatever comes short of perfect purity in soul or perfect health in body is non-conformity to God and contradicts his law, it being understood that only that perfection is demanded which answers to the creature's stage of growth and progress, so that of the child there is required only the perfection of the child, of the youth only the perfection of the youth, of the man only the perfection of the man. See Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, chapter 1.

(e) Not outwardly published,—since all positive enactment is only the imperfect expression of this underlying and unwritten law of being.

Much misunderstanding of God's law results from confounding it with published enactment. Paul takes the larger view that the law is independent of such expression; see Rom. 2:14, 15 — "for when Gentiles that have not the law do by nature the things of the law, these, not having the law, are the law unto themselves; in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts one with another reasoning or else excusing them:" see Expositor's Greek Testament, *in loco*: "written on their hearts," when contrasted with the law written on the tables of stone, is equal to 'unwritten'; the Apostle refers to what the Greeks called *ἀγραφοὶ νόμοι*."

(f) Not inwardly conscious, or limited in its scope by men's consciousness of it. Like the laws of our physical being, the moral law exists whether we recognize it or not.

Overeating brings its penalty in dyspepsia, whether we are conscious of our fault or not. We cannot by ignorance or by vote repeal the laws of our physical system. Self-will does not secure independence, any more than the stars can by combination abolish gravitation. Man cannot get rid of God's dominion by denying its existence, nor by refusing submission to it. Palm 2:1-4 — "Why do the nations rage . . . against Jehovah . . . saying, Let us break their bonds asunder . . . Is that siteth in the heavens will laugh." Saiter, *First Steps in Philosophy*, 94 — "The fact that one is not aware of obligation no more affects its reality than ignorance of what is at the centre of the earth affects the nature of what is really discoverable there. We discover obligation, and do not create it by thinking of it, any more than we create the sensible world by thinking of it."

(g) Not local, or confined to place. — since no moral creature can escape from God, from his own being, or from the natural necessity that unlikeness to God should involve misery and ruin.

"The Dutch auction" was the public offer of property at a price beyond its value, followed by the lowering of the price until some one accepted it as a purchaser. There is no such local exception to the full validity of God's demands. The moral law has even more necessary and universal sway than the law of gravitation in the physical universe. It is inwrought into the very constitution of man, and of every other moral being. The man who offended the Roman Emperor found the whole empire a prison.

(h) Not changeable, or capable of modification. Since law represents the unchangeable nature of God, it is not a sliding scale of requirements which adapts itself to the ability of the subjects. God himself cannot change it without ceasing to be God.

The law, then, has a deeper foundation than that God merely "said so." God's word and God's will are revelations of his inmost being; every transgression of the law is a stab at the heart of God. Simon, *Reconciliation*, 141, 142 — "God continues to demand loyalty even after man has proved disloyal. Sin changes man, and man's change involves a change in God. Man now regards God as a ruler and exactor, and God must regard man as a defaulter and a rebel." God's requirement is not lessened because man is unable to meet it. This inability is itself non-conformity to law, and is no excuse for sin; see Dr. Bushnell's sermon on "Duty not measured by Ability." The man with the withered hand would not have been justified in refusing to stretch it forth at Jesus' command (Mat 12:10-13).

The obligation to obey this law and to be conformed to God's perfect moral character is based upon man's original ability and the gifts which God bestowed upon him at the beginning. Created in the image of God, it is man's duty to render back to God that which God first gave, enlarged and improved by growth and culture (Luk 19:28 — "wherefore gavesst thou not my money into the bank, and I at my coming should have required it with interest"). This obligation is not impaired by sin and the weakening of man's powers. To let down the standard would be to misrepresent God. Adolphe Monod would not save himself from shame and remorse by lowering the claims of the law: "Save first the holy law of my God," he says, "after that you shall save me!"

Even salvation is not through violation of law. The moral law is immutable, because it is a transcript of the nature of the immutable God. Shall nature conform to me, or I to nature? If I attempt to resist even physical laws, I am crushed. I can use nature only by obeying her laws. Lord Bacon: "Natura enim non nisi parendo vincitur." So

in the moral realm. We cannot buy off nor escape the moral law of God. God will not, and God can not, change his law by one hair's breadth, even to save a universe of sinners. Omar Kháyyám, in his *Rubáiyat*, begs his god to "reconcile the law to my desires." Marie Corelli says well: "As if a gnat should seek to build a cathedral, and should ask to have the laws of architecture altered to suit its gnat-like capacity." See Martineau, *Types*, 2:120.

X Secondly, the law of God as the ideal of human nature.—A law thus identical with the eternal and necessary relations of the creature to the Creator, and demanding of the creature nothing less than perfect holiness, as the condition of harmony with the infinite holiness of God, is adapted to man's finite nature, as needing law; to man's free nature, as needing moral law; and to man's progressive nature, as needing ideal law.

Man, as finite, needs law, just as railway cars need a track to guide them—to leap the track is to find, not freedom, but ruin. Railway President: "Our rules are written in blood." Goethe, *Was wir Bringen*, 19 *Auftritt*: "In vain shall spirits that are all unbound To the pure heights of perfectness aspire; In limitation first the Master shines, And law alone can give us liberty."—Man, as a free being, needs moral law. He is not an automaton, a creature of necessity, governed only by physical influences. With conscience to command the right, and will to choose or reject it, his true dignity and calling are that he should freely realize the right.—Man, as a progressive being, needs nothing less than an ideal and infinite standard of attainment, a goal which he can never overpass, an end which shall ever attract and urge him forward. This he finds in the holiness of God.

The law is a fence, not only for ownership, but for care. God not only demands, but he protects. Law is the transcript of love as well as of holiness. We may reverse the well-known couplet and say: "I slept, and dreamed that life was Duty; I woke and found that life was Beauty." "Cui servire regnare est." Butcher, *Aspects of Greek Genius*, 56—"In Plato's *Crito*, the Laws are made to present themselves in person to Socrates in prison, not only as the guardians of his liberty, but as his lifelong friends, his well-wishers, his equals, with whom he had of his own free will entered into binding compact." It does not harm the scholar to have before him the ideal of perfect scholarship; nor the teacher to have before him the ideal of a perfect school; nor the legislator to have before him the ideal of perfect law. Gordon, *The Christ of To-day*, 124—"The moral goal must be a flying goal; the standard to which we are to grow must be ever rising; the type to which we are to be conformed must have in it inexhaustible fulness."

John Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, 2:119—"It is just the best, purest, noblest human souls, who are least satisfied with themselves and their own spiritual attainments; and the reason is that the human is not a nature essentially different from the divine, but a nature which, just because it is in essential affinity with God, can be satisfied with nothing less than a divine perfection." J. M. Whiton, *The Divine Satisfaction*: "Law requires being, character, likeness to God. It is automatic, self-operating. Penalty is untransferable. It cannot admit of any other satisfaction than the reestablishment of the normal relation which it requires. Punishment proclaims that the law has not been satisfied. There is no cancelling of the curse except through the growing up of the normal relation. Blessing and curse ensue upon what we are, not upon what we were. Reparation is within the spirit itself. The atonement is educational, not governmental." We reply that the atonement is both governmental and educational, and that reparation must first be made to the holiness of God before conscience, the mirror of God's holiness, can reflect that reparation and be at peace.

The law of God is therefore characterized by:

(a) All-comprehensiveness.—It is over us at all times; it respects our past, our present, our future. It forbids every conceivable sin; it requires every conceivable virtue; omissions as well as commissions are condemned by it.

Pa. 119:96—"I have seen an end of all perfection . . . thy commandment is exceeding broad"; Rom. 3:23—"all have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God"; James 4:17—"To him therefore that knoweth to do good, and

death it not, to him it is sin." Gravitation holds the mote as well as the world. God's law detects and denounces the least sin, so that without atonement it cannot be pardoned. The law of gravitation may be suspended or abrogated, for it has no necessary ground in God's being; but God's moral law cannot be suspended or abrogated, for that would contradict God's holiness. "About right" is not "all right." "The giant hexagonal pillars of basalt in the Scottish Staffa are identical in form with the microscopic crystals of the same mineral." So God is our pattern, and goodness is our likeness to him.

(b) Spirituality.—It demands not only right acts and words, but also right dispositions and states. Perfect obedience requires not only the intense and unremitting reign of love toward God and man, but conformity of the whole inward and outward nature of man to the holiness of God.

Mat. 5: 22, 28—the angry word is murder; the sinful look is adultery. Mark 12: 30, 31—"thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength . . . Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"; 2 Cor. 10: 5—"bringing every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ"; Eph. 5: 1—"Be ye therefore imitators of God, as beloved children"; 1 Pet. 1: 16—"Ye shall be holy; for I am holy." As the brightest electric light, seen through a smoked glass against the sun, appears like a black spot, so the brightest unregenerate character is dark, when compared with the holiness of God. Matheson, Moments on the Mount, 235, remarks on Gal. 6: 4—"let each man prove his own work, and then shall he have his glorying in regard of himself alone, and not of his neighbor"—"I have a small candle and I compare it with my brother's taper and come away rejoicing. Why not compare it with the sun? Then I shall lose my pride and uncharitableness." The distance to the sun from the top of an ant-hill and from the top of Mount Everest is nearly the same. The African princess praised for her beauty had no way to verify the compliments paid her but by looking in the glassy surface of the pool. But the trader came and sold her a mirror. Then she was so shocked at her own ugliness that she broke the mirror in pieces. So we look into the mirror of God's law, compare ourselves with the Christ who is reflected there, and hate the mirror which reveals us to ourselves (James 1: 23, 24).

(c) Solidarity.—It exhibits in all its parts the nature of the one Lawgiver, and it expresses, in its least command, the one requirement of harmony with him.

Mat. 5: 48—"Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect"; Mark 12: 30, 31—"The Lord our God, the Lord is one: and thou shalt love the Lord thy God"; James 2: 10—"For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet stumble in one point, he is become guilty of all"; 4: 12—"One only is the lawgiver and judge." Even little rattlesnakes are snakes. One link broken in the chain, and the bucket falls into the well. The least sin separates us from God. The least sin renders us guilty of the whole law, because it shows us to lack the love which is required in all the commandments. Those who send us to the Sermon on the Mount for salvation send us to a tribunal that damns us. The Sermon on the Mount is but a republication of the law given on Sinai, but now in more spiritual and penetrating form. Thunders and lightnings proceed from the N. T., as from the O. T., mount. The Sermon on the Mount is only the introductory lecture of Jesus' theological course, as John 14-17 is the closing lecture. In it is announced the law, which prepares the way for the gospel. Those who would degrade doctrine by exalting precept will find that they have left men without the motive or the power to keep the precept. Æschylus, Agamemnon: "For there's no bulwark in man's wealth to him Who, through a surfeit, kicks—into the dim And disappearing—Right's great altar."

Only to the first man, then, was the law proposed as a method of salvation. With the first sin, all hope of obtaining the divine favor by perfect obedience is lost. To sinners the law remains as a means of discovering and developing sin in its true nature, and of compelling a recourse to the mercy provided in Jesus Christ.

3 Chron. 34: 19—"And it came to pass, when the king had heard the words of the law, that he rent his clothes"; Job 42: 5, 6—"I had heard of thee by the hearing of the ear; But now mine eye seeth thee; Wherefore I abhor myself, And repent in dust and ashes." The revelation of God in Is. 6: 3, 5—"Holy, holy, holy, is Jehovah of hosts"—causes the prophet to cry like the leper: "Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips." Rom. 3: 20—"by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight; for through the law cometh the

knowledge of sin"; 5: 20—"the law came in beside, that the trespass might abound"; 7: 7, 8—"I had not known sin, except through the law: for I had not known coveting, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet: but sin, finding occasion, wrought in me through the commandment all manner of coveting: for apart from the law sin is dead"; Gal. 3: 24—"So that the law is become our tutor, or attendant-slave, to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith"—the law trains our wayward boyhood and leads it to Christ the Master, as in old times the slave accompanied children to school. Stevens, *Pauline Theology*, 177, 178—"The law increases sin by increasing the knowledge of sin and by increasing the activity of sin. The law does not add to the inherent energy of the sinful principle which pervades human nature, but it does cause this principle to reveal itself more energetically in sinful act." The law inspires fear, but it leads to love. The Rabbins said that, if Israel repented but for one day, the Messiah would appear.

No man ever yet drew a straight line or a perfect curve; yet he would be a poor architect who contented himself with anything less. Since men never come up to their ideals, he who aims to live only an average moral life will inevitably fall below the average. The law, then, leads to Christ. He who is the ideal is also the way to attain the ideal. He who is himself the Word and the Law embodied, is also the Spirit of life that makes obedience possible to us (John 14: 6—"I am the way, and the truth, and the life"; Rom. 8: 2—"For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus made me free from the law of sin and of death"). Mrs. Browning, *Aurora Leigh*: "The Christ himself had been no Lawgiver, Unless he had given the Life too with the Law." Christ for us upon the Cross, and Christ in us by his Spirit, is the only deliverance from the curse of the law; Gal. 3: 13—"Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us." We must see the claims of the law satisfied and the law itself written on our hearts. We are "reconciled to God through the death of his Son," but we are also "saved by his life" (Rom. 5: 10).

Robert Browning, in *The Ring and the Book*, represents Caponsacchi as comparing himself at his best with the new ideal of "perfect as Father in heaven is perfect" suggested by Pompilia's purity, and as breaking out into the cry: "O great, just, good God! Miserable me!" In the Interpreter's House of Pilgrim's Progress, Law only stirred up the dust in the foul room,—the Gospel had to sprinkle water on the floor before it could be cleansed. E. G. Robinson: "It is necessary to smoke a man out, before you can bring a higher motive to bear upon him." Barnabas said that Christ was the answer to the riddle of the law. Rom. 10: 4—"Christ is the end of the law unto righteousness to every one that believeth." The railroad track opposite Detroit on the St. Clair River runs to the edge of the dock and seems intended to plunge the train into the abyss. But when the ferry boat comes up, rails are seen upon its deck, and the boat is the end of the track, to carry passengers over to Detroit. So the law, which by itself would bring only destruction, finds its end in Christ who ensures our passage to the celestial city.

Law, then, with its picture of spotless innocence, simply reminds man of the heights from which he has fallen. "It is a mirror which reveals derangement, but does not create or remove it." With its demand of absolute perfection, up to the measure of man's original endowments and possibilities, it drives us, in despair of ourselves, to Christ as our only righteousness and our only Savior (Rom. 8: 3, 4—"For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh: that the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit"; Phil. 3: 8, 9—"that I may gain Christ, and be found in him, not having a righteousness of mine own, even that which is of the law, but that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is from God by faith"). Thus law must prepare the way for grace, and John the Baptist must precede Christ.

When Sarah Bernhardt was solicited to add an eleventh commandment, she declined upon the ground there were already ten too many. It was an expression of pagan contempt of law. In heathendom, sin and insensibility to sin increased together. In Judaism and Christianity, on the contrary, there has been a growing sense of sin's guilt and condemnableness. McLaren, in *S. S. Times*, Sept. 23, 1893: 600—"Among the Jews there was a far profounder sense of sin than in any other ancient nation. The law written on men's hearts evoked a lower consciousness of sin, and there are prayers on the Assyrian and Babylonian tablets which may almost stand beside the 51st Psalm. But, on the whole, the deep sense of sin was the product of the revealed law." See Fairbairn, *Revelation of Law and Scripture*; Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 187-242; Hovey, *God with Us*, 187-210; Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 1: 45-50; Murphy, *Scientific Bases of Faith*, 52-71; Martineau, *Types*, 2: 120-125.

2. *Positive Enactment*, or the expression of the will of God in published ordinances. This is also two-fold:

**A. General moral precepts.**—These are written summaries of the elemental law (Mat. 5 : 43 ; 22 : 37-40), or authorized applications of it to special human conditions (Ex. 20 : 1-17 ; Mat. chap. 5-8).

Mat. 5 : 48—“Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect” ; 22 : 37-40—“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . . Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments the whole law hangeth and the prophets” ; Ex. 20 : 1-17—the Ten Commandments ; Mat. chap. 5-8—the Sermon on the Mount. Cf. Augustine, on Ps. 57 : 1.

Solly, On the Will, 162, gives two illustrations of the fact that positive precepts are merely applications of elemental law or the law of nature : “*Thou shalt not steal*, is a moral law which may be stated thus : *thou shalt not take that for thy own property, which is the property of another*. The contradictory of this proposition would be : *thou mayest take that for thy own property which is the property of another*. But this is a contradiction in terms ; for it is the very conception of property, that the owner stands in a peculiar relation to its subject matter ; and what is every man's property is no man's property, as it is proper to no man. Hence the contradictory of the commandment contains a simple contradiction directly it is made a rule universal ; and the commandment itself is established as one of the principles for the harmony of individual wills.

“*Thou shalt not tell a lie*, as a rule of morality, may be expressed generally : *thou shalt not by thy outward act make another to believe thy thought to be other than it is*. The contradictory made universal is : *every man may by his outward act make another to believe his thought to be other than it is*. Now this maxim also contains a contradiction, and is self-destructive. It conveys a permission to do that which is rendered impossible by the permission itself. Absolute and universal indifference to truth, or the entire mutual independence of the thought and symbol, makes the symbol cease to be a symbol, and the conveyance of thought by its means, an impossibility.”

Kant, *Metaphysic of Ethics*, 48, 90—“Fundamental law of reason : So act, that thy maxims of will might become laws in a system of universal moral legislation.” This is Kant's categorical imperative. He expresses it in yet another form : “Act from maxims fit to be regarded as universal laws of nature.” For expositions of the Decalogue which bring out its spiritual meaning, see Kurtz, *Religionslehre*, 9-73 ; Dick, *Theology*, 3 : 513-554 ; Dwight, *Theology*, 3 : 163-560 ; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 3 : 259-455.

**B. Ceremonial or special injunctions.**—These are illustrations of the elemental law, or approximate revelations of it, suited to lower degrees of capacity and to earlier stages of spiritual training (Ex. 20 : 25 ; Mat. 19 : 8 ; Mark 10 : 5). Though temporary, only God can say when they cease to be binding upon us in their outward form.

All positive enactments, therefore, whether they be moral or ceremonial, are republications of elemental law. Their forms may change, but the substance is eternal. Certain modes of expression, like the Mosaic system, may be abolished, but the essential demands are unchanging (Mat. 5 : 17, 18 ; cf. Eph. 2 : 15). From the imperfection of human language, no positive enactments are able to express in themselves the whole content and meaning of the elemental law. “It is not the purpose of revelation to disclose the whole of our duties.” Scripture is not a complete code of rules for practical action, but an enunciation of principles, with occasional precepts by way of illustration. Hence we must supplement the positive enactment by the law of being—the moral ideal found in the nature of God.

Ex. 20 : 25—“Moreover also I gave them statutes that were not good, and ordinances wherein they should not live” ; Mat. 19 : 8—“Moses for your hardness of heart suffered you to put away your wives” ; Mark 10 : 5—“For your hardness of heart he wrote you this commandment” ; Mat. 5 : 17, 18—“Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets : I came not to destroy, but to fulfill. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the law, till all things be accomplished” ; cf. Eph. 2 : 15—“having abolished in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances” ; Heb. 8 : 7—“if that first covenant had been faultless, then would no place have been sought for a second.” Fisher, *Nature and Method of Revelation*, 90—“After the coming of the new covenant, the keeping up of the old was as

needless a burden as winter garments in the mild air of summer, or as the attempt of an adult to wear the clothes of a child."

Wendt, Teaching of Jesus, 2:5-35—"Jesus repudiates for himself and for his disciples absolute subjection to O. T. Sabbath law (Mark 3:27 sq.); to O. T. law as to external defilements (Mark 7:15); to O. T. divorce law (Mark 10:2 sq.). He would 'fulfil' law and prophets by complete practical performance of the revealed will of God. He would bring out their inner meaning, not by literal and slavish obedience to every minute requirement of the Mosaic law, but by revealing in himself the perfect life and work toward which they tended. He would perfect the O. T. conceptions of God—not keep them intact in their literal form, but in their essential spirit. Not by quantitative extension, but by qualitative renewal, he would fulfil the law and the prophets. He would bring the imperfect expression in the O. T. to perfection, not by servile letter-worship or allegorizing, but through grasp of the divine idea."

Scripture is not a series of minute injunctions and prohibitions such as the Pharisees and the Jesuits laid down. The Koran showed its immeasurable inferiority to the Bible by establishing the letter instead of the spirit, by giving permanent, definite, and specific rules of conduct, instead of leaving room for the growth of the free spirit and for the education of conscience. This is not true either of O. T. or of N. T. law. In Miss Fowler's novel *The Farringtons*, Mrs. Herbert wishes "that the Bible had been written on the principle of that dreadful little book called 'Don't,' which gives a list of the solecisms you should avoid; she would have understood it so much better than the present system." Our Savior's words about giving to him that asketh, and turning the cheek to the smiter (Mat 5:39-42) must be interpreted by the principle of love that lies at the foundation of the law. Giving to every tramp and yielding to every marauder is not pleasing our neighbor "for that which is good unto edifying" (Rom. 15:2). Only by confounding the divine law with Scripture prohibition could one write as in *N. Amer. Rev.*, Feb. 1890:275—"Sin is the transgression of a divine law; but there is no divine law against suicide; therefore suicide is not sin."

The written law was imperfect because God could, at the time, give no higher to an unenlightened people. "But to say that the scope and design were imperfectly moral, is contradicted by the whole course of the history. We must ask what is the moral standard in which this course of education issues." And this we find in the life and precepts of Christ. Even the law of repentance and faith does not take the place of the old law of being, but applies the latter to the special conditions of sin. Under the Levitical law, the prohibition of the touching of the dry bone (Num. 19:16), equally with the purifications and sacrifices, the separations and penalties of the Mosaic code, expressed God's holiness and his repelling from him all that savored of sin or death. The laws with regard to leprosy were symbolic, as well as sanitary. So church polity and the ordinances are not arbitrary requirements, but they publish to dull sense-environed consciences, better than abstract propositions could have done, the fundamental truths of the Christian scheme. Hence they are not to be abrogated "all in one" (1 Cor. 11:22).

The Puritans, however, in reëdicting the Mosaic code, made the mistake of confounding the eternal law of God with a partial, temporary, and obsolete expression of it. So we are not to rest in external precepts respecting woman's hair and dress and speech, but to find the underlying principle of modesty and subordination which alone is of universal and eternal validity. Robert Browning, *The Ring and the Book*, 1:255—"God breathes, not speaks, his verdicts, felt not heard—Passed on successively to each court, I call Man's conscience, custom, manners, all that make More and more effort to promulgate, mark God's verdict in determinable words, Till last come human jurists—solidify Fluid results,—what's fixable lies forged, Statute,—the residue escapes in fume, Yet hangs aloft a cloud, as palpable To the finer sense as word the legist welds. Justinian's Pandects only make precise What simply sparkled in men's eyes before, Twitched in their brow or quivered on their lip, Waited the speech they called, but would not come." See Mozley, *Ruling Ideas in Early Ages*, 104; Tulloch, *Doctrine of Sin*, 141-144; Finney, *Syst. Theol.*, 1-40, 185-319; Mansel, *Metaphysics*, 373, 379; H. B. Smith, *System of Theology*, 191-193.

Paul's injunction to women to keep silence in the churches (1 Cor. 14:35; 1 Tim. 2:11, 12) is to be interpreted by the larger law of gospel equality and privilege (Gal. 3:28). Modesty and subordination once required a seclusion of the female sex which is no longer obligatory. Christianity has emancipated woman and has restored her to the dignity which belonged to her at the beginning. "In the old dispensation Miriam and Deborah and Huldah were recognized as leaders of God's people, and Anna was a notable prophetess

in the temple courts at the time of the coming of Christ. Elizabeth and Mary spoke songs of praise for all generations. A prophecy of Joel 2:28 was that the daughters of the Lord's people should prophesy, under the guidance of the Spirit, in the new dispensation. Philip the evangelist had 'four virgin daughters, who prophesied' (Acts 21:9), and Paul cautioned Christian women to have their heads covered when they prayed or prophesied in public (1 Cor. 11:5), but had no words against the work of such women. He brought Priscilla with him to Ephesus, where she aided in training Apollos into better preaching power (Acts 18:26). He welcomed and was grateful for the work of those women who labored with him in the gospel at Philippi (Phil. 4:3). And it is certainly an inference from the spirit and teachings of Paul that we should rejoice in the efficient service and sound words of Christian women to-day in the Sunday School and in the missionary field." The command "And he that heareth let him say, Come" (Rev. 22:17) is addressed to women also. See Ellen Batelle Dietrick, Women in the Early Christian Ministry; *per contra*, see G. F. Wilkin, Prophecy of Women, 183-193.

### III. RELATION OF THE LAW TO THE GRACE OF GOD.

In human government, while law is an expression of the will of the governing power, and so of the nature lying behind the will, it is by no means an exhaustive expression of that will and nature, since it consists only of general ordinances, and leaves room for particular acts of command through the executive, as well as for "the institution of equity, the faculty of discretionary punishment, and the prerogative of pardon."

Amos, Science of Law, 29-46, shows how "the institution of equity, the faculty of discretionary punishment, and the prerogative of pardon" all involve expressions of will above and beyond what is contained in mere statute. Century Dictionary, on Equity: "English law had once to do only with property in goods, houses and lands. A man who had none of these might have an interest in a salary, a patent, a contract, a copyright, a security, but a creditor could not at common law levy upon these. When the creditor applied to the crown for redress, a chancellor or keeper of the king's conscience was appointed, who determined what and how the debtor should pay. Often the debtor was required to put his intangible property into the hands of a receiver and could regain possession of it only when the claim against it was satisfied. These chancellors' courts were called courts of equity, and redressed wrongs which the common law did not provide for. In later times law and equity are administered for the most part by the same courts. The same court sits at one time as a court of law, and at another time as a court of equity." "Summa lex, summa injuria," is sometimes true.

Applying now to the divine law this illustration drawn from human law, we remark:

(a) The law of God is a general expression of God's will, applicable to all moral beings. It therefore does not exclude the possibility of special injunctions to individuals, and special acts of wisdom and power in creation and providence. The very speciality of these latter expressions of will prevents us from classing them under the category of law.

Lord Bacon, Confession of Faith: "The soul of man was not produced by heaven or earth, but was breathed immediately from God; so the ways and dealings of God with spirits are not included in nature, that is, in the laws of heaven and earth, but are reserved to the law of his secret will and grace."

(b) The law of God, accordingly, is a partial, not an exhaustive, expression of God's nature. It constitutes, indeed, a manifestation of that attribute of holiness which is fundamental in God, and which man must possess in order to be in harmony with God. But it does not fully express God's nature in its aspects of personality, sovereignty, helpfulness, mercy.

The chief error of all pantheistic theology is the assumption that law is an exhaustive expression of God: Straus, Glaubenslehre, 1:31—"If nature, as the self-realization of

the divine essence, is equal to this divine essence, then it is infinite, and there can be nothing above and beyond it." This is a denial of the transcendence of God (see notes on Pantheism, pages 100-105). Mere law is illustrated by the Buddhist proverb: "As the cartwheel follows the tread of the ox, so punishment follows sin." Denovan: "Apart from Christ, even if we have never yet broken the law, it is only by steady and perfect obedience for the entire future that we can remain justified. If we have sinned, we can be justified [without Christ] only by suffering and exhausting the whole penalty of the law."

(c) Mere law, therefore, leaves God's nature in these aspects of personality, sovereignty, helpfulness, mercy, to be expressed toward sinners in another way, namely, through the atoning, regenerating, pardoning, sanctifying work of the gospel of Christ. As creation does not exclude miracles, so law does not exclude grace (Rom. 8:3—"what the law could not do . . . . God" did).

Murphy, *Scientific Basis*, 303-327, esp. 315—"To impersonal law, it is indifferent whether its subjects obey or not. But God desires, not the punishment, but the destruction, of sin." Campbell, *Atonement*, *Introd.*, 28—"There are two regions of the divine self-manifestation, one the reign of law, the other the kingdom of God." C. H. M.: "Law is the transcript of the mind of God as to what man ought to be. But God is not merely law, but love. There is more in his heart than could be wrapped up in the 'tan words.' Not the law, but only Christ, is the perfect image of God" (John 1:17—"For the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ"). So there is more in man's heart toward God than exact fulfillment of requirement. The mother who sacrifices herself for her sick child does it, not because she must, but because she loves. To say that we are saved by grace, is to say that we are saved both without merit on our own part, and without necessity on the part of God. Grace is made known in proclamation, offer, command; but in all these it is gospel, or glad-tidings.

(d) Grace is to be regarded, however, not as abrogating law, but as republishing and enforcing it (Rom. 8:31—"we establish the law"). By removing obstacles to pardon in the mind of God, and by enabling man to obey, grace secures the perfect fulfillment of law (Rom. 8:4—"that the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us"). Even grace has its law (Rom. 8:2—"the law of the Spirit of life"); another higher law of grace, the operation of individualizing mercy, overbears the "law of sin and of death,"—this last, as in the case of the miracle, not being suspended, annulled, or violated, but being merged in, while it is transcended by, the exertion of personal divine will.

Hooker, *Ecol. Polity*, 1: 155, 185, 194—"Man, having utterly disabled his nature unto those [natural] means, hath had other revealed by God, and hath received from heaven a law to teach him how that which is desired naturally, must now be supernaturally attained. Finally, we see that, because those latter exclude not the former as unnecessary, therefore the law of grace teaches and includes natural duties also, such as are hard to ascertain by the law of nature." The truth is midway between the Pelagian view, that there is no obstacle to the forgiveness of sins, and the modern rationalistic view, that since law fully expresses God, there can be no forgiveness of sins at all. Greg, *Creed of Christendom*, 2: 217-228—"God is the only being who cannot forgive sins. . . . Punishment is not the execution of a sentence, but the occurrence of an effect." Robertson, *Lect. on Genesis*, 100—"Deeds are irrevocable,—their consequences are knit up with them irrevocably." So Baden Powell, *Law and Gospel*, in Noyes' *Theological Essays*, 27. All this is true if God be regarded as merely the source of law. But there is such a thing as grace, and grace is more than law. There is no forgiveness in nature, but grace is above and beyond nature.

Bradford, *Heredity*, 283, quotes from Huxley the terrible utterance: "Nature always checkmates, without haste and without remorse, never overlooking a mistake, or making the slightest allowance for ignorance." Bradford then remarks: "This is Calvinism with God left out. Christianity does not deny or minimize the law of retribution, but it discloses a Person who is able to deliver in spite of it. There is grace,

but grace brings salvation to those who accept the terms of salvation — terms strictly in accord with the laws revealed by science." God revealed himself, we add, not only in law but in life; see Deut. 1: 6, 7—"Ye have dwelt long enough in this mountain"—the mountain of the law; "turn you and take your journey"—*i. e.*, see how God's law is to be applied to life.

(e) Thus the revelation of grace, while it takes up and includes in itself the revelation of law, adds something different in kind, namely, the manifestation of the personal love of the Lawgiver. Without grace, law has only a demanding aspect. Only in connection with grace does it become "the perfect law, the law of liberty" (James 1: 25). In fine, grace is that larger and completer manifestation of the divine nature, of which law constitutes the necessary but preparatory stage.

Law reveals God's love and mercy, but only in their mandatory aspect; it requires in men conformity to the love and mercy of God; and as love and mercy in God are conditioned by holiness, so law requires that love and mercy should be conditioned by holiness in men. Law is therefore chiefly a revelation of holiness: it is in grace that we find the chief revelation of love; though even love does not save by ignoring holiness, but rather by vicariously satisfying its demands. Robert Browning, *Saul*: "I spoke as I saw. I report as man may of God's work—All's Love, yet all's Law."

Dorner, *Person of Christ*, 1: 64, 78—"The law was a word (*λόγος*), but it was not a *λόγος τέλειος*, a plastic word, like the words of God that brought forth the world, for it was only imperative, and there was no reality nor willing corresponding to the command (*dem Sollen fehlte das Seyn, das Wollen*). The Christian *λόγος* is *λόγος ἀληθίνος*—*ὁ ὁμοῦς τέλειος τῆς ἀληθείας*—an operative and effective word, as that of creation." Chaucer, *The Persones Tale*: "For sothly the laws of God is the love of God." *S. S. Times*, Sept. 14, 1901: 595—"Until a man ceases to be an outsider to the kingdom and knows the liberty of the sons of God, he is apt to think of God as the great Exacter, the great Forbidder, who reaps where he has not sown and gathers where he has not strewn." Burton, in *Bap. Rev.*, July, 1879: 261-273, art.: *Law and Divine Intervention*; Farrar, *Science and Theology*, 184; Salmon, *Reign of Law*; Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 1: 81.

## SECTION II.—NATURE OF SIN.

### I. DEFINITION OF SIN.

Sin is lack of conformity to the moral law of God, either in act, disposition, or state.

In explanation, we remark that (a) This definition regards sin as predicable only of rational and voluntary agents. (b) It assumes, however, that man has a rational nature below consciousness, and a voluntary nature apart from actual volition. (c) It holds that the divine law requires moral likeness to God in the affections and tendencies of the nature, as well as in its outward activities. (d) It therefore considers lack of conformity to the divine holiness in disposition or state as a violation of law, equally with the outward act of transgression.

In our discussion of the Will (pages 504-518), we noticed that there are permanent states of the will, as well as of the intellect and of the sensibilities. It is evident, moreover, that these permanent states, unlike man's deliberate acts, are always very imperfectly conscious, and in many cases are not conscious at all. Yet it is in these very states that man is most unlike God, and so, as law only reflects God (see pages 537-544), most lacking in conformity to God's law.

One main difference between Old School and New School views of sin is that the latter constantly tends to limit sin to mere act, while the former finds sin in the states of the soul. We propose what we think to be a valid and proper compromise between the two.

We make sin coextensive, not with act, but with activity. The Old School and the New School are not so far apart, when we remember that the New School "choice" is *elective preference*, exercised so soon as the child is born (Park) and reasserting itself in all the subordinate choices of life; while the Old School "state" is not a dead, passive, mechanical thing, but is a *state of active movement*, or of tendency to move, toward evil. As God's holiness is not passive purity but purity willing (pages 268-275), so the opposite to this, sin, is not passive impurity but is impurity willing.

The soul may not always be conscious, but it may always be active. At his creation man "became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7), and it may be doubted whether the human spirit ever ceases its activity, any more than the divine Spirit in whose image it is made. There is some reason to believe that even in the deepest sleep the body rests rather than the mind. And when we consider how large a portion of our activity is automatic and continuous, we see the impossibility of limiting the term 'sin' to the sphere of momentary act, whether conscious or unconscious.

E. G. Robinson: "Sin is not mere act—something foreign to the being. It is a quality of being. There is no such thing as a sin apart from a sinner, or an act apart from an actor. God punishes sinners, not sins. Sin is a mode of being; as an entity by itself it never existed. God punishes sin as a state, not as an act. Man is not responsible for the consequences of his crimes, nor for the acts themselves, except as they are symptomatic of his personal states." Dörner, *Hist. Doct. Person Christ*, 5: 183—"The knowledge of sin has justly been termed the  $\beta$  and  $\psi$  of philosophy."

Our treatment of Holiness, as belonging to the nature of God (pages 268-275); of Will, as not only the faculty of volitions, but also a permanent state of the soul (pages 504-513); and of Law as requiring the conformity of man's nature to God's holiness (pages 537-544); has prepared us for the definition of sin as a state. The chief psychological defect of New School theology, next to its making holiness to be a mere form of love, is its ignoring of the unconscious and subconscious elements in human character. To help our understanding of sin as an underlying and permanent state of the soul, we subjoin references to recent writers of note upon psychology and its relations to theology.

We may preface our quotations by remarking that mind is always greater than its conscious operations. The man is more than his acts. Only the smallest part of the self is manifested in the thoughts, feelings, and volitions. In counting, to put myself to sleep, I find, when my attention has been diverted by other thoughts, that the counting has gone on all the same. Ladd, *Philosophy of Mind*, 176, speaks of the "dramatic sundering of the ego." There are dream-conversations. Dr. Johnson was once greatly vexed at being worsted by his opponent in an argument in a dream. M. Maury in a dream corrected the bad English of his real self by the good English of his other unreal self. Spurgeon preached a sermon in his sleep after vainly trying to excoogitate one when awake, and his wife gave him the substance of it after he woke. Hegel said that "Life is divided into two realms—a night-life of genius, and a day-life of consciousness."

Du Prel, *Philosophy of Mysticism*, propounds the thesis: "The ego is not wholly embraced in self-consciousness," and claims that there is much of psychical activity within us of which our common waking conception of ourselves takes no account. Thus when 'dream dramatizes'—when we engage in a dream-conversation in which our interlocutor's answer comes to us with a shock of surprise—if our own mind is assumed to have furnished that answer, it has done so by a process of unconscious activity. Dwinell, in *Bib. Sac.*, July, 1890: 369-389—"The soul is only imperfectly in possession of its organs, and is able to report only a small part of its activities in consciousness." Thoughts come to us like foundlings laid at our door. We slip in a question to the librarian, Memory, and after leaving it there awhile the answer appears on the bulletin board. Delboeuf, *Le Sommeil et les Rêves*, 91—"The dreamer is a momentary and involuntary dupe of his own imagination, as the poet is the momentary and voluntary dupe, and the insane man is the permanent and involuntary dupe." If we are the organs not only of our own past thinking, but, as Herbert Spencer suggests, also the organs of the past thinking of the race, his doctrine may give additional, though unintended, confirmation to a Scriptural view of sin.

William James, *Will to Believe*, 316, quotes from F. W. H. Myers, in *Jour. Psych. Research*, who likens our ordinary consciousness to the visible part of the solar spectrum; the total consciousness is like that spectrum prolonged by the inclusion of the ultra-red and the ultra-violet rays — 1 to 12 and 96. "Each of us," he says, "is an abiding psychological entity far more extensive than he knows—an individuality which can never express itself completely through any corporeal manifestation. The self manifests itself through the organism; but there is always some part of the self unmanifested, and always, as it seems, some power of organic expression in abeyance or reserve." William James himself, in *Scribner's Monthly*, March, 1890: 361-373, sketches the hypnotic investigations of Janet and Binet. There is a secondary, subconscious self. Hysteria is the lack of synthesizing power, and consequent disintegration of the field of consciousness into mutually exclusive parts. According to Janet, the secondary and the primary consciousnesses, added together, can never exceed the normally total consciousness of the individual. But Prof. James says: "There are trances which obey another type. I know a non-hysterical woman, who in her trances knows facts which altogether transcend her possible normal consciousness, facts about the lives of people whom she never saw or heard of before."

Our affections are deeper and stronger than we know. We learn how deep and strong they are, when their current is resisted by affliction or dammed up by death. We know how powerful evil passions are, only when we try to subdue them. Our dreams show us our naked selves. On the morality of dreams, the *London Spectator* remarks: "Our conscience and power of self-control act as a sort of watchdog over our worse selves during the day, but when the watchdog is off duty, the primitive or natural man is at liberty to act as he pleases; our 'soul' has left us at the mercy of our own evil nature, and in our dreams we become what, except for the grace of God, we would always be."

Both in conscience and in will there is a self-diremption. Kant's categorical imperative is only one self laying down the law to the other self. The whole Kantian system of ethics is based on this doctrine of double consciousness. Ladd, in his *Philosophy of Mind*, 169 *sq.*, speaks of "psychical automatism." Yet this automatism is possible only to self-conscious and cognitively remembering minds. It is always the "I" that puts itself into "that other." We could not conceive of the other self except under the figure of the "I." All our mental operations are ours, and we are responsible for them, because the subconscious and even the unconscious self is the product of past self-conscious thoughts and volitions. The present settled state of our wills is the result of former decisions. The will is a storage battery, charged by past acts, full of latent power, ready to manifest its energy so soon as the force which confines it is withdrawn. On unconscious mental action, see Carpenter, *Mental Physiology*, 136, 515-543, and criticism of Carpenter, in Ireland, *Blot on the Brain*, 226-238; Bramwell, *Hypnotism, its History, Practice and Theory*, 358-398; Porter, *Human Intellect*, 333, 334; *versus* Sir Wm. Hamilton, who adopts the maxim: "Non sentimus, nisi sentiamus nos sentire" (*Philosophy*, ed. Wight, 171). Observe also that sin may infect the body, as well as the soul, and may bring it into a state of non-conformity to God's law (see H. B. Smith, *Syst. Theol.*, 267).

In adducing our Scriptural and rational proof of the definition of sin as a state, we desire to obviate the objection that this view leaves the soul wholly given over to the power of evil. While we maintain that this is true of man apart from God, we also insist that side by side with the evil bent of the human will there is always an immanent divine power which greatly counteracts the force of evil, and if not resisted leads the individual soul—even when resisted leads the race at large—toward truth and salvation. This immanent divine power is none other than Christ, the eternal Word, the Light which lighteth every man; see John 1:4, 9.

John 1:4, 9— "In him was life, and the life was the light of men. . . . There was the true light, even the light which lighteth every man." See a further statement in A. H. Strong, *Cleveland Sermon*, May, 1904, with regard to the old and the new view as to sin:—"Our fathers believed in total depravity, and we agree with them that man naturally is devoid of love to God and that every faculty is weakened, disordered, and corrupted by the selfish bent of his will. They held to original sin. The selfish bent of man's will can be traced back to the apostasy of our first parents; and, on account of that departure of the race from God,

all men are by nature children of wrath. And all this is true, if it is regarded as a statement of the facts, apart from their relation to Christ. But our fathers did not see, as we do, that man's relation to Christ antedated the Fall and constituted an underlying and modifying condition of man's life. Humanity was naturally in Christ, in whom all things were created and in whom they all consist. Even man's sin did not prevent Christ from still working in him to counteract the evil and to suggest the good. There was an internal, as well as an external, preparation for man's redemption. In this sense, of a divine principle in man striving against the selfish and godless will, there was a total redemption, over against man's total depravity; and an original grace, that was even more powerful than original sin.

"We have become conscious that total depravity alone is not a sufficient or proper expression of the truth; and the phrase has been outgrown. It has been felt that the old view of sin did not take account of the generous and noble aspirations, the unselfish efforts, the strivings after God, of even unregenerate men. For this reason there has been less preaching about sin, and less conviction as to its guilt and condemnation. The good impulses of men outside the Christian pale have been often credited to human nature, when they should have been credited to the indwelling Spirit of Christ. I make no doubt that one of our radical weaknesses at this present time is our more superficial view of sin. Without some sense of sin's guilt and condemnation, we cannot feel our need of redemption. John the Baptist must go before Christ; the law must prepare the way for the gospel.

"My belief is that the new apprehension of Christ's relation to the race will enable us to declare, as never before, the lost condition of the sinner; while at the same time we show him that Christ is with him and in him to save. This presence in every man of a power not his own that works for righteousness is a very different doctrine from that 'divinity of man' which is so often preached. The divinity is not the divinity of man, but the divinity of Christ. And the power that works for righteousness is not the power of man, but the power of Christ. It is a power whose warning, inviting, persuading influence renders only more marked and dreadful the evil will which hampers and resists it. Depravity is all the worse, when we recognize in it the constant antagonist of an ever-present, all-holy, and all-loving Redeemer."

### 1. Proof.

As it is readily admitted that the outward act of transgression is properly denominated sin, we here attempt to show only that lack of conformity to the law of God in disposition or state is also and equally to be so denominated.

#### A. From Scripture.

(a) The words ordinarily translated 'sin,' or used as synonyms for it, are as applicable to dispositions and states as to acts ( $\text{ἡμαρτία}$  and  $\text{ἀμαρτία}$  = a missing, failure, coming short [sc. of God's will]).

See Num. 15:22—"sinnest unwittingly"; Ps. 51:3—"cleanse me from my sin"; 5—"Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me"; Rom. 7:17—"sin which dwelleth in me"; compare Judges 20:16, where the literal meaning of the word appears; "slung stones at a hair-breadth, and not miss" ( $\text{נִשְׁטָּט}$ ). In a similar manner,  $\text{שָׁשַׁב}$  [LXX  $\text{ἀπέβη}$ ] = separation from, rebellion against [sc. God]; see Lev. 16:16, 21; cf. Delitzsch on Ps. 32:1.  $\text{שָׁשַׁב}$  [LXX  $\text{ἀπέβη}$ ] = bending, perversion [sc. of what is right], iniquity; see Lev. 5:17; cf. John 7:18. See also the Hebrew  $\text{שָׁשַׁב}$ ,  $\text{שָׁשַׁב}$ , [-ruin, confusion], and the Greek  $\text{ἀνομοσία}$ ,  $\text{ἀνομία}$ ,  $\text{ἔχθρα}$ ,  $\text{κακία}$ ,  $\text{πορνεία}$ ,  $\text{ἀσέβεια}$ . None of these designations of sin limits it to mere act,—most of them more naturally suggest disposition or state.  $\text{ἀμαρτία}$  implies that man in sin does not reach what he seeks therein; sin is a state of delusion and deception (Julius Müller). On the words mentioned, see Girdlestone, O. T. Synonyms; Cremer, Lexicon N. T. Greek; Present Day Tracts, 5: no. 23, pp. 48-47; Trench, N. T. Synonyms, part 2: 61, 73.

(b) The New Testament descriptions of sin bring more distinctly to view the states and dispositions than the outward acts of the soul (1 John 3:4— $\text{ἡ ἀμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία}$ , where  $\text{ἀνομία}$  =, not "transgression of the law," but, as both context and etymology show, "lack of conformity to law" or "lawlessness"—Rev. Vers.).

See 1 John 5: 17—“All unrighteousness is sin”; Rom. 14: 23—“whatever is not of faith is sin”; James 4: 17—“To him therefore that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin.” Where the sin is that of *not doing*, sin cannot be said to consist in *act*. It must then at least be a *state*.

(c) Moral evil is ascribed not only to the thoughts and affections, but to the heart from which they spring (we read of the “evil thoughts” and of the “evil heart”—Mat. 15: 19 and Heb. 3: 12).

See also Mat. 5: 22—anger in the heart is murder; 28—impure desire is adultery. Luke 6: 45—“the evil man out of the evil treasure [of his heart] bringeth forth that which is evil.” Heb. 3: 13—“an evil heart of unbelief”; cf. Is. 1: 5—“the whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint”; Jer. 17: 9—“The heart is deceitful above all things, and it is exceedingly corrupt: who can know it?”—here the sin that cannot be known is not sin of act, but sin of the heart. “Below the surface stream, shallow and light, Of what we say we feel; below the stream, As light, of what we think we feel, there flows, With silent current, strong, obscure and deep, The central stream of what we feel *indeed*.”

(d) The state or condition of the soul which gives rise to wrong desires and acts is expressly called sin (Rom. 7: 8—“Sin . . . wrought in me . . . all manner of coveting”).

John 8: 34—“Every one that committeth sin is the bondservant of sin”; Rom. 7: 11, 13, 14, 17, 20—“sin . . . beguiled me . . . working death to me . . . I am carnal, sold under sin . . . sin which dwelleth in me.” These representations of sin as a principle or state of the soul are incompatible with the definition of it as a mere act. John Byrom, 1691-1763: “Think and be careful what thou art within, For there is sin in the desire of sin. Think and be thankful in a different case, For there is grace in the desire of grace.”

Alexander, Theories of the Will, 85—“In the person of Paul is represented the man who has been already justified by faith and who is at peace with God. In the 6th chapter of *Romans*, the question is discussed whether such a man is obliged to keep the moral law. But in the 7th chapter the question is not, *must* man keep the moral law? but why is he so *incapable* of keeping the moral law? The struggle is thus, not in the soul of the unregenerate man who is dead in sin, but in the soul of the regenerate man who has been pardoned and is endeavoring to keep the law. . . . In a state of sin the will is determined toward the bad; in a state of grace the will is determined toward righteousness; but not wholly so, for the flesh is not at once subdued, and there is a war between the good and bad principles of action in the soul of him who has been pardoned.”

(e) Sin is represented as existing in the soul, prior to the consciousness of it, and as only discovered and awakened by the law (Rom. 7: 9, 10—“when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died”—if sin “revived,” it must have had previous existence and life, even though it did not manifest itself in acts of conscious transgression).

Rom. 7: 8—“apart from the law sin is dead”—here is sin which is not yet sin of act. Dead or unconscious sin is still sin. The fire in a cave discovers reptiles and stirs them, but they were there before; the light and heat do not create them. Let a beam of light, says Jean Paul Richter, through your window-shutter into a darkened room, and you reveal a thousand motes floating in the air whose existence was before unsuspected. So the law of God reveals our “hidden faults” (Ps. 19: 12)—infirmities, imperfections, evil tendencies and desires—which also cannot all be classed as acts of transgression.

(f) The allusions to sin as a permanent power or reigning principle, not only in the individual but in humanity at large, forbid us to define it as a momentary act, and compel us to regard it as being primarily a settled depravity of nature, of which individual sins or acts of transgression are the workings and fruits (Rom. 5: 21—“sin reigned in death”; 6: 12—“let not therefore sin reign in your mortal body”).

In Rom. 5: 21, the reign of sin is compared to the reign of grace. As grace is not an act but a principle, so sin is not an act but a principle. As the poisonous exhalations from

a well indicate that there is corruption and death at the bottom, so the ever-recurring thoughts and acts of sin are evidence that there is a principle of sin in the heart,—in other words, that sin exists as a permanent disposition or state. A momentary act cannot "rise" nor "dwell"; a disposition or state can. Maudsley, *Sleep, its Psychology*, makes the damaging confession: "If we were held responsible for our dreams, there is no living man who would not deserve to be hanged."

(g) The Mosaic sacrifices for sins of ignorance and of omission, and especially for general sinfulness, are evidence that sin is not to be limited to mere act, but that it includes something deeper and more permanent in the heart and the life (Lev. 1: 8; 5: 11; 12: 8; cf. Luke 2: 24).

The sin-offering for sins of ignorance (Lev. 4: 14, 20, 31), the trespass-offering for sins of omission (Lev. 5: 5, 6), and the burnt offering to expiate general sinfulness (Lev. 1: 3; cf. Luke 2: 22-24), all witness that sin is not confined to mere act. John 1: 29—"the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin," not the sins, "of the world." See Oehler, O. T. Theology, 1: 233; Schmid, Bib. Theol. N. T., 194, 281, 442, 443, 492, 604; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3: 210-217; Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 2: 250-266; Edwards, Works, 3: 16-18. For the New School definition of sin, see Fitch, Nature of Sin, and Park, in Bib. Sac., 7: 551.

#### B. From the common judgment of mankind.

(a) Men universally attribute vice as well as virtue not only to conscious and deliberate acts, but also to dispositions and states. Belief in something more permanently evil than acts of transgression is indicated in the common phrases, "hateful temper," "wicked pride," "bad character."

As the beatitudes (Mat 5: 1-12) are pronounced, not upon acts, but upon dispositions of the soul, so the curses of the law are uttered not so much against single acts of transgression as against the evil affections from which they spring. Compare the "works of the flesh" (Gal 5: 19) with the "fruit of the Spirit" (5: 22). In both, dispositions and states predominate.

(b) Outward acts, indeed, are condemned only when they are regarded as originating in, and as symptomatic of, evil dispositions. Civil law proceeds upon this principle in holding crime to consist, not alone in the external act, but also in the evil motive or intent with which it is performed.

The *mens rea* is essential to the idea of crime. The "idle word" (Mat 12: 34) shall be brought into the judgment, not because it is so important in itself, but because it is a floating straw that indicates the direction of the whole current of the heart and life. Murder differs from homicide, not in any outward respect, but simply because of the motive that prompts it,—and that motive is always, in the last analysis, an evil disposition or state.

(c) The stronger an evil disposition, or in other words, the more it connects itself with, or resolves itself into, a settled state or condition of the soul, the more blameworthy is it felt to be. This is shown by the distinction drawn between crimes of passion and crimes of deliberation.

Edwards: "Guilt consists in having one's heart wrong, and in doing wrong from the heart." There is guilt in evil desires, even when the will combats them. But there is greater guilt when the will consents. The outward act may be in each case the same, but the guilt of it is proportioned to the extent to which the evil disposition is settled and strong.

(d) This condemning sentence remains the same, even although the origin of the evil disposition or state cannot be traced back to any conscious act of the individual. Neither the general sense of mankind, nor the civil law in which this general sense is expressed, goes behind the fact of an

existing evil will. Whether this evil will is the result of personal transgression or is a hereditary bias derived from generations passed, this evil will is the man himself, and upon him terminates the blame. We do not excuse arrogance or sensuality upon the ground that they are family traits.

The young murderer in Boston was not excused upon the ground of a congenitally cruel disposition. We repent in later years of sins of boyhood, which we only now see to be sins; and converted cannibals repent, after becoming Christians, of the sins of heathendom which they once committed without a thought of their wickedness. The peacock cannot escape from his feet by flying, nor can we absolve ourselves from blame for an evil state of will by tracing its origin to a remote ancestry. We are responsible for what we are. How this can be, when we have not personally and consciously originated it, is the problem of original sin, which we have yet to discuss.

(e) When any evil disposition has such strength in itself, or is so combined with others, as to indicate a settled moral corruption in which no power to do good remains, this state is regarded with the deepest disapprobation of all. Sin weakens man's power of obedience, but the can-not is a will-not, and is therefore condemnable. The opposite principle would lead to the conclusion that, the more a man weakened his powers by transgression, the less guilty he would be, until absolute depravity became absolute innocence.

The boy who hates his father cannot change his hatred into love by a single act of will; but he is not therefore innocent. Spontaneous and uncontrollable profanity is the worst profanity of all. It is a sign that the whole will, like a subterranean Kentucky river, is moving away from God, and that no recuperative power is left in the soul which can reach into the depths to reverse its course. See Dorner, Glaubenslehre, 2: 110-114; Shedd, Hist. Doct., 2: 79-82, 152-157; Richards, Lectures on Theology, 266-301; Edwards, Works, 2: 134; Baird, Elohim Revealed, 248-252; Princeton Essays, 2: 224-230; Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 394.

### C. From the experience of the Christian.

Christian experience is a testing of Scripture truth, and therefore is not an independent source of knowledge. It may, however, corroborate conclusions drawn from the word of God. Since the judgment of the Christian is formed under the influence of the Holy Spirit, we may trust this more implicitly than the general sense of the world. We affirm, then, that just in proportion to his spiritual enlightenment and self-knowledge, the Christian

(a) Regards his outward deviations from God's law, and his evil inclinations and desires, as outgrowths and revelations of a depravity of nature which lies below his consciousness; and

(b) Repents more deeply for this depravity of nature, which constitutes his inmost character and is inseparable from himself, than for what he merely feels or does.

In proof of these statements we appeal to the biographies and writings of those in all ages who have been by general consent regarded as most advanced in spiritual culture and discernment.

"Intelligentia prima est, ut te noris peccatorem." Compare David's experience, Ps. 51: 6—"Behold, thou desirest truth in the inward part: And in the hidden part thou wilt make me to know wisdom"—with Paul's experience in Rom. 7: 24—"Wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?"—with Isaiah's experience (6: 5), when in the presence of God's glory he uses the words of the leper (Lev. 13: 45) and calls himself "unclean," and with Peter's experience (Luke 8: 8) when at the manifestation of Christ's miraculous power he "fell down at Jesus'

knees, saying, Depart from me; for I am a sinful man, O Lord." So the publican cries: "God, be thou merciful to me the sinner" (Luke 18:13), and Paul calls himself the "chief" of sinners (1 Tim. 1:15). It is evident that in none of these cases were there merely single acts of transgression in view; the humiliation and self-aborrence were in view of permanent states of depravity. Van Oosterzee: "What we do outwardly is only the revelation of our inner nature." The outcropping and visible rock is but small in extent compared with the rock that is underlying and invisible. The iceberg has eight-ninths of its mass below the surface of the sea, yet icebergs have been seen near Cape Horn from 700 to 800 feet high above the water.

It may be doubted whether any repentance is genuine which is not repentance for *sin* rather than for *sins*; compare John 16: 8—the Holy Spirit "will convict the world in respect of sin." On the difference between conviction of sins and conviction of sin, see Hare, Mission of the Comforter. Dr. A. J. Gordon, just before his death, desired to be left alone. He was then overheard confessing his sins in such seemingly extravagant terms as to excite fear that he was in delirium. Martensen, Dogmatics, 389—Luther during his early experience "often wrote to Staupitz: 'Oh, my sins, my sins!' and yet in the confessional he could name no sins in particular which he had to confess; so that it was clearly a sense of the general depravity of his nature which filled his soul with deep sorrow and pain." Luther's conscience would not accept the comfort that he wished to be without sin, and therefore had no real sin. When he thought himself too great a sinner to be saved, Staupitz replied: "Would you have the semblance of a sinner and the semblance of a Savior?"

After twenty years of religious experience, Jonathan Edwards wrote (Works 1: 23, 23; also 3: 16-18): "Often since I have lived in this town I have had very affecting views of my own sinfulness and vileness, very frequently to such a degree as to hold me in a kind of loud weeping, sometimes for a considerable time together, so that I have been often obliged to shut myself up. I have had a vastly greater sense of my own wickedness and the badness of my heart than ever I had before my conversion. It has often appeared to me that if God should mark iniquity against me, I should appear the very worst of all mankind, of all that have been since the beginning of the world to this time; and that I should have by far the lowest place in hell. When others that have come to talk with me about their soul's concerns have expressed the sense they have had of their own wickedness, by saying that it seemed to them they were as bad as the devil himself; I thought their expressions seemed exceeding faint and feeble to represent my wickedness."

Edwards continues: "My wickedness, as I am in myself, has long appeared to me perfectly ineffable and swallowing up all thought and imagination—like an infinite deluge, or mountains over my head. I know not how to express better what my sins appear to me to be, than by heaping infinite on infinite and multiplying infinite by infinite. Very often for these many years, these expressions are in my mind and in my mouth: 'Infinite upon infinite—infinite upon infinite!' When I look into my heart and take a view of my wickedness, it looks like an abyss infinitely deeper than hell. And it appears to me that were it not for free grace, exalted and raised up to the infinite height of all the fulness and glory of the great Jehovah, and the arm of his power and grace stretched forth in all the majesty of his power and in all the glory of his sovereignty, I should appear sunk down in my sins below hell itself, far beyond the sight of everything but the eye of sovereign grace that can pierce even down to such a depth. And yet it seems to me that my conviction of sin is exceeding small and faint; it is enough to amaze me that I have no more sense of my sin. I know certainly that I have very little sense of my sinfulness. When I have had turns of weeping for my sins, I thought I knew at the time that my repentance was nothing to my sin. . . . It is affecting to think how ignorant I was, when a young Christian, of the bottomless, infinite depths of wickedness, pride, hypocrisy, and deceit left in my heart."

Jonathan Edwards was not an ungodly man, but the holiest man of his time. He was not an enthusiast, but a man of acute, philosophic mind. He was not a man who indulged in exaggerated or random statements, for with his power of introspection and analysis he combined a faculty and habit of exact expression unsurpassed among the sons of men. If the maxim "*culque in arte sua credendum est*" is of any value, Edwards's statements in a matter of religious experience are to be taken as correct interpretations of the facts. H. B. Smith (System. Theol., 275) quotes Thomasius as saying: "It is a striking fact in Scripture that statements of the depth and power of sin are chiefly from the regenerate." Another has said that "a serpent is never seen at its whole length until it is dead." Thomas à Kempis (ed. Gould and Lincoln, 142)—"Do

not think that thou hast made any progress toward perfection, till thou feelest that thou art less than the least of all human beings." Young's Night Thoughts: "Heaven's Sovereign saves all beings but himself That hideous sight — a naked human heart."

Law's Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life: "You may justly condemn yourself for being the greatest sinner that you know, 1. Because you know more of the folly of your own heart than of other people's, and can charge yourself with various sins which you know only of yourself and cannot be sure that others are guilty of them. 2. The greatness of our guilt arises from the greatness of God's goodness to us. You know more of these aggravations of your sins than you do of the sins of other people. Hence the greatest saints have in all ages condemned themselves as the greatest sinners." We may add: 3. That, since each man is a peculiar being, each man is guilty of peculiar sins, and in certain particulars and aspects may constitute an example of the enormity and hatefulness of sin, such as neither earth nor hell can elsewhere show.

Of Cromwell, as a representative of the Puritans, Green says (Short History of the English People, 454): "The vivid sense of the divine Purity close to such men, made the life of common men seem sin." Dr. Arnold of Rugby (Life and Corresp., App. D.): "In a deep sense of moral evil, more perhaps than anything else, abides a saving knowledge of God." Augustine, on his death-bed, had the 32d Psalm written over against him on the wall. For his expressions with regard to sin, see his Confessions, book 10. See also Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 284, note.

## 2. Inferences.

In the light of the preceding discussion, we may properly estimate the elements of truth and of error in the common definition of sin as 'the voluntary transgression of known law.'

(a) Not all sin is voluntary as being a distinct and conscious volition; for evil disposition and state often precede and occasion evil volition, and evil disposition and state are themselves sin. All sin, however, is voluntary as springing either directly from will, or indirectly from those perverse affections and desires which have themselves originated in will. 'Voluntary' is a term broader than 'volitional,' and includes all those permanent states of intellect and affection which the will has made what they are. Will, moreover, is not to be regarded as simply the faculty of volitions, but as primarily the underlying determination of the being to a supreme end.

Will, as we have seen, includes preference (*θέλω, voluntas, Wille*) as well as volition (*βούλη, arbitrium, Willkür*). We do not, with Edwards and Hodge, regard the sensibilities as states of the will. They are, however, in their character and their objects determined by the will, and so they may be called voluntary. The permanent state of the will (New School "elective preference") is to be distinguished from the permanent state of the sensibilities (dispositions, or desires). But both are voluntary because both are due to past decisions of the will, and "whatever springs from will we are responsible for" (Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 243). Julius Müller, 2:51—"We speak of self-consciousness and reason as something which the ego has, but we identify the will with the ego. No one would say, 'my will has decided this or that,' although we do say, 'my reason, my conscience teaches me this or that.' The will is the very man himself, as Augustine says: 'Voluntas est in omnibus; imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt.'"

For other statements of the relation of disposition to will, see Alexander, Moral Science, 151—"In regard to dispositions, we say that they are in a sense voluntary. They properly belong to the will, taking the word in a large sense. In judging of the morality of voluntary acts, the principle from which they proceed is always included in our view and comes in for a large part of the blame"; see also pages 201, 207, 208. Edwards on the Affections, 3:1-22; on the Will, 3:4—"The affections are only certain modes of the exercise of the will." A. A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology, 234—"All sin is voluntary, in the sense that all sin has its root in the perverted dispositions, desires, and affections which constitute the depraved state of the will." But to Alexander, Edwards, and Hodge, we reply that the first sin was not voluntary in this sense, for there was no such depraved state of the will from which it could spring. We are

responsible for dispositions, not upon the ground that they are a part of the will, but upon the ground that they are effects of will, in other words, that past decisions of the will have made them what they are. See pages 504-513.

(b) Deliberate intention to sin is an aggravation of transgression, but it is not essential to constitute any given act or feeling a sin. Those evil inclinations and impulses which rise unbidden and master the soul before it is well aware of their nature, are themselves violations of the divine law, and indications of an inward depravity which in the case of each descendant of Adam is the chief and fountal transgression.

Joseph Cook: "Only the surface-water of the sea is penetrated with light. Beneath is a half-lit region. Still further down is absolute darkness. We are greater than we know." Weismann, *Heredity*, 2:8 — "At the depth of 170 meters, or 553 feet, there is about as much light as that of a starlight night when there is no moon. Light penetrates as far as 400 meters, or 1,300 feet, but animal life exists at a depth of 4,000 meters, or 13,000 feet. Below 1,300 feet, all animals are blind." Cf. Ps. 81:6; 19:12 — "the inward parts . . . the hidden parts . . . hidden faults" — hidden not only from others, but even from ourselves. The light of consciousness plays only on the surface of the waters of man's soul.

(c) Knowledge of the sinfulness of an act or feeling is also an aggravation of transgression, but it is not essential to constitute it a sin. Moral blindness is the effect of transgression, and, as inseparable from corrupt affections and desires, is itself condemned by the divine law.

It is our duty to do better than we know. Our duty of knowing is as real as our duty of doing. Sin is an opiate. Some of the most deadly diseases do not reveal themselves in the patient's countenance, nor has the patient any adequate understanding of his malady. There is an ignorance which is indolence. Men are often unwilling to take the trouble of rectifying their standards of judgment. There is also an ignorance which is intention. Instance many students' ignorance of College laws.

We cannot excuse disobedience by saying: "I forgot." God's commandment is: "Remember" — as in Ex. 20:8; cf. 2 Pet. 3:5 — "For this they wilfully forget." "Ignorantia legis neminem excusat." Rom. 2:12 — "as many as have sinned without the law shall also perish without the law": Luke 12:48 — "he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten [though] with few stripes." The aim of revelation and of preaching is to bring man "to himself" (cf. Luke 15:17) — to show him what he has been doing and what he is. Goethe: "We are never deceived: we deceive ourselves." Royce, *World and Individual*, 2:369 — "The sole possible free moral action is then a freedom that relates to the present fixing of attention upon the ideas of the Ought which are already present. To sin is *consciously to choose to forget*, through a narrowing of the field of attention, an Ought that one already recognizes."

(d) Ability to fulfill the law is not essential to constitute the non-fulfillment sin. Inability to fulfill the law is a result of transgression, and, as consisting not in an original deficiency of faculty but in a settled state of the affections and will, it is itself condemnable. Since the law presents the holiness of God as the only standard for the creature, ability to obey can never be the measure of obligation or the test of sin.

Not power to the contrary, in the sense of ability to change all our permanent states by mere volition, is the basis of obligation and responsibility; for surely Satan's responsibility does not depend upon his power at any moment to turn to God and be holy.

Definitions of sin — Melancthon: Defectus vel inclinatio vel actio pugnant cum lege. Def. Calvin: Illegalitas, seu difformitas a lege. Hollaz: Aberratio a lege divina. Hollaz adds: "Voluntariness does not enter into the definition of sin, generically considered. Sin may be called voluntary, either in respect to its cause, as it inheres in the will, or in respect to the act, as it proceeds from deliberate volition. Here is the antithesis to the Roman Catholics and to the Socinians, the latter of whom define sin as a voluntary [i. e., a volitional] transgression of law" — a view, says Hase (*Hutterus Redivivus*, 11th ed., 162-164), "which is derived from the necessary methods of civil tribunals, and which is incompatible with the orthodox doctrine of original sin."

On the New School definition of sin, see Fairchild, *Nature of Sin*, in *Bib. Sac.*, 25: 80-88; Whedon, in *Bib. Sac.*, 19: 251, and *On the Will*, 238. *Per contra*, see Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 190-190; Lawrence, *Old School in N. E. Theol.*, in *Bib. Sac.*, 20: 317-328; Julius Müller, *Doc. Sin.*, 1: 40-73; Nietzsche, *Christ. Doct.*, 216; Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 124-126.

## II. THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE OF SIN.

The definition of sin as lack of conformity to the divine law does not exclude, but rather necessitates, an inquiry into the characterizing motive or impelling power which explains its existence and constitutes its guilt. Only three views require extended examination. Of these the first two constitute the most common excuses for sin, although not propounded for this purpose by their authors: Sin is due (1) to the human body, or (2) to finite weakness. The third, which we regard as the Scriptural view, considers sin as (3) the supreme choice of self, or selfishness.

In the preceding section on the Definition of Sin, we showed that sin is a *state*, and a state of the *will*. We now ask: What is the nature of this state? and we expect to show that it is essentially a *selfish* state of the will.

### 1. Sin as Sensuousness.

This view regards sin as the necessary product of man's sensuous nature—a result of the soul's connection with a physical organism. This is the view of Schleiermacher and of Rothe. More recent writers, with John Fiske, regard moral evil as man's inheritance from a brute ancestry.

For statement of the view here opposed, see Schleiermacher, *Der Christliche Glaube*, 1: 361-364—"Sin is a prevention of the determining power of the spirit, caused by the independence (Selbständigkeit) of the sensuous functions." The child lives at first a life of sense, in which the bodily appetites are supreme. The senses are the avenues of all temptation, the physical dominates over the spiritual, and the soul never shakes off the body. Sin is, therefore, a malarious exhalation from the low grounds of human nature, or, to use the words of Schleiermacher, "a positive opposition of the flesh to the spirit." Pfleiderer, *Prot. Theol. seit Kant*, 113,—says that Schleiermacher here repeats Spinoza's "inability of the spirit to control the sensuous affections." Pfleiderer, *Philos. Religion*, 1: 390—"In the development of man out of naturalness, the lower impulses have already won a power of self-assertion and resistance, before the reason could yet come to its valid position and authority. As this propensity of the self-will is grounded in the specific nature of man, it may be designated as inborn, hereditary, or *original* sinfulness."

Rothe's view of sin may be found in his *Dogmatik*, 1: 300-303; notice the connection of Rothe's view of sin with his doctrine of continuous creation (see page 416 of this *Compendium*). *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 21: 2—"Rothe was a thorough going evolutionist who regarded the natural man as the consummation of the development of physical nature, and regarded spirit as the personal attainment, with divine help, of those beings in whom the further creative process of moral development is carried on. This process of development necessarily takes an abnormal form and passes through the phase of sin. This abnormal condition necessitates a fresh creative act, that of salvation, which was however from the very first a part of the divine plan of development. Rothe, notwithstanding his evolutionary doctrine, believed in the supernatural birth of Christ."

John Fiske, *Destiny of Man*, 108—"Original sin is neither more nor less than the brute inheritance which every man carries with him, and the process of evolution is an advance toward true salvation." Thus man is a sphynx in whom the human has not yet escaped from the animal. So Bowne, *Atonement*, 60, declares that sin is "a relic of the animal not yet outgrown, a resultant of the mechanism of appetite and impulse and reflex action for which the proper inhibitions are not yet developed. Only slowly does it grow into a consciousness of itself as evil. . . . It would be hysteria to regard the common life of men as rooting in a conscious choice of unrighteousness."

In refutation of this view, it will be sufficient to urge the following considerations:

(a) It involves an assumption of the inherent evil of matter, at least so far as regards the substance of man's body. But this is either a form of dualism, and may be met with the objections already brought against that system, or it implies that God, in being the author of man's physical organism, is also the responsible originator of human sin.

This has been called the "caged-eagle theory" of man's existence; it holds that the body is a prison only, or, as Plato expressed it, "the tomb of the soul," so that the soul can be pure only by escaping from the body. But matter is not eternal. God made it, and made it pure. The body was made to be the servant of the spirit. We must not throw the blame of sin upon the senses, but upon the spirit that used the senses so wickedly. To attribute sin to the body is to make God, the author of the body, to be also the author of sin,—which is the greatest of blasphemies. Men cannot "justly accuse Their Maker, or their making, or their fate" (Milton, *Paradise Lost*, 3:112). Sin is a contradiction within the spirit itself, and not simply between the spirit and the flesh. Sensuous activities are not themselves sinful—this is essential Manichæism. Robert Burns was wrong when he laid the blame for his delinquencies upon "the passions wild and strong." And Samuel Johnson was wrong when he said that "Every man is a rascal so soon as he is sick." The normal soul has power to rise above both passion and sickness and to make them serve its moral development. On the development of the body, as the organ of sin, see Straffen's *Hulsean Lectures on Sin*, 33-50. The essential error of this view is its identification of the moral with the physical. If it were true, then Jesus, who came in human flesh, must needs be a sinner.

(b) In explaining sin as an inheritance from the brute, this theory ignores the fact that man, even though derived from a brute ancestry, is no longer brute, but man, with power to recognize and to realize moral ideals, and under no necessity to violate the law of his being.

See A. H. Strong, *Christ in Creation*, 168-180, on The Fall and the Redemption of Man, in the Light of Evolution: "Evolution has been thought to be incompatible with any proper doctrine of a fall. It has been assumed by many that man's immoral course and conduct are simply survivals of his brute inheritance, inevitable remnants of his old animal propensities, yieldings of the weak will to fleshly appetites and passions. This is to deny that sin is truly sin, but it is also to deny that man is truly man. . . . Sin must be referred to freedom, or it is not sin. To explain it as the natural result of weak will overmastered by lower impulses is to make the animal nature, and not the will, the cause of transgression. And that is to say that man at the beginning is not man, but brute." See also D. W. Simon, in *Bib. Sac.*, Jan. 1897:1-20—"The key to the strange and dark contrast between man and his animal ancestry is to be found in the fact of the Fall. Other species live normally. No remnant of the reptile hinders the bird. The bird is a true bird. Only man fails to live normally and is a true man only after ages of sin and misery." Marlowe very properly makes his Faustus to be tempted by sensual baits only after he has sold himself to Satan for power.

To regard vanity, deceitfulness, malice, and revenge as inherited from brute ancestors is to deny man's original innocence and the creatorship of God. B. W. Lockhart: "The animal mind knows not God, is not subject to his law, neither indeed can be, just because it is animal, and as such is incapable of right or wrong. . . . If man were an animal and nothing more, he could not sin. It is by virtue of being something more, that he becomes capable of sin. Sin is the yielding of the known higher to the known lower. It is the soul's abdication of its being to the brute. . . . Hence the need of spiritual forces from the spiritual world of divine revelation, to heal and build and discipline the soul within itself, giving it the victory over the animal passions which constitute the body and over the kingdom of blind desire which constitutes the world. The final purpose of man is growth of the soul into liberty, truth, love, likeness to God. Education is the word that covers the movement, and probation is incident to education." We add that reparation for past sin and renewing power from above must follow probation, in order to make education possible.

Some recent writers hold to a real fall of man, and yet regard that fall as necessary to his moral development. Emma Marie Caillard, in *Contemp. Rev.*, Dec. 1898: 878 — "Man passed out of a state of innocence — unconscious of his own imperfection — into a state of consciousness of it. The will became slave instead of master. The result would have been the complete stoppage of his evolution but for redemption, which restored his will and made the continuance of his evolution possible. Incarnation was the method of redemption. But even apart from the fall, this incarnation would have been necessary to reveal to man the goal of his evolution and so to secure his coöperation in it." Lisle, *Evolution of Spiritual Man*, 39, and in *Bib. Sac.*, July, 1892: 431-452 — "Evolution by catastrophe in the natural world has a striking analogue in the spiritual world. . . . Sin is primarily not so much a fall from a higher to a lower, as a failure to rise from a lower to a higher; not so much eating of the forbidden tree, as failure to partake of the tree of life. The latter represented communion and correspondence with God, and had innocent man continued to reach out for this, he would not have fallen. Man's refusal to choose the higher preceded and conditioned his fall to the lower, and the essence of sin is therefore in this refusal, whatever may cause the will to make it. . . . Man chose the lower of his own free will. Then his centripetal force was gone. His development was swiftly and endlessly away from God. He reverted to his original type of savage animalism; and yet, as a self-conscious and free-acting being, he retained a sense of responsibility that filled him with fear and suffering."

On the development-theory of sin, see W. W. McLane, in *New Englander*, 1891: 180-188; A. B. Bruce, *Apologetics*, 60-62; Lyman Abbott, *Evolution of Christianity*, 203-206; Le Conte, *Evolution*, 330, 365-376; Henry Drummond, *Ascent of Man*, 1-12, 329, 342; Salem Wilder, *Life, its Nature*, 268-273; Wm. Graham, *Creed of Science*, 33-44; Frank H. Foster, *Evolution and the Evangelical System*; Chandler, *The Spirit of Man*, 45-47.

(c) It rests upon an incomplete induction of facts, taking account of sin solely in its aspect of self-degradation, but ignoring the worst aspect of it as self-exaltation. Avarice, envy, pride, ambition, malice, cruelty, revenge, self-righteousness, unbelief, enmity to God, are none of them fleshly sins, and upon this principle are incapable of explanation.

Two historical examples may suffice to show the insufficiency of the sensuous theory of sin. Goethe was not a markedly sensual man; yet the spiritual vivisection which he practised on Friederike Brion, his perfidious misrepresentation of his relations with Kestner's wife in the "Sorrows of Werther," and his flattery of Napoleon, when a patriot would have scorned the advances of the invader of his country, show Goethe to have been a very incarnation of heartlessness and selfishness. The patriot Boerne said of him: "Not once has he ever advanced a poor solitary word in his country's cause — he who from the lofty height he has attained might speak out what none other but himself would dare pronounce." It has been said that Goethe's first commandment to genius was: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor and thy neighbor's wife." His biographers count up sixteen women to whom he made love and who reciprocated his affection, though it is doubtful whether he contented himself with the doctrine of 16 to 1. As Sainte-Beuve said of Châteaubriand's attachments: "They are like the stars in the sky, — the longer you look, the more of them you discover." Christiane Vulpius, after being for seventeen years his mistress, became at last his wife. But the wife was so alighted that she was driven to intemperance, and Goethe's only son inherited her passion and died of drink. Goethe was the great heathen of modern Christendom, deriding self-denial, extolling self-confidence, attention to the present, the seeking of enjoyment, and the submission of one's self to the decrees of fate. Hutton calls Goethe "a Narcissus in love with himself." Like George Eliot's "Dinah," in Adam Bede, Goethe's "Confessions of a Beautiful Soul," in *Wilhelm Meister*, are the purely artistic delineation of a character with which he had no inner sympathy. On Goethe, see Hutton, *Essays*, 2:1-79; Shedd, *Dogm. Theology*, 1:490; A. H. Strong, *Great Poets*, 279-331; Principal Shairp, *Culture and Religion*, 16 — "Goethe, the high priest of culture, loathes Luther, the preacher of righteousness"; S. Law Wilson, *Theology of Modern Literature*, 149-156.

Napoleon was not a markedly sensual man, but "his self-sufficiency surpassed the self-sufficiency of common men as the great Sahara desert surpasses an ordinary sand patch." He wantonly divulged his amours to Josephine, with all the details of his ill-conduct, and when she revolted from them, he only replied: "I have the right to meet all your complaints with an eternal I." When his wars had left almost no able-bodied

men in France, he called for the boys, saying: "A boy can stop a bullet as well as a man," and so the French nation lost two inches of stature. Before the battle of Leipzig, when there was prospect of unexampled slaughter, he exclaimed: "What are the lives of a million of men, to carry out the will of a man like me?" His most truthful epitaph was: "The little butchers of Ghent to Napoleon the Great" [butcher]. Heine represents Napoleon as saying to the world: "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." *Memoirs of Madame de Rémusat*, 1:225—"At a fête given by the city of Paris to the Emperor, the repertory of inscriptions being exhausted, a brilliant device was resorted to. Over the throne which he was to occupy, were placed, in letters of gold, the following words from the Holy Scriptures: 'I am the I am.' And no one seemed to be scandalized." Iago, in Shakespeare's *Othello*, is the greatest villain of all literature; but Coleridge, *Works*, 4:180, calls attention to his passionless character. His sin is, like that of Goethe and of Napoleon, sin not of the flesh but of the intellect and will.

(d) It leads to absurd conclusions,—as, for example, that asceticism, by weakening the power of sense, must weaken the power of sin; that man becomes less sinful as his senses fail with age; that disembodied spirits are necessarily holy; that death is the only Redeemer.

Asceticism only turns the current of sin in other directions. Spiritual pride and tyranny take the place of fleshly desires. The miser clutches his gold more closely as he nears death. Satan has no physical organism, yet he is the prince of evil. Not our own death, but Christ's death, saves us. But when Rousseau's *Émile* comes to die, he calmly declares: "I am delivered from the trammels of the body, and am myself without contradiction." At the age of seventy-five Goethe wrote to Eckermann: "I have ever been esteemed one of fortune's favorites, nor can I complain of the course my life has taken. Yet truly there has been nothing but care and toil, and I may say that I have never had four weeks of genuine pleasure." Shedd, *Dogm. Theology*, 2:743—"When the authoritative demand of Jesus Christ, to confess sin and beg remission through atoning blood, is made to David Hume, or David Strauss, or John Stuart Mill, none of whom were sensualists, it wakens intense mental hostility."

(e) It interprets Scripture erroneously. In passages like Rom. 7:18—*οὐκ οἰκεί ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτ' ἐστίν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἀγαθόν*—*σάρξ*, or flesh, signifies, not man's body, but man's whole being when destitute of the Spirit of God. The Scriptures distinctly recognize the seat of sin as being in the soul itself, not in its physical organism. God does not tempt man, nor has he made man's nature to tempt him (James 1:13, 14).

In the use of the term "flesh," Scripture puts a stigma upon sin, and intimates that human nature without God is as corruptible and perishable as the body would be without the soul to inhabit it. The "carnal mind," or "mind of the flesh" (Rom. 8:7), accordingly means, not the sensual mind, but the mind which is not under the control of the Holy Spirit, its true life. See Meyer, on 1 Cor. 1:26—*σάρξ*—"the purely human element in man, as opposed to the divine principle"; Pope, *Theology*, 2:68—*σάρξ*—"the whole being of man, body, soul, and spirit, separated from God and subjected to the creature"; Julius Müller, *Proof-texts*, 19—*σάρξ*—"human nature as living in and for itself, sundered from God and opposed to him." The earliest and best statement of this view of the term *σάρξ* is that of Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 1:295-333, especially 291. See also Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 270-271—*σάρξ*—"human nature without the *πνεῦμα* . . . man standing by himself, or left to himself, over against God . . . the natural man, conceived as not having yet received grace, or as not yet wholly under its influence."

James 1:14, 15—"Desire, when it hath conceived, beareth sin"—innocent desire—for it comes in before the sin—innocent constitutional propensity, not yet of the nature of depravity, is only the occasion of sin. The love of freedom is a part of our nature; sin arises only when the will determines to indulge this impulse without regard to the restraints of the divine law. Luther, *Preface to Ep. to Romans*: "Thou must not understand 'flesh' as though that only were 'flesh' which is connected with unchastity. St. Paul uses 'flesh' of the whole man, body and soul, reason and all his faculties included, because all that is in him longs and strives after the 'flesh'." Melancthon: "Note that 'flesh' signifies the entire nature of man, sense and reason, without the Holy Spirit." Gould,

Bib. Theol. N. T., 75—"The *σῶμα* of Paul corresponds to the *κῆνος* of John. Paul sees the divine economy; John the divine nature. That Paul did not hold sin to consist in the possession of a body appears from his doctrine of a bodily resurrection (1 Cor. 15:38-49). This resurrection of the body is an integral part of immortality." On *σῶμα*, see Thayer, N. T. Lexicon, 571; Kaftan, Dogmatik, 319.

(f) Instead of explaining sin, this theory virtually denies its existence, — for if sin arises from the original constitution of our being, reason may recognize it as misfortune, but conscience cannot attribute to it guilt.

Sin which in its ultimate origin is a necessary thing is no longer sin. On the whole theory of the sensuous origin of sin, see Neander, Planting and Training, 386, 428; Ernesti, Ursprung der Sünde, 1:29-374; Philipp, Glaubenslehre, 2:132-147; Tulloch, Doctrine of Sin, 144—"That which is an inherent and necessary power in the creation cannot be a contradiction of its highest law." This theory confounds sin with the mere consciousness of sin. On Schleiermacher, see Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 1:341-349. On the sense-theory of sin in general, see John Caird, Fund. Ideas of Christianity, 2:28-52; N. E. Wood, The Witness of Sin, 79-87.

## 2. Sin as Finiteness.

This view explains sin as a necessary result of the limitations of man's finite being. As an incident of imperfect development, the fruit of ignorance and impotence, sin is not absolutely but only relatively evil—an element in human education and a means of progress. This is the view of Leibnitz and of Spinoza. Modern writers, as Schurman and Royce, have maintained that moral evil is the necessary background and condition of moral good.

The theory of Leibnitz may be found in his *Théodicée*, part 1, sections 30 and 31; that of Spinoza in his *Ethics*, part 4, proposition 20. Upon this view sin is the blundering of inexperience, the thoughtlessness that takes evil for good, the ignorance that puts its fingers into the fire, the stumbling without which one cannot learn to walk. It is a fruit which is sour and bitter simply because it is immature. It is a means of discipline and training for something better,—it is holiness in the germ, good in the making—"Erhebung des Menschen zur freien Vernunft." The Fall was a fall up, and not down.

John Fluke, in addition to his sense-theory of sin already mentioned, seems to hold this theory also. In his *Mystery of Evil*, he says: "Its impress upon the human soul is the indispensable background against which shall be set hereafter the eternal joys of heaven"; in other words, sin is necessary to holiness, as darkness is the indispensable contrast and background to light; without black, we should never be able to know white. Schurman, *Belief in God*, 251 sq.—"The possibility of sin is the correlative of the free initiative God has vacated on man's behalf. . . . The essence of sin is the enthronement of self. . . . Yet, without such self-absorption, there could be no sense of union with God. For consciousness is possible only through opposition. To know A, we must know it through not-A. Alienation from God is the necessary condition of communion with God. And this is the meaning of the Scripture that 'where sin abounded, grace shall much more abound.' . . . Modern culture protests against the Puritan enthronement of goodness above truth. . . . For the decalogue it would substitute the wider new commandment of Goethe: 'Live resolutely in the Whole, in the Good, in the Beautiful.' The highest religion can be content with nothing short of the synthesis demanded by Goethe. . . . God is the universal life in which individual activities are included as movements of a single organism."

Royce, *World and Individual*, 2:364-384—"Evil is a discord necessary to perfect harmony. In itself it is evil, but in relation to the whole it has value by showing us its own finiteness and imperfection. It is a sorrow to God as much as to us; indeed, all our sorrow is his sorrow. The evil serves the good only by being overcome, thwarted, overruled. Every evil deed must somewhere and at some time be atoned for, by some other than the agent, if not by the agent himself. . . . All finite life is a struggle with evil. Yet from the final point of view the Whole is good. The temporal order contains at no moment anything that can satisfy. Yet the eternal order is perfect. We have all sinned and come short of the glory of God. Yet in just our life, viewed in its

entirety, the glory of God is completely manifest. These hard sayings are the deepest expressions of the essence of true religion. They are also the most inevitable outcome of philosophy. . . . Were there no longing in time, there would be no peace in eternity. The prayer that God's will may be done on earth as it is in heaven is identical with what philosophy regards as simple fact."

We object to this theory that

(a) It rests upon a pantheistic basis, as the sense-theory rests upon dualism. The moral is confounded with the physical; might is identified with right. Since sin is a necessary incident of finiteness, and creatures can never be infinite, it follows that sin must be everlasting, not only in the universe, but in each individual soul.

Goethe, Carlyle, and Emerson are representatives of this view in literature. Goethe spoke of the "idleness of wishing to jump off from one's own shadow." He was a disciple of Spinoza, who believed in one substance with contradictory attributes of thought and extension. Goethe took the pantheistic view of God with the personal view of man. He ignored the fact of sin. Hutton calls him "the wisest man the world has seen who was without humility and faith, and who lacked the wisdom of a child." Speaking of Goethe's Faust, Hutton says: "The great drama is radically false in its fundamental philosophy. Its primary notion is that even a spirit of pure evil is an exceedingly useful-being, because he stirs into activity those whom he leads into sin, and so prevents them from rusting away in pure indolence. There are other and better means of stimulating the positive affections of men than by tempting them to sin." On Goethe, see Hutton, *Essays*, 2: 1-79; Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 1: 490; A. H. Strong, *Great Poets and their Theology*, 279-331.

Carlyle was a Scotch Presbyterian minus Christianity. At the age of twenty-five, he rejected miraculous and historical religion, and thenceforth had no God but natural Law. His worship of objective truth became a worship of subjective sincerity, and his worship of personal will became a worship of impersonal force. He preached truth, service, sacrifice, but all in a mandatory and pessimistic way. He saw in England and Wales "twenty-nine millions—mostly fools." He had no love, no remedy, no hope. In our civil war, he was upon the side of the slaveholder. He claimed that his philosophy made right to be might, but in practice he made might to be right. Confounding all moral distinctions, as he did in his later writings, he was fit to wear the title which he invented for another: "President of the Heaven-and-Hell-Amalgamation Society." Froude calls him "a Calvinist without the theology"—a believer in predestination without grace. On Carlyle, see S. Law Wilson, *Theology of Modern Literature*, 131-178.

Emerson also is the worshiper of successful force. His pantheism is most manifest in his poems "Cupido" and "Brahma," and in his Essays on "Spirit" and on "The Over-soul." Cupido: "The solid, solid universe is pervious to Love; With bandaged eyes he never errs, Around, below, above. His blinding light He flingeth white On God's and Satan's brood, And reconciles by mystic wiles The evil and the good." Brahma: "If the red slayer thinks he slays, Or if the slain think he is slain, They know not well the subtle ways I keep, and pass, and turn again. Far or forgot to me is near; Shadow and sunlight are the same; The vanished gods to me appear; And one to me are shame or fame. They reckon ill who leave me out; When me they fly, I am the wings; I am the doubter and the doubt, And I the hymn the Brahmin sings. The strong gods pine for my abode, And pine in vain the sacred Seven; But thou, meek lover of the good, Find me, and turn thy back on heaven."

Emerson taught that man's imperfection is not sin, and that the cure for it lies in education. "He lets God evaporate into abstract Ideality. Not a Deity in the concrete, nor a superhuman Person, but rather the immanent divinity in things, the essentially spiritual structure of the universe, is the object of the transcendental cult." His view of Jesus is found in his *Essays*, 2: 268—"Jesus would absorb the race; but Tom Paine, or the coarsest blasphemer, helps humanity by resisting this exuberance of power." In his *Divinity School Address*, he banished the person of Jesus from genuine religion. He thought "one could not be a man if he must subordinate his nature to Christ's nature." He failed to see that Jesus not only absorbs but transforms, and that we grow only by the impact of nobler souls than our own. Emerson's essay style is devoid of clear and precise theological statement, and in this vagueness lies its harmfulness. Fisher, *Nature and Method of Revelation*, xii—"Emerson's pantheism

is not hardened into a consistent creed, for to the end he clung to the belief in personal immortality, and he pronounced the acceptance of this belief 'the test of mental sanity.'" On Emerson, see S. L. Wilson, *Theology of Modern Literature*, 97-122.

We may call this theory the "green-apple theory" of sin. Sin is a green apple, which needs only time and sunshine and growth to bring it to ripeness and beauty and usefulness. But we answer that sin is not a green apple, but an apple with a worm at its heart. The evil of it can never be cured by growth. The fall can never be anything else than downward. Upon this theory, sin is an inseparable factor in the nature of finite things. The highest archangel cannot be without it. Man in moral character is "the asymptote of God,"—forever learning, but never able to come to the knowledge of the truth. The throne of iniquity is set up forever in the universe. If this theory were true, Jesus, in virtue of his partaking of our finite humanity, must needs be a sinner. His perfect development, without sin, shows that sin was not a necessity of finite progress. Matthews, in *Christianity and Evolution*, 137—"It was not necessary for the prodigal to go into the far country and become a swineherd, in order to find out the father's love." R. H. Johnson, *Syst. Theol.*, 141—"It is not the privilege of the infinite alone to be good." Dörner, *System*, 1: 119, speaks of the moral career which this theory describes, as "a *progressus in infinitum*, where the constant approach to the goal has as its reverse side an eternal separation from the goal." In his "Transformation," Hawthorne hints, though rather hesitatingly, that without sin the higher humanity of man could not be taken up at all, and that sin may be essential to the first conscious awakening of moral freedom and to the possibility of progress; see Hutton, *Essays*, 2: 381.

(δ) So far as this theory regards moral evil as a necessary presupposition and condition of moral good, it commits the serious error of confounding the possible with the actual. What is necessary to goodness is not the actuality of evil, but only the possibility of evil.

Since we cannot know white except in contrast to black, it is claimed that without knowing actual evil we could never know actual good. George A. Gordon, *New Epoch for Faith*, 49, 50, has well shown that in that case the elimination of evil would imply the elimination of good. Sin would need to have place in God's being in order that he might be holy, and thus he would be divinity and devil in one person. Jesus too must needs be evil as well as good. Not only would it be true, as intimated above, that Christ, since his humanity is finite, must be a sinner, but also that we ourselves, who must always be finite, must always be sinners. We grant that holiness, in either God or man, must involve the abstract possibility of its opposite. But we maintain that, as this possibility in God is only abstract and never realized, so in man it should be only abstract and never realized. Man has power to reject this possible evil. His sin is a turning of the merely possible evil, by the decision of his will, into actual evil. Robert Browning is not free from the error above mentioned; see S. Law Wilson, *Theology of Modern Literature*, 207-210; A. H. Strong, *Great Poets and their Theology*, 433-444.

This theory of sin dates back to Hegel. To him there is no real sin and cannot be. Imperfection there is and must always be, because the relative can never become the absolute. Redemption is only an evolutionary process, indefinitely prolonged, and evil must remain an eternal condition. All finite thought is an element in the infinite thought, and all finite will an element in the infinite will. As good cannot exist without evil as its antithesis, infinite righteousness should have for its counterpart an infinite wickedness. Hegel's guiding principle was that "What is rational is real, and what is real is rational." Seth, *Hegelianism and Personality*, remarks that this principle ignores "the riddle of the painful earth." The disciples of Hegel thought that nothing remained for history to accomplish, now that the World-spirit had come to know himself in Hegel's philosophy.

Biedermann's *Dogmatik* is based upon the Hegelian philosophy. At page 649 we read: "Evil is the finiteness of the world-being which clings to all individual existences by virtue of their belonging to the immanent world-order. Evil is therefore a necessary element in the divinely willed being of the world." Bradley follows Hegel in making sin to be no reality, but only a relative appearance. There is no free will, and no antagonism between the will of God and the will of man. Darkness is an evil, a destroying agent. But it is not a positive force, as light is. It cannot be attacked and overcome as an entity. Bring light, and darkness disappears. So evil is not a positive force, as

good is. Bring good, and evil disappears. Herbert Spencer's Evolutionary Ethics fits in with such a system, for he says: "A perfect man in an imperfect race is impossible." On Hegel's view of sin, a view which denies holiness even to Christ, see J. Müller, *Doct. Sin*, 1: 390-407; Dorner, *Hist. Doct. Person of Christ*, B. 8: 131-163; Stearns, *Evidence of Christ. Experience*, 33-36; John Caird, *Fund. Ideas*, 2: 1-25; Forrest, *Authority of Christ*, 13-16.

(c) It is inconsistent with known facts,—as for example, the following: Not all sins are negative sins of ignorance and infirmity; there are acts of positive malignity, conscious transgressions, wilful and presumptuous choices of evil. Increased knowledge of the nature of sin does not of itself give strength to overcome it; but, on the contrary, repeated acts of conscious transgression harden the heart in evil. Men of greatest mental powers are not of necessity the greatest saints, nor are the greatest sinners men of least strength of will and understanding.

Not the weak but the strong are the greatest sinners. We do not pity Nero and Cæsar Borgia for their weakness; we abhor them for their crimes. Judas was an able man, a practical administrator; and Satan is a being of great natural endowments. Sin is not simply a weakness,—it is also a power. A pantheistic philosophy should worship Satan most of all; for he is the truest type of godless intellect and selfish strength.

John 13: 6—Judas, "having the bag, made away with what was put therein." Judas was set by Christ to do the work he was best fitted for, and that was best fitted to interest and save him. Some men may be put into the ministry, because that is the only work that will prevent their destruction. Pastors should find for their members work suited to the aptitudes of each. Judas was tempted, or tried, as all men are, according to his native propensity. While his motive in objecting to Mary's generosity was really avarice, his pretext was charity, or regard for the poor. Each one of the apostles had his own peculiar gift, and was chosen because of it. The sin of Judas was not a sin of weakness, or ignorance, or infirmity. It was a sin of disappointed ambition, of malice, of hatred for Christ's self-sacrificing purity.

E. H. Johnson: "Sins are not men's limitations, but the active expressions of a perverse nature." M. F. H. Round, Sec. of Nat. Prison Association, on examining the record of a thousand criminals, found that one quarter of them had an exceptionally fine basis of physical life and strength, while the other three quarters fell only a little below the average of ordinary humanity; see *The Forum*, Sept. 1893. The theory that sin is only holiness in the making reminds us of the view that the most objectionable refuse can by ingenious processes be converted into butter or at least into oleomargarine. It is not true that "tout comprendre est tout pardonner." Such doctrine obliterates all moral distinctions. Gilbert, *Bab Ballads*, "My Dream": "I dreamt that somehow I had come To dwell in Topsy-Turvydom, Where vice is virtue, virtue vice; Where nice is nasty, nasty nice; Where right is wrong, and wrong is right; Where white is black and black is white."

(d) Like the sense-theory of sin, it contradicts both conscience and Scripture by denying human responsibility and by transferring the blame of sin from the creature to the Creator. This is to explain sin, again, by denying its existence.

Edipus said that his evil deeds had been suffered, not done. Agamemnon, in the *Iliad*, says the blame belongs, not to himself, but to Jupiter and to fate. So sin blames everything and everybody but self. Gen. 3: 12—"The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat." But self-vindicating is God-accusing. Made imperfect at the start, man cannot help his sin. By the very fact of his creation he is out loose from God. That cannot be sin which is a necessary outgrowth of human nature, which is not our act but our fate. To all this, the one answer is found in Conscience. Conscience testifies that sin is not "das Gewordene," but "das Gemachte," and that it was his own act when man by transgression fell. The Scriptures refer man's sin, not to the limitations of his being, but to the free will of man himself. On the theory here combated, see Müller, *Doct. Sin*, 1: 271-295; Philipp, *Glaubenslehre*, 3: 123-131; N. R. Wood, *The Witness of Sin*, 20-42.

3. *Sin as Selfishness.*

We hold the essential principle of sin to be selfishness. By selfishness we mean not simply the exaggerated self-love which constitutes the antithesis of benevolence, but that choice of self as the supreme end which constitutes the antithesis of supreme love to God. That selfishness is the essence of sin may be shown as follows:

A. Love to God is the essence of all virtue. The opposite to this, the choice of self as the supreme end, must therefore be the essence of sin.

We are to remember, however, that the love to God in which virtue consists is love for that which is most characteristic and fundamental in God, namely, his holiness. It is not to be confounded with supreme regard for God's interests or for the good of being in general. Not mere benevolence, but love for God as holy, is the principle and source of holiness in man. Since the love of God required by the law is of this sort, it not only does not imply that love, in the sense of benevolence, is the essence of holiness in God,—it implies rather that holiness, or self-loving and self-affirming purity, is fundamental in the divine nature. From this self-loving and self-affirming purity, love properly so-called, or the self-communicating attribute, is to be carefully distinguished (see vol. 1, pages 271-275).

Bossuet, describing heathendom, says: "Every thing was God but God himself." Sin goes further than this, and says: "I am myself all things,"—not simply as Louis XVI: "I am the state," but: "I am the world, the universe, God." Heinrich Heine: "I am no child. I do not want a heavenly Father any more." A French critic of Fichte's philosophy said that it was a flight toward the infinite which began with the ego, and never got beyond it. Kidd, *Social Evolution*, 75—"In Calderon's tragic story, the unknown figure, which throughout life is everywhere in conflict with the individual whom it haunts, lifts the mask at last to disclose to the opponent his own features." Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, 1: 78—"Every self, once awakened, is naturally a despot, and 'bears, like the Turk, no brother near the throne.'" Every one has, as Hobbes said, "an infinite desire for gain or glory," and can be satisfied with nothing but a whole universe for himself. Selfishness—"homo homini lupus." James Martineau: "We ask Comte to lift the veil from the holy of holies and show us the all-perfect object of worship,—he produces a looking-glass and shows us ourselves." Comte's religion is a "synthetic idealization of our existence"—a worship, not of God, but of humanity; and "the festival of humanity" among Positivists—Walt Whitman's "I celebrate myself." On Comte, see Martineau, *Types*, 1: 499. The most thorough discussion of the essential principle of sin is that of Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin*, 1: 147-182. He defines sin as "a turning away from the love of God to self-seeking."

N. W. Taylor holds that self-love is the primary cause of all moral action; that selfishness is a different thing, and consists not in making our own happiness our ultimate end, which we must do if we are moral beings, but in love of the world, and in preferring the world to God as our portion or chief good (see N. W. Taylor, *Moral Govt.*, 1: 24-26; 2: 20-24, and *Rev. Theol.*, 184-182; Tyler, *Letters on the New Haven Theology*, 72). We claim, on the contrary, that to make our own happiness our ultimate aim is itself sin, and the essence of sin. As God makes his holiness the central thing, so we are to live for that, loving self only in God and for God's sake. This love for God as holy is the essence of virtue. The opposite to this, or supreme love for self, is sin. As Richard Lovelace writes: "I could not love thee, dear, so much, Loved I not honor more," so Christian friends can say: "Our loves in higher love endure." The sinner raises some lower object of instinct or desire to supremacy, regardless of God and his law, and this he does for no other reason than to gratify self. On the distinction between mere benevolence and the love required by God's law, see Hovey, *God With Us*, 187-200; Hopkins, *Works*, 1: 235; F. W. Robertson, *Sermon I*. Emerson: "Your goodness must have some edge to it, else it is none." See Newman Smyth, *Christian Ethics*, 327-370, on duties toward self as a moral end.

Love to God is the essence of all virtue. We are to love God with all the heart. But what God? Surely, not the false God, the God who is indifferent to moral distinctions.

and who treats the wicked as he treats the righteous. The love which the law requires is love for the true God, the God of holiness. Such love aims at the reproduction of God's holiness in ourselves and in others. We are to love ourselves only for God's sake and for the sake of realizing the divine idea in us. We are to love others only for God's sake and for the sake of realizing the divine idea in them. In our moral progress we, first, love self for our own sake; secondly, God for our own sake; thirdly, God for his own sake; fourthly, ourselves for God's sake. The first is our state by nature; the second requires preventent grace; the third, regenerating grace; and the fourth, sanctifying grace. Only the last is reasonable self-love. Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*, 27 — "Reasonable self-love is a virtue wholly incompatible with what is commonly called selfishness. Society suffers, not from having too much of it, but from having too little." Altruism is not the whole of duty. Self-realization is equally important. But to care only for self, like Goethe, is to miss the true self-realization, which love to God ensures.

Love desires only the best for its object, and the best is God. The golden rule bids us give, not what others desire, but what they need. Rom. 15:2 — "Let each one of us please his neighbor for that which is good, unedifying." Deutsche Liebe; "Nicht Liebe die fragt: Willst du mein sein? Sondern Liebe die sagt: Ich muss dein sein." Sin consists in taking for one's self alone and apart from God that in one's self and in others to which one has a right only in God and for God's sake. Mrs. Humphrey Ward, *David Grieve*, 403 — "How dare a man pluck from the Lord's hand, for his wild and reckless use, a soul and body for which he died? How dare he, the Lord's bondsman, steal his joy, carrying it off by himself into the wilderness, like an animal his prey, instead of asking it at the hands and under the blessing of the Master? How dare he, a member of the Lord's body, forget the whole, in his greed for the one — eternity in his thirst for the present?" Wordsworth, *Prelude*, 546 — "Delight how pitiable, Unless this love by a still higher love be hallowed, love that breathes not without awe; Love that adores, but on the knees of prayer, By heaven inspired. . . . This spiritual love acts not nor can exist Without imagination, which in truth is but another name for absolute power, And clearest insight, amplitude of mind, And reason in her most exalted mood."

Aristotle says that the wicked have no right to love themselves, but that the good may. So, from a Christian point of view, we may say: No unregenerate man can properly respect himself. Self-respect belongs only to the man who lives in God and who has God's image restored to him thereby. True self-love is not love for the happiness of the self, but for the worth of the self in God's sight, and this self-love is the condition of all genuine and worthy love for others. But true self-love is in turn conditioned by love to God as holy, and it seeks primarily, not the happiness, but the holiness, of others. Asquith, *Christian Conception of Holiness*, 98, 145, 154, 207 — "Benevolence or love is not the same with altruism. Altruism is instinctive, and has not its origin in the moral reason. It has utility, and it may even furnish material for reflection on the part of the moral reason. But so far as it is not deliberate, not indulged for the sake of the end, but only for the gratification of the instinct of the moment, it is not moral. . . . Holiness is dedication to God, the Good, not as an external Ruler, but as an internal controller and transformer of character. . . . God is a being whose every thought is love, of whose thoughts not one is for himself, save so far as himself is not himself, that is, so far as there is a distinction of persons in the Godhead. Creation is one great unselfish thought — the bringing into being of creatures who can know the happiness that God knows. . . . To the spiritual man holiness and love are one. Salvation is deliverance from selfishness." Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, 316, 320, regards the essence of sin as consisting, not in selfishness, but in turning away from God and so from the love which would cause man to grow in knowledge and likeness to God. But this seems to be nothing else than choosing self instead of God as our object and end.

B. All the different forms of sin can be shown to have their root in selfishness, while selfishness itself, considered as the choice of self as a supreme end, cannot be resolved into any simpler elements.

(a) Selfishness may reveal itself in the elevation to supreme dominion of any one of man's natural appetites, desires, or affections. Sensuality is selfishness in the form of inordinate appetite. Selfish desire takes the forms respectively of avarice, ambition, vanity, pride, according as it is set upon property, power, esteem, independence. Selfish affection is falsehood or

malice, according as it hopes to make others its voluntary servants, or regards them as standing in its way; it is unbelief or enmity to God, according as it simply turns away from the truth and love of God, or conceives of God's holiness as positively resisting and punishing it.

Augustine and Aquinas held the essence of sin to be pride; Luther and Calvin regarded its essence to be unbelief. Kreibitz (*Versöhnungslehre*) regards it as "world-love"; still others consider it as enmity to God. In opposing the view that sensuality is the essence of sin, Julius Müller says: "Wherever we find sensuality, there we find selfishness, but we do not find that, where there is selfishness, there is always sensuality. Selfishness may embody itself in fleshly lust or inordinate desire for the creature, but this last cannot bring forth spiritual sins which have no element of sensuality in them."

Covetousness or avarice makes, not sensual gratification itself, but the things that may minister thereto, the object of pursuit, and in this last chase often loses sight of its original aim. Ambition is selfish love of power; vanity is selfish love of esteem. Pride is but the self-complacency, self-sufficiency, and self-isolation of a selfish spirit that desires nothing so much as unrestrained independence. Falsehood originates in selfishness, first as self-deception, and then, since man by sin isolates himself and yet in a thousand ways needs the fellowship of his brethren, as deception of others. Malice, the perversion of natural resentment (together with hatred and revenge), is the reaction of selfishness against those who stand, or are imagined to stand, in its way. Unbelief and enmity to God are effects of sin, rather than its essence; selfishness leads us first to doubt, and then to hate, the Lawgiver and Judge. Tacitus: "Humanis generis proprium est odium quem læserit." In sin, self-affirmation and self-surrender are not coordinate elements, as Dörner holds, but the former conditions the latter.

As love to God is love to God's holiness, so love to man is love for holiness in man and desire to impart it. In other words, true love for man is the longing to make man like God. Over against this normal desire which should fill the heart and inspire the life, there stands a hierarchy of lower desires which may be utilized and sanctified by the higher love, but which may assert their independence and may thus be the occasions of sin. Physical gratification, money, esteem, power, knowledge, family, virtue, are proper objects of regard, so long as these are sought for God's sake and within the limitations of his will. Sin consists in turning our backs on God and in seeking any one of these objects for its own sake; or, which is the same thing, for our own sake. Appetite gratified without regard to God's law is lust; the love of money becomes avarice; the desire for esteem becomes vanity; the longing for power becomes ambition; the love for knowledge becomes a selfish thirst for intellectual satisfaction; parental affection degenerates into indulgence and nepotism; the seeking of virtue becomes self-righteousness and self-sufficiency. Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, 323— "Jesus grants that even the heathen and sinners love those who love them. But family love becomes family pride; patriotism comes to stand for country right or wrong; happiness in one's calling leads to class distinctions."

Dante, in his *Divine Comedy*, divides the Inferno into three great sections: those in which are punished, respectively, incontinence, bestiality, and malice. Incontinence—sin of the heart, the emotions, the affections. Lower down is found bestiality—sin of the head, the thoughts, the mind, as infidelity and heresy. Lowest of all is malice—sin of the will, deliberate rebellion, fraud and treachery. So we are taught that the heart carries the intellect with it, and that the sin of unbelief gradually deepens into the intensity of malice. See A. H. Strong, *Great Poets and their Theology*, 183—"Dante teaches us that sin is the self-perversion of the will. If there is any thought fundamental to his system, it is the thought of freedom. Man is not a waif swept irresistibly downward on the current; he is a being endowed with power to resist, and therefore guilty if he yields. Sin is not misfortune, or disease, or natural necessity; it is wilfulness, and crime, and self-destruction. The *Divine Comedy* is, beyond all other poems, the poem of conscience; and this could not be, if it did not recognize man as a free agent, the responsible cause of his own evil acts and his own evil state." See also Harris, in *Jour. Spec. Philos.*, 21:350-451; Dinmore, *Atonement in Literature and Life*, 69-86.

In Greek tragedy, says Prof. Wm. Arnold Stevens, the one sin which the gods hated and would not pardon was *hubris*—obstinate self-assertion of mind or will, absence of reverence and humility—of which we have an illustration in *Ajax*. George MacDonald: "A man may be possessed of himself, as of a devil." Shakespeare depicts this insolence of infatuation in *Shylock*, *Macbeth*, and *Richard III*. *Troilus and Cres-*

sida, 4:4—"Something may be done that we will not; And sometimes we are devils to ourselves. When we will tempt the frailty of our powers, Presuming on their changeable potency." Yet Robert G. Ingersoll said that Shakespeare holds crime to be the mistake of ignorance! N. P. Willis, *Farrhasius*: "How like a mounting devil in the heart Rules unrestrained ambition!"

(δ) Even in the nobler forms of unregenerate life, the principle of selfishness is to be regarded as manifesting itself in the preference of lower ends to that of God's proposing. Others are loved with idolatrous affection because these others are regarded as a part of self. That the selfish element is present even here, is evident upon considering that such affection does not seek the highest interest of its object, that it often ceases when unreturned, and that it sacrifices to its own gratification the claims of God and his law.

Even in the mother's idolatry of her child, the explorer's devotion to science, the sailor's risk of his life to save another's, the gratification sought may be that of a lower instinct or desire, and any substitution of a lower for the highest object is non-conformity to law, and therefore sin. H. B. Smith, *System Theology*, 277—"Some lower affection is supreme." And the underlying motive which leads to this substitution is self-gratification. There is no such thing as disinterested sin, for "every one that loveth is begotten of God" (1 John 4:7). Thomas Hughes, *The Manliness of Christ*: Much of the heroism of battle is simply "resolution in the actors to have their way, contempt for ease, animal courage which we share with the bulldog and the weasel, intense assertion of individual will and force, avowal of the rough-handed man that he has that in him which enables him to defy pain and danger and death."

Mozley on Blanco White, in *Essays*, 2:143: Truth may be sought in order to absorb truth in self, not for the sake of absorbing self in truth. So Blanco White, in spite of the pain of separating from old views and friends, lived for the selfish pleasure of new discovery, till all his early faith vanished, and even immortality seemed a dream. He falsely thought that the pain he suffered in giving up old beliefs was evidence of self-sacrifice with which God must be pleased, whereas it was the inevitable pain which attends the victory of selfishness. Robert Browning, *Paracelsus*, 81—"I still must hoard, and heap, and class all truths With one ulterior purpose: I must know! Would God translate me to his throne, believe That I should only listen to his words To further my own ends." F. W. Robertson on Genesis, 57—"He who sacrifices his sense of right, his conscience, for another, sacrifices the God within him; he is not sacrificing self. . . . He who prefers his dearest friend or his beloved child to the call of duty, will soon show that he prefers himself to his dearest friend, and would not sacrifice himself for his child." *Ib.*, 91—"In those who love little, love [for finite beings] is a primary affection,—a secondary, in those who love much. . . . The only true affection is that which is subordinate to a higher." True love is love for the soul and its highest, its eternal, interests; love that seeks to make it holy; love for the sake of God and for the accomplishment of God's idea in his creation.

Although we cannot, with Augustine, call the virtues of the heathen "splendid vices"—for they were relatively good and useful,—they still, except in possible instances where God's Spirit wrought upon the heart, were illustrations of a morality divorced from love to God, were lacking in the most essential element demanded by the law, were therefore infected with sin. Since the law judges all action by the heart from which it springs, no action of the unregenerate can be other than sin. The ebony-tree is white in its outer circles of woody fibre; at heart it is black as ink. There is no unselfishness in the unregenerate heart, apart from the divine enlightenment and energizing. Self-sacrifice for the sake of self is selfishness after all. Professional burglars and bank-robbers are often carefully abstemious in their personal habits, and they deny themselves the use of liquor and tobacco while in the active practice of their trade. Herron, *The Larger Christ*, 47—"It is as truly immoral to seek truth out of mere love of knowing it, as it is to seek money out of love to gain. Truth sought for truth's sake is an intellectual vice; it is spiritual covetousness. It is an idolatry, setting up the worship of abstractions and generalities in place of the living God."

(ε) It must be remembered, however, that side by side with the selfish will, and striving against it, is the power of Christ, the immanent God,

imparting aspirations and impulses foreign to unregenerate humanity, and preparing the way for the soul's surrender to truth and righteousness.

Rom. 8:7—"the mind of the flesh is enmity against God"; Acts 17:27, 28—"he is not far from each one of us: for in him we live, and move, and have our being"; Rom. 2:4—"the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance"; John 1:9—"the light which lighteth every man." Many generous traits and acts of self-sacrifice in the unregenerate must be ascribed to the prevenient grace of God and to the enlightening influence of the Spirit of Christ. A mother, during the Russian famine, gave to her children all the little supply of food that came to her in the distribution, and died that they might live. In her decision to sacrifice herself for her offspring she may have found her probation and may have surrendered herself to God. The impulse to make the sacrifice may have been due to the Holy Spirit, and her yielding may have been essentially an act of saving faith. In Mark 10:21, 22—"And Jesus looking upon him loved him . . . he went away sorrowful"—our Lord apparently loved the young man, not only for his gifts, his efforts, and his possibilities, but also for the manifest working in him of the divine Spirit, even while in his natural character he was without God and without love, self-ignorant, self-righteous, and self-seeking.

Paul, in like manner, before his conversion, loved and desired righteousness, provided only that this righteousness might be the product and achievement of his own will and might reflect honor on himself; in short, provided only that self might still be uppermost. To be dependent for righteousness upon another was abhorrent to him. And yet this very impulse toward righteousness may have been due to the divine Spirit within him. On Paul's experience before conversion, see E. D. Burton, *Bib. World*, Jan. 1893. Peter objected to the washing of his feet by Jesus (John 13:8), not because it humbled the Master too much in the eyes of the disciple, but because it humbled the disciple too much in his own eyes. Pfleiderer, *Philos. Religion*, 1:218—"Sin is the violation of the God-willed moral order of the world by the self-will of the individual." Tophel on the Holy Spirit, 17—"You would deeply wound him [the average sinner] if you told him that his heart, full of sin, is an object of horror to the holiness of God." The impulse to repentance, as well as the impulse to righteousness, is the product, not of man's own nature, but of the Christ within him who is moving him to seek salvation.

Elizabeth Barrett wrote to Robert Browning after she had accepted his proposal of marriage: "Henceforth I am yours for everything but to do you harm." George Harris, *Moral Evolution*, 138—"Love seeks the true good of the person loved. It will not minister in an unworthy way to afford a temporary pleasure. It will not approve or tolerate that which is wrong. It will not encourage the coarse, base passions of the one loved. It condemns impurity, falsehood, selfishness. A parent does not really love his child if he tolerates the self-indulgence, and does not correct or punish the faults, of the child." Hutton: "You might as well say that it is a fit subject for art to paint the morbid ecstasy of cannibals over their horrid feasts, as to paint lust without love. If you are to delineate man at all, you must delineate him with his human nature, and therefore you can never omit from any worthy picture that conscience which is its crown."

Tennyson, in *In Memoriam*, speaks of "Fantastic beauty such as lurks in some wild poet when he works without a conscience or an aim." Such work may be due to mere human nature. But the lofty work of true creative genius, and the still loftier acts of men still unregenerate but conscientious and self-sacrificing, must be explained by the working in them of the immanent Christ, the life and light of men. James Martineau, *Study*, 1:20—"Conscience may act as human, before it is discovered to be divine." See J. D. Stoops, in *Jour. Philos., Psych., and Sci. Meth.*, 2:512—"If there is a divine life over and above the separate streams of individual lives, the welding up of this larger life in the experience of the individual is precisely the point of contact between the individual person and God." Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, 2:122—"It is this divine element in man, this relationship to God, which gives to sin its darkest and direst complexion. For such a life is the turning of a light brighter than the sun into darkness, the squandering or bartering away of a boundless wealth, the suicidal abasement, to the things that perish, of a nature destined by its very constitution and structure for participation in the very being and blessedness of God."

On the various forms of sin as manifestations of selfishness, see Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin*, 1:147-182; Jonathan Edwards, *Works*, 2:268, 269; Philipp, *Glaubenslehre*, 3:5, 6; Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 248-262; Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers*, 11-91; Hopkins, *Moral Science*, 86-156. On the Roman Catholic "Seven Deadly Sins" (Pride, Envy,

Anger, Sloth, Avarice, Gluttony, Lust), see Wetzler und Welte, *Kirchenlexikon*, and Orby Shipley, *Theory about Sin*, preface, xvi-xviii.

C. This view accords best with Scripture.

(a) The law requires love to God as its all-embracing requirement. (b) The holiness of Christ consisted in this, that he sought not his own will or glory, but made God his supreme end. (c) The Christian is one who has ceased to live for self. (d) The tempter's promise is a promise of selfish independence. (e) The prodigal separates himself from his father, and seeks his own interest and pleasure. (f) The "man of sin" illustrates the nature of sin, in "opposing and exalting himself against all that is called God."

(a) Mat. 22:37-39 — the command of love to God and man; Rom. 13:8-10 — "love therefore is the fulfillment of the law"; Gal. 5:14 — "the whole law is fulfilled in one word, even in this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"; James 2:8 — "the royal law." (b) John 5:30 — "my judgment is righteous; because I seek not mine own will, but the will of him that sent me"; 7:18 — "He that speaketh from himself seeketh his own glory; but he that seeketh the glory of him that sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him"; Rom. 15:3 — "Christ also pleased not himself." (c) Rom. 14:7 — "none of us liveth to himself, and none dieth to himself"; 2 Cor. 5:15 — "he died for all, that they that live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again"; Gal. 2:20 — "I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me." Contrast 2 Tim. 3:2 — "lovers of self." (d) Gen. 3:5 — "ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil." (e) Luke 15:12, 13 — "give me the portion of thy substance . . . gathered all together and took his journey into a far country." (f) 2 Thes. 2:3, 4 — "the man of sin . . . the son of perdition, he that opposeth and exalteth himself against all that is called God or that is worshipped; so that he sitteth in the temple of God, setting himself forth as God."

Contrast "the man of sin" who "exalteth himself" (2 Thes. 2:3, 4) with the Son of God who "emptied himself" (Phil. 2:7). On "the man of sin", see Wm. Arnold Stevens, in *Bap. Quar. Rev.*, July, 1889:328-360. Ritchie, Darwin, and Hegel, 24 — "We are conscious of sin, because we know that our true self is God, from whom we are severed. No ethics is possible unless we recognize an ideal for all human effort in the presence of the eternal Self which any account of conduct presupposes." John Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, 2:59-73 — "Here, as in all organic life, the individual member or organ has no independent or exclusive life, and the attempt to attain to it is fatal to itself." Milton describes man as "affecting Godhead, and so losing all." Of the sinner, we may say with Shakespeare, *Coriolanus*, 5:4 — "He wants nothing of a god but eternity and a heaven to throne in. . . . There is no more mercy in him than there is milk in a male tiger." No one of us, then, can sign too early "the declaration of dependence." Both Old School and New School theologians agree that sin is selfishness; see Bellamy, Hopkins, Emmons, the younger Edwards, Finney, Taylor. See also A. H. Strong, *Christ in Creation*, 287-292.

Sin, therefore, is not merely a negative thing, or an absence of love to God. It is a fundamental and positive choice or preference of self instead of God, as the object of affection and the supreme end of being. Instead of making God the centre of his life, surrendering himself unconditionally to God and possessing himself only in subordination to God's will, the sinner makes self the centre of his life, sets himself directly against God, and constitutes his own interest the supreme motive and his own will the supreme rule.

We may follow Dr. E. G. Robinson in saying that, while sin as a state is unlikeness to God, as a principle is opposition to God, and as an act is transgression of God's law, the essence of it always and everywhere is selfishness. It is therefore not something external, or the result of compulsion from without; it is a depravity of the affections and a perversion of the will, which constitutes man's inmost character.

See Harris, in *Bib. Sac.*, 18:148 — "Sin is essentially egoism or selfishness, putting self in God's place. It has four principal characteristics or manifestations: (1) self-sufficiency, instead of faith; (2) self-will, instead of submission; (3) self-seeking, instead of

benevolence; (4) self-righteousness, instead of humility and reverence." All sin is either explicit or implicit "enmity against God" (Rom. 8:7). All true confessions are like David's (Ps. 51:4) — "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned, And done that which is evil in thy sight." Of all sinners it might be said that they "Fight neither with small nor great, save only with the king of Israel" (1 K. 22:31).

Not every sinner is conscious of this enmity. Sin is a principle in course of development. It is not yet "full-grown" (James 1:15 — "the sin, when it is full-grown, bringeth forth death"). Even now, as James Martineau has said: "If it could be known that God was dead, the news would cause but little excitement in the streets of London and Paris." But this indifference easily grows, in the presence of threatening and penalty, into violent hatred to God and positive defiance of his law. If the sin which is now hidden in the sinner's heart were but permitted to develop itself according to its own nature, it would hurl the Almighty from his throne, and would set up its own kingdom upon the ruins of the moral universe. Sin is world-destroying, as well as God-destroying, for it is inconsistent with the conditions which make being as a whole possible; see Royce, *World and Individual*, 2:366; Dwight, *Works*, sermon 80.

### SECTION III.—UNIVERSALITY OF SIN.

We have shown that sin is a state, a state of the will, a selfish state of the will. We now proceed to show that this selfish state of the will is universal. We divide our proof into two parts. In the first, we regard sin in its aspect as conscious violation of law; in the second, in its aspect as a bias of the nature to evil, prior to or underlying consciousness.

I. EVERY HUMAN BEING WHO HAS ARRIVED AT MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS HAS COMMITTED ACTS, OR CHERISHED DISPOSITIONS, CONTRARY TO THE DIVINE LAW.

#### 1. *Proof from Scripture.*

The universality of transgression is:

(a) Set forth in direct statements of Scripture.

1 E. 8:46 — "there is no man that sinneth not"; Ps. 143:2 — "enter not into judgment with thy servant; For in thy sight no man living is righteous"; Prov. 20:9 — "Who can say, I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my sin?" Eccl. 7:20 — "Surely there is not a righteous man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not"; Luke 11:13 — "If ye, then, being evil"; Rom. 3:10, 12 — "There is none righteous, no, not one . . . There is none that doeth good, no, not so much as one"; 19, 20 — "that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may be brought under the judgment of God: because by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight; for through the law cometh the knowledge of sin"; 23 — "for all have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God"; Gal. 3:22 — "the scripture shut up all things under sin"; James 3:2 — "For in many things we all stumble"; 1 John 1:8 — "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." Compare Mat. 6:12 — "forgive us our debts" — given as a prayer for all men; 14 — "If ye forgive men their trespasses" — the condition of our own forgiveness.

(b) Implied in declarations of the universal need of atonement, regeneration, and repentance.

Universal need of atonement: Mark 16:16 — "He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved" (Mark 16:9-20, though probably not written by Mark, is nevertheless of canonical authority); John 3:16 — "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish"; 6:50 — "This is the bread which cometh down out of heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die"; 12:47 — "I came not to judge the world, but to save the world"; Acts 4:12 — "in none other is there salvation: for neither is there any other name under heaven, that is given among men, wherein we must be saved." Universal need of regeneration: John 3:3, 5 — "Except one be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God. . . . Except one be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Universal need of repentance: Acts 17:30 — "commandeth men that they should all everywhere repent." Yet Mrs. Mary Baker G. Eddy, in her "Unity of Good," speaks of "the illusion which calls sin real and man a sinner needing a Savior."

## (c) Shown from the condemnation resting upon all who do not accept Christ.

John 3:18—"he that believeth not hath been judged already, because he hath not believed on the name of the only begotten Son of God"; 36—"he that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him"; Compare 1 John 5:19—"the whole world lieth in [i. e., in union with] the evil one"; see Annotated Paragraph Bible, *in loco*. Kaftan, Dogmatik, 318—"Law requires love to God. This implies love to our neighbor, not only abstaining from all injury to him, but righteousness in all our relations, forgiving instead of requiting, help to enemies as well as friends in all salutary ways, self-discipline, avoidance of all sensuous immoderation, subjection of all sensuous activity as means for spiritual ends in the kingdom of God, and all this, not as a matter of outward conduct merely, but from the heart and as the satisfaction of one's own will and desire. This is the will of God respecting us, which Jesus has revealed and of which he is the example in his life. Instead of this, man universally seeks to promote his own life, pleasure, and honor."

(d) Consistent with those passages which at first sight seem to ascribe to certain men a goodness which renders them acceptable to God, where a closer examination will show that in each case the goodness supposed is a merely imperfect and fancied goodness, a goodness of mere aspiration and impulse due to preliminary workings of God's Spirit, or a goodness resulting from the trust of a conscious sinner in God's method of salvation.

In Mat. 9:12—"They that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick"—Jesus means those who in their own esteem are whole; cf. 13—"I came not to call the righteous, but sinners"—"if any were truly righteous, they would not need my salvation; if they think themselves so, they will not care to seek it" (An. Par. Bib.). In Luke 10:30-37—the parable of the good Samaritan—Jesus intimates, not that the good Samaritan was not a sinner, but that there were saved sinners outside of the bounds of Israel. In Acts 10:35—"In every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is acceptable to him"—Peter declares, not that Cornelius was not a sinner, but that God had accepted him through Christ; Cornelius was already justified, but he needed to know (1) that he was saved, and (2) how he was saved; and Peter was sent to tell him of the fact, and of the method, of his salvation in Christ. In Rom. 2:14—"for when Gentiles that have not the law do by nature the things of the law, these, not having the law, are a law unto themselves"—it is only said that in certain respects the obedience of these Gentiles shows that they have an unwritten law in their hearts; it is not said that they perfectly obey the law and therefore have no sin—for Paul says immediately after (Rom. 3:9)—"we before laid to the charge both of Jews and Greeks, that they are all under sin."

So with regard to the words "perfect" and "upright," as applied to godly men. We shall see, when we come to consider the doctrine of Sanctification, that the word "perfect" as applied to spiritual conditions already attained, signifies only a relative perfection, equivalent to sincere piety or maturity of Christian judgment, in other words, the perfection of a sinner who has long trusted in Christ, and in whom Christ has overcome his chief defects of character. See 1 Cor. 2:6—"we speak wisdom among the perfect" (Am. Rev.: "among them that are full-grown"); Phil. 3:15—"Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded"—i. e., to press toward the goal—a goal expressly said by the apostles to be not yet attained (v. 13-14).

"Est deus in nobis; agitante calcescimus illo." God is the "spark that fires our clay." E. S. Times, Sept. 21, 1901:609—"Humanity is better and worse than men have painted it. There has been a kind of theological pessimism in denouncing human sinfulness, which has been blind to the abounding love and patience and courage and fidelity to duty among men." A. H. Strong, Christ in Creation, 287-290—"There is a natural life of Christ, and that life pulses and throbs in all men everywhere. All men are created in Christ, before they are recreated in him. The whole race lives, moves, and has its being in him, for he is the soul of its soul and the life of its life." To Christ then, and not to unaided human nature, we attribute the noble impulses of unregenerate men. These impulses are drawings of his Spirit, moving men to repentance. But they are influences of his grace which, if resisted, leave the soul in more than its original darkness.

## 2. Proof from history, observation, and the common judgment of mankind.

(a) History witnesses to the universality of sin, in its accounts of the universal prevalence of priesthood and sacrifice.

See references in Luthardt, *Fund. Truths*, 161-172, 336-339. *Baptist Review*, 1882:943— "Plutarch speaks of the tear-stained eyes, the pallid and woe-begone countenances which he sees at the public altars, men rolling themselves in the mire and confessing their sins. Among the common people the dull feeling of guilt was too real to be shaken off or laughed away."

(b) Every man knows himself to have come short of moral perfection, and, in proportion to his experience of the world, recognizes the fact that every other man has come short of it also.

Chinese proverb: "There are but two good men; one is dead, and the other is not yet born." Idaho proverb: "The only good Indian is a dead Indian." But the proverb applies to the white man also. Dr. Jacob Chamberlain, the missionary, said: "I never but once in India heard a man deny that he was a sinner. But once a Brahmin interrupted me and said: 'I deny your premises. I am not a sinner. I do not need to do better.' For a moment I was abashed. Then I said: 'But what do your neighbors say?' Thereupon one cried out: 'He cheated me in trading horses'; another: 'He defrauded a widow of her inheritance.' The Brahmin went out of the house, and I never saw him again." A great nephew of Richard Brinsley Sheridan, Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu, when a child, wrote in a few lines an "Essay on the Life of Man," which ran as follows: "A man's life naturally divides itself into three distinct parts: the first when he is contriving and planning all kinds of villainy and rascality,—that is the period of youth and innocence. In the second, he is found putting in practice all the villainy and rascality he has contrived,—that is the flower of mankind and prime of life. The third and last period is that when he is making his soul and preparing for another world,—that is the period of dotage."

(c) The common judgment of mankind declares that there is an element of selfishness in every human heart, and that every man is prone to some form of sin. This common judgment is expressed in the maxims: "No man is perfect"; "Every man has his weak side", or "his price"; and every great name in literature has attested its truth.

Seneca, *De Ira*, 3:26—"We are all wicked. What one blames in another he will find in his own bosom. We live among the wicked, ourselves being wicked"; *Ep.*, 23—"No one has strength of himself to emerge [from this wickedness]; some one must needs hold forth a hand; some one must draw us out." Ovid, *Met.*, 7:19—"I see the things that are better and I approve them, yet I follow the worse . . . We strive even after that which is forbidden, and we desire the things that are denied." Cicero: "Nature has given us faint sparks of knowledge; we extinguish them by our immoralities."

Shakespeare, *Othello*, 3:3—"Where's that palace whereinto foul things Sometimes intrude not? Who has a breast so pure, But some uncleanly apprehensions keep leets [meetings in court] and law-days, and in sessions sit With meditations lawful?" Henry VI., II:3:3—"Forbear to judge, for we are sinners all." Hamlet, 2:2, compares God's influence to the sun which "breeds maggots in a dead dog, Kissing carrion,"—that is, God is no more responsible for the corruption in man's heart and the evil that comes from it, than the sun is responsible for the maggots which its heat breeds in a dead dog; 3:1—"We are arrant knaves all." Timon of Athens, 1:2—"Who lives that's not depraved or depraves?"

Goethe: "I see no fault committed which I too might not have committed." Dr. Johnson: "Every man knows that of himself which he dare not tell to his dearest friend." Thackeray showed himself a master in fiction by having no heroes; the paragons of virtue belonged to a cruder age of romance. So George Eliot represents life correctly by setting before us no perfect characters; all act from mixed motives. Carlyle, hero-worshiper as he was inclined to be, is said to have become disgusted with each of his heroes before he finished his biography. Emerson said that to understand any crime, he had only to look into his own heart. Robert Burns: "God knows I'm no thing I would be, Nor am I even the thing I could be." Huxley: "The best men of the best epochs are simply those who make the fewest blunders and commit the fewest sins." And he speaks of "the infinite wickedness" which has attended the course of human history. Matthew Arnold: "What mortal, when he saw, Life's voyage done, his heavenly Friend, Could ever yet dare tell him fearlessly:—I have kept unfringed

my nature's law: The only written chart thou gavest me, to guide me, I have kept by to the end?" Walter Besant, *Children of Gibeon*: "The men of ability do not desire a system in which they shall not be able to do good to themselves first." "Ready to offer praise and prayer on Sunday, if on Monday they may go into the market place to skin their fellows and sell their hides." Yet Confucius declares that "man is born good." He confounds conscience with will — the *sense* of right with the *love* of right. Dean Swift's worthy sought many years for a method of extracting sunbeams from cucumbers. Human nature of itself is as little able to bear the fruits of God.

Every man will grant (1) that he is not perfect in moral character; (2) that love to God has not been the constant motive of his actions, *i. e.*, that he has been to some degree selfish; (3) that he has committed at least one known violation of conscience. Shedd, *Sermons to the Natural Man*, 86, 87 — "Those theorists who reject revealed religion, and remand man to the first principles of ethics and morality as the only religion that he needs, send him to a tribunal that damns him"; for it is simple fact that "no human creature, in any country or grade of civilization, has ever glorified God to the extent of his knowledge of God."

### 3. *Proof from Christian experience.*

(a) In proportion to his spiritual progress does the Christian recognize evil dispositions within him, which but for divine grace might germinate and bring forth the most various forms of outward transgression.

See Goodwin's experience, in Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 409; Goodwin, member of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, speaking of his conversion, says: "An abundant discovery was made to me of my inward lusts and concupiscence, and I was amazed to see with what greediness I had sought the gratification of every sin." Tillner's experience, in Martensen's *Dogmatics*; Tillner, though inclined to Pelagianism, says: "I look into my own heart and I see with penitent sorrow that I must in God's sight accuse myself of all the offences I have named," — and he had named only deliberate transgressions; — "he who does not allow that he is similarly guilty, let him look deep into his own heart." John Newton sees the murderer led to execution, and says: "There, but for the grace of God, goes John Newton." Count de Maistre: "I do not know what the heart of a villain may be — I only know that of a virtuous man, and that is frightful." Tholuck, on the fiftieth anniversary of his professorship at Halle, said to his students: "In review of God's manifold blessings, the thing I seem most to thank him for is the conviction of sin."

Roger Ascham: "By experience we find out a short way, by a long wandering." Luke 15: 25-32 is sometimes referred to as indicating that there are some of God's children who never wander from the Father's house. But there were two prodigals in that family. The elder was a servant in spirit as well as the younger. J. J. Murphy, *Nat. Selection and Spir. Freedom*, 41, 42 — "In the wish of the elder son that he might sometimes feast with his own friends apart from his father, was contained the germ of that desire to escape the wholesome restraints of home which, in its full development, had brought his brother first to riotous living, and afterwards to the service of the stranger and the herding of swine. This root of sin is in us all, but in him it was not so full-grown as to bring death. Yet he says: 'Lo, these many years do I serve thee' (*δουλεύω* — as a bondservant), 'and I never transgressed a commandment of thine.' Are the father's commandments grievous? Is service true and sincere, without love from the heart? The elder brother was calculating toward his father and unsympathetic toward his brother." Sir J. R. Seelye, *Eccle Homo*: "No virtue can be safe, unless it is enthusiastic." Wordsworth: "Heaven rejects the love Of nicely calculated less or more."

(b) Since those most enlightened by the Holy Spirit recognize themselves as guilty of unnumbered violations of the divine law, the absence of any consciousness of sin on the part of unregenerate men must be regarded as proof that they are blinded by persistent transgression.

It is a remarkable fact that, while those who are enlightened by the Holy Spirit and who are actually overcoming their sins see more and more of the evil of their hearts and lives, those who are the slaves of sin see less and less of that evil, and often deny that they are sinners at all. Rousseau, in his *Confessions*, confesses sin in a spirit which itself needs to be confessed. He glosses over his vices, and magnifies his virtues. "No

man," he says, "can come to the throne of God and say: 'I am a better man than Rousseau.' . . . Let the trumpet of the last judgment sound when it will: I will present myself before the Sovereign Judge with this book in my hand, and I will say aloud: 'Here is what I did, what I thought, and what I was.'" "Ah," said he, just before he expired, "how happy a thing it is to die, when one has no reason for remorse or self-reproach!" And then, addressing himself to the Almighty, he said: "Eternal Being, the soul that I am going to give thee back is as pure at this moment as it was when it proceeded from thee; render it a partaker of thy felicity!" Yet, in his boyhood, Rousseau was a petty thief. In his writings, he advocated adultery and suicide. He lived for more than twenty years in practical licentiousness. His children, most of whom, if not all, were illegitimate, he sent off to the foundling hospital as soon as they were born, thus casting them upon the charity of strangers, yet he inflamed the mothers of France with his eloquent appeals to them to nurse their own babies. He was mean, vacillating, treacherous, hypocritical, and blasphemous. And in his Confessions, he rehearses the exciting scenes of his life in the spirit of the bold adventurer. See N. M. Williams, in *Bap. Review*, art.: Rousseau, from which the substance of the above is taken.

Edwin Forrest, when accused of being converted in a religious revival, wrote an indignant denial to the public press, saying that he had nothing to regret; his sins were those of omission rather than commission; he had always acted upon the principle of loving his friends and hating his enemies; and trusting in the justice as well as the mercy of God, he hoped, when he left this earthly sphere, to 'wrap the drapery of his couch about him, and lie down to pleasant dreams.' And yet no man of his time was more arrogant, self-sufficient, licentious, revengeful. John Y. McCane, when sentenced to Sing Sing prison for six years for violating the election laws by the most highhanded bribery and ballot-stuffing, declared that he had never done anything wrong in his life. He was a Sunday School Superintendent, moreover. A lady who lived to the age of 92, protested that, if she had her whole life to live over again, she would not alter a single thing. Lord Nelson, after he had received his death wound at Trafalgar, said: "I have never been a great sinner." Yet at that very time he was living in open adultery. Tennyson, *Sea Dreams*: "With all his conscience and one eye askew, so false, he partly took himself for true." Contrast the utterance of the apostle Paul: 1 Tim. 1:15—"Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners; of whom I am chief." It has been well said that "the greatest of sins is to be conscious of none." Rowland Hill: "The devil makes little of sin, that he may retain the sinner."

The following reasons may be suggested for men's unconsciousness of their sins: 1. We never know the force of any evil passion or principle within us, until we begin to resist it. 2. God's providential restraints upon sin have hitherto prevented its full development. 3. God's judgments against sin have not yet been made manifest. 4. Sin itself has a blinding influence upon the mind. 5. Only he who has been saved from the penalty of sin is willing to look into the abyss from which he has been rescued.—That a man is unconscious of any sin is therefore only proof that he is a great and hardened transgressor. This is also the most hopeless feature of his case, since for one who never realizes his sin there is no salvation. In the light of this truth, we see the amazing grace of God, not only in the gift of Christ to die for sinners, but in the gift of the Holy Spirit to convince men of their sins and to lead them to accept the Savior. Ps. 90:8—"Thou hast set . . . Our secret sins in the light of thy countenance"—man's inner sinfulness is hidden from himself, until it is contrasted with the holiness of God. Light—a luminary or sun, which shines down into the depths of the heart and brings out its hidden evil into painful relief. See Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 2: 248-259; Edwards, *Works*, 2: 326; John Caird, *Reasons for Men's Unconsciousness of their Sins*, in *Sermons*, 33.

II. EVERY MEMBER OF THE HUMAN RACE, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, POSSESSES A CORRUPTED NATURE, WHICH IS A SOURCE OF ACTUAL SIN, AND IS ITSELF SIN.

### 1. *Proof from Scripture.*

A. The sinful acts and dispositions of men are referred to, and explained by, a corrupt nature.

By 'nature' we mean that which is *born* in a man, that which he has by birth. That there is an inborn corrupt state, from which sinful acts and dispositions flow, is evident

from Luke 6: 43-45 — "there is no good tree that bringeth forth corrupt fruit . . . the evil man out of the evil treasure [of his heart] bringeth forth that which is evil"; Mat. 12: 34 — "Ye offspring of vipers, how can ye, being evil, speak good things?" Ps. 58: 3 — "The wicked are estranged from the womb: They go astray as soon as they are born, speaking lies."

This corrupt nature (*a*) belongs to man from the first moment of his being; (*b*) underlies man's consciousness; (*c*) cannot be changed by man's own power; (*d*) first constitutes him a sinner before God; (*e*) is the common heritage of the race.

(*a*) Ps. 51: 5 — "Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity; And in sin did my mother conceive me" — here David is confessing, not his mother's sin, but his own sin; and he declares that this sin goes back to the very moment of his conception. Tholuck, quoted by H. B. Smith, System, 281 — "David confesses that sin begins with the life of man; that not only his works, but the man himself, is guilty before God." Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2: 94 — "David mentions the fact that he was born sinful, as an aggravation of his particular act of adultery, and not as an excuse for it." (*b*) Ps. 19: 12 — "Who can discern his errors? Clear thou me from hidden faults"; Ps. 6: 7 — "Behold, thou desirest truth in the inward parts; And in the hidden part thou wilt make me to know wisdom. Purify me with hyssop, and I shall be clean: Wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow." (*c*) Jer. 13: 23 — "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil"; Rom. 7: 24 — "Wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" (*d*) Ps. 51: 6 — "Behold, thou desirest truth in the inward parts"; Jer. 17: 9 — "The heart is deceitful above all things and it is exceedingly corrupt: who can know it? I, Jehovah, search the mind, I try the heart," — only God can fully know the native and incurable depravity of the human heart; see Annotated Paragraph Bible, *in loco*. (*e*) Job 14: 4 — "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? not one"; John 3: 6 — "That which is born of the flesh is flesh." *i. e.*, human nature sundered from God. Pope, Theology, 2: 53 — "Christ, who knew what was in man, says: 'If ye then, being evil' (Mat. 7: 11), and 'that which is born of the flesh is flesh' (John 3: 6), that is — putting the two together — 'men are evil, because they are born evil.'"

Nathaniel Hawthorne's story of *The Minister's Black Veil* portrays the isolation of every man's deepest life, and the awe which any visible assertion of that isolation inspires. C. P. Cranch: "We are spirits clad in veils; Man by man was never seen; All our deep communing fails To remove the shadowy screen." In the heart of every one of us is that fearful "black drop," which the Koran says the angel showed to Mohammed. Sin is like the taint of scrofula in the blood, which shows itself in tumors, in consumption, in cancer, in manifold forms, but is everywhere the same organic evil. Byron spoke truly of "This ineradicable taint of sin, this boundless Upas, this all-blasting tree."

E. G. Robinson, Christ. Theol., 161, 162 — "The objection that conscience brings no charge of guilt against inborn depravity, however true it may be of the nature in its passive state, is seen, when the nature is roused to activity, to be unfounded. This faculty, on the contrary, lends support to the doctrine it is supposed to overthrow. When the conscience holds intelligent inquisition upon single acts, it soon discovers that these are mere accessories to crime, while the principal is hidden away beyond the reach of consciousness. In following up its inquisition, it in due time extorts the exclamation of David: Ps. 51: 5 — 'Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity; And in sin did my mother conceive me.' Conscience traces guilt to its seat in the inherited nature."

B. All men are declared to be by nature children of wrath (Eph. 2: 3). Here 'nature' signifies something inborn and original, as distinguished from that which is subsequently acquired. The text implies that: (*a*) Sin is a nature, in the sense of a congenital depravity of the will. (*b*) This nature is guilty and condemnable, — since God's wrath rests only upon that which deserves it. (*c*) All men participate in this nature and in this consequent guilt and condemnation.

Eph. 2: 3 — "were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest." Shedd: "Nature here is not substance created by God, but corruption of that substance, which corruption is created by man." 'Nature' (from *nascor*) may denote anything inborn, and the term may just as properly designate inborn evil tendencies and state, as inborn faculties or substance. "By nature" therefore — "by birth"; compare Gal. 2: 15 — "Jews by nature." E. G. Robinson: "Nature — not *obscure*, or essence, but only qualification of essence, as something born

in us. There is just as much difference in babes, from the beginning of their existence, as there is in adults. If sin is defined as 'voluntary transgression of known law,' the definition of course disposes of original sin." But if sin is a selfish state of the will, such a state is demonstrably inborn. Aristotle speaks of some men as born to be savages (*φύσει βάρβαραι*), and of others as destined by nature to be slaves (*φύσει δούλοι*). Here evidently is a congenital aptitude and disposition. Similarly we can interpret Paul's words as declaring nothing less than that men are possessed at birth of an aptitude and disposition which is the object of God's just displeasure.

The opposite view can be found in Stevens, *Pauline Theology*, 152-157. Principal Fairbairn also says that inherited sinfulness "is not transgression, and is without guilt." Ritschl, *Just. and Recon.*, 344—"The predicate 'children of wrath' refers to the former actual transgression of those who now as Christians have the right to apply to themselves that divine purpose of grace which is the antithesis of wrath." Meyer interprets the verse: "We become children of wrath by following a natural propensity." He claims the doctrine of the apostle to be, that man incurs the divine wrath by his *actual* sin, when he submits his will to the inborn sin principle. So N. W. Taylor, *Concio ad Clerum*, quoted in H. B. Smith, *System*, 261—"We were by nature such that we became through our own act children of wrath." "But," says Smith, "if the apostle had meant this, he could have said so; there is a proper Greek word for 'became'; the word which is used can only be rendered 'were.'" So 1 Cor. 7: 14—"she was your children's uncle"—implies that, apart from the operations of grace, all men are defiled in virtue of their very birth from a corrupt stock. Cloth is first dyed in the wool, and then dyed again after the weaving. Man is a "double-dyed villain." He is corrupted by nature and afterwards by practice. The colored physician in New Orleans advertised that his method was "first to remove the disease, and then to eradicate the system." The New School method of treating this text is of a similar sort. Beginning with a definition of sin which excludes from that category all inborn states of the will, it proceeds to vacate of their meaning the positive statements of Scripture.

For the proper interpretation of Eph. 2: 3, see Julius Müller, *Doct. of Sin*, 2: 273, and Commentaries of Harless and Olshausen. See also Philipp, *Glaubenslehre*, 3: 212 sq.; Thomastus, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 269; and an excellent note in the *Expositor's Greek N. T.*, *in loco*. *Per contra*, see Reuss, *Christ. Theol. in Apost. Age*, 2: 29, 79-84; Weiss, *Bib. Theol. N. T.*, 290.

C. Death, the penalty of sin, is visited even upon those who have never exercised a personal and conscious choice (Rom. 5: 12-14). This text implies that (a) Sin exists in the case of infants prior to moral consciousness, and therefore in the nature, as distinguished from the personal activity. (b) Since infants die, this visitation of the penalty of sin upon them marks the ill-desert of that nature which contains in itself, though undeveloped, the germs of actual transgression. (c) It is therefore certain that a sinful, guilty, and condemnable nature belongs to all mankind.

Rom. 5: 12-14—"Therefore, as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned:—for until the law sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed when there is no law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression"—that is, over those who, like infants, had never personally and consciously sinned. See a more full treatment of these last words in connection with an exegesis of the whole passage—Rom. 5: 12-19—under *Imputation of Sin*, pages 625-627.

N. W. Taylor maintained that infants, prior to moral agency, are not subjects of the moral government of God, any more than are animals. In this he disagreed with Edwards, Ballamy, Hopkins, Dwight, Smalley, Griffin. See Tyler, *Letters on N. E. Theol.*, 8, 132-142—"To say that animals die, and therefore death can be no proof of sin in infants, is to take infidel ground. The infidel has just as good a right to say: Because animals die without being sinners, therefore adults may. If death may reign to such an alarming extent over the human race and yet be no proof of sin, then you adopt the principle that death may reign to any extent over the universe, yet never can be made a proof of sin in any case." We reserve our full proof that physical death is the penalty of sin to the section on Penalty as one of the Consequences of Sin.

## 2. Proof from Reason.

Three facts demand explanation: (a) The universal existence of sinful

*all living things*

dispositions in every mind, and of sinful acts in every life. (b) The preponderating tendencies to evil, which necessitate the constant education of good impulses, while the bad grow of themselves. (c) The yielding of the will to temptation, and the actual violation of the divine law, in the case of every human being so soon as he reaches moral consciousness.

The fundamental selfishness of man is seen in childhood, when human nature acts itself out spontaneously. It is difficult to develop courtesy in children. There can be no true courtesy without regard for man as man and willingness to accord to each man his place and right as a son of God equal with ourselves. But children wish to please themselves without regard to others. The mother asks the child: "Why don't you do right instead of doing wrong?" and the child answers: "Because it makes me so tired," or "Because I do wrong without trying." Nothing runs itself, unless it is going down hill. "No other animal does things habitually that will injure and destroy it, and does them from the love of it. But man does this, and he is born to do it, he does it from birth. As the seedlings of the peach-tree are all peaches, not apples, and those of thorns are all thorns, not grapes, so all the descendants of man are born with evil in their natures. That sin continually comes back to us, like a dog or cat that has been driven away, proves that our hearts are its home."

Mrs. Humphrey Ward's novel, *Robert Elsmere*, represents the milk-and-water school of philanthropists. "Give man a chance," they say; "give him good example and favorable environment and he will turn out well. He is more sinned against than sinning. It is the outward presence of evil that drives men to evil courses." But God's indictment is found in Rom. 8:7—"the mind of the flesh is enmity against God." G. P. Fisher: "Of the ideas of natural religion, Plato, Plutarch and Cicero found in the fact that they are in man's reason, but not obeyed and realized in man's will, the most convincing evidence that humanity is at scism with itself, and therefore depraved, fallen, and unable to deliver itself. The reason why many moralists fail and grow bitter and hateful is that they do not take account of this state of sin."

Reason seeks an underlying principle which will reduce these multitudinous phenomena to unity. As we are compelled to refer common physical and intellectual phenomena to a common physical and intellectual nature, so we are compelled to refer these common moral phenomena to a common moral nature, and to find in it the cause of this universal, spontaneous, and all-controlling opposition to God and his law. The only possible solution of the problem is this, that the common nature of mankind is corrupt, or, in other words, that the human will, prior to the single volitions of the individual, is turned away from God and supremely set upon self-gratification. This unconscious and fundamental direction of the will, as the source of actual sin, must itself be sin; and of this sin all mankind are partakers.

The greatest thinkers of the world have certified to the correctness of this conclusion. See Aristotle's doctrine of "the slope," described in Chase's Introduction to Aristotle's *Ethics*, xxxv and 32—"In regard to moral virtue, man stands on a slope. His appetites and passions gravitate downward; his reason attracts him upward. Conflict occurs. A step upward, and reason gains what passion has lost; but the reverse is the case if he steps downward. The tendency in the former case is to the entire subjection of passion; in the latter case, to the entire suppression of reason. The slope will terminate upwards in a level summit where men's steps will be secure, or downwards in an irretrievable plunge over the precipice. Continual self-control leads to absolute self-mastery; continual failure, to the utter absence of self-control. But *all we can see is the slope*. No man is ever at the *apex* of the summit, nor can we say that a man has irretrievably fallen into the abyss. How it is that men constantly act against their own convictions of what is right, and their previous determinations to follow right, is a mystery which Aristotle discusses, but leaves unexplained.

"Compare the passage in the *Ethics*, I:11—"Clearly there is in them [men], besides the Reason, some other inborn principle (*νεφελες*) which fights with and strains against the Reason . . . There is in the soul also somewhat besides the Reason which is

opposed to this and goes against it.—Compare this passage with Paul, in Rom. 7:23—'I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members.' But as Aristotle does not explain the cause, so he suggests no cure. Revelation alone can account for the disease, or point out the remedy."

Wuttke, *Christian Ethics*, 1:102—"Aristotle makes the significant and almost surprising observation, that the character which has become evil by guilt can just as little be thrown off again at mere volition, as the person who has made himself sick by his own fault can become well again at mere volition; once become evil or sick, it stands no longer within his discretion to cease to be so; a stone, when once cast, cannot be caught back from its flight; and so is it with the character that has become evil." He does not tell "how a reformation in character is possible,—moreover, he does not concede to evil any other than an individual effect,—knows nothing of any natural solidarity of evil in self-propagating, morally degenerated races" (*Nic. Eth.*, 3:6, 7; 5:12; 7:2, 3; 10:10). The good nature, he says, "is evidently not within our power, but is by some kind of divine causality conferred upon the truly happy."

Plato speaks of "that blind, many-headed wild beast of all that is evil within thee." He repudiates the idea that men are naturally good, and says that, if this were true, all that would be needed to make them holy would be to shut them up, from their earliest years, so that they might not be corrupted by others. *Republic*, 4 (Jowett's translation, 11:278)—"There is a rising up of part of the soul against the whole of the soul." *Meno*, 89—"The cause of corruption is from our parents, so that we never relinquish their evil way, or escape the blemish of their evil habit." Horace, *Ep.*, 1:10—"Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret." Latin proverb: "Nemo repente fuit turpissimus." Pascal: "We are born unrighteous; for each one tends to himself, and the bent toward self is the beginning of all disorder." Kant, in his *Metaphysical Principles of Human Morals*, speaks of "the indwelling of an evil principle side by side with the good one, or the radical evil of human nature," and of "the contest between the good and the evil principles for the control of man." Hegel, pantheist as he was, declared that original sin is the nature of every man,—every man begins with it" (H. B. Smith).

Shakespeare, *Timon of Athens*, 4:3—"All is oblique: There's nothing level in our cursed natures, But direct villainy." *All's Well*, 4:3—"As we are in ourselves, how weak we are! Merely our own traitors." *Measure for Measure*, 1:2—"Our natures do pursue, Like rats that ravin down their proper bane, A thirsty evil, and when we drink, we die." *Hamlet*, 3:1—"Virtue cannot so inoculate our old stock, but we shall relish of it." *Love's Labor Lost*, 1:1—"Every man with his affects is born, Not by might mastered, but by special grace." *Winter's Tale*, 1:2—"We should have answered Heaven boldly, Not guilty; the imposition cleared Hereditary ours"—that is, provided our hereditary connection with Adam had not made us guilty. On the theology of Shakespeare, see A. H. Strong, *Great Poets*, 195-211—"If any think it irrational to believe in man's depravity, guilt, and need of supernatural redemption, they must also be prepared to say that Shakespeare did not understand human nature."

S. T. Coleridge, *Omniana*, at the end: "It is a fundamental article of Christianity that I am a fallen creature . . . that an evil ground existed in my will, previously to any act or assignable moment of time in my consciousness; I am born a child of wrath. This fearful mystery I pretend not to understand. I cannot even conceive the possibility of it; but I know that it is so. . . . and what is real must be possible." A sceptic who gave his children no religious training, with the view of letting them each in mature years choose a faith for himself, reproved Coleridge for letting his garden run to weeds; but Coleridge replied, that he did not think it right to prejudice the soil in favor of roses and strawberries. Van Oosterzee: Rain and sunshine make weeds grow more quickly, but could not draw them out of the soil if the seeds did not lie there already; so evil education and example draw out sin, but do not implant it. Tennyson, *Two Voices*: "He finds a baseness in his blood, At such strange war with what is good, He cannot do the thing he would." Robert Browning, *Gold Hair: a Legend of Pornic*: "The faith that launched point-blank her dart At the head of a lie—taught Original Sin, The corruption of Man's Heart." Taine, *Ancien Régime*: "Savage, brigand and madman each of us harbors, in repose or manacled, but always living, in the recesses of his own heart." Alexander Maclaren: "A great mass of knotted weeds growing in a stagnant pool is dragged toward you as you drag one filament." Draw out one sin, and it brings with it the whole matted nature of sin.

Chief Justice Thompson, of Pennsylvania: "If those who preach had been lawyers previous to entering the ministry, they would know and say far more about the deprav-

ity of the human heart than they do. The old doctrine of total depravity is the only thing that can explain the falsehoods, the dishonesties, the licentiousness, and the murders which are so rife in the world. Education, refinement, and even a high order of talent, cannot overcome the inclination to evil which exists in the heart, and has taken possession of the very fibres of our nature." See Edwards, *Original Sin*, in *Works*, 2: 309-510; Julius Müller, *Doct. Stp.*, 2: 269-307; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 231-238; Shedd, *Discourses and Essays*, 325-236.

#### SECTION IV.—ORIGIN OF SIN IN THE PERSONAL ACT OF ADAM.

With regard to the origin of this sinful nature which is common to the race, and which is the occasion of all actual transgressions, reason affords no light. The Scriptures, however, refer the origin of this nature to that free act of our first parents by which they turned away from God, corrupted themselves, and brought themselves under the penalties of the law.

Chandler, *Spirit of Man*, 76— "It is vain to attempt to sever the moral life of Christianity from the historical fact in which it is rooted. We may cordially assent to the assertion that the whole value of historical events is in their ideal significance. But in many cases, part of that which the idea signifies is the fact that it has been exhibited in history. The value and interest of the conquest of Greece over Persia lie in the significant idea of freedom and intelligence triumphing over despotic force; but surely a part, and a very important part, of the idea, is the fact that this triumph was won in a historical past, and the encouragement for the present which rests upon that fact. So too, the value of Christ's resurrection lies in its immense moral significance as a principle of life; but an essential part of that very significance is the fact that the principle was actually realized by One in whom mankind was summed up and expressed, and by whom, therefore, the power of realizing it is conferred on all who receive him."

As it is important for us to know that redemption is not only ideal but actual, so it is important for us to know that sin is not an inevitable accompaniment of human nature, but that it had a historical beginning. Yet no *a priori* theory should prejudice our examination of the facts. We would preface our consideration of the Scriptural account, therefore, by stating that our view of inspiration would permit us to regard that account as inspired, even if it were mythical or allegorical. As God can use all methods of literary composition, so he can use all methods of instructing mankind that are consistent with essential truth. George Adam Smith observes that the myths and legends of primitive folk-lore are the intellectual equivalents of later philosophies and theories of the universe, and that "at no time has revelation refused to employ such human conceptions for the investiture and conveyance of the higher spiritual truths." Sylvester Burnham: "Fiction and myth have not yet lost their value for the moral and religious teacher. What a knowledge of his own nature has shown man to be good for his own use, God surely may also have found to be good for his use. Nor would it of necessity affect the value of the Bible if the writer, in using for his purpose myth or fiction, supposed that he was using history. Only when the value of the truth of the teaching depends upon the historicity of the alleged fact, does it become impossible to use myth or fiction for the purpose of teaching." See vol. 1, page 241 of this work, with quotations from Denney, *Studies in Theology*, 218, and Gore, in *Lux Mundi*, 356. Euripides: "Thou God of all! infuse light into the souls of men, whereby they may be enabled to know what is the root from which all their evils spring, and by what means they may avoid them!"

#### I. THE SCRIPTURAL ACCOUNT OF THE TEMPTATION AND FALL IN GENESIS 3: 1-7.

##### 1. *Its general character not mythical or allegorical, but historical.*

We adopt this view for the following reasons:—(a) There is no intimation in the account itself that it is not historical. (b) As a part of a

historical book, the presumption is that it is itself historical. (c) The later Scripture writers refer to it as a veritable history even in its details. (d) Particular features of the narrative, such as the placing of our first parents in a garden and the speaking of the tempter through a serpent-form, are incidents suitable to man's condition of innocent but untried childhood. (e) This view that the narrative is historical does not forbid our assuming that the trees of life and of knowledge were symbols of spiritual truths, while at the same time they were outward realities.

See John 8: 44 — "Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father it is your will to do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and standeth not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar and the father thereof"; 2 Cor. 11: 3 — "the serpent beguiled Eve in his craftiness"; Rev. 12: 3 — "the dragon, the old serpent, which is the Devil and Satan." H. B. Smith, *System*, 261 — "If Christ's temptation and victory over Satan were historical events, there seems to be no ground for supposing that the first temptation was not a historical event." We believe in the unity and sufficiency of Scripture. We moreover regard the testimony of Christ and the apostles as conclusive with regard to the historicity of the account in Genesis. We assume a divine superintendence in the choice of material by its author, and the fulfillment to the apostles of Christ's promise that they should be guided into the truth. Paul's doctrine of sin is so manifestly based upon the historical character of the Genesis story, that the denial of the one must naturally lead to the denial of the other. John Milton writes, in his *Areopagitica*: "It was from out of the rind of one apple tasted that the knowledge of good and evil, as two twins cleaving together, leaped forth into the world. And perhaps this is that doom which Adam fell into, that is to say, of knowing good by evil." He should have learned to know evil as God knows it — as a thing possible, hateful, and forever rejected. He actually learned to know evil as Satan knows it — by making it actual and matter of bitter experience.

Infantile and innocent man found his fit place and work in a garden. The language of appearances is doubtless used. Satan might enter into a brute-form, and might appear to speak through it. In all languages, the stories of brutes speaking show that such a temptation is congruous with the condition of early man. Asiatic myths agree in representing the serpent as the emblem of the spirit of evil. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil was the symbol of God's right of eminent domain, and indicated that all belonged to him. It is not necessary to suppose that it was known by this name before the Fall. By means of it man came to know good, by the loss of it; to know evil, by bitter experience; C. H. M.: "To know good, without the power to do it; to know evil, without the power to avoid it." Bible Com., 1: 40 — "The tree of life was symbol of the fact that 'life is to be sought, not from within, from himself, in his own powers or faculties; but from that which is without him, even from him who hath life in himself.'"

As the water of baptism and the bread of the Lord's supper, though themselves common things, are symbolic of the greatest truths, so the tree of knowledge and the tree of life were sacramental. McIlvaine, *Wisdom of Holy Scripture*, 99-141 — "The two trees represented good and evil. The prohibition of the latter was a declaration that man of himself could not distinguish between good and evil, and must trust divine guidance. Satan urged man to discern between good and evil by his own wisdom, and so become independent of God. Sin is the attempt of the creature to exercise God's attribute of discerning and choosing between good and evil by his own wisdom. It is therefore self-conceit, self-trust, self-assertion, the preference of his own wisdom and will to the wisdom and will of God." McIlvaine refers to Lord Bacon, *Works*, 1: 83, 162. See also Pope, *Theology*, 2: 10, 11; Boston Lectures for 1871: 80, 81.

Griffith-Jones, *Ascent through Christ*, 142, on the tree of the knowledge of good and evil — "When for the first time man stood face to face with definite conscious temptation to do that which he knew to be wrong, he held in his hand the fruit of that tree, and his destiny as a moral being hung trembling in the balance. And when for the first time he succumbed to temptation and faint dawning of remorse visited his heart, at that moment he was banished from the Eden of innocence, in which his nature had hitherto dwelt, and he was driven forth from the presence of the Lord." With the first sin, was started another and a downward course of development. For the mythical or allegorical explanation of the narrative, see also Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, 164, 165, and Nietzsche, *Christian Doctrine*, 218.

2. *The course of the temptation, and the resulting fall.*

The stages of the temptation appear to have been as follows:

(a) An appeal on the part of Satan to innocent appetites, together with an implied suggestion that God was arbitrarily withholding the means of their gratification (Gen. 3:1). The first sin was in Eve's isolating herself and choosing to seek her own pleasure without regard to God's will. This initial selfishness it was, which led her to listen to the tempter instead of rebuking him or flying from him, and to exaggerate the divine command in her response (Gen. 3:3).

Gen. 3:1—"Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of any tree of the garden?" Satan emphasizes the *limitation*, but is silent with regard to the generous *permission*—"Of every tree of the garden [but one] thou mayest freely eat" (2:16). C. H. M., *in loco*: "To admit the question 'hath God said?' is already positive infidelity. To add to God's word is as bad as to take from it. 'Hath God said?' is quickly followed by 'Ye shall not surely die.' Questioning whether God has spoken, results in open contradiction of what God has said. Eve suffered God's word to be contradicted by a creature, only because she had abjured its authority over her conscience and heart." The command was simply: "thou shalt not eat of it" (Gen. 2:17). In her rising dislike to the authority she had renounced, she exaggerates the command into: "Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it" (Gen. 3:3). Here is already self-isolation, instead of love. Matheson, *Messages of the Old Religions*, 818—"Ere ever the human soul disobeyed, it had learned to distrust. . . . Before it violated the existing law, it had come to think of the Lawgiver as one who was jealous of his creatures." Dr. C. H. Parkhurst: "The first question ever asked in human history was asked by the devil, and the interrogation point still has in it the trail of the serpent."

(b) A denial of the veracity of God, on the part of the tempter, with a charge against the Almighty of jealousy and fraud in keeping his creatures in a position of ignorance and dependence (Gen. 3:4, 5). This was followed, on the part of the woman, by positive unbelief, and by a conscious and presumptuous cherishing of desire for the forbidden fruit, as a means of independence and knowledge. Thus unbelief, pride, and lust all sprang from the self-isolating, self-seeking spirit, and fastened upon the means of gratifying it (Gen. 3:6).

Gen. 3:4, 5—"And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die: for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil"; 3:6—"And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat; and she gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat"—so "taking the word of a Professor of Lying, that he does not lie" (John Henry Newman). Hooker, *Ecol. Polity*, book I—"To live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery." Godet on John 1:4—"In the words 'life' and 'light' it is natural to see an allusion to the tree of life and to that of knowledge. After having eaten of the former, man would have been called to feed on the second. John initiates us into the real essence of these primordial and mysterious facts and gives us in this verse, as it were, the philosophy of Paradise." Obedience is the way to knowledge, and the sin of Paradise was the seeking of light without life; cf. John 7:17—"If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it is of God, or whether I speak from myself."

(c) The tempter needed no longer to urge his suit. Having poisoned the fountain, the stream would naturally be evil. Since the heart and its desires had become corrupt, the inward disposition manifested itself in act (Gen. 3:6—"did eat; and she gave also unto her husband with her"—who had been with her, and had shared her choice and longing). Thus man fell inwardly, before the outward act of eating the forbidden fruit,—fell in that one fundamental determination whereby he made supreme choice of self instead of God. This sin of the inmost nature gave rise to sins of the

desires, and sins of the desires led to the outward act of transgression (James 1:15).

James 1:15—"Then the lust, when it hath conceived, beareth sin." Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 338—"The law of God had already been violated; man was fallen before the fruit had been plucked, or the rebellion had been thus signalized. The law required not only outward obedience but fealty of the heart, and this was withdrawn before any outward token indicated the change." Would he part company with God, or with his wife? When the Indian asked the missionary where his ancestors were, and was told that they were in hell, he replied that he would go with his ancestors. He preferred hell with his tribe to heaven with God. Sapphira, in like manner, had opportunity given her to part company with her husband, but she preferred him to God; *Lvs* 5:7-11.

Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*: "So man became like God, a setter of law to himself. Man's self-elevation to godhood was his fall. God's self-humiliation to manhood was man's restoration and elevation. . . . Gen. 3:22—"The man has become as one of us" in his condition of self-centered activity,—thereby losing all real likeness to God, which consists in having the same aim with God himself. *De te fabula narratur*; it is the condition, not of one alone, but of all the race." Sin once brought into being is self-propagating; its seed is in itself: the centuries of misery and crime that have followed have only shown what endless possibilities of evil were wrapped up in that single sin. Keble: "'T was but a little drop of sin We saw this morning enter in, And lo, at eventide a world is drowned!" Farrar, *Fall of Man*: "The guilty wish of one woman has swollen into the irremediable corruption of a world." See Oehler, *O. T. Theology*, 1:231; Miller, *Doct. Sin*, 2:361-365; Edwards, on *Original Sin*, part 4, chap. 2; Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 2:168-180.

## II. DIFFICULTIES CONNECTED WITH THE FALL CONSIDERED AS THE PERSONAL ACT OF ADAM.

### 1. *How could a holy being fall?*

Here we must acknowledge that we cannot understand how the first unholy emotion could have found lodgment in a mind that was set supremely upon God, nor how temptation could have overcome a soul in which there were no unholy propensities to which it could appeal. The mere power of choice does not explain the fact of an unholy choice. The fact of natural desire for sensuous and intellectual gratification does not explain how this desire came to be inordinate. Nor does it throw light upon the matter, to resolve this fall into a deception of our first parents by Satan. Their yielding to such deception presupposes distrust of God and alienation from him. Satan's fall, moreover, since it must have been uncaused by temptation from without, is more difficult to explain than Adam's fall.

We may distinguish six incorrect explanations of the origin of sin: 1. Emmons: Sin is due to God's efficiency—God wrought the sin in man's heart. This is the "exercise system," and is essentially pantheistic. 2. Edwards: Sin is due to God's providence—God caused the sin indirectly by presenting motives. This explanation has all the difficulties of determinism. 3. Augustine: Sin is the result of God's withdrawal from man's soul. But inevitable sin is not sin, and the blame of it rests on God who withdrew the grace needed for obedience. 4. Pfleiderer: The fall results from man's already existing sinfulness. The fault then belongs, not to man, but to God who made man sinful. 5. Hadley: Sin is due to man's moral insanity. But such concreated ethical defect would render sin impossible. Insanity is the effect of sin, but not its cause. 6. Newman: Sin is due to man's weakness. It is a negative, not a positive, thing, an incident of finiteness. But conscience and Scripture testify that it is positive as well as negative, opposition to God as well as non-conformity to God.

Emmons was really a pantheist: "Since God," he says, "works in all men both to will and to do of his good pleasure, it is as easy to account for the first offence of Adam as for any other sin. . . . There is no difficulty respecting the fall of Adam from his

original state of perfection and purity into a state of sin and guilt, which is in any way peculiar. . . . It is as consistent with the moral rectitude of the Deity to produce sinful as holy exercises in the minds of men. He puts forth a positive influence to make moral agents act, in every instance of their conduct, as he pleases. . . . There is but one satisfactory answer to the question *Whence came evil?* and that is: It came from the great first Cause of all things"; see Nathaniel Emmons, Works, 2: 688.

Jonathan Edwards also denied power to the contrary even in Adam's first sin. God did not immediately cause that sin. But God was active in the region of motives though his action was not seen. Freedom of the Will, 161—"It was fitting that the transaction should so take place that it might not appear to be from God as the apparent fountain." Yet "God may actually in his providence so dispose and permit things that the event may be certainly and infallibly connected with such disposal and permission"; see Allen, Jonathan Edwards, 304. Encyc. Britannica, 7: 690—"According to Edwards, Adam had two principles,—natural and supernatural. When Adam sinned, the supernatural or divine principle was withdrawn from him, and thus his nature became corrupt without God infusing any evil thing into it. His posterity came into being entirely under the government of natural and inferior principles. But this solves the difficulty of making God the author of sin only at the expense of denying to sin any real existence, and also destroys Edwards's essential distinction between natural and moral ability." Edwards on Trinity, Fisher's edition, 44—"The sun does not cause darkness and cold, when these follow infallibly upon the withdrawal of his beams. God's disposing the result is not a positive exertion on his part." Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2: 50—"God did not withdraw the common supporting grace of his Spirit from Adam until after transgression." To us Adam's act was irrational, but not impossible; to a determinist like Edwards, who held that men simply act out their characters, Adam's act should have been not only irrational, but impossible. Edwards nowhere shows how, according to his principles, a holy being could possibly fall.

Pfeiderer, Grundriss, 123—"The account of the fall is the first appearance of an already existing sinfulness, and a typical example of the way in which every individual becomes sinful. Original sin is simply the universality and originality of sin. There is no such thing as indeterminism. The will can lift itself from natural unfreedom, the unfreedom of the natural impulses, to real spiritual freedom, only by distinguishing itself from the law which sets before it its true end of being. The opposition of nature to the law reveals an original nature power which precedes all free self-determination. Sin is the evil bent of lawless self-willed selfishness." Pfeiderer appears to make this sinfulness concreated, and guiltless, because proceeding from God. Hill, Genetic Philosophy, 288—"The wide discrepancy between precept and practice gives rise to the theological conception of *sin*, which, in low types of religion, is as often a violation of some trivial prescription as it is of an ethical principle. The presence of sin, contrasted with a state of innocence, occasions the idea of a fall, or lapse from a sinless condition. This is not incompatible with man's derivation from an animal ancestry, which prior to the rise of self-consciousness may be regarded as having been in a state of moral *innocence*, the sense and reality of sin being impossible to the animal. . . . The existence of sin, both as an inherent disposition, and as a perverted form of action, may be explained as a survival of animal propensity in human life. . . . Sin is the disturbance of higher life by the intrusion of lower."

Professor James Hadley: "Every man is more or less insane." We prefer to say: Every man, so far as he is apart from God, is morally insane. But we must not make sin the result of insanity. *Insanity is the result of sin. Insanity, moreover, is a physical disease,—sin is a perversion of the will.* John Henry Newman, Idea of a University, 60—"Evil has no substance of its own, but is only the defect, excess, perversion or corruption of that which has substance." Augustine seems at times to favor this view. He maintains that evil has no origin, inasmuch as it is negative, not positive; that it is merely defect or failure. He illustrates it by the damaged state of a discordant harp; see Moule, Outlines of Theology, 171. So too A. A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, 190, tells us that Adam's will was like a violin in tune, which through mere inattention and neglect got out of tune at last. But here, too, we must say with E. G. Robinson, Christ. Theology, 124—"Sin explained is sin defended." All these explanations fail to explain, and throw the blame of sin upon God, as directly or indirectly its cause.

But sin is an existing fact. God cannot be its author, either by creating man's nature so that sin was a necessary incident of its development, or by withdrawing a supernatural grace which was necessary to keep man holy.

Reason, therefore, has no other recourse than to accept the Scripture doctrine that sin originated in man's free act of revolt from God—the act of a will which, though inclined toward God, was not yet confirmed in virtue and was still capable of a contrary choice. The original possession of such power to the contrary seems to be the necessary condition of probation and moral development. Yet the exercise of this power in a sinful direction can never be explained upon grounds of reason, since sin is essentially unreason. It is an act of wicked arbitrariness, the only motive of which is the desire to depart from God and to render self supreme.

Sin is a "mystery of lawlessness" (2 Thes. 2:7), at the beginning, as well as at the end. Neander, *Planting and Training*, 238— "Whoever explains sin nullifies it." Man's power at the beginning to choose evil does not prove that, now that he has fallen, he has equal power of himself permanently to choose good. Because man has power to cast himself from the top of a precipice to the bottom, it does not follow that he has equal power to transport himself from the bottom to the top.

Man fell by wilful resistance to the inworking God. Christ is in all men as he was in Adam, and all good impulses are due to him. Since the Holy Spirit is the Christ within, all men are the subjects of his striving. He does not withdraw from them except upon, and in consequence of, their withdrawing from him. John Milton makes the Almighty say of Adam's sin: "Whose fault? Whose but his own? Ingrate, he had of me All he could have; I made him just and right, Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall. Such I created all the Etherial Powers, And Spirits, both them who stood and them who failed; Freely they stood who stood, and fell who failed." The word "cursedness" has become an apt word here. The Standard Dictionary defines it as "1. Cursedness, meanness, perverseness; 2. resolute courage, endurance: 'Jim Bludsoe's voice was heard, And they all had trust in his cursedness And knowed he would keep his word.'" (John Hay, *Jim Bludsoe*, stanza 6). Not the last, but the first, of these definitions best describes the first sin. The most thorough and satisfactory treatment of the fall of man in connection with the doctrine of evolution is found in Griffith-Jones, *Ascent through Christ*, 73-240.

Hodge, *Essays and Reviews*, 30—"There is a broad difference between the commencement of holiness and the commencement of sin, and more is necessary for the former than for the latter. An act of obedience, if it is performed under the mere impulse of self-love, is virtually no act of obedience. It is not performed with any intention to obey, for that is holy, and cannot, according to the theory, precede the act. But an act of disobedience, performed from the desire of happiness, is rebellion. The cases are surely different. If, to please myself, I do what God commands, it is not holiness; but if, to please myself, I do what he forbids, it is sin. Besides, no creature is immutable. Though created holy, the taste for holy enjoyments may be overcome by a temptation sufficiently insidious and powerful, and a selfish motive or feeling excited in the mind. Neither is a sinful character immutable. By the power of the Holy Spirit, the truth may be clearly presented and so effectually applied as to produce that change which is called regeneration; that is, to call into existence a taste for holiness, so that it is chosen for its own sake, and not as a means of happiness."

H. B. Smith, *System*, 262—"The state of the case, as far as we can enter into Adam's experience, is this: Before the command, there was the state of love without the thought of the opposite: a knowledge of good only, a yet unconscious goodness: there was also the knowledge that the eating of the fruit was against the divine command. The temptation aroused pride: the yielding to that was the sin. The change was there. The change was not in the choice as an executive act, nor in the result of that act—the eating; but in the choice of supreme love to the world and self, rather than supreme devotion to God. It was an immanent preference of the world,—not a love of the world following the choice, but a love of the world which is the choice itself."

263—"We cannot account for Adam's fall, psychologically. In saying this we mean: It is inexplicable by anything outside itself. We must receive the fact as ultimate, and rest there. Of course we do not mean that it was not in accordance with the laws of moral agency—that it was a violation of those laws: but only that we do not see the mode, that we cannot construct it for ourselves in a rational way. It differs from all other similar cases of ultimate preference *which we know*; viz., the sinner's immanent preference of the world, where we know there is an antecedent ground in the bias to

sin, and the Christian's regeneration, or immanent preference of God, where we know there is an influence from without, the working of the Holy Spirit." 284—"We must leave the whole question with the immanent preference standing forth as the ultimate fact in the case, which is not to be constructed philosophically, as far as the processes of Adam's soul are concerned: we must regard that immanent preference as both a choice and an affection, not an affection the result of a choice, not a choice which is the consequence of an affection, but both together."

In one particular, however, we must differ with H. B. Smith: Since the power of voluntary internal movement is the power of the will, we must regard the change from good to evil as primarily a choice, and only secondarily a state of affection caused thereby. Only by postulating a free and conscious act of transgression on the part of Adam, an act which bears to evil affection the relation not of effect but of cause, do we reach, at the beginning of human development, a proper basis for the responsibility and guilt of Adam and the race. See Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2: 148-167.

## 2. *How could God justly permit Satanic temptation?*

We see in this permission not justice but benevolence.

(a) Since Satan fell without external temptation, it is probable that man's trial would have been substantially the same, even though there had been no Satan to tempt him.

Angels had no animal nature to obscure the vision; they could not be influenced through sense: yet they were tempted and they fell. As Satan and Adam sinned under the best possible circumstances, we may conclude that the human race would have sinned with equal certainty. The only question at the time of their creation, therefore, was how to modify the conditions so as best to pave the way for repentance and pardon. These conditions are: 1. a material body—which means confinement, limitation, need of self-restraint; 2. infancy—which means development, deliberation, with no memory of the first sin; 3. the parental relation—repressing the wilfulness of the child, and teaching submission to authority.

(b) In this case, however, man's fall would perhaps have been without what now constitutes its single mitigating circumstance. Self-originated sin would have made man himself a Satan.

Mat. 13: 25—"An enemy hath done this." "God permitted Satan to divide the guilt with man, so that man might be saved from despair." See Trench, *Studies in the Gospels*, 16-20. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 103—"Why was not the tree made outwardly repulsive? Because only the abuse of that which was positively good and desirable could have attractiveness for Adam or could constitute a real temptation."

(c) As, in the conflict with temptation, it is an advantage to objectify evil under the image of corruptible flesh, so it is an advantage to meet it as embodied in a personal and seducing spirit.

Man's body, corruptible and perishable as it is, furnishes him with an illustration and reminder of the condition of soul to which sin has reduced him. The flesh, with its burdens and pains, is thus, under God, a help to the distinct recognition and overcoming of sin. So it was an advantage to man to have temptation confined to a single external voice. We may say of the influence of the tempter, as Birks, in his *Difficulties of Belief*, 101, says of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: "Temptation did not depend upon the tree. Temptation was certain in any event. The tree was a type into which God contracted the possibilities of evil, so as to strip them of delusive vastness, and connect them with definite and palpable warning,—to show man that it was only one of the many possible activities of his spirit which was forbidden, that God had right to all and could forbid all." The originality of sin was the most fascinating element in it. It afforded boundless range for the imagination. Luther did well to throw his inkstand at the devil. It was an advantage to localize him. The concentration of the human powers upon a definite offer of evil helps our understanding of the evil and increases our disposition to resist it.

(d) Such temptation has in itself no tendency to lead the soul astray. If

the soul be holy, temptation may only confirm it in virtue. Only the evil will, self-determined against God, can turn temptation into an occasion of ruin.

As the sun's heat has no tendency to wither the plant rooted in deep and moist soil, but only causes it to send down its roots the deeper and to fasten itself the more strongly, so temptation has in itself no tendency to pervert the soul. It was only the seeds that "fell upon the rocky places, where they had not much earth" (Mat. 13:5, 6), that "were scorched" when "the sun was risen"; and our Lord attributes their failure, not to the sun, but to their lack of root and of soil: "because they had no root," "because they had no deepness of earth." The same temptation which occasions the ruin of the false disciple stimulates to sturdy growth the virtue of the true Christian. Contrast with the temptation of Adam the temptation of Christ. Adam had everything to plead for God, the garden and its delights, while Christ had everything to plead against him, the wilderness and its privations. But Adam had confidence in Satan, while Christ had confidence in God; and the result was in the former case defeat, in the latter victory. See Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 385-396.

C. H. Spurgeon: "All the sea outside a ship can do it no damage till the water enters and fills the hold. Hence, it is clear, our greatest danger is within. All the devils in hell and tempters on earth could do us no injury, if there were no corruption in our own natures. The sparks will fly harmlessly, if there is no tinder. Alas, our heart is our greatest enemy; this is the little home-born thief. Lord, save me from that evil man, myself!"

Lyman Abbott: "The scorn of goody-goody is justified; for goody-goody is innocence, not virtue; and the boy who never does anything wrong because he never does anything at all is of no use in the world. . . . Sin is not a help in development; it is a hindrance. But temptation is a help; it is an indispensable means." E. G. Robinson, *Christ. Theology*, 123—"Temptation in the bad sense and a fall from innocence were no more necessary to the perfection of the first man, than a marring of any one's character is now necessary to its completeness." John Milton, *Areopagitica*: "Many there be that complain of divine providence for suffering Adam to transgress. Foolish tongues! When God gave him reason, he gave him freedom to choose, for reason is but choosing; he had been else a mere artificial Adam, such an Adam as he is in the motions" (puppet shows). Robert Browning, *Ring and the Book*, 204 (Pope, 1183)—"Temptation sharp? Thank God a second time! Why comes temptation but for man to meet And master and make crouch beneath his foot, And so be pedestaled in triumph? Pray 'Lead us into no such temptations, Lord'? Yea, but, O thou whose servants are the bold, Lead such temptations by the head and hair, Reluctant dragons, up to who dares fight, That so he may do battle and have praise!"

3. *How could a penalty so great be justly connected with disobedience to so slight a command?*

To this question we may reply:

(a) So slight a command presented the best test of the spirit of obedience.

Cicero: "Parva res est, at magna culpa." The child's persistent disobedience in one single respect to the mother's command shows that in all his other acts of seeming obedience he does nothing for his mother's sake, but all for his own,—shows, in other words, that he does not possess the spirit of obedience in a single act. *S. S. Times*: "Trifles are trifles only to triflers. Awake to the significance of the insignificant! for you are in a world that belongs not alone to the God of the infinite, but also to the God of the infinitesimal."

(b) The external command was not arbitrary or insignificant in its substance. It was a concrete presentation to the human will of God's claim to eminent domain or absolute ownership.

John Hall, *Lectures on the Religious Use of Property*, 10—"It sometimes happens that owners of land, meaning to give the use of it to others, without alienating it, impose a nominal rent—a quit-rent, the passing of which acknowledges the recipient as owner and the occupier as tenant. This is understood in all lands. In many an old English deed, 'three barley-corns,' 'a fat capon,' or 'a shilling,' is the consideration

which permanently recognizes the rights of lordship. God taught men by the forbidden tree that he was owner, that man was occupier. He selected the matter of property to be the test of man's obedience, the outward and sensible sign of a right state of heart toward God; and when man put forth his hand and did eat, he denied God's ownership and asserted his own. Nothing remained but to eject him."

(c) The sanction attached to the command shows that man was not left ignorant of its meaning or importance.

Gen. 2:17—"In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Cf. Gen. 3:3—"the tree which is in the midst of the garden"; and see Dodge, *Christian Theology*, 206, 207—"The tree was central, as the commandment was central. The choice was between the tree of life and the tree of death,—between self and God. Taking the one was rejecting the other."

(d) The act of disobedience was therefore the revelation of a will thoroughly corrupted and alienated from God—a will given over to ingratitude, unbelief, ambition, and rebellion.

The motive to disobedience was not appetite, but the ambition to be as God. The outward act of eating the forbidden fruit was only the thin edge of the wedge, behind which lay the whole mass—the fundamental determination to isolate self and to seek personal pleasure regardless of God and his law. So the man under conviction for sin commonly clings to some single passion or plan, only half-conscious of the fact that opposition to God in one thing is opposition in all.

### III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL, SO FAR AS RESPECTS ADAM.

1. *Death*.—This death was twofold. It was partly :

A. *Physical death*, or the separation of the soul from the body.—The seeds of death, naturally implanted in man's constitution, began to develop themselves the moment that access to the tree of life was denied him. Man from that moment was a dying creature.

In a true sense death began at once. To it belonged the pains which both man and woman should suffer in their appointed callings. The fact that man's earthly existence did not at once end, was due to God's counsel of redemption. "The law of the Spirit of life" (Rom. 8:2) began to work even then, and grace began to counteract the effects of the Fall. Christ has now "abolished death" (2 Tim. 1:10) by taking its terrors away, and by turning it into the portal of heaven. He will destroy it utterly (1 Cor. 15:26) when by resurrection from the dead, the bodies of the saints shall be made immortal. Dr. William A. Hammond, following a French scientist, declares that there is no reason in a normal physical system why man should not live forever.

That death is not a physical necessity is evident if we once remember that life is, not fuel, but fire. Weismann, *Heredity*, 8, 24, 72, 156—"The organism must not be looked upon as a heap of combustible material, which is completely reduced to ashes in a certain time, the length of which is determined by its size and by the rate at which it burns; but it should be compared to a fire, to which fresh fuel can be continually added, and which, whether it burns quickly or slowly, can be kept burning as long as necessity demands. . . . Death is not a primary necessity, but it has been acquired secondarily, as an adaptation. . . . Unicellular organisms, increasing by means of fission, in a certain sense possess immortality. No Amoeba has ever lost an ancestor by death. . . . Each individual now living is far older than mankind, and is almost as old as life itself. . . . Death is not an essential attribute of living matter."

If we regard man as primarily spirit, the possibility of life without death is plain. God lives on eternally, and the future physical organism of the righteous will have in it no seed of death. Man might have been created without being mortal. That he is mortal is due to anticipated sin. Regard body as simply the constant energizing of God, and we see that there is no inherent necessity of death. Denney, *Studies in Theology*, 98—"Man, it is said, must die because he is a natural being, and what belongs to nature belongs to him. But we assert, on the contrary, that he was created a supernatural being, with a primacy over nature, so related to God as to be immortal. Death is an intrusion, and it is finally to be abolished." Chandler, *The Spirit of Man*, 45-47—"The

first stage in the fall was the disintegration of spirit into body and mind; and the second was the enslavement of mind to body."

Some recent writers, however, deny that death is a consequence of the Fall, except in the sense that man's fear of death results from his sin. Newman Smyth, *Place of Death in Evolution*, 19-22, indeed, asserts the value and propriety of death as an element of the normal universe. He would oppose to the doctrine of Weismann the conclusions of Maupas, the French biologist, who has followed infusoria through 600 generations. Fission, says Maupas, reproduces for many generations, but the unicellular germ ultimately weakens and dies out. The asexual reproduction must be supplemented by a higher conjugation, the meeting and partial blending of the contents of two cells. This is only occasional, but it is necessary to the permanence of the species. Isolation is ultimate death. Newman Smyth adds that death and sex appear together. When sex enters to enrich and diversify life, all that will not take advantage of it dies out. Survival of the fittest is accompanied by death of that which will not improve. Death is a secondary thing—a consequence of life. A living form acquired the power of giving up its life for another. It died in order that its offspring might survive in a higher form. Death helps life on and up. It does not put a stop to life. It became an advantage to life as a whole that certain primitive forms should be left by the way to perish. We owe our human birth to death in nature. The earth before us has died that we might live. We are the living children of a world that has died for us. Death is a means of life, of increasing specialization of function. Some cells are born to give up their life sacrificially for the organism to which they belong.

While we regard Newman Smyth's view as an ingenious and valuable explanation of the incidental results of death, we do not regard it as an explanation of death's origin. God has overruled death for good, and we can assent to much of Dr. Smyth's exposition. But that this good could be gained only by death seems to us wholly unproved and unprovable. Biology shows us that other methods of reproduction are possible, and that death is an incident and not a primary requisite to development. We regard Dr. Smyth's theory as incompatible with the Scripture representations of death as the consequence of sin, as the sign of God's displeasure, as a means of discipline for the fallen, as destined to complete abolition when sin itself has been done away. We reserve, however, the full proof that physical death is part of the penalty of sin until we discuss the Consequences of Sin to Adam's Posterity.

But this death was also, and chiefly,

B. Spiritual death, or the separation of the soul from God.—In this are included: (a) Negatively, the loss of man's moral likeness to God, or that underlying tendency of his whole nature toward God which constituted his original righteousness. (b) Positively, the depraving of all those powers which, in their united action with reference to moral and religious truth, we call man's moral and religious nature; or, in other words, the blinding of his intellect, the corruption of his affections, and the enslavement of his will.

Seeking to be a god, man became a slave; seeking independence, he ceased to be master of himself. Once his intellect was pure,—he was supremely conscious of God, and saw all things else in God's light. Now he was supremely conscious of self, and saw all things as they affected self. This self-consciousness—how unlike the objective life of the first apostles, of Christ, and of every loving soul! Once man's affections were pure,—he loved God supremely, and other things in subordination to God's will. Now he loved self supremely, and was ruled by inordinate affections toward the creatures which could minister to his selfish gratification. Now man could do nothing pleasing to God, because he lacked the love which is necessary to all true obedience.

G. F. Wilkin, *Control in Evolution*, shows that the will may initiate a counter-evolution which shall reverse the normal course of man's development. First comes an act, then a habit, of surrender to animalism; then subversion of faith in the true and the good; then active championship of evil; then transmission of evil disposition and tendencies to posterity. This subversion of the rational will by an evil choice took place very early, indeed in the first man. All human history has been a conflict between these two antagonistic evolutions, the upward and the downward. Biological rather than moral phenomena predominate. No human being escapes transgress-

ing the law of his evolutionary nature. There is a moral deadness and torpor resulting. The rational will must be restored before man can go right again. Man must commit himself to a true life; then to the restoration of other men to that same life; then there must be coöperation of society; this work must extend to the limits of the human species. But this will be practicable and rational only as it is shown that the unfolding plan of the universe has destined the righteous to a future incomparably more desirable than that of the wicked; in other words, immortality is necessary to evolution.

"If immortality be necessary to evolution, then immortality becomes scientific. Jesus has the authority and omnipresence of the power behind evolution. He imposes upon his followers the same normal evolutionary mission that sent him into the world. He organizes them into churches. He teaches a moral evolution of society through the united voluntary efforts of his followers. They are 'the good seed . . . the sons of the kingdom' (Mat. 13:38). Theism makes a definite attempt to counteract the evil of the counter-evolution, and the attempt justifies itself by its results. Christianity is scientific (1) in that it satisfies the conditions of *knowledge*: the persisting and comprehensive harmony of phenomena, and the interpretation of all the facts; (2) in its *aim*, the moral regeneration of the world; (3) in its *methods*, adapting itself to man as an ethical being, capable of endless progress; (4) in its conception of normal *society*, as of sinners uniting together to help one another to depend on God and conquer self, so recognizing the ethical bond as the most essential. This doctrine harmonises science and religion, revealing the new species of control which marks the highest stage of evolution; shows that the religion of the N. T. is essentially scientific and its truths capable of practical verification; that Christianity is not any particular church, but the teachings of the Bible; that Christianity is the true system of ethics, and should be taught in public institutions; that cosmic evolution comes at last to depend on the wisdom and will of man, the immanent God working in finite and redeemed humanity."

In fine, man no longer made God the end of his life, but chose self instead. While he retained the power of self-determination in subordinate things, he lost that freedom which consisted in the power of choosing God as his ultimate aim, and became fettered by a fundamental inclination of his will toward evil. The intuitions of the reason were abnormally obscured, since these intuitions, so far as they are concerned with moral and religious truth, are conditioned upon a right state of the affections; and — as a necessary result of this obscuring of reason — conscience, which, as the normal judiciary of the soul, decides upon the basis of the law given to it by reason, became perverse in its deliverances. Yet this inability to judge or act aright, since it was a moral inability springing ultimately from will, was itself hateful and condemnable.

See Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3: 61-73; Shedd, Sermons to the Natural Man, 202-220, esp. 206 — "Whatsoever springs from will we are responsible for. Man's inability to love God supremely results from his intense self-will and self-love, and therefore his impotence is a part and element of his sin, and not an excuse for it." And yet the question "Adam, where art thou?" (Gen. 3:9), says C. J. Baldwin, "was, (1) a question, not as to Adam's physical locality, but as to his moral condition; (2) a question, not of justice threatening, but of love inviting to repentance and return; (3) a question, not to Adam as an individual only, but to the whole humanity of which he was the representative."

Dale, Ephesians, 40 — "Christ is the eternal Son of God; and it was the first, the primeval purpose of the divine grace that his life and sonship should be shared by all mankind; that through Christ all men should rise to a loftier rank than that which belonged to them by their creation; should be 'partakers of the divine nature' (2 Pet. 1:4), and share the divine righteousness and joy. Or rather, the race was actually created in Christ; and it was created that the whole race might in Christ inherit the life and glory of God. The divine purpose has been thwarted and obstructed and partially defeated by human sin. But it is being fulfilled in all who are 'in Christ' (Eph. 1:3)."

2. *Positive and formal exclusion from God's presence.* — This included:

(a) The cessation of man's former familiar intercourse with God, and

the setting up of outward barriers between man and his Maker (cherubim and sacrifice).

"In die Welt hinausgestossen, Steht der Mensch verlassen da." Though God punished Adam and Eve, he did not curse them as he did the serpent. Their exclusion from the tree of life was a matter of benevolence as well as of justice, for it prevented the immortality of sin.

(b) Banishment from the garden, where God had specially manifested his presence.—Eden was perhaps a spot reserved, as Adam's body had been, to show what a sinless world would be. This positive exclusion from God's presence, with the sorrow and pain which it involved, may have been intended to illustrate to man the nature of that eternal death from which he now needed to seek deliverance.

At the gates of Eden, there seems to have been a manifestation of God's presence, in the cherubim, which constituted the place a sanctuary. Both Cain and Abel brought offerings "unto the Lord" (Gen. 4:3, 4), and when Cain fled, he is said to have gone out "from the presence of the Lord" (Gen. 4:16). On the consequences of the Fall to Adam, see Edwards, Works, 2:390-406; Hopkins, Works, 1:206-246; Dwight, Theology, 1:388-434; Watson, Institutes, 2:19-43; Martensen, Dogmatics, 155-173; Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 408-412.

SECTION V. — IMPUTATION OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY.

We have seen that all mankind are sinners; that all men are by nature depraved, guilty, and condemnable; and that the transgression of our first parents, so far as respects the human race, was the first sin. We have still to consider the connection between Adam's sin and the depravity, guilt, and condemnation of the race.

(a) The Scriptures teach that the transgression of our first parents constituted their posterity sinners (Rom. 5:19—"through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners"), so that Adam's sin is imputed, reckoned, or charged to every member of the race of which he was the germ and head (Rom. 5:16—"the judgment came of one [offence] unto condemnation"). It is because of Adam's sin that we are born depraved and subject to God's penal inflictions (Rom. 5:12—"through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin"; Eph. 2:3—"by nature children of wrath"). Two questions demand answer,—first, how we can be responsible for a depraved nature which we did not personally and consciously originate; and, secondly, how God can justly charge to our account the sin of the first father of the race. These questions are substantially the same, and the Scriptures intimate the true answer to the problem when they declare that "in Adam all die" (1 Cor. 15:22) and "that death passed unto all men, for that all sinned" when "through one man sin entered into the world" (Rom. 5:12). In other words, Adam's sin is the cause and ground of the depravity, guilt, and condemnation of all his posterity, simply because Adam and his posterity are one, and, by virtue of their organic unity, the sin of Adam is the sin of the race.

Amiel says that "the best measure of the profundity of any religious doctrine is given by its conception of sin and of the cure of sin." We have seen that sin is a state; a state of the will; a selfish state of the will; a selfish state of the will inborn and universal; a selfish state of the will inborn and universal by reason of man's free act.

Connecting the present discussion with the preceding doctrines of theology, the steps of our treatment thus far are as follows: 1. God's holiness is purity of nature. 2. God's law demands purity of nature. 3. Sin is impure nature. 4. All men have this impure nature. 5. Adam originated this impure nature. In the present section we expect to add: 6. Adam and we are one; and, in the succeeding section, to complete the doctrine with: 7. The guilt and penalty of Adam's sin are ours.

(5) According as we regard this twofold problem from the point of view of the abnormal human condition, or of the divine treatment of it, we may call it the problem of original sin, or the problem of imputation. Neither of these terms is objectionable when its meaning is defined. By imputation of sin we mean, not the arbitrary and mechanical charging to a man of that for which he is not naturally responsible, but the reckoning to a man of a guilt which is properly his own, whether by virtue of his individual acts, or by virtue of his connection with the race. By original sin we mean that participation in the common sin of the race with which God charges us, in virtue of our descent from Adam, its first father and head.

We should not permit our use of the term 'imputation' to be hindered or prejudiced by the fact that certain schools of theology, notably the Federal school, have attached to it an arbitrary, external, and mechanical meaning—holding that God imputes sin to men, not because they are sinners, but upon the ground of a legal fiction whereby Adam, without their consent, was made their representative. We shall see, on the contrary, that (1) in the case of Adam's sin imputed to us, (2) in the case of our sins imputed to Christ, and (3) in the case of Christ's righteousness imputed to the believer, there is always a realistic basis for the imputation, namely, a real union, (1) between Adam and his descendants, (2) between Christ and the race, and (3) between believers and Christ, such as gives in each case community of life, and enables us to say that God imputes to no man what does not properly belong to him.

Dr. E. G. Robinson used to say that "imputed righteousness and imputed sin are as absurd as any notion that ever took possession of human nature." He had in mind, however, only that constructive guilt and merit which was advocated by Princeton theologians. He did not mean to deny the imputation to men of that which is their own. He recognized the fact that all men are sinners by inheritance as well as by voluntary act, and he found this taught in Scripture, both in the O. T. and in the N. T.; e. g., Neh. 1:6—"I confess the sins of the children of Israel, which we have sinned against thee. Yea, I and my father's house have sinned"; Jer. 3:25—"Let us lie down in our shame, and let our confusion cover us; for we have sinned against Jehovah our God, we and our fathers"; 14:22—"We acknowledge, O Jehovah, our wickedness, and the iniquity of our fathers; for we have sinned against thee." The word "imputed" is itself found in the N. T.; e. g., 2 Tim. 4:18—"At my first defence no one took my part; may it not be laid to their account," or "imputed to them"—*μὴ εἰς τοὺς λογιζομένους*. Rom. 5:13—"sin is not imputed when there is no law"—*οὐκ ἄλλογῶται*.

Not only the saints of Scripture times, but modern saints also, have imputed to themselves the sins of others, of their people, of their times, of the whole world. Jonathan Edwards, Resolutions, quoted by Allen, 28—"I will take it for granted that no one is so evil as myself; I will identify myself with all men and act as if their evil were my own, as if I had committed the same sins and had the same infirmities, so that the knowledge of their failings will promote in me nothing but a sense of shame." Frederick Denison Maurice: "I wish to confess the sins of the time as my own." Moberly, Atonement and Personality, 87—"The phrase 'solidarity of humanity' is growing every day in depth and significance. Whatever we do, we do not for ourselves alone. It is not as an individual alone that I can be measured or judged." Royce, World and Individual, 2:404—"The problem of evil indeed demands the presence of free will in the world; while, on the other hand, it is equally true that no moral world whatever can be made consistent with the realistic thesis according to which free will agents are, in fortune and in penalty, independent of the deeds of other moral agents. It follows that, in our moral world, the righteous can suffer without individually deserving their suffering, just because their lives have no independent being, but are linked with all life—God himself also sharing in their suffering."

The above quotations illustrate the belief in a human responsibility that goes beyond the bounds of personal sins. What this responsibility is, and what its limits are, we have yet to define. The problem is stated, but not solved, by A. H. Bradford, Heredity,

188, and *The Age of Faith*, 236—"Stephen prays: 'Lord, lay not this sin to their charge' (Acts 7:60). To whose charge then? We all have a share in one another's sins. We too stood by and consented, as Paul did. 'My sins gave sharpness to the nails, And pointed every thorn' that pierced the brow of Jesus. . . . Yet in England and Wales the severer forms of this teaching [with regard to sin] have almost disappeared; not because of more thorough study of the Scripture, but because the awful congestion of population, with its attendant miseries, has convinced the majority of Christian thinkers that the old interpretations were too small for the near and terrible facts of human life, such as women with babies in their arms at the London gin-shops giving the infants sips of liquor out of their glasses, and a tavern keeper setting his four or five year old boy upon the counter to drink and swear and fight in imitation of his elders."

(c) There are two fundamental principles which the Scriptures already cited seem clearly to substantiate, and which other Scriptures corroborate. The first is that man's relations to moral law extend beyond the sphere of conscious and actual transgression, and embrace those moral tendencies and qualities of his being which he has in common with every other member of the race. The second is, that God's moral government is a government which not only takes account of persons and personal acts, but also recognizes race responsibilities and inflicts race-penalties; or, in other words, judges mankind, not simply as a collection of separate individuals, but also as an organic whole, which can collectively revolt from God and incur the curse of the violated law.

On race-responsibility, see H. B. Smith, *System of Theology*, 288-303—"No one can apprehend the doctrine of original sin, nor the doctrine of redemption, who insists that the whole moral government of God has respect only to individual desert, who does not allow that the moral government of God, as moral, has a wider scope and larger relations, so that God may dispense suffering and happiness (in his all-wise and inscrutable providence) on other grounds than that of personal merit and demerit. The dilemma here is: the facts connected with native depravity and with the redemption through Christ either belong to the moral government of God, or not. If they do, then that government has to do with other considerations than those of personal merit and demerit (since our disabilities in consequence of sin and the grace offered in Christ are not in any sense the result of our personal choice, though we do choose in our relations to both). If they do not belong to the moral government of God, where shall we assign them? To the physical? That certainly can not be. To the divine sovereignty? But that does not relieve any difficulty; for the question still remains, Is that sovereignty, as thus exercised, just or unjust? We must take one or the other of these. The whole (of sin and grace) is either a mystery of sovereignty—of mere omnipotence—or a proceeding of moral government. The question will arise with respect to grace as well as to sin: How can the theory that all moral government has respect only to the merit or demerit of personal acts be applied to our justification? If all sin is sinning, with a personal desert of everlasting death, by parity of reasoning all holiness must consist in a holy choice with personal merit of eternal life. We say then, generally, that all definitions of sin which mean a sin are irrelevant here." Dr. Smith quotes Edwards, 2:309—"Original sin, the innate sinful depravity of the heart, includes not only the depravity of nature but the imputation of Adam's first sin, or, in other words, the liability or exposedness of Adam's posterity, in the divine judgment, to partake of the punishment of that sin."

The watchword of a large class of theologians—popularly called "New School"—is that "all sin consists in sinning,"—that is, all sin is sin of act. But we have seen that the dispositions and states in which a man is unlike God and his purity are also sin according to the meaning of the law. We have now to add that each man is responsible also for that sin of our first father in which the human race apostatized from God. In other words, we recognize the guilt of race-sin as well as of personal sin. We desire to say at the outset, however, that our view, and, as we believe, the Scriptural view, requires us also to hold to certain qualifications of the doctrine which to some extent alleviate its harshness and furnish its proper explanation. These qualifications we now proceed to mention.

(d) In recognizing the guilt of race-sin, we are to bear in mind: (1) that actual sin, in which the personal agent reaffirms the underlying determination of his will, is more guilty than original sin alone; (2) that no human being is finally condemned solely on account of original sin; but that all who, like infants, do not commit personal transgressions, are saved through the application of Christ's atonement; (3) that our responsibility for inborn evil dispositions, or for the depravity common to the race, can be maintained only upon the ground that this depravity was caused by an original and conscious act of free will, when the race revolted from God in Adam; (4) that the doctrine of original sin is only the ethical interpretation of biological facts—the facts of heredity and of universal congenital ills, which demand an ethical ground and explanation; and (5) that the idea of original sin has for its correlate the idea of original grace, or the abiding presence and operation of Christ, the immanent God, in every member of the race, in spite of his sin, to counteract the evil and to prepare the way, so far as man will permit, for individual and collective salvation.

Over against the maxim: "All sin consists in sinning," we put the more correct statement: Personal sin consists in sinning, but in Adam's first sinning the race also sinned, so that "in Adam all die" (1 Cor. 15: 22). Denney, *Studies in Theology*, 86—"Sin is not only personal but social; not only social but organic; character and all that is involved in character are capable of being attributed not only to individuals but to societies, and eventually to the human race itself; in short, there are not only isolated sins and individual sinners, but what has been called a kingdom of sin upon earth." Leslie Stephen: "Man not dependent on a race is as meaningless a phrase as an apple that does not grow on a tree." "Yet Aaron Burr and Abraham Lincoln show how a man may throw away every advantage of the best heredity and environment, while another can triumph over the worst. Man does not take his character from external causes, but shapes it by his own willing submission to influences from beneath or from above."

Wm. Adams Brown: "The idea of inherited guilt can be accepted only if paralleled by the idea of inherited good. The consequences of sin have often been regarded as social, while the consequences of good have been regarded as only individual. But heredity transmits both good and evil." Mrs. Lydia Avery Coonley Ward: "Why bowest thou, O soul of mine, Crushed by ancestral sin? Thou hast a noble heritage, That bids thee victory win. The tainted past may bring forth flowers, As blossomed Aaron's rod: No legacy of sin annuls Heredity from God." For further statements with regard to race-responsibility, see Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 29-39 (*System Doctrine*, 2: 324-333). For the modern view of the Fall, and its reconciliation with the doctrine of evolution, see J. H. Bernard, art.: *The Fall*, in *Hastings' Dict. of Bible*; A. H. Strong, *Christ in Creation*, 163-180; Griffith-Jones, *Ascent through Christ*.

(e) There is a race-sin, therefore, as well as a personal sin; and that race-sin was committed by the first father of the race, when he comprised the whole race in himself. All mankind since that time have been born in the state into which he fell—a state of depravity, guilt, and condemnation. To vindicate God's justice in imputing to us the sin of our first father, many theories have been devised, a part of which must be regarded as only attempts to evade the problem by denying the facts set before us in the Scriptures. Among these attempted explanations of the Scripture statements, we proceed to examine the six theories which seem most worthy of attention.

The first three of the theories which we discuss may be said to be evasions of the problem of original sin; all, in one form or another, deny that God imputes to all men Adam's sin, in such a sense that all are guilty for it. These theories are the Pelagian, the Arminian, and the New School. The last three of the theories which we are about to treat, namely, the Federal theory, the theory of Mediate Imputation, and the theory

of Adam's Natural Headship, are all Old School theories, and have for their common characteristic that they assert the guilt of inborn depravity. All three, moreover, hold that we are in some way responsible for Adam's sin, though they differ as to the precise way in which we are related to Adam. We must grant that no one, even of these latter theories, is wholly satisfactory. We hope, however, to show that the last of them—the Augustinian theory, the theory of Adam's natural headship, the theory that Adam and his descendants are naturally and organically one—explains the largest number of facts, is least open to objection, and is most accordant with Scripture.

#### I. THEORIES OF IMPUTATION.

##### 1. *The Pelagian Theory, or Theory of Man's natural Innocence.*

Pelagius, a British monk, propounded his doctrines at Rome, 409. They were condemned by the Council of Carthage, 418. Pelagianism, however, as opposed to Augustinianism, designates a complete scheme of doctrine with regard to sin, of which Pelagius was the most thorough representative, although every feature of it cannot be ascribed to his authorship. Socinians and Unitarians are the more modern advocates of this general scheme.

According to this theory, every human soul is immediately created by God, and created as innocent, as free from depraved tendencies, and as perfectly able to obey God, as Adam was at his creation. The only effect of Adam's sin upon his posterity is the effect of evil example; it has in no way corrupted human nature; the only corruption of human nature is that habit of sinning which each individual contracts by persistent transgression of known law.

Adam's sin therefore injured only himself; the sin of Adam is imputed only to Adam,—it is imputed in no sense to his descendants; God imputes to each of Adam's descendants only those acts of sin which he has personally and consciously committed. Men can be saved by the law as well as by the gospel; and some have actually obeyed God perfectly, and have thus been saved. Physical death is therefore not the penalty of sin, but an original law of nature; Adam would have died whether he had sinned or not; in Rom. 5:12, "death passed unto all men, for that all sinned," signifies: "all incurred eternal death by sinning after Adam's example."

Wiggers, *Augustinism and Pelagianism*, 83, states the seven points of the Pelagian doctrine as follows: (1) Adam was created mortal, so that he would have died even if he had not sinned; (2) Adam's sin injured, not the human race, but only himself; (3) new-born infants are in the same condition as Adam before the Fall; (4) the whole human race neither dies on account of Adam's sin, nor rises on account of Christ's resurrection; (5) infants, even though not baptized, attain eternal life; (6) the law is as good a means of salvation as the gospel; (7) even before Christ some men lived who did not commit sin.

In Pelagius' *Com. on Rom. 5:12*, published in Jerome's Works, vol. xi, we learn who these sinless men were, namely, Abel, Enoch, Joseph, Job, and, among the heathen, Socrates, Aristides, Numa. The virtues of the heathen entitle them to reward. Their worthies were not indeed without evil thoughts and inclinations; but, on the view of Pelagius that all sin consists in act, these evil thoughts and inclinations were not sin. "Non pleni nascimur": we are born, not full, but vacant, of character. Holiness, Pelagius thought, could not be concreated. Adam's descendants are not weaker, but stronger, than he; since they have fulfilled many commands, while he did not fulfil so much as one. In every man there is a natural conscience; he has an ideal of life; he forms right resolves; he recognizes the claims of law; he accuses himself when he sins,—all these things Pelagius regards as indications of a certain holiness in all men, and misinterpretation of these facts gives rise to his system; he ought to have seen in them evidences of a divine influence opposing man's bent to evil and leading him to repent-

ance. Grace, on the Pelagian theory, is simply the grace of *creation*—God's originally endowing man with his high powers of reason and will. While Augustinianism regards human nature as *dead*, and Semi-Pelagianism regards it as *et cetera*, Pelagianism proper declares it to be *well*.

Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 43 (Syst. Doct., 2: 338)—“Neither the body, man's surroundings, nor the inward operation of God, have any determining influence upon the will. God reaches man only through external means, such as Christ's doctrine, example, and promise. This clears God of the charge of evil, but also takes from him the authorship of good. It is Deism, applied to man's nature. God cannot enter man's being if he would, and he would not if he could. Free will is everything.” *Ib.*, 1: 626 (Syst. Doct., 2: 188, 189)—“Pelagianism at one time counts it too great an honor that man should be directly moved upon by God, and at another, too great a dishonor that man should not be able to do without God. In this inconsistent reasoning, it shows its desire to be rid of God as much as possible. The true conception of God requires a living relation to man, as well as to the external universe. The true conception of man requires satisfaction of his longings and powers by reception of impulses and strength from God. Pelagianism, in seeking for man a development only like that of nature, shows that its high estimate of man is only a delusive one; it really degrades him, by ignoring his true dignity and destiny.” See *Ib.*, 1: 124, 125 (Syst. Doct., 1: 136, 137); 2: 43-45 (Syst. Doct., 2: 338, 339); 2: 143 (Syst. Doct., 3: 44). Also Schaff, *Church History*, 2: 783-856; *Doctrines of the Early Socinians*, in *Princeton Essays*, 1: 194-211; *Wörter, Pelagianismus*. For substantially Pelagian statements, see Sheldon, *Sin and Redemption*; Ellis, *Half Century of Unitarian Controversy*, 76.

Of the Pelagian theory of sin, we may say:

A. It has never been recognized as Scriptural, nor has it been formulated in confessions, by any branch of the Christian church. Held only sporadically and by individuals, it has ever been regarded by the church at large as heresy. This constitutes at least a presumption against its truth.

As slavery was “the sum of all villainy,” so the Pelagian doctrine may be called the sum of all false doctrine. Pelagianism is a survival of paganism, in its majestic egoism and self-complacency. “Cicero, in his *Natura Deorum*, says that men thank the gods for external advantages, but no man ever thanks the gods for his virtues—that he is honest or pure or merciful. Pelagius was first roused to opposition by hearing a bishop in the public services of the church quote Augustine's prayer: ‘*Da quod jubes, et jube quod vis*’—‘Give what thou commandest, and command what thou wilt.’ From this he was led to formulate the gospel according to St. Cicero, so perfectly does the Pelagian doctrine reproduce the Pagan teaching.” The impulse of the Christian, on the other hand, is to refer all gifts and graces to a divine source in Christ and in the Holy Spirit. Eph. 2: 10—“For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God afore prepared that we should walk in them”; John 15: 16—“Ye did not choose me, but I chose you”; 1: 13—“who were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.” H. Anker: “And every virtue we possess, And every victory won, And every thought of holiness, Are his alone.”

Augustine had said that “Man is most free when controlled by God alone”—“[Deo] solo dominante, liberrimus” (*De Mor. Eccl.*, xxi). Gore, in *Lux Mundi*, 320—“In Christ humanity is perfect, because in him it retains no part of that false independence which, in all its manifold forms, is the secret of sin.” Pelagianism, on the contrary, is man's declaration of independence. Harnack, *Hist. Dogma*, 5: 200—“The essence of Pelagianism, the key to its whole mode of thought, lies in this proposition of Julian: ‘*Homo libero arbitrio emancipatus a Deo*’—man, created free, is in his whole being independent of God. He has no longer to do with God, but with himself alone. God reënters man's life only at the end, at the judgment,—a doctrine of the orphanage of humanity.”

B. It contradicts Scripture in denying: (a) that evil disposition and state, as well as evil acts, are sin; (b) that such evil disposition and state are inborn in all mankind; (c) that men universally are guilty of overt transgression so soon as they come to moral consciousness; (d) that no man is able without divine help to fulfil the law; (e) that all men, with-

out exception, are dependent for salvation upon God's atoning, regenerating, sanctifying grace; (f) that man's present state of corruption, condemnation, and death, is the direct effect of Adam's transgression.

The Westminster Confession, ch. vi, § 4, declares that "we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil." To Pelagius, on the contrary, sin is a mere incident. He knows only of *sine*, not of *sin*. He holds the atomic, or atomistic, theory of sin, which regards it as consisting in isolated volitions. Pelagianism, holding, as it does, that virtue and vice consist only in single decisions, does not account for *character* at all. There is no such thing as a state of sin, or a self-propagating power of sin. And yet upon these the Scriptures lay greater emphasis than upon mere acts of transgression. John 3: 6—"That which is born of the flesh is flesh"—"that which comes of a sinful and guilty stock is itself, from the very beginning, sinful and guilty" (Dorner). Witness the tendency to degradation in families and nations.

Amtel says that the great defect of liberal Christianity is its superficial conception of sin. The tendency dates far back; Tertullian spoke of the soul as naturally Christian—"anima naturaliter Christiana." The tendency has come down to modern times: Crane, *The Religion of To-morrow*, 246—"It is only when children grow up, and begin to absorb their environment, that they lose their artless loveliness." A Rochester Unitarian preacher publicly declared it to be as much a duty to believe in the natural purity of man, as to believe in the natural purity of God. Dr. Lyman Abbott speaks of "the shadow which the Manichean theology of Augustine, borrowed by Calvin, cast upon all children, in declaring them born to an inheritance of wrath as a viper's brood." Dr. Abbott forgets that Augustine was the greatest opponent of Manichæism, and that his doctrine of inherited guilt may be supplemented by a doctrine of inherited divine influences tending to salvation.

Prof. G. A. Coe tells us that "all children are within the household of God"; that "they are already members of his kingdom"; that "the adolescent change" is "a step not *into* the Christian life, but *within* the Christian life." We are taught that salvation is by education. But education is only a way of presenting truth. It still remains needful that the soul should accept the truth. Pelagianism ignores or denies the presence in every child of a congenital selfishness which hinders acceptance of the truth, and which, without the working of the divine Spirit, will absolutely counteract the influence of the truth. Augustine was taught his guilt and helplessness by transgression, while Pelagius remained ignorant of the evil of his own heart. Pelagius might have said with Wordsworth, *Prelude*, 534—"I had approached, like other youths, the shield Of human nature from the golden side; And would have fought, even unto the death, to attest The quality of the metal which I saw."

Schaff, on the Pelagian controversy, in *Bib. Sac.*, 5: 205-243—The controversy "resolves itself into the question whether redemption and sanctification are the work of man or of God. Pelagianism in its whole mode of thinking starts from man and seeks to work itself upward gradually, by means of an imaginary good-will, to holiness and communion with God. Augustinianism pursues the opposite way, deriving from God's unconditioned and all-working grace a new life and all power of working good. The first is led from freedom into a legal, self-righteous piety; the other rises from the slavery of sin to the glorious liberty of the children of God. For the first, revelation is of force only as an outward help, or the power of a high example; for the last, it is the inmost life, the very marrow and blood of the new man. The first involves an Ebionitic view of Christ, as noble man, not high-priest or king; the second finds in him one in whom dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. The first makes conversion a process of gradual moral purification on the ground of original nature; with the last, it is a total change, in which the old passes away and all becomes new. . . . Rationalism is simply the form in which Pelagianism becomes theoretically complete. The high opinion which the Pelagian holds of the natural will is transferred with equal right by the Rationalist to the natural reason. The one does without grace, as the other does without revelation. Pelagian divinity is rationalistic. Rationalistic morality is Pelagian." See this Compendium, page 88.

Allen, *Religious Progress*, 98-100—"Most of the mischief of religious controversy springs from the desire and determination to impute to one's opponent positions which he does not hold, or to draw inferences from his principles, insisting that he shall be held responsible for them, even though he declares that he does not teach them. We say that he ought to accept them; that he is bound logically to do so; that they are necessary deductions from his system; that the tendency of his teaching is in these

directions; and then we denounce and condemn him for what he disowns. It was in this way that Augustine filled out for Pelagius the gaps in his scheme, which he thought it necessary to do, in order to make Pelagius's teaching consistent and complete; and Pelagius, in his turn, drew inferences from the Augustinian theology, about which Augustine would have preferred to maintain a discreet silence. Neither Augustine nor Calvin was anxious to make prominent the doctrine of the reprobation of the wicked to damnation, but preferred to dwell on the more attractive, more rational tenet of the elect to salvation, as subjects of the divine choice and approbation; substituting for the obnoxious word reprobation the milder, euphemistic word preterition. It was their opponents who were bent on forcing them out of their reserve, pushing them into what seemed the consistent sequence of their attitude, and then holding it up before the world for execration. And the same remark would apply to almost every theological contention that has embittered the church's experience."

C. It rests upon false philosophical principles; as, for example: (a) that the human will is simply the faculty of volitions; whereas it is also, and chiefly, the faculty of self-determination to an ultimate end; (b) that the power of a contrary choice is essential to the existence of will; whereas the will fundamentally determined to self-gratification has this power only with respect to subordinate choices, and cannot by a single volition reverse its moral state; (c) that ability is the measure of obligation,—a principle which would diminish the sinner's responsibility, just in proportion to his progress in sin; (d) that law consists only in positive enactment; whereas it is the demand of perfect harmony with God, inwrought into man's moral nature; (e) that each human soul is immediately created by God, and holds no other relations to moral law than those which are individual; whereas all human souls are organically connected with each other, and together have a corporate relation to God's law, by virtue of their derivation from one common stock.

(a) Neander, Church History, 2: 564-625, holds one of the fundamental principles of Pelagianism to be "the ability to choose, equally and at any moment, between good and evil." There is no recognition of the law by which acts produce states; the power which repeated acts of evil possess to give a definite character and tendency to the will itself.—"Volition is an everlasting 'tick,' 'tick,' and swinging of the pendulum, but no moving forward of the hands of the clock follows." "There is no continuity of moral life—no character, in man, angel, devil, or God."—(b) See art. on Power of Contrary Choice, in Princeton Essays, 1: 212-233; Pelagianism holds that no confirmation in holiness is possible. Thornwell, Theology: "The sinner is as free as the saint; the devil as the angel." Harris, Philos. Basis of Theism, 399—"The theory that indifference is essential to freedom implies that will never acquires character; that voluntary action is atomistic, every act disintegrated from every other; that character, if acquired, would be incompatible with freedom." "By mere volition the soul now a *plenum* can become a *vacuum*, or now a *vacuum* can become a *plenum*." On the Pelagian view of freedom, see Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 37-44.

(c) Ps. 79: 8—"Remember not against us the iniquities of our forefathers"; 106: 6—"We have sinned with our fathers." Notice the analogy of individuals who suffer from the effects of parental mistakes or of national transgression. Julius Müller, Doct. Sin, 2: 316, 317—"Neither the *atomistic* nor the *organic* view of human nature is the complete truth." Each must be complemented by the other. For statement of race-responsibility, see Dorner, Glaubenslehre, 2: 30-33, 51-54, 161, 169 (System of Doctrine, 2: 324-334, 345-350; 3: 50-54) —"Among the Scripture proofs of the moral connection of the individual with the race are the visiting of the sins of the fathers upon the children; the obligation of the people to punish the sin of the individual, that the whole land may not incur guilt; the offering of sacrifice for a murder, the perpetrator of which is unknown. Achan's crime is charged to the whole people. The Jewish race is the better for its parentage, and other nations are the worse for theirs. The Hebrew people become a legal personality.

"Is it said that none are punished for the sins of their fathers unless they are like their fathers? But to be unlike their fathers requires a new heart. They who are not

held accountable for the sins of their fathers are those who have recognized their responsibility for them, and have repented for their likeness to their ancestors. Only the self-isolating spirit says: 'Am I my brother's keeper?' (Gen. 4:9), and thinks to construct a constant equation between individual misfortune and individual sin. The calamities of the righteous led to an ethical conception of the relation of the individual to the community. Such sufferings show that men can love God disinterestedly, that the good has unselfish friends. These sufferings are substitutionary, when borne as belonging to the sufferer, not foreign to him, the guilt of others attaching to him by virtue of his national or race-relation to them. So Moses in Ex. 24:3, David in Ps. 51:4, Isaiah in Is. 53:9-14, recognize the connection between personal sin and race-sin.

"Christ restores the bond between man and his fellows, turns the hearts of the fathers to the children. He is the creator of a new race-consciousness. In him as the head we see ourselves bound to, and responsible for, others. Love finds it morally impossible to isolate itself. It restores the consciousness of unity and the recognition of common guilt. Does every man stand for himself in the N. T.? This would be so, only if each man became a sinner solely by free and conscious personal decision, either in the present, or in a past state of existence. But this is not Scriptural. Something comes before personal transgression: 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh' (John 3:6). Personality is the stronger for recognizing the race-sin. We have common joy in the victories of the good; so in shameful lapses we have sorrow. These are not our worst moments, but our best,—there is something great in them. Original sin must be displeasing to God; for it perverts the reason, destroys likeness to God, excludes from communion with God, makes redemption necessary, leads to actual sin, influences future generations. But to complain of God for permitting its propagation is to complain of his not destroying the race,—that is, to complain of one's own existence." See Shedd, *Hist. Doctrine*, 2: 98-110; Hagenbach, *Hist. Doctrine*, 1: 287, 296-310; Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 254-262; Princeton Essays, 1: 74-97; Dabney, *Theology*, 296-302, 314, 315.

## 2. *The Arminian Theory, or Theory of voluntarily appropriated Depravity.*

Arminius (1560-1609), professor in the University of Leyden, in South Holland, while formally accepting the doctrine of the Adamic unity of the race propounded both by Luther and Calvin, gave a very different interpretation to it—an interpretation which verged toward Semi-Pelagianism and the anthropology of the Greek Church. The Methodist body is the modern representative of this view.

According to this theory, all men, as a divinely appointed sequence of Adam's transgression, are naturally destitute of original righteousness, and are exposed to misery and death. By virtue of the infirmity propagated from Adam to all his descendants, mankind are wholly unable without divine help perfectly to obey God or to attain eternal life. This inability, however, is physical and intellectual, but not voluntary. As matter of justice, therefore, God bestows upon each individual from the first dawn of consciousness a special influence of the Holy Spirit, which is sufficient to counteract the effect of the inherited depravity and to make obedience possible, provided the human will coöperates, which it still has power to do.

The evil tendency and state may be called sin; but they do not in themselves involve guilt or punishment; still less are mankind accounted guilty of Adam's sin. God imputes to each man his inborn tendencies to evil, only when he consciously and voluntarily appropriates and ratifies these in spite of the power to the contrary, which, in justice to man, God has specially communicated. In Rom. 5:12, "death passed unto all men, for that all sinned," signifies that physical and spiritual death is inflicted upon all men, not as the penalty of a common sin in Adam, but because, by

divine decree, all suffer the consequences of that sin, and because all personally consent to their inborn sinfulness by acts of transgression.

See Arminius, Works, 1: 252-254, 317-324, 325-327, 523-531, 575-583. The description given above is a description of Arminianism proper. The expressions of Arminius himself are so guarded that Moses Stuart (Bib. Repos., 1831) found it possible to construct an argument to prove that Arminius was not an Arminian. But it is plain that by inherited sin Arminius meant only inherited evil, and that it was not of a sort to justify God's condemnation. He denied any inbeing in Adam, such as made us justly chargeable with Adam's sin, except in the sense that we are obliged to endure certain consequences of it. This Shedd has shown in his History of Doctrine, 2: 173-190. The system of Arminius was more fully expounded by Limborch and Episcopius. See Limborch, Theol. Christ., 3: 4: 6 (p. 189). The sin with which we are born "does not inhere in the soul, for this [soul] is immediately created by God, and therefore, if it were infected with sin, that sin would be from God." Many so-called Arminians, such as Whitby and John Taylor, were rather Pelagians.

John Wesley, however, greatly modified and improved the Arminian doctrine. Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 320, 330—"Wesleyanism (1) admits entire moral depravity; (2) denies that men in this state have any power to cooperate with the grace of God; (3) asserts that the guilt of all through Adam was removed by the justification of all through Christ; (4) ability to cooperate is of the Holy Spirit, through the universal influence of the redemption of Christ. The order of the decrees is (1) to permit the fall of man; (2) to send the Son to be a full satisfaction for the sins of the whole world; (3) on that ground to remit all original sin, and to give such grace as would enable all to attain eternal life; (4) those who improve that grace and persevere to the end are ordained to be saved." We may add that Wesley made the bestowal upon our depraved nature of ability to cooperate with God to be a matter of grace, while Arminius regarded it as a matter of justice, man without it not being accountable.

Wesleyanism was systematized by Watson, who, in his Institutes, 2: 53-55, 59, 77, although denying the imputation of Adam's sin in any proper sense, yet declares that "Limborch and others materially departed from the tenets of Arminius in denying inward lusts and tendencies to be sinful till complied with and augmented by the will. But men universally choose to ratify these tendencies; therefore they are corrupt in heart. If there be a universal depravity of will previous to the actual choice, then it inevitably follows that though infants do not commit actual sin, yet that theirs is a sinful nature. . . . As to infants, they are not indeed born justified and regenerate; so that to say original sin is taken away, as to infants, by Christ, is not the correct view of the case, for the reasons before given; but they are all born under 'the free gift,' the effects of the 'righteousness' of one, which is extended to all men; and this free gift is bestowed on them in order to justification of life, the adjudging of the condemned to live. . . . Justification in adults is connected with repentance and faith; in infants, we do not know how. The Holy Spirit may be given to children. Divine and effectual influence may be exerted on them, to cure the spiritual death and corrupt tendency of their nature."

It will be observed that Watson's Wesleyanism is much more near to Scripture than what we have described, and properly described, as Arminianism proper. Pope, in his Theology, follows Wesley and Watson, and (2: 70-80) gives a valuable synopsis of the differences between Arminius and Wesley. Whedon and Raymond, in America, better represent original Arminianism. They hold that God was under obligation to restore man's ability, and yet they inconsistently speak of this ability as a *gracious* ability. Two passages from Raymond's Theology show the inconsistency of calling that "grace," which God is bound in justice to bestow, in order to make man responsible; 2: 84-86—"The race came into existence under grace. Existence and justification are secured for it only through Christ; for, apart from Christ, punishment and destruction would have followed the first sin. So all gifts of the Spirit necessary to qualify him for the putting forth of free moral choices are secured for him through Christ. The Spirit of God is not a bystander, but a quickening power. So man is by grace, not by his fallen nature, a moral being capable of knowing, loving, obeying, and enjoying God. Such he ever will be, if he does not frustrate the grace of God. Not till the Spirit takes his final flight is he in a condition of total depravity."

Compare with this the following passage of the same work in which this "grace" is called a debt; 2: 317—"The relations of the posterity of Adam to God are substantially those of newly created beings. Each individual person is obligated to God, and

God to him, precisely the same as if God had created him such as he is. Ability must equal obligation. God was not obligated to provide a Redeemer for the first transgressors, but having provided Redemption for them, and through it having permitted them to propagate a degenerate race, an adequate compensation is due. The gracious influences of the Spirit are then a debt due to man—a compensation for the disabilities of inherited depravity." McClintock and Strong (Cyclopædia, art.: Arminius) endorse Whedon's art. in the Bib. Sac., 19: 241, as an exhibition of Arminianism, and Whedon himself claims it to be such. See Hagenbach, Hist. Doct., 2: 214-216.

With regard to the Arminian theory we remark :

A. We grant that there is a universal gift of the Holy Spirit, if by the Holy Spirit is meant the natural light of reason and conscience, and the manifold impulses to good which struggle against the evil of man's nature. But we regard as wholly unscriptural the assumptions: (a) that this gift of the Holy Spirit of itself removes the depravity or condemnation derived from Adam's fall; (b) that without this gift man would not be responsible for being morally imperfect; and (c) that at the beginning of moral life men consciously appropriate their inborn tendencies to evil.

John Wesley adduced in proof of universal grace the text: John 1: 9— "the light which lighteth every man"—which refers to the natural light of reason and conscience which the preincarnate Logos bestowed on all men, though in different degrees, before his coming in the flesh. This light can be called the Holy Spirit, because it was "the Spirit of Christ" (1 Pt. 1: 11). The Arminian view has a large element of truth in its recognition of an influence of Christ, the immanent God, which mitigates the effects of the Fall and strives to prepare men for salvation. But Arminianism does not fully recognize the evil to be removed, and it therefore exaggerates the effect of this divine working. Universal grace does not remove man's depravity or man's condemnation; as is evident from a proper interpretation of Rom. 5: 12-19 and of Eph. 2: 3; it only puts side by side with that depravity and condemnation influences and impulses which counteract the evil and urge the sinner to repentance: John 1: 5—"the light shineth in the darkness; and the darkness apprehended it not." John Wesley also referred to Rom. 5: 12—"through one act of righteousness the free gift came unto all men to justification of life"—but here the "all men" is conterminous with "the many" who are "made righteous" in verse 19, and with the "all" who are "made alive" in 1 Cor. 15: 22; in other words, the "all" in this case is "all believers": else the passage teaches, not universal gift of the Spirit, but universal salvation.

Arminianism holds to inherited sin, in the sense of infirmity and evil tendency, but not to inherited guilt. John Wesley, however, by holding also that the giving of ability is a matter of grace and not of justice, seems to imply that there is a common guilt as well as a common sin, before consciousness. American Arminians are more logical, but less Scriptural. Sheldon, Syst. Christian Doctrine, 321, tells us that "guilt cannot possibly be a matter of inheritance, and consequently original sin can be affirmed of the posterity of Adam only in the sense of hereditary corruption, which first becomes an occasion of guilt when it is embraced by the will of the individual." How little the Arminian means by "sin," can be inferred from the saying of Bishop Simpson that "Christ inherited sin." He meant of course only physical and intellectual infirmity, without a tinge of guilt. "A child inherits its parent's nature," it is said, "not as a punishment, but by natural law." But we reply that this natural law is itself an expression of God's moral nature, and the inheritance of evil can be justified only upon the ground of a common non-conformity to God in both the parent and the child, or a participation of each member in the common guilt of the race.

In the light of our preceding treatment, we can estimate the element of good and the element of evil in Pfeiderer, Philos. Religion, 1: 232—"It is an exaggeration when original sin is considered as personally imputable guilt; and it is going too far when it is held to be the whole state of the natural man, and yet the actually present good, the 'original grace,' is overlooked. . . . We may say, with Schleiermacher, that original sin is the common deed and common guilt of the human race. But the individual always participates in this collective guilt in the measure in which he takes part with his personal doing in the collective act that is directed to the furtherance of the bad." Dabney, Theology, 315, 316—"Arminianism is orthodox as to the legal consequences of Adam's sin to his posterity; but what it gives with one hand, it takes back with the other,

attributing to grace the restoration of this natural ability lost by the Fall. If the effects of Adam's Fall on his posterity are such that they would have been unjust if not repaired by a redeeming plan that was to follow it, then God's act in providing a Redeemer was not an act of pure grace. He was under obligation to do some such thing,—salvation is not grace, but debt." A. J. Gordon, *Ministry of the Spirit*, 187 sq., denies the universal gift of the Spirit, quoting John 14:17—"whom the world cannot receive; for it beareth him not, neither knoweth him"; 16:7—"If I go, I will send him unto you"; i. e., Christ's disciples were to be the recipients and distributors of the Holy Spirit, and his church the mediator between the Spirit and the world. Therefore Mark 16:15—"Go ye into all the world, and preach," implies that the Spirit shall go only with them. Conviction of the Spirit does not go beyond the church's evangelizing. But we reply that Gen. 6:3 implies a wider striving of the Holy Spirit.

B. It contradicts Scripture in maintaining: (a) that inherited moral evil does not involve guilt; (b) that the gift of the Spirit, and the regeneration of infants, are matters of justice; (c) that the effect of grace is simply to restore man's natural ability, instead of disposing him to use that ability aright; (d) that election is God's choice of certain men to be saved upon the ground of their foreseen faith, instead of being God's choice to make certain men believers; (e) that physical death is not the just penalty of sin, but is a matter of arbitrary decree.

(a) See Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2:58 (*System of Doctrine*, 2:322-329)—"With Arminius, original sin is original *evil* only, not *guilt*. He explained the problem of original sin by denying the fact, and turning the native sinfulness into a morally indifferent thing. No sin without consent; no consent at the beginning of human development; therefore, no guilt in evil desire. This is the same as the Romanist doctrine of concupiscence, and like that leads to blaming God for an originally bad constitution of our nature. . . . Original sin is merely an enticement to evil addressed to the free will. All internal disorder and viciousness is morally indifferent, and becomes sin only through appropriation by free will. But involuntary, loveless, proud thoughts are recognized in Scripture as sin; yet they spring from the heart without our conscious consent. Undeliberate and deliberate sins run into each other, so that it is impossible to draw a line between them. The doctrine that there is no sin without consent implies power to withhold consent. But this contradicts the universal need of redemption and our observation that none have ever thus entirely withheld consent from sin."

(b) H. B. Smith's *Review of Whedon on the Will*, in *Faith and Philosophy*, 329-339—"A child, upon the old view, needs only growth to make him guilty of actual sin; whereas, upon this view, he needs growth and grace too." See *Bib. Sac.*, 20:327, 328. According to Whedon, *Com. on Rom. 5:12*: "the condition of an infant apart from Christ is that of a sinner, as *one sure to sin*, yet never actually condemned before personal apostasy. This *would be* its condition, rather, for in Christ the infant is regenerate and justified and endowed with the Holy Spirit. Hence all actual sinners are apostates from a state of grace." But we ask: 1. Why then do infants die before they have committed actual sin? Surely not on account of Adam's sin, for they are delivered from all the evils of that, through Christ. It must be because they are still somehow sinners. 2. How can we account for all infants sinning so soon as they begin morally to act, if, before they sin, they are in a state of grace and sanctification? It must be because they were still somehow sinners. In other words, the universal regeneration and justification of infants contradict Scripture and observation.

(c) Notice that this "gracious" ability does not involve saving grace to the recipient, because it is given equally to all men. Nor is it more than a restoring to man of his natural ability lost by Adam's sin. It is not sufficient to explain why one man who has the gracious ability chooses God, while another who has the same gracious ability chooses self. 1 Cor. 1:7—"who maketh the difference?" Not God, but thyself. Over against this doctrine of Arminians, who hold to universal, resistible grace, restoring natural ability, Calvinists and Augustinians hold to particular, irresistible grace, giving moral ability, or, in other words, bestowing the disposition to use natural ability aright. "Grace" is a word much used by Arminians. *Methodist Doctrine and Discipline*, *Articles of Religion*, viii—"The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to faith, and calling upon God; wherefore we have no power to do good works, pleasant and accept-

able to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us, when we have that good will." It is important to understand that, in Arminian usage, grace is simply the restoration of man's natural ability to act for himself; it never actually saves him, but only enables him to save himself—if he will. Arminian grace is evenly bestowed grace of spiritual endowment, as Pelagian grace is evenly bestowed grace of creation. It regards redemption as a compensation for innate and consequently irresponsible depravity.

(d) In the Arminian system, the order of salvation is, (1) faith—by an unrenewed but convicted man; (2) justification; (3) regeneration, or a holy heart. God decrees not to originate faith, but to reward it. Hence Wesleyans make faith a work, and regard election as God's ordaining those who, he foresees, will of their own accord believe. The Augustinian order, on the contrary, is (1) regeneration; (2) faith; (3) justification. Memoir of Adolph Saphir, 285—"My objection to the Arminian or semi-Arminian is not that they make the entrance very wide; but that they do not give you anything definite, safe and real, when you have entered. . . . Do not believe the devil's gospel, which is a *chance* of salvation: chance of salvation is chance of damnation." Grace is not a *reward* for good deeds done, but a *power* enabling us to do them. Francis Bous of Truro, in the Parliament of 1629, spoke as a man nearly frantic with horror at the increase of that "error of Arminianism which makes the grace of God lackey it after the will of man"; see Masson, *Life of Milton*, 1: 277. Arminian converts say: "I gave my heart to the Lord"; Augustinian converts say: "The Holy Spirit convicted me of sin and renewed my heart." Arminianism tends to self-sufficiency; Augustinianism promotes dependence upon God.

C. It rests upon false philosophical principles, as for example: (a) That the will is simply the faculty of volitions. (b) That the power of contrary choice, in the sense of power by a single act to reverse one's moral state, is essential to will. (c) That previous certainty of any given moral act is incompatible with its freedom. (d) That ability is the measure of obligation. (e) That law condemns only volitional transgression. (f) That man has no organic moral connection with the race.

(b) Raymond says: "Man is responsible for character, but only so far as that character is self-imposed. We are not responsible for character irrespective of its origin. Freedom from an act is as essential to responsibility as freedom to it. If power to the contrary is impossible, then freedom does not exist in God or man. Sin was a necessity, and God was the author of it." But this is a denial that there is any such thing as character; that the will can give itself a bent which no single volition can change; that the wicked man can become the slave of sin; that Satan, though without power now in himself to turn to God, is yet responsible for his sin. The power of contrary choice which Adam had exists no longer in its entirety; it is narrowed down to a power to the contrary in temporary and subordinate choices; it no longer is equal to the work of changing the fundamental determination of the being to selfishness as an ultimate end. Yet for this very inability, because originated by will, man is responsible.

Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 2: 28—"Formal freedom leads the way to real freedom. The starting-point is a freedom which does not yet involve an inner necessity, but the possibility of something else; the goal is the freedom which is identical with necessity. The first is a means to the last. When the will has fully and truly chosen, the power of acting otherwise may still be said to exist in a metaphysical sense; but morally, i. e., with reference to the contrast of good and evil, it is entirely done away. Formal freedom is freedom of choice, in the sense of volition with the express consciousness of other possibilities." Real freedom is freedom to choose the good only, with no remaining possibility that evil will exert a counter attraction. But as the will can reach a "moral necessity" of good, so it can through sin reach a "moral necessity" of evil.

(c) Park: "The great philosophical objection to Arminianism is its denial of the *certainty* of human action—the idea that a man may act either way without certainty how he will act—power of a contrary choice in the sense of a moral indifference which can choose without motive, or contrary to the strongest motive. The New School view is better than this, for that holds to the certainty of wrong choice, while yet the soul has power to make a right one. . . . The Arminians believe that it is objectively uncertain whether a man shall act in this way or in that, right or wrong. There is nothing,

antecedently to choice, to decide the choice. It was the whole aim of Edwards to refute the idea that man would not *certainly* sin. The old Calvinists believe that antecedently to the Fall Adam was in this state of objective uncertainty, but that after the Fall it was certain he would sin, and his probation therefore was closed. Edwards affirms that no such objective uncertainty or power to the contrary ever existed, and that man now has all the liberty he ever had or could have. The truth in 'power to the contrary' is simply the power of the will to act contrary to the way it does act. President Edwards believed in this, though he is commonly understood as reasoning to the contrary. The false 'power to the contrary' is *uncertainty* how one will act, or a willingness to act otherwise than one does act. This is the Arminian power to the contrary, and it is this that Edwards opposes."

(c) Whedon, *On the Will*, 388-390, 388-395—"Prior to free volition, man may be unconformed to law, yet not a subject of retribution. The law has two offices, one judicatory and critical, the other retributive and penal. Hereditary evil may not be visited with retribution, as Adam's concreated purity was not meritorious. Passive, prevolitional holiness is moral rectitude, but not moral desert. Passive, prevolitional impurity needs concurrence of active will to make it condemnable."

D. It renders uncertain either the universality of sin or man's responsibility for it. If man has full power to refuse consent to inborn depravity, then the universality of sin and the universal need of a Savior are merely hypothetical. If sin, however, be universal, there must have been an absence of free consent; and the objective certainty of man's sinning, according to the theory, destroys his responsibility.

Raymond, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 86-89, holds it "theoretically possible that a child may be so trained and educated in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, as that he will never knowingly and willingly transgress the law of God; in which case he will certainly grow up into regeneration and final salvation. But it is grace that preserves him from sin—[common grace?]. We do not know, either from experience or Scripture, that none have been free from known and wilful transgressions." J. J. Murphy, *Nat. Selection and Spir. Freedom*, 28-32—"It is possible to walk from the cradle to the grave, not indeed altogether without sin, but without any period of alienation from God, and with the heavenly life developing along with the earthly, as it did in Christ, from the first." But, since grace merely restores ability without giving the disposition to use that ability aright, Arminianism does not logically provide for the certain salvation of any infant. Calvinism can provide for the salvation of all dying in infancy, for it knows of a divine power to renew the will, but Arminianism knows of no such power, and so is furthest from a solution of the problem of infant salvation. See Julius Müller, *Doot. Sin*, 2: 320-326; Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 479-494; *Bib. Sac.*, 23: 206; 28: 279; *Philippi, Glaubenslehre*, 8: 56 sq.

### 3. *The New School Theory, or Theory of uncondemnable Vitiosity.*

This theory is called New School, because of its recession from the old Puritan anthropology of which Edwards and Bellamy in the last century were the exponents. The New School theory is a general scheme built up by the successive labors of Hopkins, Emmons, Dwight, Taylor, and Finney. It is held at present by New School Presbyterians, and by the larger part of the Congregational body.

According to this theory, all men are born with a physical and moral constitution which predisposes them to sin, and all men do actually sin so soon as they come to moral consciousness. This vitiosity of nature may be called sinful, because it uniformly leads to sin; but it is not itself sin, since nothing is to be properly denominated sin but the voluntary act of transgressing known law.

God imputes to men only their own acts of personal transgression; he does not impute to them Adam's sin; neither original vitiosity nor physi-

cal death are penal inflictions; they are simply consequences which God has in his sovereignty ordained to mark his displeasure at Adam's transgression, and subject to which evils God immediately creates each human soul. In Rom. 5:12, "death passed unto all men, for that all sinned," signifies: "spiritual death passed on all men, because all men have actually and personally sinned."

Edwards held that God imputes Adam's sin to his posterity by arbitrarily identifying them with him,—identity, on the theory of continuous creation (see pages 415-418), being only what God appoints. Since this did not furnish sufficient ground for imputation, Edwards joined the Placean doctrine to the other, and showed the justice of the condemnation by the fact that man is depraved. He adds, moreover, the consideration that man ratifies this depravity by his own act. So Edwards tried to combine three views. But all were vitiated by his doctrine of continuous creation, which logically made God the only cause in the universe, and left no freedom, guilt, or responsibility to man. He held that preservation is a continuous series of new divine volitions, personal identity consisting in consciousness or rather memory, with no necessity for identity of substance. He maintained that God could give to an absolutely new creation the consciousness of one just annihilated, and thereby the two would be identical. He maintained this not only as a possibility, but as the actual fact. See *Lutheran Quarterly*, April, 1901: 149-169; and H. N. Gardiner, in *Philos. Rev.*, Nov. 1900: 573-596.

The idealistic philosophy of Edwards enables us to understand his conception of the relation of the race to Adam. He believed in "a real union between the root and the branches of the world of mankind, established by the author of the whole system of the universe . . . the full consent of the hearts of Adam's posterity to the first apostasy . . . and therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs merely because God imputes it to them, but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground God imputes it to them." Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.*, 2: 435-448, esp. 436, quotes from Edwards: "The guilt a man has upon his soul at his first existence is one and simple, viz.: the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God." Interpret this by other words of Edwards: "The child and the acorn, which come into existence in the course of nature, are truly immediately created by God"—i. e., continuously created (quoted by Dodge, *Christian Theology*, 188). Allen, *Jonathan Edwards*, 310—"It required but a step from the principle that each individual has an identity of consciousness with Adam, to reach the conclusion that each individual is Adam and repeats his experience. Of every man it might be said that like Adam he comes into the world attended by the divine nature, and like him sins and falls. In this sense the sin of every man becomes original sin." Adam becomes not the head of humanity but its generic type. Hence arises the New School doctrine of exclusively individual sin and guilt.

Shedd, *Hist. Doctrines*, 2: 26, claims Edwards as a Traducianist. But Fisher, *Discussions*, 240, shows that he was not. As we have seen (*Prolegomena*, pages 48, 49), Edwards thought too little of *nature*. He tended to Berkeleyanism as applied to mind. Hence the chief good was in happiness—a form of *sensibility*. Virtue is voluntary *choice* of this good. Hence union of *acts* and *exercises* with Adam was sufficient. This God's will might make identity of *being* with him. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 250 sq., says well, that "Edwards's idea that the character of an act was to be sought somewhere else than in its cause involves the fallacious assumption that acts have a subsistence and moral agency of their own apart from that of the actor." This divergence from the truth led to the Exercise-system of Hopkins and Emmons, who not only denied moral character prior to individual choices (i. e., denied sin of nature), but attributed all human acts and exercises to the direct efficiency of God. Hopkins declared that Adam's act, in eating the forbidden fruit, was not the act of his posterity; therefore they did not sin at the same time that he did. The sinfulness of that act could not be transferred to them afterwards; because the sinfulness of an act can no more be transferred from one person to another than an act itself. Therefore, though men became sinners by Adam, according to divine constitution, yet they have, and are accountable for, no sins but personal. See Woods, *History of Andover Theological Seminary*, 33. So the doctrine of continuous creation led to the Exercise-system, and the Exercise-system led to the theology of acts. On Emmons, see *Works*, 4: 502-507, and *Bib. Sac.*, 7: 479; 20: 317; also H. R. Smith, in *Faith and Philosophy*, 215-233.

N. W. Taylor, of New Haven, agreed with Hopkins and Emmons that there is no

imputation of Adam's sin or of inborn depravity. He called that depravity physical, not moral. But he repudiated the doctrine of divine efficiency in the production of man's acts and exercises, and made all sin to be personal. He held to the power of contrary choice. Adam had it, and contrary to the belief of Augustinians, he never lost it. Man "not only can if he will, but he can if he won't." He can, but, without the Spirit, will not. He said: "Man can, whatever the Holy Spirit does or does not do"; but also: "Man will not, unless the Holy Spirit helps"; "If I were as eloquent as the Holy Ghost, I could convert sinners as fast as he." Yet he did not hold to the Arminian liberty of indifference or contingency. He believed in the certainty of wrong action, yet in power to the contrary. See *Moral Government*, 2: 133—"The error of Pelagius was not in asserting that man *can* obey God without grace, but in saying that man does *actually* obey God without grace." There is a part of the sinner's nature to which the motives of the gospel may appeal—a part of his nature which is neither holy nor unholy, *viz.*, self-love, or innocent desire for happiness. Greatest happiness is the ground of obligation. Under the influence of motives appealing to happiness, the sinner can suspend his choice of the world as his chief good, and can give his heart to God. He can do this, whatever the Holy Spirit does, or does not do; but the moral inability can be overcome only by the Holy Spirit, who moves the soul, without coercing, by means of the truth. On Dr. Taylor's system, and its connection with prior New England theology, see Fisher, *Discussions*, 235-254.

This form of New School doctrine suggests the following questions: 1. Can the sinner suspend his selfishness before he is subdued by divine grace? 2. Can his choice of God from mere self-love be a holy choice? 3. Since God demands love in every choice, must it not be a positively unholy choice? 4. If it is not itself a holy choice, how can it be a beginning of holiness? 5. If the sinner can become regenerate by preferring God on the ground of self-interest, where is the necessity of the Holy Spirit to renew the heart? 6. Does not this asserted ability of the sinner to turn to God contradict consciousness and Scripture? For Taylor's views, see his *Revealed Theology*, 134-308. For criticism of them, see Hodge, in *Princeton Rev.*, Jan. 1838: 63 sq., and 363-398; also, Tyler, *Letters on the New Haven Theology*. Neither Hopkins and Emmons on the one hand, nor Taylor on the other, represent most fully the general course of New England theology. Smalley, Dwight, Woods, all held to more conservative views than Taylor, or than Finney, whose system had much resemblance to Taylor's. All three of these denied the power of contrary choice which Dr. Taylor so strenuously maintained, although all agreed with him in denying the imputation of Adam's sin or of our hereditary depravity. These are not sinful, except in the sense of being occasions of actual sin.

Dr. Park, of Andover, was understood to teach that the disordered state of the sensibilities and faculties with which we are born is the *immediate* occasion of sin, while Adam's transgression is the *remote* occasion of sin. The will, though influenced by an evil tendency, is still free; the evil tendency itself is not free, and therefore is not sin. The statement of New School doctrine given in the text is intended to represent the common New England doctrine, as taught by Smalley, Dwight, Woods and Park; although the historical tendency, even among these theologians, has been to emphasize less and less the depraved tendencies prior to actual sin, and to maintain that moral character begins only with individual choice, most of them, however, holding that this individual choice begins at birth. See *Bib. Sac.*, 7: 552, 567; 8: 607-647; 20: 463-471, 576-593; Van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, 407-412; Foster, *Hist. N. E. Theology*.

Both Ritschl and Pfeiderer lean toward the New School interpretation of sin. Ritschl, *Unterricht*, 25—"Universal death was the consequence of the sin of the first man, and the death of his posterity proved that they too had sinned." Thus death is universal, not because of natural generation from Adam, but because of the individual sins of Adam's posterity. Pfeiderer, *Grundriss*, 122—"Sin is a direction of the will which contradicts the moral Idea. As preceding personal acts of the will, it is not personal guilt but imperfection or evil. When it persists in spite of awaking moral consciousness, and by indulgence become habit, it is guilty abnormality."

To the New School theory we object as follows:

A. It contradicts Scripture in maintaining or implying: (a) That sin consists solely in acts, and in the dispositions caused in each case by man's individual acts, and that the state which predisposes to acts of sin is not itself sin. (b) That the vitiosity which predisposes to sin is a part of each man's nature as it proceeds from the creative hand of God. (c) That

physical death in the human race is not a penal consequence of Adam's transgression. (d) That infants, before moral consciousness, do not need Christ's sacrifice to save them. Since they are innocent, no penalty rests upon them, and none needs to be removed. (e) That we are neither condemned upon the ground of actual inbeing in Adam, nor justified upon the ground of actual inbeing in Christ.

If a child may not be unholy before he voluntarily transgresses, then, by parity of reasoning, Adam could not have been holy before he obeyed the law, nor can a change of heart precede Christian action. New School principles would compel us to assert that right action precedes change of heart, and that obedience in Adam must have preceded his holiness. Emmons held that, if children die before they become moral agents, it is most rational to conclude that they are annihilated. They are mere animals. The common New School doctrine would regard them as saved either on account of their innocence, or because the atonement of Christ avails to remove the consequences as well as the penalty of sin.

But to say that infants are pure contradicts Rom. 5:12—"all sinned"; 1 Cor. 7:14—"also were ye all saved"; Eph. 2:3—"by nature children of wrath." That Christ's atonement removes natural consequences of sin is nowhere asserted or implied in Scripture. See, *per contra*, H. B. Smith, System, 271, where, however, it is only maintained that Christ saves from all the *just* consequences of sin. But all *just* consequences are penalty, and should be so called. The exigencies of New School doctrine compel it to put the beginning of sin in the infant at the very first moment of its separate existence,—in order not to contradict those Scriptures which speak of sin as being universal, and of the atonement as being needed by all. Dr. Park held that infants sin so soon as they are born. He was obliged to hold this, or else to say that some members of the human race exist who are not sinners. But by putting sin thus early in human experience, all meaning is taken out of the New School definition of sin as the "voluntary transgression of known law." It is difficult to say, upon this theory, what sort of a choice the infant makes of sin, or what sort of a *known law* it violates.

The first need in a theory of sin is that of satisfying the statements of Scripture. The second need is that it should point out an act of man which will justify the infliction of pain, suffering, and death upon the whole human race. Our moral sense refuses to accept the conclusion that all this is a matter of arbitrary sovereignty. We cannot find the act in each man's conscious transgression, nor in sin committed at birth. We do find such a voluntary transgression of known law in Adam; and we claim that the New School definition of sin is much more consistent with this last explanation of sin's origin than is the theory of a multitude of individual transgressions.

The final test of every theory, however, is its conformity to Scripture. We claim that a false philosophy prevents the advocates of New School doctrine from understanding the utterances of Paul. Their philosophy is a modified survival of atomistic Pelagianism. They ignore nature in both God and man, and resolve character into transient acts. The unconscious or subconscious state of the will they take little or no account of, and the possibility of another and higher life interpenetrating and transforming our own life is seldom present to their minds. They have no proper idea of the union of the believer with Christ, and so they have no proper idea of the union of the race with Adam. They need to learn that, as all the spiritual life of the race was in Christ, the second Adam, so all the natural life of the race was in the first Adam; as we derive righteousness from the former, so we derive corruption from the latter. Because Christ's life is in them, Paul can say that all believers rose in Christ's resurrection; because Adam's life is in them, he can say that in Adam all die. We should prefer to say with Pfeiderer that Paul teaches this doctrine but that Paul is no authority for us, rather than to profess acceptance of Paul's teaching while we ingeniously evade the force of his argument. We agree with Stevens, Pauline Theology, 135, 136, that all men "sinned in the same sense in which believers were crucified to the world and died unto sin when Christ died upon the cross." But we protest that to make Christ's death the mere occasion of the death of the believer, and Adam's sin the mere occasion of the sins of men, is to ignore the central truths of Paul's teaching—the *vital union* of the believer with Christ, and the *vital union* of the race with Adam.

B. It rests upon false philosophical principles, as for example: (a) That the soul is immediately created by God. (b) That the law of God consists

wholly in outward command. (c) That present natural ability to obey the law is the measure of obligation. (d) That man's relations to moral law are exclusively individual. (e) That the will is merely the faculty of individual and personal choices. (f) That the will, at man's birth, has no moral state or character.

See Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 250 sq.—“Personality is inseparable from nature. The one duty is love. Unless any given duty is performed through the activity of a principle of love springing up in the nature, it is not performed at all. *The law addresses the nature.* The efficient cause of moral action is the proper subject of moral law. It is only in the perversity of unscriptural theology that we find the absurdity of separating the moral character from the substance of the soul, and tying it to the vanishing deeds of life. The idea that responsibility and sin are predicable of actions merely is only consistent with an utter denial that man's nature as such owes anything to God, or has an office to perform in showing forth his glory. It ignores the fact that actions are empty phenomena, which in themselves have no possible value. It is the heart, soul, might, mind, strength, with which we are to love. Christ conformed to the law, by being ‘that holy thing’ (Luk. 1:35, marg.).”

Erroneous philosophical principles lie at the basis of New School interpretations of Scripture. The solidarity of the race is ignored, and all moral action is held to be individual. In our discussion of the Augustinian theory of sin, we shall hope to show that underlying Paul's doctrine there is quite another philosophy. Such a philosophy together with a deeper Christian experience would have corrected the following statement of Paul's view of sin, by Orello Cone, in *Am. Jour. Theology*, April, 1898: 241-237. On the phrase *Rom. 5:12*—“for that all sinned,” he remarks: “If under the new order men do not become righteous simply because of the righteousness of Christ and without their choice, neither under the old order did Paul think them to be subject to death without their own acts of sin. Each representative head is conceived only as the occasion of the results of his work, on the one hand in the tragic order of death, and on the other hand in the blessed order of life—the occasion indispensable to all that follows in either order. . . . It may be questioned whether Pfeiderer does not state the case too strongly when he says that the sin of Adam's posterity is regarded as ‘the necessary consequence’ of the sin of Adam. It does not follow from the employment of the aorist *ἥμαρτον* that the sinning of all is contained in that of Adam, although this sense must be considered as grammatically possible. It is not however the only grammatically defensible sense. In *Rom. 3:23*, *ἥμαρτον* certainly does not denote such a definite past act filling only one point of time.” But we reply that the context determines that in *Rom. 5:12*, *ἥμαρτον* does denote such a definite past act; see our interpretation of the whole passage, under the Augustinian Theory, pages 625-627.

C. It impugns the justice of God:

(a) By regarding him as the direct creator of a vicious nature which infallibly leads every human being into actual transgression. To maintain that, in consequence of Adam's act, God brings it about that all men become sinners, and this, not by virtue of inherent laws of propagation, but by the direct creation in each case of a vicious nature, is to make God indirectly the author of sin.

(b) By representing him as the inflicter of suffering and death upon millions of human beings who in the present life do not come to moral consciousness, and who are therefore, according to the theory, perfectly innocent. This is to make him visit Adam's sin on his posterity, while at the same time it denies that moral connection between Adam and his posterity which alone could make such visitation just.

(c) By holding that the probation which God appoints to men is a separate probation of each soul, when it first comes to moral consciousness and is least qualified to decide aright. It is much more consonant with our ideas of the divine justice that the decision should have been made by the

whole race, in one whose nature was pure and who perfectly understood God's law, than that heaven and hell should have been determined for each of us by a decision made in our own inexperienced childhood, under the influence of a vitiated nature.

On this theory, God determines, in his mere sovereignty, that because one man sinned, all men should be called into existence depraved, under a constitution which secures the certainty of their sinning. But we claim that it is unjust that any should suffer without ill-desert. To say that God thus marks his sense of the guilt of Adam's sin is to contradict the main principle of the theory, namely, that men are held responsible only for their own sins. We prefer to justify God by holding that there is a reason for this infliction, and that this reason is the connection of the infant with Adam. If mere tendency to sin is innocent, then Christ might have taken it, when he took our nature. But if he had taken it, it would not explain the fact of the atonement, for upon this theory it would not need to be atoned for. To say that the child inherits a sinful nature, not as penalty, but by natural law, is to ignore the fact that this natural law is simply the regular action of God, the expression of his moral nature, and so is itself penalty.

"Man kills a snake," says Raymond, "because it is a snake, and not because it is to blame for being a snake,"—which seems to us a new proof that the advocates of innocent depravity regard infants, not as moral beings, but as mere animals. "We must distinguish automatic excellence or badness," says Raymond again, "from moral desert, whether good or ill." This seems to us a doctrine of punishment without guilt. Princeton Essays, 1: 188, quote Coleridge: "It is an outrage on common sense to affirm that it is no evil for men to be placed on their probation under such circumstances that not one of ten thousand millions ever escapes sin and condemnation to eternal death. There is evil inflicted on us, as a consequence of Adam's sin, antecedent to our personal transgressions. It matters not what this evil is, whether temporal death, corruption of nature, certainty of sin, or death in its more extended sense; if the ground of the evil's coming on us is Adam's sin, the principle is the same." Baird, Elohim Revealed, 488—So, it seems, "if a creature is punished, it implies that some one has sinned, but does not necessarily intimate the sufferer to be the sinner! But this is wholly contrary to the argument of the apostle in Rom. 5: 12-18, which is based upon the opposite doctrine, and it is also contrary to the justice of God, who punishes only those who deserve it." See Julius Müller, Doct. Sin, 2: 67-74.

D. Its limitation of responsibility to the evil choices of the individual and the dispositions caused thereby is inconsistent with the following facts:

(a) The first moral choice of each individual is so undeliberate as not to be remembered. Put forth at birth, as the chief advocates of the New School theory maintain, it does not answer to their definition of sin as a voluntary transgression of known law. Responsibility for such choice does not differ from responsibility for the inborn evil state of the will which manifests itself in that choice.

(b) The uniformity of sinful action among men cannot be explained by the existence of a mere faculty of choices. That men should uniformly choose may be thus explained; but that men should uniformly choose evil requires us to postulate an evil tendency or state of the will itself, prior to these separate acts of choice. This evil tendency or inborn determination to evil, since it is the real cause of actual sins, must itself be sin, and as such must be guilty and condemnable.

(c) Power in the will to prevent the inborn vitiosity from developing itself is upon this theory a necessary condition of responsibility for actual sins. But the absolute uniformity of actual transgression is evidence that the will is practically impotent. If responsibility diminishes as the difficulties in the way of free decision increase, the fact that these difficulties are insu-

perable shows that there can be no responsibility at all. To deny the guilt of inborn sin is therefore virtually to deny the guilt of the actual sin which springs therefrom.

The aim of all the theories is to find a decision of the will which will justify God in condemning men. Where shall we find such a decision? At the age of fifteen, ten, five? Then all who die before this age are not sinners, cannot justly be punished with death, do not need a Savior. Is it at birth? But decision at such a time is not such a conscious decision against God as, according to this theory, would make it the proper determiner of our future destiny. We claim that the theory of Augustine—that of a sin of the race in Adam—is the only one that shows a conscious transgression fit to be the cause and ground of man's guilt and condemnation.

Wm. Adams Brown: "Who can tell how far his own acts are caused by his own will, and how far by the nature he has inherited? Men do feel guilty for acts which are largely due to their inherited natures, which inherited corruption is guilt, deserving of punishment and certain to receive it." H. B. Smith, *System*, 350, note—"It has been said, in the way of a taunt against the older theology, that men are very willing to speculate about sinning in Adam, so as to have their attention diverted from the sense of personal guilt. But the whole history of theology bears witness that those who have believed most fully in our native and strictly moral corruption—as Augustine, Calvin, and Edwards—have ever had the deepest sense of their personal demerit. We know the full evil of sin only when we know its roots as well as its fruits."

"Causa cause est causa causati." Inborn depravity is the cause of the first actual sin. The cause of inborn depravity is the sin of Adam. If there be no guilt in original sin, then the actual sin that springs therefrom cannot be guilty. There are subsequent presumptuous sins in which the personal element overbears the element of race and heredity. But this cannot be said of the first acts which make man a sinner. These are so naturally and uniformly the result of the inborn determination of the will, that they cannot be guilty, unless that inborn determination is also guilty. In short, not all sin is personal. There must be a sin of nature—a race-sin—or the beginnings of actual sin cannot be accounted for or regarded as objects of God's condemnation. Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 2: 320-323, 341—"If the deep-rooted depravity which we bring with us into the world be not our sin, it at once becomes an excuse for our actual sins." *Princeton Essays*, 1: 183, 190—Alternative: 1. May a man by his own power prevent the development of this hereditary depravity? Then we do not know that all men are sinners, or that Christ's salvation is needed by all. 2. Is actual sin a necessary consequence of hereditary depravity? Then it is, on this theory, a free act no longer, and is not guilty, since guilt is predicable only of voluntary transgression of known law. See Baird, *Edhim Revealed*, 256 sq.; Hodge, *Essays*, 571-633; Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 61-73; Edwards on the Will, part iii, sec. 4; *Bib. Sac.*, 20: 317-320.

#### 4. *The Federal Theory, or Theory of Condemnation by Covenant.*

The Federal theory, or theory of the Covenants, had its origin with Cocceius (1603-1669), professor at Leyden, but was more fully elaborated by Turretin (1623-1687). It has become a tenet of the Reformed as distinguished from the Lutheran church, and in this country it has its main advocates in the Princeton school of theologians, of whom Dr. Charles Hodge was the representative.

According to this view, Adam was constituted by God's sovereign appointment the representative of the whole human race. With Adam as their representative, God entered into covenant, agreeing to bestow upon them eternal life on condition of his obedience, but making the penalty of his disobedience to be the corruption and death of all his posterity. In accordance with the terms of this covenant, since Adam sinned, God accounts all his descendants as sinners, and condemns them because of Adam's transgression.

In execution of this sentence of condemnation, God immediately creates each soul of Adam's posterity with a corrupt and depraved nature, which

infallibly leads to sin, and which is itself sin. The theory is therefore a theory of the immediate imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, their corruption of nature not being the cause of that imputation, but the effect of it. In Rom. 5:12, "death passed unto all men, for that all sinned," signifies: "physical, spiritual, and eternal death came to all, because all were regarded and treated as sinners."

Fisher, Discussions, 355-409, compares the Augustinian and Federal theories of Original Sin. His account of the Federal theory and its origin is substantially as follows: The Federal theory is a theory of the covenants (*foedus*, a covenant). 1. The covenant is a sovereign constitution imposed by God. 2. Federal union is the legal ground of imputation, though kinship to Adam is the reason why Adam and not another was selected as our representative. 3. Our guilt for Adam's sin is simply a legal responsibility. 4. That imputed sin is punished by inborn depravity, and that inborn depravity by eternal death. Augustine could not reconcile inherent depravity with the justice of God; hence he held that we sinned in Adam.

So Anselm says: "Because the whole human nature was in them (Adam and Eve), and outside of them there was nothing of it, the whole was weakened and corrupted." After the first sin "this nature was propagated just as it had made itself by sinning." All sin belongs to the will; but this is a part of our inheritance. The descendants of Adam were not in him as individuals; yet what he did as a person, he did not do *sine natura*, and this nature is ours as well as his. So Peter Lombard. Sins of our immediate ancestors, because they are qualities which are purely personal, are not propagated. After Adam's first sin, the actual qualities of the first parent or of other later parents do not corrupt the nature as concerns its qualities, but only as concerns the qualities of the person.

Calvin maintained two propositions: 1. We are not condemned for Adam's sin apart from our own inherent depravity which is derived from him. The sin for which we are condemned is our own sin. 2. This sin is ours, for the reason that our nature is vitiated in Adam, and we receive it in the condition in which it was put by the first transgression. Melancthon also held to an imputation of the first sin conditioned upon our innate depravity. The impulse to Federalism was given by the difficulty, on the pure Augustinian theory, of accounting for the non-imputation of Adam's subsequent sins, and those of his posterity.

Cocceus (Dutch, Coch: English, Cook), the author of the covenant-theory, conceived that he had solved this difficulty by making Adam's sin to be imputed to us upon the ground of a covenant between God and Adam, according to which Adam was to stand as the representative of his posterity. In Cocceus's use of the term, however, the only difference between covenant and command is found in the promise attached to the keeping of it. Fisher remarks on the mistake, in modern defenders of imputation, of ignoring the capital fact of a true and real participation in Adam's sin. The great body of Calvinistic theologians in the 17th century were Augustinians as well as Federalists. So Owen and the Westminster Confession. Turretin, however, almost merged the natural relation to Adam in the federal.

Edwards fell back on the old doctrine of Aquinas and Augustine. He tried to make out a real participation in the first sin. The first rising of sinful inclination, by a divinely constituted identity, is this participation. But Hopkins and Emmons regarded the sinful inclination, not as a real participation, but only as a *constructive* consent to Adam's first sin. Hence the New School theology, in which the imputation of Adam's sin was given up. On the contrary, Calvinists of the Princeton school planted themselves on the Federal theory, and taking Turretin as their text book, waged war on New England views, not wholly sparing Edwards himself. After this review of the origin of the theory, for which we are mainly indebted to Fisher, it can be easily seen how little show of truth there is in the assumption of the Princeton theologians that the Federal theory is "the immemorial doctrine of the church of God."

Statements of the theory are found in Cocceus, *Summa Doctrinae de Fœdere*, cap. 1, §; Turretin, *Inst.*, loc. 9, quæst. 9; Princeton Essays, 1: 98-185, esp. 120—"In imputation there is, first, an ascription of something to those concerned; secondly, a determination to deal with them accordingly." The ground for this imputation is "the union between Adam and his posterity, which is twofold,—a natural union, as between father and children, and the union of representation, which is the main idea here insisted on." 188—"As in Christ we are constituted righteous by the imputation of righteousness, so

in Adam we are made sinners by the imputation of his sin. . . . Guilt is liability or exposedness to punishment; it does not in theological usage imply moral turpitude or criminality." 182—Turretin is quoted: "The foundation, therefore, of imputation is not merely the natural connection which exists between us and Adam—for, were this the case, all his sins would be imputed to us, but principally the moral and federal, on the ground of which God entered into covenant with him as our head. Hence in that sin Adam acted not as a private but a public person and representative." The oneness results from contract; the natural union is frequently not mentioned at all. Marek: All men sinned in Adam, "eos representantes." The acts of Adam and of Christ are ours "jure representationis."

G. W. Northrup makes the order of the Federal theory to be: "(1) imputation of Adam's guilt; (2) condemnation on the ground of this imputed guilt; (3) corruption of nature consequent upon treatment as condemned. So judicial imputation of Adam's sin is the cause and ground of innate corruption. . . . All the acts, with the single exception of the sin of Adam, are divine acts: the appointment of Adam, the creation of his descendants, the imputation of his guilt, the condemnation of his posterity, their consequent corruption. Here we have guilt without sin, exposure to divine wrath without ill-desert, God regarding men as being what they are not, punishing them on the ground of a sin committed before they existed, and visiting them with gratuitous condemnation and gratuitous reprobation. Here are arbitrary representation, fictitious imputation, constructive guilt, limited atonement." The Presb. Rev., Jan. 1882: 30, claims that Kloppenburg (1642) preceded Cocceus (1643) in holding to the theory of the Covenants, as did also the Canons of Dort. For additional statements of Federalism, see Hodge, Essays, 49-86, and Syst. Theol., 2: 192-204; Bib. Sac., 21: 95-107; Cunningham, Historical Theology.

To the Federal theory we object:

A. It is extra-Scriptural, there being no mention of such a covenant with Adam in the account of man's trial. The assumed allusion to Adam's apostasy in Hosea 6: 7, where the word "covenant" is used, is too precarious and too obviously metaphorical to afford the basis for a scheme of imputation (see Henderson, Com. on Minor Prophets, *in loco*). In Heb. 8: 8—"new covenant"—there is suggested a contrast, not with an Adamic, but with the Mosaic, covenant (*cf.* verse 9).

In Hosea 6: 7—"they like Adam [ marg. 'men' ] have transgressed the covenant" (Rev. Ver.)—the correct translation is given by Henderson, Minor Prophets: "But they, like men that break a covenant, there they proved false to me." LXX; *αὐτοὶ ὡς εἰς αὐθιγὰς παραβαίνον διαθήκην*. De Wette: "Aber sie übertreten den Bund nach Menschenart; daselbst sind sie mir treulos." Here the word *adam*, translated "man," either means "a man," or "man," *i. e.*, generic man. "Israel had as little regard to their covenants with God as men of unprincipled character have for ordinary contracts." "Like a man"—as men do. Compare Ps. 82: 7—"ye shall die like men"; Hosea 8: 1, 2—"they have transgressed my covenant"—an allusion to the Abrahamic or Mosaic covenant. Heb. 8: 9—"Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah; Not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day that I took them by the hand to lead them forth out of the land of Egypt."

B. It contradicts Scripture, in making the first result of Adam's sin to be God's regarding and treating the race as sinners. The Scripture, on the contrary, declares that Adam's offense constituted us sinners (Rom. 5: 19). We are not sinners simply because God regards and treats us as such, but God regards us as sinners because we are sinners. Death is said to have "passed unto all men," not because all were regarded and treated as sinners, but "because all sinned" (Rom. 5: 12).

For a full exegesis of the passage Rom. 5: 12-19, see note to the discussion of the Theory of Adam's Natural Headship, pages 625-627. Dr. Park gave great offence by saying that the so-called "covenants" of law and of grace, referred in the Westminster Confession as made by God with Adam and Christ respectively, were really "made in Holland." The word *fœdus*, in such a connection, could properly mean nothing more than "ordi-

nance"; see Vergil, *Georgics*, 1: 60-63—"eterna foedera." E. G. Robinson, *Christ. Theol.*, 185—"God's 'covenant' with men is simply his method of dealing with them according to their knowledge and opportunities."

C. It impugns the justice of God by implying:

(a) That God holds men responsible for the violation of a covenant which they had no part in establishing. The assumed covenant is only a sovereign decree; the assumed justice, only arbitrary will.

We not only never authorized Adam to make such a covenant, but there is no evidence that he ever made one at all. It is not even certain that Adam knew he should have posterity. In the case of the imputation of our sins to Christ, Christ covenanted voluntarily to bear them, and joined himself to our nature that he might bear them. In the case of the imputation of Christ's righteousness to us, we first become one with Christ, and upon the ground of our union with him are justified. But upon the Federal theory, we are condemned upon the ground of a covenant which we neither instituted, nor participated in, nor assented to.

(b) That upon the basis of this covenant God accounts men as sinners who are not sinners. But God judges according to truth. His condemnations do not proceed upon a basis of legal fiction. He can regard as responsible for Adam's transgression only those who in some real sense have been concerned, and have had part, in that transgression.

See Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 54—"Here is a sin, which is no crime, but a mere condition of being regarded and treated as sinners; and a guilt, which is devoid of sinfulness, and which does not imply moral demerit or turpitude,"—that is, a sin which is no sin, and a guilt which is no guilt. Why might not God as justly reckon Adam's sin to the account of the fallen angels, and punish them for it? Dörner, *System Doct.*, 2: 351; 3: 53, 54—"Hollaz held that God treats men in accordance with what he foresaw all would do, if they were in Adam's place" (*sententia media* and *imputatio metaphysica*). Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 141—"Immediate imputation is as unjust as *imputatio metaphysica*, *i. e.*, God's condemning us for what he knew we would have done in Adam's place. On such a theory there is no need of a trial at all. God might condemn half the race at once to hell without probation, on the ground that they would ultimately sin and come thither at any rate." Justification can be gratuitous, but not condemnation. "Like the social-compact theory of government, the covenant-theory of sin is a mere legal fiction. It explains, only to belittle. The theory of New England theology, which attributes to mere sovereignty God's making us sinners in consequence of Adam's sin, is more reasonable than the Federal theory" (Fisher).

Professor Moses Stuart characterized this theory as one of "fictitious guilt, but veritable damnation." The divine economy admits of no fictitious substitutions nor forensic evasions. No legal quibbles can modify eternal justice. Federalism reverses the proper order, and puts the effect before the cause, as is the case with the social-compact theory of government. Ritchie, Darwin and Hegel, 27—"It is illogical to say that society originated in a contract; for contract presupposes society." *Unus homo, nullus homo*—without society, no persons. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 351—"No individual can make a conscience for himself. He always needs a society to make it for him. . . . 200—Only through society is personality actualized." Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, 208, note—"Organic interrelationship of individuals is the condition even of their relatively independent selfhood." We are "members one of another" (Rom, 12: 15). Schurman, *Agnosticism*, 176—"The individual could never have developed into a personality but for his training through society and under law." Imagine a theory that the family originated in a compact! We must not define the state by its first crude beginnings, any more than we define the oak by the acorn. On the theory of a social-compact, see Lowell, *Essays on Government*, 138-138.

(c) That, after accounting men to be sinners who are not sinners, God makes them sinners by immediately creating each human soul with a corrupt nature such as will correspond to his decree. This is not only to assume a false view of the origin of the soul, but also to make God directly

the author of sin. Imputation of sin cannot precede and account for corruption; on the contrary, corruption must precede and account for imputation.

By God's act we became depraved, as a penal consequence of Adam's act imputed to us solely as *peccatum alterum*. Dabney, *Theology*, 842, says the theory regards the soul as originally pure until imputation. See Hodge on *Rom. 5:13*; *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 208, 210; Thornwell, *Theology*, 1: 348-349; Chalmers, *Institutes*, 1: 485, 487. The Federal theory "makes sin in us to be the penalty of another's sin, instead of being the penalty of our own sin, as on the Augustinian scheme, which regards depravity in us as the punishment of our own sin in Adam. . . . It holds to a sin which does not bring eternal punishment, but for which we are legally responsible as truly as Adam." It only remains to say that Dr. Hodge always persistently refused to admit the one added element which might have made his view less arbitrary and mechanical, namely, the traducian theory of the origin of the soul. He was a creatianist, and to the end maintained that God immediately created the soul, and created it depraved. Acceptance of the traducian theory would have compelled him to exchange his Federalism for Augustinianism. Creatianism was the one remaining element of Pelagian atomism in an otherwise Scriptural theory. Yet Dr. Hodge regarded this as an essential part of Biblical teaching. His unwavering confidence was like that of Fichte, whom Caroline Schelling represented as saying: "Zweifle an der Sonne Klarheit, Zweifle an der Sterne Licht, Leser, nur an meiner Wahrheit Und an deiner Dummheit, nicht."

As a corrective to the atomistic spirit of Federalism we may quote a view which seems to us far more tenable, though it perhaps goes to the opposite extreme. Dr. H. H. Bawden writes: "The self is the product of a social environment. An ascetic self is so far forth not a self. Selfhood and consciousness are essentially social. We are members one of another. The biological view of selfhood regards it as a function, activity, process, inseparable from the social matrix out of which it has arisen. Consciousness is simply the name for the functioning of an organism. Not that the soul is a secretion of the brain, as bile is a secretion of the liver; not that the mind is a function of the body in any such materialistic sense. But that mind or consciousness is only the growing of an organism, while, on the other hand, the organism is just that which grows. The psychical is not a second, subtle, parallel form of energy causally interactive with the physical; much less is it a concomitant series, as the parallelists hold. Consciousness is not an order of existence or a thing, but rather a function. It is the organization of reality, the universe coming to a focus, flowering, so to speak, in a finite centre. Society is an organism in the same sense as the human body. The separation of the units of society is no greater than the separation of the unit factors of the body,—in the microscope the molecules are far apart. Society is a great sphere with many smaller spheres within it.

"Each self is not impervious to other selves. Selves are not water-tight compartments, each one of which might remain complete in itself, even if all the others were destroyed. But there are open sluiceways between all the compartments. Society is a vast plexus of interweaving personalities. We are members one of another. What affects my neighbor affects me, and what affects me ultimately affects my neighbor. The individual is not an impenetrable atomic unit. . . . The self is simply the social whole coming to consciousness at some particular point. Every self is rooted in the social organism of which it is but a local and individual expression. A self is a mere cipher apart from its social relations. As the old Greek adage has it: 'He who lives quite alone is either a beast or a god.'" While we regard this exposition of Dr. Bawden as throwing light upon the origin of consciousness and so helping our contention against the Federal theory of sin, we do not regard it as proving that consciousness, once developed, may not become relatively independent and immortal. Back of society, as well as back of the individual, lies the consciousness and will of God, in whom alone is the guarantee of persistence. For objections to the Federal theory, see Fisher, *Discussions*, 401 sq.; *Bib. Sac.*, 20: 435-462, 577; *New Englander*, 1868: 551-603; Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 305-304, 435-450; Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin.*, 2: 330; Dabney, *Theology*, 341-351.

##### 5. *Theory of Mediate Imputation, or Theory of Condemnation for Depravity.*

This theory was first maintained by Placcus (1606-1655), professor of

Theology at Saumur in France. Placeus originally denied that Adam's sin was in any sense imputed to his posterity, but after his doctrine was condemned by the Synod of the French Reformed Church at Charenton in 1644, he published the view which now bears his name.

According to this view, all men are born physically and morally depraved; this native depravity is the source of all actual sin, and is itself sin; in strictness of speech, it is this native depravity, and this only, which God imputes to men. So far as man's physical nature is concerned, this inborn sinfulness has descended by natural laws of propagation from Adam to all his posterity. The soul is immediately created by God, but it becomes actively corrupt so soon as it is united to the body. Inborn sinfulness is the consequence, though not the penalty, of Adam's transgression.

There is a sense, therefore, in which Adam's sin may be said to be imputed to his descendants,—it is imputed, not immediately, as if they had been in Adam or were so represented in him that it could be charged directly to them, corruption not intervening,—but it is imputed mediately, through and on account of the intervening corruption which resulted from Adam's sin. As on the Federal theory imputation is the cause of depravity, so on this theory depravity is the cause of imputation. In Rom. 5:12, "death passed unto all men, for that all sinned," signifies: "death physical, spiritual, and eternal passed upon all men, because all sinned by possessing a depraved nature."

See Placeus, *De Imputatione Primi Peccati Adami*, in *Opera*, 1:709—"The sensitive soul is produced from the parent; the intellectual or rational soul is directly created. The soul, on entering the corrupted physical nature, is not passively corrupted, but becomes corrupt actively, accommodating itself to the other part of human nature in character." 710—"So this soul 'contracts from the vitiosity of the dispositions of the body a corresponding vitiosity, not so much by the action of the body upon the soul, as by that essential appetite of the soul by which it unites itself to the body in a way accommodated to the dispositions of the body, as liquid put into a bowl accommodates itself to the figure of a bowl—sicut vinum in vass acetoso. God was therefore neither the author of Adam's fall, nor of the propagation of sin."

Herzog, *Encyclopædie*, art.: Placeus—"In the title of his works we read 'Placeus'; he himself, however, wrote 'Placeus,' which is the more correct Latin form [of the French 'de la Place']. In Adam's first sin, Placeus distinguished between the actual sinning and the first habitual sin (corrupted disposition). The former was transient; the latter clung to his person, and was propagated to all. It is truly sin, and it is imputed to all, since it makes all condemnable. Placeus believes in the imputation of this corrupted disposition, but not in the imputation of the first act of Adam, except mediately, through the imputation of the inherited depravity." Fisher, *Discussions*, 889—"Mere native corruption is the whole of original sin. Placeus justifies his use of the term 'imputation' by Rom. 5:12—"If therefore the uncircumcised keep the ordinances of the law, shall not his uncircumcision be reckoned [imputed] for circumcision?" Our own depravity is the necessary condition of the imputation of Adam's sin, just as our own faith is the necessary condition of the imputation of Christ's righteousness."

Advocates of Mediate Imputation are, in Great Britain, G. Payne, in his book entitled: *Original Sin*; John Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, 1:196-232; and James S. Candlish, *Biblical Doctrine of Sin*, 111-122; in America, H. B. Smith, in his *System of Christian Doctrine*, 169, 284, 285, 314-323; and E. G. Robinson, *Christian Theology*. The editor of Dr. Smith's work says: "On the whole, he favored the theory of Mediate Imputation. There is a note which reads thus: 'Neither Mediate nor Immediate Imputation is wholly satisfactory.' Understand by 'Mediate Imputation' a full statement of the facts in the case, and the author accepted it; understand by it a theory professing to give the final explanation of the facts, and it was 'not wholly satisfactory.'" Dr. Smith himself says, 316—"Original sin is a doctrine respecting the moral conditions of human nature as from Adam—generic: and it is not a doctrine respecting personal

liabilities and desert. For the latter, we need more and other circumstances. Strictly speaking, it is not sin, which is ill-deserving, but only the sinner. The ultimate distinction is here: There is a well-grounded difference to be made between personal desert, strictly personal character and liabilities (of each individual under the divine law, as applied specifically, *e. g.*, in the last adjudication), and a generic moral condition—the antecedent ground of such personal character.

"The distinction, however, is not between what has moral quality and what has not, but between the moral state of each as a member of the race, and his personal liabilities and desert as an individual. This original sin would wear to us only the character of evil, and not of sinfulness, were it not for the fact that we feel guilty in view of our corruption when it becomes known to us in our own acts. Then there is involved in it not merely a sense of evil and misery, but also a sense of guilt; moreover, redemption is also necessary to remove it, which shows that it is a moral state. Here is the point of junction between the two extreme positions, that we sinned in Adam, and that all sin consists in sinning. The guilt of Adam's sin is—this exposure, this liability on account of such native corruption, our having the same nature in the same moral bias. The guilt of Adam's sin is *not to be separated* from the existence of this evil disposition. And this guilt is what is imputed to us." See art. on H. B. Smith, in *Presb. Rev.*, 1881: "He did not fully acquiesce in Placeus's view, which makes the corrupt nature by descent the only ground of imputation."

The theory of Mediate Imputation is exposed to the following objections:

A. It gives no explanation of man's responsibility for his inborn depravity. No explanation of this is possible, which does not regard man's depravity as having had its origin in a free personal act, either of the individual, or of collective human nature in its first father and head. But this participation of all men in Adam's sin the theory expressly denies.

The theory holds that we are responsible for the effect, but not for the cause—"post Adamum, non propter Adamum." But, says Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin.*, 2: 206, 281—"If this sinful tendency be in us solely through the act of others, and not through our own deed, they, and not we, are responsible for it,—it is not our guilt, but our misfortune. And even as to actual sins which spring from this inherent sinful tendency, these are not strictly our own, but the acts of our first parents through us. Why impute them to us as actual sins, for which we are to be condemned? Thus, if we deny the existence of guilt, we destroy the reality of sin, and *vice versa*." Thornwell, *Theology*, 1: 248, 249—"This theory does not explain the sense of guilt, as connected with depravity of nature,—how the feeling of ill-desert can arise in relation to a state of mind of which we have been only passive recipients. The child does not reproach himself for the afflictions which a father's follies have brought upon him. But our inward corruption we do feel to be our own fault,—it is our crime as well as our shame."

B. Since the origination of this corrupt nature cannot be charged to the account of man, man's inheritance of it must be regarded in the light of an arbitrary divine infliction—a conclusion which reflects upon the justice of God. Man is not only condemned for a sinfulness of which God is the author, but is condemned without any real probation, either individual or collective.

Dr. Hovey, *Outlines of Theology*, objects to the theory of Mediate Imputation, because: "1. It casts so faint a light on the justice of God in the imputation of Adam's sin to adults who do as he did. 2. It casts no light on the justice of God in bringing into existence a race inclined to sin by the fall of Adam. The inherited bias is still unexplained, and the imputation of it is a riddle, or a wrong, to the natural understanding." It is unjust to hold us guilty of the effect, if we be not first guilty of the cause.

C. It contradicts those passages of Scripture which refer the origin of human condemnation, as well as of human depravity, to the sin of our first parents, and which represent universal death, not as a matter of divine sovereignty, but as a judicial infliction of penalty upon all men for the sin

of the race in Adam (Rom. 5 : 16, 18). It moreover does violence to the Scripture in its unnatural interpretation of "all sinned," in Rom. 5 : 12—words which imply the oneness of the race with Adam, and the causative relation of Adam's sin to our guilt.

Certain passages which Dr. H. B. Smith, *System*, 317, quotes from Edwards, as favoring the theory of Mediate Imputation, seem to us to favor quite a different view. See Edwards, 2 : 483 sq.—"The first existing of a corrupt disposition in their hearts is not to be looked upon as sin belonging to them distinct from their participation in Adam's first sin; it is, as it were, the extended pollution of that sin through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted union of the branches with the root. . . . I am humbly of the opinion that, if any have supposed the children of Adam to come into the world with a double guilt, one the guilt of Adam's sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so well considered the matter." And afterwards: "Derivation of evil disposition (or rather co-existence) is in consequence of the union,"—but "not properly a consequence of the imputation of his sin; nay, rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the consequences of that established union; but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt consequent, as it was in the case of Adam himself."

Edwards quotes Stapfer: "The Reformed divines do not hold immediate and mediate imputation *separately*, but always together." And still further, 2 : 493—"And therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to them; but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground God imputes it to them." It seems to us that Dr. Smith mistakes the drift of these passages from Edwards, and that in making the identification with Adam primary, and imputation of his sin secondary, they favor the theory of Adam's Natural Headship rather than the theory of Mediate Imputation. Edwards regards the order as (1) apostasy; (2) depravity; (3) guilt;—but in all three, Adam and we are, by divine constitution, one. To be guilty of the depravity, therefore, we must first be guilty of the apostasy.

For the reasons above mentioned we regard the theory of Mediate Imputation as a half-way house where there is no permanent lodgment. The logical mind can find no satisfaction therein, but is driven either forward, to the Augustinian doctrine which we are next to consider, or backward, to the New School doctrine with its atomistic conception of man and its arbitrary sovereignty of God. On the theory of Mediate Imputation, see Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, 1 : 496-639; *Princeton Essays*, 1 : 129, 154, 168; Hodge, *Syst. Theology*, 2 : 205-214; Shedd, *History of Doctrine*, 2 : 153; Baird, *Kohim Revealed*, 46, 47, 474-479, 504-507.

#### 6. *The Augustinian Theory, or Theory of Adam's Natural Headship.*

This theory was first elaborated by Augustine (354-430), the great opponent of Pelagius; although its central feature appears in the writings of Tertullian (died about 220), Hilary (350), and Ambrose (374). It is frequently designated as the Augustinian view of sin. It was the view held by the Reformers, Zwingle excepted. Its principal advocates in this country are Dr. Shedd and Dr. Baird.

It holds that God imputes the sin of Adam immediately to all his posterity, in virtue of that organic unity of mankind by which the whole race at the time of Adam's transgression existed, not individually, but seminally, in him as its head. The total life of humanity was then in Adam; the race as yet had its being only in him. Its essence was not yet individualized; its forces were not yet distributed; the powers which now exist in separate men were then unified and localized in Adam; Adam's will was yet the will of the species. In Adam's free act, the will of the race revolted from God and the nature of the race corrupted itself. The nature which we now possess is the same nature that corrupted itself in Adam—"not the same in kind merely, but the same as flowing to us continuously from him."

Adam's sin is imputed to us immediately, therefore, not as something foreign to us, but because it is ours — we and all other men having existed as one moral person or one moral whole, in him, and, as the result of that transgression, possessing a nature destitute of love to God and prone to evil. In Rom. 5 : 12 — "death passed unto all men, for that all sinned," signifies: "death physical, spiritual, and eternal passed unto all men, because all sinned in Adam their natural head."

Milton, *Par. Lost*, 9: 414 — "Where likeliest he [Satan] might find The only two of mankind, but in them The whole included race, his purpos'd prey." Augustine, *De Pec. Mer. et Rem.*, 3: 7 — "In Adamo omnes tunc peccaverunt, quando in ejus natura adhuc omnes ille unus fuerunt"; *De Civ. Dei*, 13, 14 — "Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus. . . . Nondum erat nobis singillatim creata et distributa forma in qua singuli viveremus, sed jam natura erat seminalis ex qua propagaremur." On Augustine's view, see Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2; 43-45 (*System Doct.*, 2: 283, 289) — In opposition to Pelagius who made sin to consist in single acts, "Augustine emphasized the sinful state. This was a deprivation of original righteousness + inordinate love. Tertullian, Cyprian, Hilarius, Ambrose had advocated traducianism, according to which, without their personal participation, the sinfulness of all is grounded in Adam's free act. They incur its consequences as an evil which is, at the same time, punishment of the inherited fault. But Irenæus, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, say Adam was not simply a single individual, but the universal man. We were comprehended in him, so that in him we sinned. On the first view, the posterity were passive; on the second, they were active, in Adam's sin. Augustine represents both views, desiring to unite the universal sinfulness involved in traducianism with the universal will and guilt involved in coöperation with Adam's sin. Adam, therefore, to him, is a double conception, and = individual + race."

Mozley on Predestination, 402 — "In Augustine, some passages refer all wickedness to original sin; some account for different degrees of evil by different degrees of original sin (*Op. imp. cont. Julianum*, 4: 128 — 'Malitia naturalis . . . in aliis minor, in aliis major est'); in some, the individual seems to add to original sin (*De Correp. et Gratia*, c. 13 — 'Per liberum arbitrium alia insuper addiderunt, alii majus, alii minus, sed omnes mali.' *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.*, 2: 1 — 'Added to the sin of their birth sins of their own commission'; 2: 4 — 'Neither denies our liberty of will, whether to choose an evil or a good life, nor attributes to it so much power that it can avail anything without God's grace, or that it can change itself from evil to good'). These passages seem to show that, side by side with the race-sin and its development, Augustine recognized a domain of free personal decision, by which each man could to some extent modify his character, and make himself more or less depraved.

The theory of Augustine was not the mere result of Augustine's temperament or of Augustine's sins. Many men have sinned like Augustine, but their intellects have only been benumbed and have been led into all manner of unbelief. It was the Holy Spirit who took possession of the temperament, and so overruled the sin as to make it a glass through which Augustine saw the depths of his nature. Nor was his doctrine one of exclusive divine transcendence, which left man a helpless worm at enmity with infinite justice. He was also a passionate believer in the immanence of God. He writes: "I could not be, O my God, could not be at all, wert not thou in me; rather, wert not I in thee, of whom are all things, by whom are all things, in whom are are all things. . . . O God, thou hast made us for thyself, and our heart is restless, till it find rest in thee. . . . The will of God is the very nature of things — *Dei voluntas rerum natura est.*"

Allen, *Continuity of Christian Thought*, Introduction, very erroneously declares that "the Augustinian theology rests upon the transcendence of Deity as its controlling principle, and at every point appears as an inferior rendering of the earlier interpretation of the Christian faith." On the other hand, L. L. Paine, *Evolution of Trinitarianism*, 66, 368-397, shows that, while Athanasius held to a dualistic transcendence, Augustine held to a theistic immanence: "Thus the Stoic, Neo-Platonic immanence, with Augustine, supplants the Platonic-Aristotelian and Athanasian transcendence." Alexander, *Theories of the Will*, 90 — "The theories of the early Fathers were indeterminate, and the pronounced Augustinianism of Augustine was the result of the rise into prominence of the doctrine of original sin. . . . The early Fathers thought of the origin of sin in angels and in Adam as due to free will. Augustine thought of the origin of

sin in Adam's posterity as due to inherited evil will." Harnack, *Wesen des Christenthums*, 161—"To this day in Catholicism inward and living piety and the expression of it is in essence wholly Augustinian."

Calvin was essentially Augustinian and realistic; see his *Institutes*, book 2, chap. 1-3; Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.*, 1:505, 506, with the quotations and references. Zwingli was not an Augustinian. He held that native vitiosity, although it is the uniform occasion of sin, is not itself sin: "It is not a crime, but a condition and a disease." See Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.* 2:256, with references. Zwingli taught that every new-born child—thanks to Christ's making alive of all those who had died in Adam—is as free from any taint of sin as Adam was before the fall. The Reformers, however, with the single exception of Zwingli, were Augustinians, and accounted for the hereditary guilt of mankind, not by the fact that all men were represented in Adam, but that all men participated in Adam's sin. This is still the doctrine of the Lutheran church.

The theory of Adam's Natural Headship regards humanity at large as the outgrowth of one germ. Though the leaves of a tree appear as disconnected units when we look down upon them from above, a view from beneath will discern the common connection with the twigs, branches, trunk, and will finally trace their life to the root, and to the seed from which it originally sprang. The race of man is one because it sprang from one head. Its members are not to be regarded atomistically, as segregated individuals; the deeper truth is the truth of organic unity. Yet we are not philosophical realists; we do not believe in the separate existence of universals. We hold, not to *universalia ante rem*, which is extreme realism; nor to *universalia post rem*, which is nominalism; but to *universalia in re*, which is moderate realism. Extreme realism cannot see the trees for the wood; nominalism cannot see the wood for the trees; moderate realism sees the wood in the trees. We hold to "*universalia in re*, but insist that the universals must be recognized as realities, as truly as the individuals are" (H. B. Smith, *System*, 319, note). Three acorns have a common life, as three spoons have not. Moderate realism is true of organic things; nominalism is true only of proper names. God has not created any new tree nature since he created the first tree; nor has he created any new human nature since he created the first man. I am but a branch and outgrowth of the tree of humanity.

Our realism then only asserts the real historical connection of each member of the race with its first father and head, and such a derivation of each from him as makes us partakers of the character which he formed. Adam was once the race; and when he fell, the race fell. Shedd: "We all existed in Adam in our elementary invisible substance. The *Sein* of all was there, though the *Dasein* was not; the *noumenon*, though not the *phenomenon*, was in existence." On realism, see Koehler, *Realismus und Nominalismus*; Neander, *Ch. Hist.*, 4:356; Dorner, *Person Christ*, 2:377; Hase, *Anselm*, 2:77; F. E. Abbott, *Scientific Theism*, *Introd.*, 1-29, and in *Mind*, Oct. 1882:476, 477; Raymond, *Theology*, 2:30-33; Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 2:69-74; Bowne, *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, 129-132; Ten Broeke, in *Baptist Quar. Rev.*, Jan. 1892:1-26; Baldwin, *Psychology*, 280, 281; D. J. Hill, *Genetic Philosophy*, 136; *Hours with the Mystics*, 1:218; Case, *Physical Realism*, 17-19; Fullerton, *Sameness and Identity*, 83, 82, and *Concept of the Infinite*, 95-114.

The new conceptions of the reign of law and of the principle of heredity which prevail in modern science are working to the advantage of Christian theology. The doctrine of Adam's Natural Headship is only a doctrine of the hereditary transmission of character from the first father of the race to his descendants. Hence we use the word "imputation" in its proper sense—that of a reckoning or charging to us of that which is truly and properly ours. See Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, 2:259-357, esp. 328—"The problem is: We must allow that the depravity, which all Adam's descendants inherit by natural generation, nevertheless involves personal guilt; and yet this depravity, so far as it is natural, wants the very conditions on which guilt depends. The only satisfactory explanation of this difficulty is the Christian doctrine of original sin. Here alone, if its inner possibility can be maintained, can the apparently contradictory principles be harmonized, viz.: the universal and deep-seated depravity of human nature, as the source of actual sin, and individual responsibility and guilt." These words, though written by one who advocates a different theory, are nevertheless a valuable argument in corroboration of the theory of Adam's Natural Headship.

Thornwell, *Theology*, 1:343—"We must contradict every Scripture text and every Scripture doctrine which makes hereditary impurity hateful to God and punishable in his sight, or we must maintain that we sinned in Adam in his first transgression." Secrean, in his *Work on Liberty*, held to a collective life of the race in Adam. He was

answered by Naville, *Problem of Evil*: "We existed in Adam, not individually, but seminally. Each of us, as an individual, is responsible only for his personal acts, or, to speak more exactly, for the personal part of his acts. But each of us, as he is man, is jointly and severally (*solidairement*) responsible for the fall of the human race." Bersier, *The Oneness of the Race, in its Fall and in its Future*: "If we are commanded to love our neighbor as ourselves, it is because our neighbor is ourself."

See Edwards, *Original Sin*, part 4, chap. 3; Shedd, on *Original Sin*, in *Discourses and Essays*, 218-271, and references, 261-262, also *Dogm. Theol.*, 2:181-195; Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 410-425, 451-460, 494; Schaff, in *Bib. Sac.*, 5:220, and in *Lange's Com.*, on *Rom.* 5:12; Auberlen, *Div. Revelation*, 175-180; Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 3:23-28, 204-236; Thomastus, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1:308-400; Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 173-183; Murphy, *Scientific Basis*, 262 sq., cf. 101; Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 135; Bp. Reynolds, *Sinfulness of Sin*, in *Works*, 1:162-260; Mozley on *Original Sin*, in *Lectures*, 136-162; Kendall, on *Natural Heirship, or All the World Akin*, in *Nineteenth Century*, Oct. 1885: 614-626. *Per contra*, see Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2:157-164, 227-237; Haven, in *Bib. Sac.*, 20:451-455; Criticism of Baird's doctrine, in *Princeton Rev.*, Apr. 1880: 335-376; of Schaff's doctrine, in *Princeton Rev.*, Apr. 1870: 289-292.

We regard this theory of the Natural Headship of Adam as the most satisfactory of the theories mentioned, and as furnishing the most important help towards the understanding of the great problem of original sin. In its favor may be urged the following considerations:

A. It puts the most natural interpretation upon *Rom.* 5:12-21. In verse 12 of this passage — "death passed unto all men, for that all sinned" — the great majority of commentators regard the word "sinned" as describing a common transgression of the race in Adam. The death spoken of is, as the whole context shows, mainly though not exclusively physical. It has passed upon all — even upon those who have committed no conscious and personal transgression whereby to explain its infliction (verse 14). The legal phraseology of the passage shows that this infliction is not a matter of sovereign decree, but of judicial penalty (verses 13, 14, 15, 16, 18 — "law," "transgression," "trespass," "judgment . . . of one unto condemnation," "act of righteousness," "justification"). As the explanation of this universal subjection to penalty, we are referred to Adam's sin. By that one act ("so," verse 12) — the "trespass of the one" man (v. 15, 17), the "one trespass" (v. 18) — death came to all men, because all [not 'have sinned', but] sinned (*πάντες ἥμαρτον* — aorist of instantaneous past action) — that is, all sinned in "the one trespass" of "the one" man. Compare *1 Cor.* 15:22 — "As in Adam all die" — where the contrast with physical resurrection shows that physical death is meant; *2 Cor.* 5:14 — "one died for all, therefore all died." See Commentaries of Meyer, Bengel, Olshausen, Philippi, Wordsworth, Lange, Godet, Shedd. This is also recognized as the correct interpretation of Paul's words by Beyschlag, Ritschl, and Pfeiderer, although no one of these three accepts Paul's doctrine as authoritative.

Beyschlag, *N. T. Theology*, 2:58-60 — "To understand the apostle's view, we must follow the exposition of Bengel (which is favored also by Meyer and Pfeiderer): 'Because they — viz., in Adam — all have sinned'; they all, namely, who were included in Adam according to the O. T. view which sees the whole race in its founder, acted in his action." Ritschl: "Certainly Paul treated the universal destiny of death as due to the sin of Adam. Nevertheless it is not yet suited for a theological rule just for the reason that the apostle has formed this idea;" in other words, Paul's teaching it does not make it binding upon our faith. Philippi, *Com. on Rom.*, 168 — Interpret *Rom.* 5:12 — "one sinned for all, therefore all sinned," by *1 Cor.* 5:15 — "one died for all, therefore all died." Evans, in *Fresh. Rev.*, 1858:294 — "by the trespass of the one the many died," "by the trespass of the one, death reigned

through the one," "through the one man's disobedience"—all these phrases, and the phrases with respect to salvation which correspond to them, indicate that the fallen race and the redeemed race are each regarded as a multitude, a totality. So *oi wárris* in 2 Cor. 5:14 indicates a corresponding conception of the organic unity of the race.

Prof. George B. Stevens, *Pauline Theology*, 82-40, 129-133, denies that Paul taught the sinning of all men in Adam: "They sinned in the same sense in which believers were crucified to the world and died unto sin when Christ died upon the cross. The believer's renewal is conceived as wrought in advance by those acts and experiences of Christ in which it has its ground. As the consequences of his vicarious sufferings are traced back to their cause, so are the consequences which flowed from the beginning of sin in Adam traced back to that original fount of evil and identified with it; but the latter statement should no more be treated as a rigid logical formula than the former, its counterpart. . . . There is a mystical identification of the procuring cause with its effect,—both in the case of Adam and of Christ."

In our treatment of the New School theory of sin we have pointed out that the inability to understand the vital union of the believer with Christ incapacitates the New School theologian from understanding the organic union of the race with Adam. Paul's phrase "in Christ" meant more than that Christ is the type and beginner of salvation, and sinning in Adam meant more to Paul than following the example or acting in the spirit of our first father. In 2 Cor. 5:14 the argument is that since Christ died, all believers died to sin and death in him. Their resurrection-life is the same life that died and rose again in his death and resurrection. So Adam's sin is ours because the same life which transgressed and became corrupt in him has come down to us and is our possession. In Rom. 5:14 the individual and conscious sins to which the New School theory attaches the condemning sentence are expressly excluded, and in verses 15-19 the judgment is declared to be "of one trespass." Prof. Wm. Arnold Stevens, of Rochester, says well: "Paul teaches that Adam's sin is ours, not potentially, but actually." Of *ἡμᾶρων*, he says: "This might conceivably be: (1) the historical aorist proper, used in its momentary sense; (2) the comprehensive or collective aorist, as in *ἐξήλαθεν* in the same verse; (3) the aorist used in the sense of the English perfect, as in Rom. 3:23—*πάντες γὰρ ἡμᾶρων καὶ ὑπερεβύησαν*. In 5:12, the context determines with great probability that the aorist is used in the first of these senses." We may add that interpreters are not wanting who so take *ἡμᾶρων* in 3:23; see also margin of Rev. Version. But since the passage Rom. 5:12-19 is so important, we reserve to the close of this section a treatment of it in greater detail.

B. It permits whatever of truth there may be in the Federal theory and in the theory of Mediate Imputation to be combined with it, while neither of these latter theories can be justified to reason unless they are regarded as corollaries or accessories of the truth of Adam's Natural Headship. Only on this supposition of Natural Headship could God justly constitute Adam our representative, or hold us responsible for the depraved nature we have received from him. It moreover justifies God's ways, in postulating a real and a fair probation of our common nature as preliminary to imputation of sin—a truth which the theories just mentioned, in common with that of the New School, virtually deny,—while it rests upon correct philosophical principles with regard to will, ability, law, and accepts the Scriptural representations of the nature of sin, the penal character of death, the origin of the soul, and the oneness of the race in the transgression.

John Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, 1:196-232, favors the view that sin consists simply in an inherited bias of our nature to evil, and that we are guilty from birth because we are sinful from birth. But he recognizes in Augustinianism the truth of the organic unity of the race and the implication of every member in its past history. He tells us that we must not regard man simply as an abstract or isolated individual. The atomistic theory regards society as having no existence other than that of the individuals who compose it. But it is nearer the truth to say that it is society which creates the individual, rather than that the individual creates society. Man does not come into existence a blank tablet on which external agencies may write whatever record they will. The individual is steeped in influences which are due to the past his-

tory of his kind. The individualistic theory runs counter to the most obvious facts of observation and experience. As a philosophy of life, Augustinianism has a depth and significance which the individualistic theory cannot claim."

Alvah Hovey, *Manual of Christian Theology*, 176 (2d ed.)—"Every child of Adam is accountable for the degree of sympathy which he has for the whole system of evil in the world, and with the primal act of disobedience among men. If that sympathy is full, whether expressed by deed or thought, if the whole force of his being is arrayed against heaven and on the side of hell, it is difficult to limit his responsibility." Schleiermacher held that the guilt of original sin attached, not to the individual as an individual, but as a member of the race, so that the consciousness of race-union carried with it the consciousness of race-guilt. He held all men to be equally sinful and to differ only in their different reception of or attitude toward grace, sin being the universal *malum metaphysicum* of Spinoza; see Pfeiderer, *Prot. Theol. seit Kant*, 112.

C. While its fundamental presupposition—a determination of the will of each member of the race prior to his individual consciousness—is an hypothesis difficult in itself, it is an hypothesis which furnishes the key to many more difficulties than it suggests. Once allow that the race was one in its first ancestor and fell in him, and light is thrown on a problem otherwise insoluble—the problem of our accountability for a sinful nature which we have not personally and consciously originated. Since we cannot, with the three theories first mentioned, deny either of the terms of this problem—inborn depravity or accountability for it,—we accept this solution as the best attainable.

Sterrett, *Reason and Authority in Religion*, 20—"The whole swing of the pendulum of thought of to-day is away from the individual and towards the social point of view. Theories of society are supplementing theories of the individual. The solidarity of man is the regnant thought in both the scientific and the historical study of man. It is even running into the extreme of a determinism that annihilates the individual." Chapman, *Jesus Christ and the Present Age*, 48—"It was never less possible to deny the truth to which theology gives expression in its doctrine of original sin than in the present age. It is only one form of the universally recognized fact of heredity. There is a collective evil, for which the responsibility rests on the whole race of man. Of this common evil each man inherits his share; it is organized in his nature; it is established in his environment." E. G. Robinson: "The tendency of modern theology [in the last generation] was to individualization, to make each man 'a little Almighty.' But the human race is one in kind, and in a sense is numerically one. The race lay potentially in Adam. The entire developing force of the race was in him. There is no carrying the race up, except from the starting-point of a fallen and guilty humanity." Goethe said that while humanity ever advances, individual man remains the same.

The true test of a theory is, not that it can itself be explained, but that it is capable of explaining. The atomic theory in chemistry, the theory of the ether in physics, the theory of gravitation, the theory of evolution, are all in themselves indemonstrable hypotheses, provisionally accepted simply because, if granted, they unify great aggregations of facts. Coleridge said that original sin is the one mystery that makes all other things clear. In this mystery, however, there is nothing self-contradictory or arbitrary. Gladden, *What is Left?* 121—"Heredity is God working in us, and environment is God working around us." Whether we adopt the theory of Augustine or not, the facts of universal moral obliquity and universal human suffering confront us. We are compelled to reconcile these facts with our faith in the righteousness and goodness of God. Augustine gives us a unifying principle which, better than any other, explains these facts and justifies them. On the solidarity of the race, see Bruce, *The Providential Order*, 260-310, and art. on Sin, by Bernard, in *Hastings' Bible Dictionary*.

D. This theory finds support in the conclusions of modern science: with regard to the moral law, as requiring right states as well as right acts; with regard to the human will, as including subconscious and unconscious bent and determination; with regard to heredity, and the transmission of evil character; with regard to the unity and solidarity of the human race.

The Augustinian theory may therefore be called an ethical or theological interpretation of certain incontestable and acknowledged biological facts.

Ribot, *Heredity*, 1—"Heredity is that biological law by which all beings endowed with life tend to repeat themselves in their descendants; it is for the species what personal identity is for the individual. By it a groundwork remains unchanged amid incessant variations. By it nature ever copies and imitates herself." Griffith-Jones, *Ascent through Christ*, 202-218—"In man's moral condition we find arrested development; reversion to a savage type; hypocritical and self-protective mimicry of virtue; parasitism; physical and moral abnormality; deep-seated perversion of faculty." Simon, *Reconciliation*, 154 sq.—"The organism was affected before the individuals which are its successive differentiations and products were affected. . . . Humanity as an organism received an injury from sin. It received that injury at the very beginning. . . . At the moment when the seed began to germinate disease entered and it was smitten with death on account of sin."

Bowne, *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, 184—"A general notion has no actual or possible metaphysical existence. All real existence is necessarily singular and individual. The only way to give the notion any metaphysical significance is to turn it into a law inherent in reality, and this attempt will fail unless we finally conceive this law as a rule according to which a basal intelligence proceeds in positing individuals." Sheldon, in the *Methodist Review*, March, 1901: 214-227, applies this explanation to the doctrine of original sin. Men have a common nature, he says, only in the sense that they are resembling personalities. If we literally died in Adam, we also literally died in Christ. There is no all-inclusive Christ, any more than there is an all-inclusive Adam. We regard this argument as proving the precise opposite of its intended conclusion. There is an all-inclusive Christ, and the fundamental error of most of those who oppose Augustinianism is that they misconceive the union of the believer with Christ. "A basal intelligence" here "posits individuals." And so with the relation of men to Adam. Here too there is "a law inherent in reality"—the regular working of the divine will, according to which like produces like, and a sinful germ reproduces itself.

E. We are to remember, however, that while this theory of the method of our union with Adam is merely a valuable hypothesis, the problem which it seeks to explain is, in both its terms, presented to us both by conscience and by Scripture. In connection with this problem a central fact is announced in Scripture, which we feel compelled to believe upon divine testimony, even though every attempted explanation should prove unsatisfactory. That central fact, which constitutes the substance of the Scripture doctrine of original sin, is simply this: that the sin of Adam is the immediate cause and ground of inborn depravity, guilt and condemnation to the whole human race.

Three things must be received on Scripture testimony: (1) inborn depravity; (2) guilt and condemnation therefor; (3) Adam's sin the cause and ground of both. From these three positions of Scripture it seems not only natural, but inevitable, to draw the inference that we "all sinned" in Adam. The Augustinian theory simply puts in a link of connection between two sets of facts which otherwise would be difficult to reconcile. But, in putting in that link of connection, it claims that it is merely bringing out into clear light an underlying but implicit assumption of Paul's reasoning, and this it seeks to prove by showing that upon no other assumption can Paul's reasoning be understood at all. Since the passage in Rom. 5:12-19 is so important, we proceed to examine it in greater detail. Our treatment is mainly a reproduction of the substance of Shedd's Commentary, although we have combined with it remarks from Meyer, Schaaf, Moule, and others.

EXPOSITION OF ROM. 5: 12-19.—*Parallel between the salvation in Christ and the ruin that has come through Adam*, in each case through no personal act of our own, neither by our earning salvation in the case of the life received through Christ, nor by our individually sinning in the case of the death received through Adam. The statement of the parallel is begun in

Verse 12: "as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin, and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned," so (as we may complete the interrupted sentence) by one man right-

consciousness entered into the world, and life by righteousness, and so life passed upon all men, because all became partakers of this righteousness. Both physical and spiritual death is meant. That it is physical, is shown (1) from *verse 14*; (2) from the allusion to *Gen. 3:19*; (3) from the universal Jewish and Christian assumption that physical death was the result of Adam's sin. See *Wisdom 2:23, 24*; *Sirach 25:24*; *2 Esdras 8:7, 21*; *7:11, 48, 49*; *118*; *9:19*; *Johs 8:44*; *1 Cor. 15:21*. That it is spiritual, is evident from *Rom. 5:12, 21*, where *ζωή* is the opposite of *θάνατος*, and from *1 Tim. 1:16*, where the same contrast occurs. The *οὖτος* in *verse 12* shows the *mode* in which historically death has come to all, namely, that the *one* sinned, and thereby brought death to all; in other words, death is the effect, of which the sin of the one is the cause. By Adam's act, physical and spiritual death passed upon all men, because all sinned. *ἐφ' ᾧ* = because, on the ground of the fact that, for the reason that, all sinned. *πάντες* = all, without exception, infants included, as *verse 14* teaches.

*Ἡμαρτον* mentions the particular reason why all men died, *viz.*, because all men sinned. It is the sinner of momentary past action — sinned when, through the one, sin entered into the world. It is as much as to say, "because, when Adam sinned, all men sinned in and with him." This is proved by the succeeding explanatory context (*verses 15-19*), in which it is reiterated five times in succession that one and only one sin is the cause of the death that befalls all men. Compare *1 Cor. 15:22*. The senses "all were sinful," "all became sinful," are inadmissible, for *ἡμαρτάνειν* is not *ἡμαρτῶν γίγνεσθαι* or *εἶναι*. The sense "death passed upon all men, because all have consciously and personally sinned," is contradicted (1) by *verse 14*, in which it is asserted that certain persons who are a part of *πάντες*, the subject of *ἡμαρτον*, and who suffer the death which is the penalty of sin, did not commit sins resembling Adam's first sin, *i. e.*, individual and conscious transgressions; and (2) by *verses 15-19*, in which it is asserted repeatedly that only one sin, and not millions of transgressions, is the cause of the death of all men. This sense would seem to require *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτάνουσιν*. Neither can *ἡμαρτον* have the sense "were accounted and treated as sinners"; for (1) there is no other instance in Scripture where this active verb has a passive signification; and (2) the passive makes *ἡμαρτον* to denote God's action, and not man's. This would not furnish the justification of the infliction of death, which Paul is seeking.

*Verse 12* begins a demonstration of the proposition, in *verse 12*, that death comes to all, because all men sinned the one sin of the one man. The argument is as follows: Before the law sin existed; for there was death, the penalty of sin. But this sin was not sin committed against the Mosaic law, because that law was not yet in existence. The death in the world prior to that law proves that there must have been some other law, against which sin had been committed.

*Verse 14*. Nor could it have been personal and conscious violation of an *unwritten* law, for which death was inflicted; for death passed upon multitudes, such as infants and idiots, who did not sin in their own persons, as Adam did, by violating some known commandment. Infants are not specifically named here, because the intention is to include others who, though mature in years, have not reached moral consciousness. But since death is everywhere and always the penalty of sin, the death of all must have been the penalty of the common sin of the race, when *πάντες ἡμαρτον* in Adam. The law which they violated was the Eden statute, *Gen. 2:17*. The relation between their sin and Adam's is not that of *resemblance*, but of *identity*. Had the sin by which death came upon them been one *like* Adam's, there would have been as many sins, to be the cause of death and to account for it, as there were individuals. Death would have come into the world through millions of men, and not "through one man" (*verse 12*), and judgment would have come upon all men to condemnation through millions of trespasses, and not "through one trespass" (*v. 18*). The object, then, of the parenthetical digression in *verses 13* and *14* is to prevent the reader from supposing, from the statement that "all men sinned," that the individual transgressions of all men are meant, and to make it clear that only the one first sin of the one first man is intended. Those who died before Moses must have violated some law. The Mosaic law, and the law of conscience, have been ruled out of the case. These persons must, therefore, have sinned against the commandment in Eden, the probationary statute; and their sin was not *similar* (*ὅμοιος*) to Adam's, but Adam's *identical* sin, the very same sin numerically of the "one man." They did not, in their own persons and consciously, sin as Adam did; yet in Adam, and in the nature common to him and them, they sinned and fell (*versus* *Current Discussions in Theology*, 5:277, 278). They did not sin *like* Adam, but they "sinned *in* him, and fell *with* him, in that first transgression" (*Westminster Larger Catechism*, 22).

*Verses 15-17* show how the work of grace differs from, and surpasses, the work of sin.

Over against God's exact justice in punishing all for the first sin which all committed in Adam, is set the gratuitous justification of all who are in Christ. Adam's sin is the act of Adam and his posterity together; hence the imputation to the posterity is just, and merited. Christ's obedience is the work of Christ alone; hence the imputation of it to the elect is gracious and unmerited. Here τοῖς πολλοῖς is not of equal extent with οἱ πολλοί in the first clause, because other passages teach that "the many" who die in Adam are not contemporaneous with "the many" who live in Christ; see 1 Cor. 15:22; Mat. 25:46; also, see note on verse 18, below. Τοῖς πολλοῖς here refers to the same persons who, in verse 17, are said to "receive the abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness." Verse 18 notices a numerical difference between the condemnation and the justification. Condemnation results from one offense; justification delivers from many offences. Verse 17 enforces and explains verse 16. If the union with Adam in his sin was certain to bring destruction, the union with Christ in his righteousness is yet more certain to bring salvation.

Verse 18 resumes the parallel between Adam and Christ which was commenced in verse 12, but was interrupted by the explanatory parenthesis in verses 13-17. "As through one trespass . . . unto all men to condemnation; even so through one act of righteousness . . . unto all men unto justification of [necessary to] life." Here the "all men to condemnation" — the οἱ πολλοί in verse 15; and the "all men unto justification of life" — the τοῖς πολλοῖς in verse 18. There is a totality in each case; but, in the former case, it is the "all men" who derive their physical life from Adam, — in the latter case, it is the "all men" who derive their spiritual life from Christ (compare 1 Cor. 15:22 — "For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive" — in which last clause Paul is speaking, as the context shows, not of the resurrection of all men, both saints and sinners, but only of the blessed resurrection of the righteous; in other words, of the resurrection of those who are one with Christ).

Verse 19. "For as through the one man's disobedience the many were constituted sinners, even so through the obedience of the one shall the many be constituted righteous." The many were constituted sinners because, according to verse 12, they sinned and with Adam in his fall. The verb presupposes the fact of natural union between those to whom it relates. All men are declared to be sinners on the ground of that "one trespass," because, when that one trespass was committed, all men were one man — that is, were one common nature in the first human pair. Sin is imputed, because it is committed. All men are punished with death, because they literally sinned in Adam, and not because they are metaphorically reputed to have done so, but in fact did not. Οἱ πολλοί is used in contrast with the one forefather, and the atonement of Christ is designated as ἕνακος, in order to contrast it with the παρακοή of Adam.

Κατασταθήσονται has the same signification as in the first part of the verse. Δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται means simply "shall be justified," and is used instead of δικαιωθήσονται, in order to make the antithesis of ἁμαρτωλοὶ καταστήσονται more perfect. This being "constituted righteous" presupposes the fact of a union between ὁ εἷς and οἱ πολλοί, i. e., between Christ and believers, just as the being "constituted sinners" presupposed the fact of a union between ὁ εἷς and οἱ πολλοί, i. e., between all men and Adam. The future κατασταθήσονται refers to the succession of believers; the justification of all was, ideally, complete already, but actually, it would await the times of individual believing. "The many" who shall be "constituted righteous" — not all mankind, but only "the many" to whom, in verse 15, grace abounded, and who are described, in verse 17, as "they that receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness."

"But this union differs in several important particulars from that between Adam and his posterity. It is not natural and substantial, but moral and spiritual; not generic and universal, but individual and by election; not caused by the creative act of God, but by his regenerating act. All men, without exception, are one with Adam; only believing men are one with Christ. The imputation of Adam's sin is not an arbitrary act in the sense that, if God so pleased, he could reckon it to the account of any beings in the universe, by a volition. The sin of Adam could not be imputed to the fallen angels, for example, and punished in them, because they never were one with Adam by unity of substance and nature. The fact that they have committed actual transgression of their own will not justify the imputation of Adam's sin to them, any more than the fact that the posterity of Adam have committed actual transgressions of their own would be a sufficient reason for imputing the first sin of Adam to them. Nothing but a real union of nature and being can justify the imputation of Adam's sin; and, similarly, the obedience of Christ could no more be imputed to an unbelieving man than to a lost angel, because neither of these is morally and spiritually one with Christ" (Shedd). For a different interpretation (ἕνακος = sinned personally and individually), see Kendrick, in Bap. Rev., 1885: 48-72.

TABULAR VIEW OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES OF IMPUTATION.						
	NO CONDEMNATION INHERITED.			CONDEMNATION INHERITED.		
	PELAGIAN.	ARMINIAN.	NEW SCHOOL.	FEDERAL.	PLACIAN.	AUGUSTINIAN.
I. Origin of the soul.	Immediate creation.	Immediate creation.	Immediate creation.	Immediate creation.	Immediate creation.	Mediate creation.
II. Man's state at birth.	Innocent, and able to obey God.	Depraved, but still able to co-operate with the Spirit.	Depraved and vicious, but this not sin.	Depraved, unable, and condemnable.	Depraved, unable, and condemnable.	Depraved, unable, and condemnable.
III. Effects of Adam's sin.	Only upon himself.	To corrupt his posterity physically and intellectually. No guilt of Adam's sin imputed.	To communicate vitiosity to the whole race.	To insure condemnation of his fellows in covenant, and their creation as depraved.	Natural connection of depravity in all his descendants.	Guilt of Adam's sin, corruption, and death.
IV. How did all sin?	By following Adam's example.	By consciously ratifying Adam's own deed, in spite of the Spirit's aid.	By voluntary transgression of known law.	By being accounted sinners in Adam's sin.	By possessing a depraved nature.	By having part in the sin of Adam, as seminal head of the race.
V. What is corruption?	Only of evil habit, in each case.	Evil tendencies kept in spite of the Spirit.	Uncondemnable, but evil tendencies.	Condemnable, evil disposition and state.	Condemnable, evil disposition and state.	Condemnable, evil disposition and state.
VI. What is imputed?	Every man's own sins.	Only man's own sins and ratifying of this nature.	Man's individual acts of transgression.	Adam's sin, man's own corruption, and man's own sins.	Only depraved nature and man's own sins.	Adam's sin, our depravity, and our own sins.
VII. What is the death incurred?	Spiritual and eternal.	Physical and spiritual death by decree.	Spiritual and eternal death only.	Physical, spiritual, and eternal.	Physical, spiritual, and eternal.	Physical, spiritual, and eternal.
VIII. How are men saved?	By following Christ's example.	By co-operating with the Spirit given to all.	By accepting Christ under influences of truth presented by the Spirit.	By being accounted righteous through the act of Christ.	By becoming possessors of a new nature in Christ.	By Christ's work, with whom we are one.

## II.—OBJECTIONS TO THE AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.

The doctrine of Imputation, to which we have thus arrived, is met by its opponents with the following objections. In discussing them, we are to remember that a truth revealed in Scripture may have claims to our belief, in spite of difficulties to us insoluble. Yet it is hoped that examination will show the objections in question to rest either upon false philosophical principles or upon misconception of the doctrine assailed.

A. That there can be no sin apart from and prior to consciousness.

This we deny. The larger part of men's evil dispositions and acts are imperfectly conscious, and of many such dispositions and acts the evil quality is not discerned at all. The objection rests upon the assumption that law is confined to published statutes or to standards formally recognized by its subjects. A profounder view of law as identical with the constituent principles of being, as binding the nature to conformity with the nature of God, as demanding right volitions only because these are manifestations of a right state, as having claims upon men in their corporate capacity, deprives this objection of all its force.

If our aim is to find a conscious act of transgression upon which to base God's charge of guilt and man's condemnation, we can find this more easily in Adam's sin than at the beginning of each man's personal history; for no human being can remember his first sin. The main question at issue is therefore this: Is all sin personal? We claim that both Scripture and reason answer this question in the negative. There is such a thing as race-sin and race-responsibility.

B. That man cannot be responsible for a sinful nature which he did not personally originate.

We reply that the objection ignores the testimony of conscience and of Scripture. These assert that we are responsible for what we are. The sinful nature is not something external to us, but is our inmost selves. If man's original righteousness and the new affection implanted in regeneration have moral character, then the inborn tendency to evil has moral character; as the former are commendable, so the latter is condemnable.

If it be said that sin is the act of a person, and not of a nature, we reply that in Adam the whole human nature once subsisted in the form of a single personality, and the act of the person could be at the same time the act of the nature. That which could not be at any subsequent point of time, could be and was, at that time. Human nature could fall *in Adam*, though that fall could not be repeated in the case of any one of his descendants. Hovey, *Outlines*, 120—"Shall we say that *will* is the cause of sin in holy beings, while *wrong desire* is the cause of sin in unholy beings? Augustine held this." Pepper, *Outlines*, 112—"We do not fall each one by himself. We were so on probation in Adam, that his fall was our fall."

C. That Adam's sin cannot be imputed to us, since we cannot repent of it.

The objection has plausibility only so long as we fail to distinguish between Adam's sin as the inward apostasy of the nature from God, and Adam's sin as the outward act of transgression which followed and manifested that apostasy. We cannot indeed repent of Adam's sin as our personal act or as Adam's personal act, but regarding his sin as the apostasy of our common nature—an apostasy which manifests itself in our personal transgressions as it did in his, we can repent of it and do repent of it. In

truth it is this nature, as self-corrupted and averse to God, for which the Christian most deeply repents.

God, we know, has not made our nature as we find it. We are conscious of our depravity and apostasy from God. We know that God cannot be responsible for this; we know that our nature is responsible. But this it could not be, unless its corruption were self-corruption. For this self-corrupted nature we should repent, and do repent. Anselm, *De Concep. Virg.*, 23—"Adam sinned in one point of view as a person, in another as man (i. e., as human nature which at that time existed in him alone). But since Adam and humanity could not be separated, the sin of the person necessarily affected the *nature*. This nature is what Adam transmitted to his posterity, and transmitted it such as his sin had made it, burdened with a debt which it could not pay, robbed of the righteousness with which God had originally invested it; and in every one of his descendants this impaired nature makes the *persons* sinners. Yet not in the same degree sinners as Adam was, for the latter sinned both as human nature and as a person, while new-born infants sin only as they possess the nature,"—more briefly, in Adam a person made nature sinful; in his posterity, nature makes persons sinful.

D. That, if we be responsible for Adam's first sin, we must also be responsible not only for every other sin of Adam, but for the sins of our immediate ancestors.

We reply that the apostasy of human nature could occur but once. It occurred in Adam before the eating of the forbidden fruit, and revealed itself in that eating. The subsequent sins of Adam and of our immediate ancestors are no longer acts which determine or change the nature,—they only show what the nature is. Here is the truth and the limitation of the Scripture declaration that "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father" (Ez. 18 : 20; cf. Luke 18 : 2, 3; John 9 : 2, 3). Man is not responsible for the specifically evil tendencies communicated to him from his immediate ancestors, as distinct from the nature he possesses; nor is he responsible for the sins of those ancestors which originated these tendencies. But he is responsible for that original apostasy which constituted the one and final revolt of the race from God, and for the personal depravity and disobedience which in his own case has resulted therefrom.

Augustine, *Encheiridion*, 46, 47, leans toward an imputing of the sins of immediate ancestors, but intimates that, as a matter of grace, this may be limited to "the third and fourth generation" (Ez. 20 : 5). Aquinas thinks this last is said by God, because fathers live to see the third and fourth generation of their descendants, and influence them by their example to become voluntarily like themselves. Burgess, *Original Sin*, 397, adds the covenant-idea to that of natural generation, in order to prevent imputation of the sins of immediate ancestors as well as those of Adam. So also Shedd. But Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 508, gives a better explanation, when he distinguishes between the first sin of nature when it apostatized, and those subsequent personal actions which merely manifest the nature but do not change it. Imagine Adam to have remained innocent, but one of his posterity to have fallen. Then the descendants of that one would have been guilty for the change of nature in him, but not guilty for the sins of ancestors intervening between him and them.

We add that man may direct the course of a lava-stream, already flowing downward, into some particular channel, and may even dig a new channel for it down the mountain. But the stream is constant in its quantity and quality, and is under the same influence of gravitation in all stages of its progress. I am responsible for the downward tendency which my nature gave itself at the beginning; but I am not responsible for inherited and specifically evil tendencies as something apart from the nature,—for they are not apart from it,—they are forms or manifestations of it. These tendencies run out after a time,—not so with sin of nature. The declaration of Ezekiel (18 : 20), "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father," like Christ's denial that blindness was due to the blind man's individual sins or those of his parents (John 9 : 2, 3), simply shows that God does not impute to us the sins of our immediate ancestors; it is not inconsistent with the doc-

trine that all the physical and moral evil of the world is the result of a sin of Adam with which the whole race is chargeable.

Peculiar tendencies to avarice or sensuality inherited from one's immediate ancestry are merely wrinkles in native depravity which add nothing to its amount or its guilt. Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2: 88-94 — "To inherit a temperament is to inherit a secondary trait." H. B. Smith, System, 296 — "Ezekiel does not deny that descendants are involved in the evil results of ancestral sins, under God's moral government; but simply shows that there is opportunity for extrication, in personal repentance and obedience." Mozley on Predestination, 179 — "Augustine says that Ezekiel's declarations that the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father are not a universal law of the divine dealings, but only a special prophetic one, as alluding to the divine mercy under the gospel dispensation and the covenant of grace, under which the effect of original sin and the punishment of mankind for the sin of their first parent was removed." See also Dornier, Glaubenslehre, 2: 31 (Syst. Doct., 2: 326, 327), where God's visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children (Ex. 20: 5) is explained by the fact that the children repeat the sins of the parents. German proverb: "The apple does not fall far from the tree."

II. That if Adam's sin and condemnation can be ours by propagation, the righteousness and faith of the believer should be propagable also.

We reply that no merely personal qualities, whether of sin or righteousness, are communicated by propagation. Ordinary generation does not transmit *personal* guilt, but only that guilt which belongs to the whole *species*. So personal faith and righteousness are not propagable. "Original sin is the consequent of man's nature, whereas the parents' grace is a *personal* excellence, and cannot be transmitted" (Burgesse).

Thornwell, Selected Writings, 1: 543, says the Augustinian doctrine would imply that Adam, penitent and believing, must have begotten penitent and believing children, seeing that the nature as it is in the parent always flows from parent to child. But see Fisher, Discussions, 370, where Aquinas holds that no quality or guilt that is *personal* is propagated (Thomas Aquinas, 2: 639). Anselm (De Concept. Virg. et Origin. Peccato, 96) will not decide the question. "The original nature of the tree is propagated — not the nature of the graft" — when seed from the graft is planted. Burgesse: "Learned parents do not convey learning to their children, but they are born in ignorance as others." Augustine: "A Jew that was circumcised begat children not circumcised, but uncircumcised; and the seed that was sown without husks, yet produced corn with husks."

The recent modification of Darwinism by Weismann has confirmed the doctrine of the text. Lamarck's view was that development of each race has taken place through the *effort* of the individuals, — the giraffe has a long neck because successive giraffes have reached for food on high trees. Darwin held that development has taken place not because of effort, but because of *environment*, which kills the unfit and permits the fit to survive, — the giraffe has a long neck because among the children of giraffes only the long-necked ones could reach the fruit, and of successive generations of giraffes only the long-necked ones lived to propagate. But Weismann now tells us that even then there would be no development unless there were a spontaneous *innate tendency* in giraffes to become long-necked, — nothing is of avail after the giraffe is born; all depends upon the germs in the parents. Darwin held to the transmission of acquired characters, so that individual men are *effluents* of the stream of humanity; Weismann holds, on the contrary, that acquired characters are not transmitted, and that individual men are only *effluents* of the stream of humanity: the stream gives its characteristics to the individuals, but the individuals do not give their characteristics to the stream: see Howard Ernest Cushman, in The Outlook, Jan. 10, 1897.

Weismann, Heredity, 2: 14, 266-270, 438 — "Characters only acquired by the operation of external circumstances, acting during the life of the individual, cannot be transmitted. . . . The loss of a finger is not inherited; increase of an organ by exercise is a purely personal acquirement and is not transmitted; no child of reading parents ever read without being taught; children do not even learn to speak untaught." Horses with docked tails, Chinese women with cramped feet, do not transmit their peculiarities. The rupture of the hymen in women is not transmitted. Weismann cut off the tails of 66 white mice in five successive generations, but of 601 offspring none were tailless. G. J. Romanes, Life and Letters, 300 — "Three additional cases of cats which

have lost their tails having tailless kittens afterwards." In his Weismannism, Romanes writes: "The truly scientific attitude of mind with regard to the problem of heredity is to say with Galton: 'We might almost reserve our belief that the structural cells can react on the sexual elements at all, and we may be confident that at most they do so in a very faint degree; in other words, that acquired modifications are barely if at all *inherited*, in the correct sense of that word.'" This seems to class both Romanes and Galton on the side of Weismann in the controversy. Burbank, however, says that "acquired characters are transmitted, or I know nothing of plant life."

A. H. Bradford, *Heredity*, 19, 20, illustrates the opposing views: "Human life is not a clear stream flowing from the mountains, receiving in its varied course something from a thousand rills and rivulets on the surface and in the soil, so that it is no longer pure as at the first. To this view of Darwin and Spencer, Weismann and Haeckel oppose the view that human life is rather a stream flowing underground from the mountains to the sea, and rising now and then in fountains, some of which are saline, some sulphuric, and some tinctured with iron; and that the differences are due entirely to the soil passed through in breaking forth to the surface, the mother-stream down and beneath all the salt, sulphur and iron, flowing on toward the sea substantially unchanged. If Darwin is correct, then we must change individuals in order to change their posterity. If Weismann is correct, then we must change environment in order that better individuals may be born. That which is born of the Spirit is spirit; but that which is born of spirit tainted by corruptions of the flesh is still tainted."

The conclusion best warranted by science seems to be that of Wallace, in the *Forum*, August, 1890, namely, that there is always a *tendency* to transmit acquired characters, but that only those which affect the blood and nervous system, like drunkenness and syphilis, overcome the fixed habit of the organism and make themselves permanent. Applying this principle now to the connection of Adam with the race, we regard the sin of Adam as a radical one, comparable only to the act of faith which merges the soul in Christ. It was a turning away of the whole being from the light and love of God, and a setting of the face toward darkness and death. Every subsequent act was an act in the same direction, but an act which manifested, not altered, the nature. This first act of sin deprived the nature of all moral sustenance and growth, except so far as the still immanent God counteracted the inherent tendencies to evil. Adam's posterity inherited his corrupt nature, but they do not inherit any subsequently acquired characters, either those of their first father or of their immediate ancestors.

Bascom, *Comparative Psychology*, chap. VII—"Modifications, however great, like artificial disablement, that do not work into physiological structure, do not transmit themselves. The more conscious and voluntary our acquisitions are, the less are they transmitted by inheritance." Shaler, *Interpretation of Nature*, 88—"Heredity and individual action may combine their forces and so intensify one or more of the inherited motives that the form is affected by it and the effect may be transmitted to the offspring. So conflict of inheritances may lead to the institution of variety. Accumulation of impulses may lead to sudden revolution, and the species may be changed, not by environment, but by contest between the host of inheritances." Visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children was thought to be outrageous doctrine, so long as it was taught only in Scripture. It is now vigorously applauded, since it takes the name of heredity. Dale, *Ephesians*, 139—"When we were young, we fought with certain sins and killed them; they trouble us no more; but their ghosts seem to rise from their graves in the distant years and to clothe themselves in the flesh and blood of our children." See A. M. Marshall, *Biological Lectures*, 273; Mivart, in *Harper's Magazine*, March, 1895: 622; Bixby, *Crisis in Morals*, 178.

F. That, if all moral consequences are properly penalties, sin, considered as a sinful nature, must be the punishment of sin, considered as the act of our first parents.

But we reply that the impropriety of punishing sin with sin vanishes when we consider that the sin which is punished is our own, equally with the sin with which we are punished. The objection is valid as against the Federal theory or the theory of Mediate Imputation, but not as against the theory of Adam's Natural Headship. To deny that God, through the operation of second causes, may punish the act of transgression by the habit and

tendency which result from it, is to ignore the facts of every-day life, as well as the statements of Scripture in which sin is represented as ever reproducing itself, and with each reproduction increasing its guilt and punishment (Rom. 6 : 19 ; James 1 : 15.)

Rom. 6 : 19 — "as ye presented your members as servants to uncleanness and to iniquity unto iniquity, even so now present your members as servants to righteousness unto sanctification"; Eph. 4 : 22 — "waxeth corrupt after the lusts of deceit"; James 1 : 15 — "Then the lust, when it hath conceived, beareth sin: and the sin, when it is full-grown, bringeth forth death"; 2 Tim. 3 : 13 — "evil men and impostors shall wax worse and worse, deceiving and being deceived." See Meyer on Rom. 1 : 24 — "Wherefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts unto uncleanness." All effects become in their turn causes. Schiller: "This is the very course of evil deed, That of new evil it becomes the seed." Tennyson, Vision of Sin: "Behold it was a crime Of sense, avenged by sense that wore with time. Another said: The crime of sense became The crime of malice, and is equal blame." Whiton, Is Eternal Punishment Endless, 53 — "The punishment of sin essentially consists in the wider spread and stronger hold of the malady of the soul. Prov. 5 : 22 — 'His own iniquities shall take the wicked.' The habit of sinning holds the wicked 'with the cords of his sin.' Sin is self-perpetuating. The sinner gravitates from worse to worse, in an ever-deepening fall." The least of our sins has in it a power of infinite expansion,—left to itself it would flood a world with misery and destruction.

Wisdom, 11 : 16 — "Wherewithal a man sinneth, by the same also he shall be punished." Shakespeare, Richard II, 5 : 5 — "I wasted time, and now doth time waste me"; Richard III, 4 : 2 — "I am in so far in blood, that sin will pluck on sin"; Pericles, 1 : 1 — "One sin I know another doth provoke; Murder's as near to lust as flame to smoke"; King Lear, 5 : 3 — "The gods are just, and of our pleasant vices Make instruments to scourge us." Marlowe's Faustus typifies the continuous degradation of a soul that has renounced its ideal, and the drawing on of one vice by another, for they go hand in hand like the Hours" (James Russell Lowell). Mrs. Humphrey Ward, David Grieve, 410 — "After all, there's not much hope when the craving returns on a man of his age, especially after some years' interval."

G. That the doctrine excludes all separate probation of individuals since Adam, by making their moral life a mere manifestation of tendencies received from him.

We reply that the objection takes into view only our connection with the race, and ignores the complementary and equally important fact of each man's personal will. That personal will does more than simply express the nature; it may to a certain extent curb the nature, or it may, on the other hand, add a sinful character and influence of its own. There is, in other words, a remainder of freedom, which leaves room for personal probation, in addition to the race-probation in Adam.

Kreibitz, Versöhnungslehre, objects to the Augustinian view that if personal sin proceeds from original, the only thing men are guilty for is Adam's sin; all subsequent sin is a spontaneous development; the individual will can only manifest its inborn character. But we reply that this is a misrepresentation of Augustine. He does not thus lose sight of the remainders of freedom in man (see references on page 630, in the statement of Augustine's view, and in the section following this, on Ability, 640-644). He says that the corrupt tree may produce the wild fruit of morality, though not the divine fruit of grace. It is not true that the will is absolutely as the character. Though character is the surest index as to what the decisions of the will may be, it is not an infallible one. Adam's first sin, and the sins of men after regeneration, prove this. Irregular, spontaneous, exceptional though these decisions are, they are still acts of the will, and they show that the agent is not bound by motives nor by character.

Here is our answer to the question whether it be not a sin to propagate the race and produce offspring. Each child has a personal will which may have a probation of its own and a chance for deliverance. Denney, Studies in Theology, 87-90 — "What we inherit may be said to fix our trial, but not our fate. We belong to God as well as to the past." "All souls are mine" (Is. 43 : 4); "Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice" (John 18 : 37). Thomas Fuller: "1. Roboam begat Abia; that is, a bad father begat a bad son; 2. Abia

begat Asa; that is, a bad father begat a good son; 3. Asa begat Josaphat; that is, a good father a good son; 4. Josaphat begat Joram; that is, a good father a bad son. I see, Lord, from hence, that my father's piety cannot be entailed; that is bad news for me. But I see that actual impiety is not always hereditary; that is good news for my son." Butcher, *Aspects of Greek Genius*, 121—Among the Greeks, "The popular view was that guilt is inherited; that is, that the children are punished for their fathers' sins. The view of Æschylus, and of Sophocles also, was that a tendency towards guilt was inherited, but that this tendency does not annihilate man's free will. If therefore the children are punished, they are punished for their own sins. But Sophocles saw the further truth that innocent children may suffer for their fathers' sins."

Julius Miller, *Doc. Sin*, 2:216—"The merely organic theory of sin leads to naturalism, which endangers not only the doctrine of a final judgment, but that of personal immortality generally." In preaching, therefore, we should begin with the known and acknowledged sins of men. We should lay the same stress upon our connection with Adam that the Scripture does, to explain the problem of universal and inveterate sinful tendencies, to enforce our need of salvation from this common ruin, and to illustrate our connection with Christ. Scripture does not, and we need not, make our responsibility for Adam's sin the great theme of preaching. See A. H. Strong, on *Christian Individualism*, and on *The New Theology*, in *Philosophy and Religion*, 156-163, 164-173.

H. That the organic unity of the race in the transgression is a thing so remote from common experience that the preaching of it neutralizes all appeals to the conscience.

But whatever of truth there is in this objection is due to the self-isolating nature of sin. Men feel the unity of the family, the profession, the nation to which they belong, and, just in proportion to the breadth of their sympathies and their experience of divine grace, do they enter into Christ's feeling of unity with the race (cf. *Is. 6:5*; *Lam. 3:39-45*; *Ezra 9:6*; *Neh. 1:6*). The fact that the self-contained and self-seeking recognize themselves as responsible only for their personal acts should not prevent our pressing upon men's attention the more searching standards of the Scriptures. Only thus can the Christian find a solution for the dark problem of a corruption which is inborn yet condemnable; only thus can the unregenerate man be led to a full knowledge of the depth of his ruin and of his absolute dependence upon God for salvation.

Identification of the individual with the nation or the race; *Is. 6:6*—"Wee is mee! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips"; *Lam. 3:43*—"We have transgressed and have rebelled"; *Ezra 9:6*—"I am ashamed and blush to lift up my face to thee, my God; for our iniquities are increased over our head"; *Neh. 1:6*—"I confess the sins of the children of Israel . . . Yes, I and my father's house have sinned." So God punishes all Israel for David's sin of pride; so the sins of Reuben, Canaan, Achan, Gehazi, are visited on their children or descendants.

H. B. Smith, *System*, 293, 297—"Under the moral government of God one man may justly suffer on account of the sins of another. An organic relation of men is regarded in the great judgment of God in history. . . . There is evil which comes upon individuals, not as punishment for their personal sins, but still as suffering which comes under a moral government. . . . *Jer. 33:18* reasserts the declaration of the second commandment, that God visits the iniquity of the fathers upon their children. It may be said that all these are merely 'consequences' of family or tribal or national or race relations,—'Evil becomes cosmic by reason of fastening on relations which were originally adapted to making good cosmic;' but then God's plan must be in the consequences—a plan administered by a moral being, over moral beings, according to moral considerations, and for moral ends; and, if that be fully taken into view, the dispute as to 'consequences' or 'punishment' becomes a merely verbal one."

There is a common conscience over and above the private conscience, and it controls individuals, as appears in great crises like those at which the fall of Fort Sumter summoned men to defend the Union and the Proclamation of Emancipation sounded the death-knell of slavery. Coleridge said that original sin is the one mystery that makes

all things clear; see Fisher, *Nature and Method of Revelation*, 151-157. Bradford, *Heredity*, 34, quotes from Elam, *A Physician's Problems*, 5—"An acquired and habitual vice will rarely fail to leave its trace upon one or more of the offspring, either in its original form, or one closely allied. The habit of the parent becomes the all but irresistible impulse of the child; . . . the organic tendency is excited to the uttermost, and the power of will and of conscience is proportionally weakened. . . . So the sins of the parents are visited upon the children."

Pascal: "It is astonishing that the mystery which is furthest removed from our knowledge—I mean the transmission of original sin—should be that without which we have no true knowledge of ourselves. It is in this abyss that the clue to our condition takes its turnings and windings, insomuch that man is more incomprehensible without the mystery than this mystery is incomprehensible to man." Yet Pascal's perplexity was largely due to his holding the Augustinian position that inherited sin is damning and brings eternal death, while not holding to the coordinate Augustinian position of a primary existence and act of the species in Adam; see Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 2:18. Atomism is egotistic. The purest and noblest feel most strongly that humanity is not like a heap of sand-grains or a row of bricks set on end, but that it is an organic unity. So the Christian feels for the family and for the church. So Christ, in Gethsemane, felt for the race. If it be said that the tendency of the Augustinian view is to diminish the sense of guilt for personal sins, we reply that only those who recognize sins as rooted in sin can properly recognize the evil of them. To such they are symptoms of an apostasy from God so deep-seated and universal that nothing but infinite grace can deliver us from it.

L. That a constitution by which the sin of one individual involves in guilt and condemnation the nature of all men who descend from him is contrary to God's justice.

We acknowledge that no human theory can fully solve the mystery of imputation. But we prefer to attribute God's dealings to justice rather than to sovereignty. The following considerations, though partly hypothetical, may throw light upon the subject: (a) A probation of our common nature in Adam, sinless as he was and with full knowledge of God's law, is more consistent with divine justice than a separate probation of each individual, with inexperience, inborn depravity, and evil example, all favoring a decision against God. (b) A constitution which made a common fall possible may have been indispensable to any provision of a common salvation. (c) Our chance for salvation as sinners under grace may be better than it would have been as sinless Adams under law. (d) A constitution which permitted oneness with the first Adam in the transgression cannot be unjust, since a like principle of oneness with Christ, the second Adam, secures our salvation. (e) There is also a *physical and natural* union with Christ which antedates the fall and which is incident to man's creation. The immanence of Christ in humanity guarantees a continuous divine effort to remedy the disaster caused by man's free will, and to restore the *moral* union with God which the race has lost by the fall.

Thus our ruin and our redemption were alike wrought out without personal act of ours. As all the natural life of humanity was in Adam, so all the spiritual life of humanity was in Christ. As our old nature was corrupted in Adam and propagated to us by physical generation, so our new nature was restored in Christ and communicated to us by the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit. If then we are justified upon the ground of our inbeing in Christ, we may in like manner be condemned on the ground of our inbeing in Adam.

Stearns, in *N. Eng.*, Jan. 1882: 95—"The silence of Scripture respecting the precise connection between the first great sin and the sins of the millions of individuals who

have lived since then is a silence that neither science nor philosophy has been, or is, able to break with a satisfactory explanation. Separate the twofold nature of man, corporate and individual. Recognize in the one the region of necessity; in the other the region of freedom. The scientific law of heredity has brought into new currency the doctrine which the old theologians sought to express under the name of original sin,—a term which had a meaning as it was at first used by Augustine, but which is an awkward misnomer if we accept any other theory but his."

Dr. Hovey claims that the Augustinian view breaks down when applied to the connection between the justification of believers and the righteousness of Christ; for believers were not in Christ, as to the substance of their souls, when he wrought out redemption for them. But we reply that the life of Christ which makes us Christians is the same life which made atonement upon the cross and which rose from the grave for our justification. The parallel between Adam and Christ is of the nature of analogy, not of identity. With Adam, we have a connection of physical life; with Christ, a connection of spiritual life.

Stahl, *Philosophie des Rechts*, quoted in Olshausen's *Com. on Rom. 5:12-21*— "Adam is the original *matter* of humanity; Christ is its original *idea* in God; both personally living. Mankind is one in them. Therefore Adam's sin became the sin of all; Christ's sacrifice the atonement for all. Every leaf of a tree may be green or wither by itself; but each suffers by the disease of the root, and recovers only by its healing. The shallower the man, so much more isolated will everything appear to him; for upon the surface all lies apart. He will see in mankind, in the nation, nay, even in the family, mere individuals, where the act of the one has no connection with that of the other. The profounder the man, the more do these inward relations of unity, proceeding from the very centre, force themselves upon him. Yea, the love of our neighbor is itself nothing but the deep feeling of this unity; for we love him only, with whom we feel and acknowledge ourselves to be one. What the Christian love of our neighbor is for the heart, that unity of race is for the understanding. If sin through one, and redemption through one, is not possible, the command to love our neighbor is also unintelligible. Christian ethics and Christian faith are therefore in truth indissolubly united. Christianity effects in history an advance like that from the animal kingdom to man, by its revealing the essential unity of men, the consciousness of which in the ancient world had vanished when the nations were separated."

If the sins of the parents were not visited upon the children, neither could their virtues be; the possibility of the one involves the possibility of the other. If the guilt of our first father could not be transmitted to all who derive their life from him, then the justification of Christ could not be transmitted to all who derive their life from him. We do not, however, see any Scripture warrant for the theory that all men are justified from original sin by virtue of their natural connection with Christ. He who is the life of all men bestows manifold temporal blessings upon the ground of his atonement. But justification from sin is conditioned upon conscious surrender of the human will and trust in the divine mercy. The immanent Christ is ever urging man individually and collectively toward such decision. But the acceptance or rejection of the offered grace is left to man's free will. This principle enables us properly to estimate the view of Dr. Henry E. Robins which follows.

H. E. Robins, *Harmony of Ethics with Theology*, 51—"All men born of Adam stand in such a relation to Christ that salvation is their birthright under promise—a birthright which can only be forfeited by their intelligent, personal, moral action, as was Esau's." Dr. Robins holds to an inchoate justification of all—a justification which becomes actual and complete only when the soul closes with Christ's offer to the sinner. We prefer to say that humanity in Christ is ideally justified because Christ himself is justified, but that individual men are justified only when they consciously appropriate his offered grace or surrender themselves to his renewing Spirit. Allen, Jonathan Edwards, 312—"The grace of God is as organic in its relation to man as is the evil in his nature. Grace also reigns wherever justice reigns." William Ashmore, on the *New Trial of the Sinner*, in *Christian Review*, 26: 245-264—"There is a gospel of nature commensurate with the law of nature; Rom. 3:23—'unto all, and upon all them that believe'; the first 'all' is unlimited; the second 'all' is limited to those who believe."

R. W. Dale, *Ephesians*, 180—"Our fortunes were identified with the fortunes of Christ; in the divine thought and purpose we were inseparable from him. Had we been true and loyal to the divine idea, the energy of Christ's righteousness would have drawn us upward to height after height of goodness and joy, until we ascended from this earthly life to the larger powers and loftier services and richer delights of other and diviner

worlds; and still, through one golden age of intellectual and ethical and spiritual growth after another, we should have continued to rise towards Christ's transcendent and infinite perfection. But we sinned; and as the union between Christ and us could not be broken without the final and irrevocable defeat of the divine purpose, Christ was drawn down from the serene heavens to the confused and troubled life of our race, to pain, to temptation, to anguish, to the cross and to the grave, and so the mystery of his atonement for our sin was consummated."

For replies to the foregoing and other objections, see Schaaf, in *Bib. Sac.*, 5:230; Shedd, *Sermons to the Nat. Man*, 266-284; Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 507-509, 529-544; Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 184-188; Edwards, *Original Sin*, in *Works*, 2: 473-510; Atwater, on Calvinism in *Doctrine and Life*, in *Princeton Review*, 1875: 73; Stearns, *Evidence of Christian Experience*, 98-100. *Per contra*, see Moxom, in *Bap. Rev.*, 1881: 273-287; Park, *Discourses*, 210-233; Bradford, *Heredity*, 237.

#### SECTION VI.—CONSEQUENCES OF SIN TO ADAM'S POSTERITY.

As the result of Adam's transgression, all his posterity are born in the same state into which he fell. But since law is the all-comprehending demand of harmony with God, all moral consequences flowing from transgression are to be regarded as sanctions of law, or expressions of the divine displeasure through the constitution of things which he has established. Certain of these consequences, however, are earlier recognized than others and are of minor scope; it will therefore be useful to consider them under the three aspects of depravity, guilt, and penalty.

##### I. DEPRAVITY.

By this we mean, on the one hand, the lack of original righteousness or of holy affection toward God, and, on the other hand, the corruption of the moral nature, or bias toward evil. That such depravity exists has been abundantly shown, both from Scripture and from reason, in our consideration of the universality of sin.

Salvation is twofold: deliverance from the evil—the penalty and the power of sin; and accomplishment of the good—likeness to God and realization of the true idea of humanity. It includes all these for the race as well as for the individual; removal of the barriers that keep men from each other; and the perfecting of society in communion with God; or, in other words, the kingdom of God on earth. It was the nature of man, when he first came from the hand of God, to fear, love, and trust God above all things. This tendency toward God has been lost; sin has altered and corrupted man's innermost nature. In place of this bent toward God there is a fearful bent toward evil. Depravity is both negative—absence of love and of moral likeness to God—and positive—presence of manifold tendencies to evil. Two questions only need detain us:

##### 1. *Depravity partial or total?*

The Scriptures represent human nature as totally depraved. The phrase "total depravity," however, is liable to misinterpretation, and should not be used without explanation. By the total depravity of universal humanity we mean:

A. Negatively,—not that every sinner is: (a) Destitute of conscience, —for the existence of strong impulses to right, and of remorse for wrongdoing, show that conscience is often keen; (b) devoid of all qualities pleasing to men, and useful when judged by a human standard,—for the

existence of such qualities is recognized by Christ; (c) prone to every form of sin, — for certain forms of sin exclude certain others; (d) intense as he can be in his selfishness and opposition to God, — for he becomes worse every day.

(a) John 8:9 — "And they, when they heard it, went out one by one, beginning from the eldest, even unto the last" (John 7:53 — 8:11, though not written by John, is a perfectly true narrative, descended from the apostolic age). The muscles of a dead frog's leg will contract when a current of electricity is sent into them. So the dead soul will thrill at touch of the divine law. Natural conscience, combined with the principle of self-love, may even prompt choice of the good, though no love for God is in the choice. Bengel: "We have lost our likeness to God; but there remains notwithstanding an indelible nobility which we ought to revere both in ourselves and in others. We still have remained men, to be conformed to that likeness, through the divine blessing to which man's will should subscribe. This they forget who speak evil of human nature. Absalom fell out of his father's favor; but the people, for all that, recognized in him the son of the king."

(b) Mark 10:21 — "And Jesus looking upon him loved him." These very qualities, however, may show that their possessors are sinning against great light and are the more guilty; cf. Mal. 1:6 — "A son honoreth his father, and a servant his master: if then I am a father, where is mine honor? and if I am a master, where is my fear?" John Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, 2:75 — "The assessor of the total depravity of human nature, of its absolute blindness and incapacity, presupposes in himself and in others the presence of a criterion or principle of good, in virtue of which he discerns himself to be wholly evil; yet the very proposition that human nature is wholly evil would be unintelligible unless it were false. . . . Consciousness of sin is a negative sign of the possibility of restoration. But it is not in itself proof that the possibility will become actuality." A ruined temple may have beautiful fragments of fluted columns, but it is no proper habitation for the god for whose worship it was built.

(c) Mat. 23:23 — "ye tithe mint and anise and cummin, and have left undone the weightier matters of the law, justice, and mercy, and faith: but these ye ought to have done, and not to have left the other undone"; Rom. 2:14 — "when Gentiles that have not the law do by nature the things of the law, these, not having the law, are the law unto themselves; in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their consciences bearing witness therewith." The sin of miserliness may exclude the sin of luxury; the sin of pride may exclude the sin of sensuality. Shakespeare, *Othello*, 3:3 — "It hath pleased the devil Drunkenness to give place to the devil Wrath." Franklin Carter, *Life of Mark Hopkins*, 321-323 — Dr. Hopkins did not think that the sons of God should describe themselves as once worms or swine or vipers. Yet he held that man could sink to a degradation below the brute: "No brute is any more capable of rebelling against God than of serving him; is any more capable of sinking below the level of its own nature than of rising to the level of man. No brute can be either a fool or a fiend. . . . In the way that sin and corruption came into the spiritual realm we find one of those analogies to what takes place in the lower forms of being that show the unity of the system throughout. All disintegration and corruption of matter is from the domination of a lower over a higher law. The body begins to return to its original elements as the lower chemical and physical forces begin to gain ascendancy over the higher forces of life. In the same way all sin and corruption in man is from his yielding to a lower law or principle of action in opposition to the demands of one that is higher."

(d) Gen. 3:16 — "the iniquity of the serpent is not yet full"; 2 Tim. 3:13 — "evil men and impostors shall wax worse and worse." Depravity is not simply being deprived of good. Depravation (*de*, and *pravus*, crooked, perverse) is more than deprivation. Left to himself man tends downward, and his sin increases day by day. But there is a divine influence within which quickens conscience and kindles aspiration for better things. The immanent Christ is "the light which lighteth every man" (John 1:9). Prof. Wm. Adams Brown: "In so far as God's Spirit is at work among men and they receive 'the light which lighteth every man,' we must qualify our statement of total depravity. Depravity is not so much a state as a tendency. With growing complexity of life, sin becomes more complex. Adam's sin was not the worst. 'It shall be more tolerable for the heath of Sodom in the day of judgment, than for thee' (Mat. 11:24)."

Men are not yet in the condition of demons. Only here and there have they attained to "a disinterested love of evil." Such men are few, and they were not born so. There are degrees in depravity. E. G. Robinson: "There is a good streak left in the devil yet." Even Satan will become worse than he now is. The phrase "total depravity" has respect only to relations to God, and it means incapability of doing anything

which in the sight of God is a good act. No act is perfectly good that does not proceed from a true heart and constitute an expression of that heart. Yet we have no right to say that every act of an unregenerate man is displeasing to God. Right acts from right motives are good, whether performed by a Christian or by one who is unrenewed in heart. Such acts, however, are always prompted by God, and thanks for them are due to God and not to him who performed them.

B. Positively,—that every sinner is: (a) totally destitute of that love to God which constitutes the fundamental and all-inclusive demand of the law; (b) chargeable with elevating some lower affection or desire above regard for God and his law; (c) supremely determined, in his whole inward and outward life, by a preference of self to God; (d) possessed of an aversion to God which, though sometimes latent, becomes active enmity, so soon as God's will comes into manifest conflict with his own; (e) disordered and corrupted in every faculty, through this substitution of selfishness for supreme affection toward God; (f) credited with no thought, emotion, or act of which divine holiness can fully approve; (g) subject to a law of constant progress in depravity, which he has no recuperative energy to enable him successfully to resist.

(a) John 5: 43—“But I know you, that ye have not the love of God in yourselves.” (b) 2 Tim. 3: 4—“lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God”; cf. Mal. 1: 6—“A son honoreth his father, and a servant his master: if then I am a father, where is mine honor? and if I am a master, where is my fear?” (c) 2 Tim. 3: 2—“lovers of self”; (d) Rom. 8: 7—“the mind of the flesh is enmity against God.” (e) Eph. 4: 18—“darkened in their understanding . . . hardening of their heart”; Tit. 1: 15—“both their mind and their conscience are defiled”; 2 Cor. 7: 1—“declination of flesh and spirit”; Heb. 3: 12—“an evil heart of unbelief”; (f) Rom. 3: 9—“they are all under sin”; 7: 18—“in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing.” (g) Rom. 7: 19—“to will is present with me, but to do that which is good is not”; 23—“law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members.”

Every sinner would prefer a milder law and a different administration. But whoever does not love God's law does not truly love God. The sinner seeks to secure his own interests rather than God's. Even so-called religious acts he performs with preference or his own good to God's glory. He disobeys, and always has disobeyed, the fundamental law of love. He is like a railway train on a down grade, and the brakes must be applied by God or destruction is sure. There are latent passions in every heart which if let loose would curse the world. Many a man who escaped from the burning Iroquois Theatre in Chicago, proved himself a brute and a demon, by trampling down fugitives who cried for mercy. Denney, *Studies in Theology*, 63—“The depravity which sin has produced in human nature extends to the whole of it. There is no part of man's nature which is unaffected by it. Man's nature is all of a piece, and what affects it at all affects it altogether. When the conscience is violated by disobedience to the will of God, the moral understanding is darkened, and the will is enfeebled. We are not constructed in water-tight compartments, one of which might be ruined while the others remained intact.” Yet over against total depravity, we must set total redemption; over against original sin, original grace. Christ is in every human heart mitigating the affects of sin, urging to repentance, and “able to save to the uttermost them that draw near unto God through him” (Heb. 7: 26). Even the unregenerate heathen may “put away . . . the old man” and “put on the new man” (Eph. 4: 22, 24), being delivered “out of the body of this death . . . through Jesus Christ our Lord” (Rom. 7: 24, 25).

H. B. Smith, *System*, 277—“By total depravity is never meant that men are as bad as they can be; nor that they have not, in their natural condition, certain amiable qualities; nor that they may not have virtues in a limited sense (*justitia civitatis*). But it is meant (1) that depravity, or the sinful condition of man, infects the whole man: intellect, feeling, heart and will; (2) that in each unrenewed person some lower affection is supreme; and (3) that each such is destitute of love to God. On these positions: as to (1) the power of depravity over the whole man, we have given proof from Scripture; as to (2) the fact that in every unrenewed man some lower affection is supreme, experience may be always appealed to; men know that their supreme affection is fixed on some lower good—intellect, heart, and will going together in it; or that some form of selfishness is predominant—using selfish in a general sense—

self seeks its happiness in some inferior object, giving to that its supreme affection; as to (3) that every unrenewed person is without supreme love to God, it is the point which is of greatest force, and is to be urged with the strongest effect, in setting forth the depth and 'totality' of man's sinfulness: unrenewed men have not that supreme love of God which is the substance of the first and great command." See also Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 248; Baird, Elohim Revealed, 510-522; Chalmers, Institutes, 1:519-542; Cunningham, Hist. Theology, 1:516-531; Princeton Review, 1877:470.

## 2. Ability or inability?

In opposition to the plenary ability taught by the Pelagians, the gracious ability of the Arminians, and the natural ability of the New School theologians, the Scriptures declare the total inability of the sinner to turn himself to God or to do that which is truly good in God's sight (see Scripture proof below). A proper conception also of the law, as reflecting the holiness of God and as expressing the ideal of human nature, leads us to the conclusion that no man whose powers are weakened by either original or actual sin can of himself come up to that perfect standard. Yet there is a certain remnant of freedom left to man. The sinner *can* (a) avoid the sin against the Holy Ghost; (b) choose the less sin rather than the greater; (c) refuse altogether to yield to certain temptations; (d) do outwardly good acts, though with imperfect motives; (e) seek God from motives of self-interest.

But on the other hand the sinner *cannot* (a) by a single volition bring his character and life into complete conformity to God's law; (b) change his fundamental preference for self and sin to supreme love for God; nor (c) do any act, however insignificant, which shall meet with God's approval or answer fully to the demands of law.

So long, then, as there are states of intellect, affection and will which man cannot, by any power of volition or of contrary choice remaining to him, bring into subjection to God, it cannot be said that he possesses any sufficient ability of himself to do God's will; and if a basis for man's responsibility and guilt be sought, it must be found, if at all, not in his plenary ability, his gracious ability, or his natural ability, but in his original ability, when he came, in Adam, from the hands of his Maker.

Man's present inability is natural, in the sense of being inborn,—it is not acquired by our personal act, but is congenital. It is not natural, however, as resulting from the original limitations of human nature, or from the subsequent loss of any essential faculty of that nature. Human nature, at its first creation, was endowed with ability perfectly to keep the law of God. Man has not, even by his sin, lost his essential faculties of intellect, affection, or will. He has weakened those faculties, however, so that they are now unable to work up to the normal measure of their powers. But more especially has man given to every faculty a bent away from God which renders him morally unable to render spiritual obedience. The inability to good which now characterizes human nature is an inability that results from sin, and is itself sin.

We hold, therefore, to an inability which is both natural and moral,—moral, as having its source in the self-corruption of man's moral nature and the fundamental aversion of his will to God;—natural, as being inborn, and as affecting with partial paralysis all his natural powers of intellect, affection, conscience, and will. For his inability, in both these aspects of it, man is responsible.

The sinner can do one very important thing, viz.: give attention to divine truth. Ps. 119:59—"I thought on my ways, And turned my feet unto thy testimonies." G. W. Northrup: "The sinner can seek God from: (a) self-love, regard for his own interest; (b) feeling of duty, sense of obligation, awakened conscience; (c) gratitude for blessings already received; (d) aspiration after the infinite and satisfying." Denney, Studies in Theology, 85—"A witty French moralist has said that God does not need to grudge to his enemies even what they call their virtues; and neither do God's ministers. . . . But there is one thing which man cannot do alone,—he cannot bring his state into harmony with his nature. When a man has been discovered who has been able, without Christ, to recon-

tile himself to God and to obtain dominion over the world and over sin, then the doctrine of inability, or of the bondage due to sin, may be denied; then, but not till then." The Free Church of Scotland, in the Declaratory Act of 1892, says "that, in holding and teaching, according to the Confession of Faith, the corruption of man's whole nature as fallen, this church also maintains that there remain tokens of his greatness as created in the image of God; that he possesses a knowledge of God and of duty; that he is responsible for compliance with the moral law and with the gospel; and that, although unable without the aid of the Holy Spirit to return to God, he is yet capable of affections and actions which in themselves are virtuous and praiseworthy."

To the use of the term "natural ability" to designate merely the sinner's possession of all the constituent faculties of human nature, we object upon the following grounds:

A. Quantitative lack.—The phrase "natural ability" is misleading, since it seems to imply that the existence of the mere powers of intellect, affection, and will is a sufficient quantitative qualification for obedience to God's law, whereas these powers have been weakened by sin, and are naturally unable, instead of naturally able, to render back to God with interest the talent first bestowed. Even if the moral direction of man's faculties were a normal one, the effect of hereditary and of personal sin would render naturally impossible that large likeness to God which the law of absolute perfection demands. Man has not therefore the natural ability perfectly to obey God. He had it once, but he lost it with the first sin.

When Jean Paul Richter says of himself: "I have made of myself all that could be made out of the stuff," he evinces a self-complacency which is due to self-ignorance and lack of moral insight. When a man realizes the extent of the law's demands, he sees that without divine help obedience is impossible. John B. Gough represented the confirmed drunkard's efforts at reformation as a man's walking up Mount Etna knee-deep in burning lava, or as one's rowing against the rapids of Niagara.

B. Qualitative lack.—Since the law of God requires of men not so much right single volitions as conformity to God in the whole inward state of the affections and will, the power of contrary choice in single volitions does not constitute a natural ability to obey God, unless man can by those single volitions change the underlying state of the affections and will. But this power man does not possess. Since God judges all moral action in connection with the general state of the heart and life, natural ability to good involves not only a full complement of faculties but also a bias of the affections and will toward God. Without this bias there is no possibility of right moral action, and where there is no such possibility, there can be no ability either natural or moral.

Wilkinson, *Epic of Paul*, 21—"Hatred is like love herein, that it, by only being, grows, until at last usurping quite the man, it overgrows him like a polypus." John Caird, *Fund. Ideas*, 1: 53—"The ideal is the revelation in me of a power that is mightier than my own. The supreme command 'Thou oughtest' is the utterance, only different in form, of the same voice in my spirit which says 'Thou canst'; and my highest spiritual attainments are achieved, not by self-assertion, but by self-renunciation and self-surrender to the infinite life of truth and righteousness that is living and reigning within me." This conscious inability in one's self, together with reception of "the strength which God supplieth" (1 Pet. 4: 11), is the secret of Paul's courage; 2 Cor. 12: 10—"when I am weak, then am I strong"; Phil. 2: 12, 13—"work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure."

C. No such ability known.—In addition to the psychological argument just mentioned, we may urge another from experience and observa-

tion. These testify that man is cognizant of no such ability. Since no man has ever yet, by the exercise of his natural powers, turned himself to God or done an act truly good in God's sight, the existence of a natural ability to do good is a pure assumption. There is no scientific warrant for inferring the existence of an ability which has never manifested itself in a single instance since history began.

"Solomon could not keep the Proverbs, — so he wrote them." The book of Proverbs needs for its complement the New Testament explanation of helplessness and offer of help: John 15: 5— "apart from me ye can do nothing"; 8: 37— "him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out." The palsied man's inability to walk is very different from his indisposition to accept a remedy. The paralytic cannot climb the cliff, but by a rope let down to him he may be lifted up, provided he will permit himself to be tied to it. Darling, in Presb. and Ref. Rev., July, 1901: 505— "If hidden, we can stretch out a withered arm; but God does not require this of one born armless. We may 'hear the voice of the Son of God' and 'live' (John 5: 25), but we shall not bring out of the tomb faculties not possessed before death."

D. Practical evil of the belief.— The practical evil attending the preaching of natural ability furnishes a strong argument against it. The Scriptures, in their declarations of the sinner's inability and helplessness, aim to shut him up to sole dependence upon God for salvation. The doctrine of natural ability, assuring him that he is able at once to repent and turn to God, encourages delay by putting salvation at all times within his reach. If a single volition will secure it, he may be saved as easily to-morrow as to-day. The doctrine of inability presses men to immediate acceptance of God's offers, lest the day of grace for them pass by.

Those who care most for self are those in whom self becomes thoroughly subjected and enslaved to external influences. — Mat. 16: 25— "whosoever would save his life shall lose it." The selfish man is a straw on the surface of a rushing stream. He becomes more and more a victim of circumstance, until at last he has no more freedom than the brute. Pa. 49: 20— "Man that is in honor, and understandeth not, is like the beasts that perish;" see R. T. Smith, Man's Knowledge of Man and of God, 121. Robert Browning, unpublished poem: " 'Would a man 'scape the rod?' Rabbi Ben Karshook saith, 'See that he turn to God The day before his death.' 'Aye, could a man inquire When it shall come?' I say. The Rabbi's eye shoots fire — 'Then let him turn to-day.' "

Let us repeat, however, that the denial to man of all ability, whether natural or moral, to turn himself to God or to do that which is truly good in God's sight, does not imply a denial of man's power to order his external life in many particulars conformably to moral rules, or even to attain the praise of men for virtue. Man has still a range of freedom in acting out his nature, and he may to a certain limited extent act down upon that nature, and modify it, by isolated volitions externally conformed to God's law. He may choose higher or lower forms of selfish action, and may pursue these chosen courses with various degrees of selfish energy. Freedom of choice, within this limit, is by no means incompatible with complete bondage of the will in spiritual things.

John 1: 12— "born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God"; 3: 5— "Except one be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God"; 6: 44— "No man can come to me, except the Father that sent me draw him"; 8: 24— "Every one that committeth sin is the bondservant of sin"; 15: 4, 5— "the branch cannot bear fruit of itself . . . apart from me ye can do nothing"; Rom. 7: 18— "in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing; for to will is present with me, but to do that which is good is not"; 24— "Wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" 8: 7, 8— "the mind of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can it be: and they that are in the flesh cannot please God"; 1 Cor. 2: 14— "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him;

and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged"; 2 Cor. 3:5—"Not that we are sufficient of ourselves, to account anything as from ourselves"; Eph. 2:1—"dead through your trespasses and sins"; 2-10—"by grace have ye been saved through faith; and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God; not of works, that no man should glory. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works"; Heb. 11:6—"without faith it is impossible to be well-pleasing unto him."

Kant's "I ought, therefore I can" is the relic of man's original consciousness of freedom—the freedom with which man was endowed at his creation—a freedom, now, alas! destroyed by sin. Or it may be the courage of the soul in which God is working anew by his Spirit. For Kant's "Ich soll, also Ich kann," Julius Müller would substitute; "Ich sollte freilich können, aber Ich kann nicht"—"I ought indeed to be able, but I am not able." Man truly repents only when he learns that his sin has made him unable to repent without the renewing grace of God. Emerson, in his poem entitled "Voluntariness," says: "So near is grandeur to our dust, So near is God to man, When duty whispers low, *Thou must*, The youth replies, *I can*." But, apart from special grace, all the ability which man at present possesses comes far short of fulfilling the spiritual demands of God's law. Parental and civil law implies a certain kind of power. Puritan theology called man "free among the dead" (Ps. 88:5, A. V.). There was a range of freedom inside of slavery,—the will was "a drop of water imprisoned in a solid crystal" (Oliver Wendell Holmes). The man who kills himself is as dead as if he had been killed by another (Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2:106).

Westminster Confession, 9:3—"Man by his fall into a state of sin hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so, as a natural man, being altogether averse from that good and dead in sin, he is not able by his own strength to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto." Hopkins, Works, 1:233-235—"So long as the sinner's opposition of heart and will continues, he cannot come to Christ. It is impossible, and will continue so, until his unwillingness and opposition be removed by a change and renovation of his heart by divine grace, and he be made willing in the day of God's power." Hopkins speaks of "utter inability to obey the law of God, yea, utter impossibility."

Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2:267-277—"Inability consists, not in the loss of any faculty of the soul, nor in the loss of free agency, for the sinner determines his own acts, nor in mere disinclination to what is good. It arises from want of spiritual discernment, and hence want of proper affections. Inability belongs only to the things of the Spirit. What man cannot do is to repent, believe, regenerate himself. He cannot put forth any act which merits the approbation of God. Sin drives to all he does, and from its dominion he cannot free himself. The distinction between natural and moral ability is of no value. Shall we say that the uneducated man can understand and appreciate the *Iliad*, because he has all the faculties that the scholar has? Shall we say that man can love God, if he will? This is false, if will means volition. It is a truism, if will means affection. The Scriptures never thus address men and tell them that they have power to do all that God requires. It is dangerous to teach a man this, for until a man feels that he can do nothing, God never saves him. Inability is involved in the doctrine of original sin; in the necessity of the Spirit's influence in regeneration. Inability is consistent with obligation, when inability arises from sin and is removed by the removal of sin."

Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2:213-257, and in South Church Sermons, 33-59—"The origin of this helplessness lies, not in creation, but in sin. God can command the ten talents or the five which he originally committed to us, together with a diligent and faithful improvement of them. Because the servant has lost the talents, is he discharged from obligation to return them with interest? Sin contains in itself the element of servitude. In the very act of transgressing the law of God, there is a reflex action of the human will upon itself, whereby it becomes less able than before to keep that law. Sin is the suicidal action of the human will. To do wrong destroys the power to do right. Total depravity carries with it total impotence. The voluntary faculty may be ruined from within; may be made impotent to holiness, by its own action; may surrender itself to appetite and selfishness with such an intensity and earnestness, that it becomes unable to convert itself and overcome its wrong inclination." See Stevenson, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,—noticed in Andover Rev., June, 1886: 564. We can merge ourselves in the life of another—either bad or good; can almost transform ourselves into Satan or into Christ, so as to say with Paul, in Gal. 2:20—"It is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me"; or be minions of "the spirit that now worketh in the senses of disobedience" (Eph. 2:2). But if we yield ourselves to the influence of Satan, the recovery of our true personality becomes increasingly difficult, and at last impossible.

There is nothing in literature sadder or more significant than the self-bewailing of Charles Lamb, the gentle Elia, who writes in his *Last Essays*, 214 — "Could the youth to whom the flavor of the first wine is delicious as the opening scenes of life or the entering of some newly discovered paradise, look into my desolation, and be made to understand what a dreary thing it is when he shall feel himself going down a precipice with open eyes and a passive will; to see his destruction, and have no power to stop it; to see all goodness emptied out of him, and yet not be able to forget a time when it was otherwise; to bear about the piteous spectacle of his own ruin, — could he see my fevered eye, fevered with the last night's drinking, and feverishly looking for to-night's repetition of the folly; could he but feel the body of this death out of which I cry hourly, with feebler outcry, to be delivered, it were enough to make him dash the sparkling beverage to the earth, in all the pride of its mantling temptation."

For the Arminian 'gracious ability,' see Raymond, *Syst. Theol.*, 2:180; McClintock & Strong, *Cyclopaedia*, 10:300. *Per contra*, see Calvin, *Institutes*, bk. 2, chap. 2 (1:222); Edwards, *Works*, 2:464 (*Orig. Sin*, 8:1); Bennet Tyler, *Works*, 73; Baird, *Elchm Revealed*, 523-528; Cunningham, *Hist. Theology*, 1:537-539; Turretin, 10:4:19; A. A. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*, 260-269; Thornwell, *Theology*, 1:394-399; Alexander, *Moral Science*, 89-208; *Princeton Essays*, 1:224-239; Richards, *Lectures on Theology*. On real as distinguished from formal freedom, see Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin*, 2:1-225. On Augustine's *Unamonta extrema* (of the divine image in man), see Wiggers, *Augustinism and Pelagianism*, 119, note. See also art. by A. H. Strong, on Modified Calvinism, or Remains of Freedom in Man, in *Bap. Rev.*, 1883:219-242; and reprinted in the author's *Philosophy and Religion*, 114-123.

## II. GUILT.

### 1. Nature of guilt.

By guilt we mean desert of punishment, or obligation to render satisfaction to God's justice for self-determined violation of law. There is a reaction of holiness against sin, which the Scripture denominates "the wrath of God" (*Rom.* 1:18). Sin is in us, either as act or state; God's punitive righteousness is over against the sinner, as something to be feared; guilt is a relation of the sinner to that righteousness, namely, the sinner's desert of punishment.

Guilt is related to sin as the burnt spot to the blaze. Schiller, *Die Braut von Messina*: "Das Leben ist der Güter höchstes nicht; Der Uebel grösstes aber ist die Schuld" — "Life is not the highest of possessions; the greatest of ills, however, is guilt." Delitzsch: "Die Schamröthe ist die Abendröthe der untergegangenen Sonne der ursprünglichen Gerechtigkeit" — "The blush of shame is the evening red after the sun of original righteousness has gone down." E. G. Robinson: "Pangs of conscience do not arise from the fear of penalty, — they are the penalty itself." See chapter on Fig-leaves, in *Mellvaine, Wisdom of Holy Scripture*, 142-154 — "Spiritual shame for sin sought an outward symbol, and found it in the nakedness of the lower parts of the body."

The following remarks may serve both for proof and for explanation:

A. Guilt is incurred only through self-determined transgression either on the part of man's nature or person. We are guilty only of that sin which we have originated or have had part in originating. Guilt is not, therefore, mere liability to punishment, without participation in the transgression for which the punishment is inflicted, — in other words, there is no such thing as constructive guilt under the divine government. We are accounted guilty only for what we have done, either personally or in our first parents, and for what we are, in consequence of such doing.

*Is.* 18:20 — "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father" —, as Calvin says (*Com. in loco*): "The son shall not bear the father's iniquity, since he shall receive the reward due to himself, and shall bear his own burden. . . . All are guilty through their own fault. . . . Every one perishes through his own iniquity." In other words, the whole race fell in Adam,

and is punished for its own sin in him, not for the sins of immediate ancestors, nor for the sin of Adam as a person foreign to us. John 9: 8 — "Neither did this man sin, nor his parents" (that he should be born blind) — Do not attribute to any special later sin what is a consequence of the sin of the race — the first sin which "brought death into the world, and all our woe." Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2: 195-213.

B. Guilt is an objective result of sin, and is not to be confounded with subjective pollution, or depravity. Every sin, whether of nature or person, is an offense against God (Ps. 51: 4-6), an act or state of opposition to his will, which has for its effect God's personal wrath (Ps. 7: 11; John 3: 18, 36), and which must be expiated either by punishment or by atonement (Heb. 9: 22). Not only does sin, as unlikeness to the divine purity, involve *pollution*, — it also, as antagonism to God's holy will, involves *guilt*. This guilt, or obligation to satisfy the outraged holiness of God, is explained in the New Testament by the terms "debtor" and "debt" (Mat. 6: 12; Luke 13: 4; Mat. 5: 21; Rom. 8: 19; 6: 23; Eph. 2: 3). Since guilt, the objective result of sin, is entirely distinct from depravity, the subjective result, human nature may, as in Christ, have the guilt without the depravity (2 Cor. 5: 21), or may, as in the Christian, have the depravity without the guilt (1 John 1: 7, 8).

Ps. 51: 4-6 — "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned, And done that which is evil in thy sight; That thou mayest be justified when thou speakest, And be clear when thou judgest"; 7: 11 — "God is a righteous judge, Yea, a God that hath indignation every day"; John 3: 18 — "he that believeth not hath been judged already"; 36 — "he that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him"; Heb. 9: 22 — "apart from shedding of blood there is no remission"; Mat. 6: 12 — "debts"; Luke 13: 4 — "offenders" (marg. "debtors"); Mat. 5: 21 — "shall be in danger of [exposed to] the judgment"; Rom. 3: 19 — "that . . . all the world may be brought under the judgment of God"; 6: 23 — "the wages of sin is death" — death is sin's desert; Eph. 2: 3 — "by nature children of wrath"; 2 Cor. 5: 21 — "him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf"; 1 John 1: 7, 8 — "the blood of Jesus his Son cleanseth us from all sin. [Yet] if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."

Sin brings in its train not only depravity but guilt, not only *macula* but *reatus*. Scripture sets forth the *pollution* of sin by its similes of "a cage of unclean birds" and of "wounds, bruises, and putrefying sores"; by leprosy and Levitical uncleanness, under the old dispensation; by death and the corruption of the grave, under both the old and the new. But Scripture sets forth the *guilt* of sin, with equal vividness, in the fear of Cain and in the remorse of Judas. The revulsion of God's holiness from sin, and its demand for satisfaction, are reflected in the shame and remorse of every awakened conscience. There is an instinctive feeling in the sinner's heart that sin will be punished, and ought to be punished. But the Holy Spirit makes this need of reparation so deeply felt that the soul has no rest until its debt is paid. The offending church member who is truly penitent loves the law and the church which excludes him, and would not think it faithful if it did not. So Jesus, when laden with the guilt of the race, pressed forward to the cross, saying: "I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!" (Luke 12: 50; Mark 10: 38).

All sin involves guilt, and the sinful soul itself demands penalty, so that all will ultimately go where they most desire to be. All the great masters in literature have recognized this. The inextinguishable thirst for reparation constitutes the very essence of tragedy. The Greek tragedians are full of it, and Shakespeare is its most impressive teacher: Measure for Measure, 5: 1 — "I am sorry that such sorrow I procure, And so deep sticks it in my penitent heart That I crave death more willingly than mercy; 'Tis my deserving, and I do entreat it"; Cymbeline, 5: 4 — "and so, great Powers, If you will take this audit, take this life, And cancel these cold bonds! . . . Desired, more than constrained, to satisfy, . . . take No stricter render of me than my all"; that is, settle the account with me by taking my life, for nothing less than that will pay my debt. And later writers follow Shakespeare. Marguerite, in Goethe's Faust, fainting in the great cathedral under the solemn reverberations of the Dies Iræ; Dimmesdale, in Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter, putting himself side by side with Hester Prynne, his victim, in her place of obloquy; Bulwer's Eugene Aram, coming forward, though unsuspected, to confess the murder he had committed, all these are illustrations of the

inner impulse that moves even a sinful soul to satisfy the claims of justice upon it. See A. H. Strong, *Philosophy and Religion*, 215, 216. On Hawthorne, see Hutton, *Essays*, 2: 370-416 — "In the *Scarlet Letter*, the minister gains fresh reverence and popularity as the very fruit of the passionate anguish with which his heart is consumed. Frantic with the stings of unacknowledged guilt, he is yet taught by these very stings to understand the hearts and stir the consciences of others." See also Dinsmore, *Atonement in Literature and Life*.

Nor are such scenes confined to the pages of romance. In a recent trial at Syracuse, Earl, the wife-murderer, thanked the jury that had convicted him; declared the verdict just; begged that no one would interfere to stay the course of justice; said that the greatest blessing that could be conferred on him would be to let him suffer the penalty of his crime. In Plattsburg, at the close of another trial in which the accused was a life-convict who had struck down a fellow-convict with an axe, the jury, after being out two hours, came in to ask the Judge to explain the difference between murder in the first and second degree. Suddenly the prisoner rose and said: "This was not a murder in the second degree. It was a deliberate and premeditated murder. I know that I have done wrong, that I ought to confess the truth, and that I ought to be hanged." This left the jury nothing to do but render their verdict, and the Judge sentenced the murderer to be hanged, as he confessed he deserved to be. In 1891, Lars Ostendahl, the most famous preacher of Norway, startled his hearers by publicly confessing that he had been guilty of immorality, and that he could no longer retain his pastorate. He begged his people for the sake of Christ to forgive him and not to desert the poor in his asylums. He was not only preacher, but also head of a great philanthropic work.

Such is the movement and demand of the enlightened conscience. The lack of conviction that crime ought to be punished is one of the most certain signs of moral decay in either the individual or the nation (*Ps. 37: 40* — "Ye that love the Lord, hate evil"; *149: 6* — "Let the high praises of God be in their mouth, and a two-edged sword in their hand" — to execute God's judgment upon iniquity).

This relation of sin to God shows us how Christ is "made sin on our behalf" (*2 Cor. 5: 21*). Since Christ is the immanent God, he is also essential humanity, the universal man, the life of the race. All the nerves and sensibilities of humanity meet in him. He is the central brain to which and through which all ideas must pass. He is the central heart to which and through which all pains must be communicated. You cannot telephone to your friend across the town without first ringing up the central office. You cannot injure your neighbor without first injuring Christ. Each one of us can say of him: "Against thee, the only, have I sinned" (*Ps. 51: 4*). Because of his central and all-inclusive humanity, Christ can feel all the pangs of shame and suffering which rightfully belong to sinners, but which they cannot feel, because their sin has stupefied and deadened them. The Messiah, if he be truly man, must be a suffering Messiah. For the very reason of his humanity he must bear in his own person all the guilt of humanity and must be "the Lamb of God who" takes, and so "takes away, the sin of the world" (*Joh. 1: 29*).

Guilt and depravity are not only distinguishable in thought, — they are also separable in fact. The convicted murderer might repent and become pure, yet he might still be under obligation to suffer the punishment of his crime. The Christian is freed from guilt (*Rom. 8: 1*), but he is not yet freed from depravity (*Rom. 7: 23*). Christ, on the other hand, was under obligation to suffer (*Luke 24: 26; Acts 3: 13; 26: 23*), while yet he was without sin (*1 Joh. 7: 26*). In the book entitled *Modern Religious Thought*, 3-28, R. J. Campbell has an essay on *The Atonement*, with which, apart from its view as to the origin of moral evil in God, we are in substantial agreement. He holds that "to relieve men from their sense of guilt, objective atonement is necessary," — we would say: to relieve men from guilt itself — the obligation to suffer. "If Christ be the eternal Son of God, that side of the divine nature which has gone forth in creation, if he contains humanity and is present in every article and act of human experience, then he is associated with the existence of the primordial evil. . . . He and only he can sever the entail between man and his responsibility for personal sin. Christ has not *stunned* in man, but he takes responsibility for that experience of evil into which humanity is born, and the yielding to which constitutes sin. He goes forth to suffer, and actually does suffer, in man. The eternal Son in whom humanity is contained is therefore a sufferer since creation began. This mysterious passion of Deity must continue until redemption is consummated and humanity restored to God. Thus every consequence of human ill is felt in the experience of Christ. Thus Christ not only assumes the guilt but bears the punishment of every human soul." We claim however that the necessity of this suffering lies, not in the needs of man, but in the holiness of God.

**Q.** Guilt, moreover, as an objective result of sin, is not to be confounded with the subjective consciousness of guilt (Lev. 5 : 17). In the condemnation of conscience, God's condemnation partially and prophetically manifests itself (1 John 3 : 20). But guilt is primarily a relation to God, and only secondarily a relation to conscience. Progress in sin is marked by diminished sensitiveness of moral insight and feeling. As "the greatest of sins is to be conscious of none," so guilt may be great, just in proportion to the absence of consciousness of it (Ps. 19 : 12 ; 51 : 6 ; Eph. 4 : 18, 19 — ἀπηλλοτριώτες). There is no evidence, however, that the voice of conscience can be completely or finally silenced. The time for repentance may pass, but not the time for remorse. Progress in holiness, on the other hand, is marked by increasing apprehension of the depth and extent of our sinfulness, while with this apprehension is combined, in a normal Christian experience, the assurance that the guilt of our sin has been taken, and taken away, by Christ (John 1 : 29).

Lev. 5 : 17 — "And if any one sin, and do any of the things which Jehovah hath commanded not to be done; though he knew it not, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity"; 1 John 3 : 20 — "because if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things"; Ps. 19 : 12 — "Who can discern his errors? Clear thou me from hidden faults"; St. 6 — "Behold, thou dost see truth in the inward parts; And in the hidden part thou wilt make me to know wisdom"; Eph. 4 : 18, 19 — "darkened in their understanding . . . being past feeling"; John 1 : 29 — "Behold, the Lamb of God, that taketh away [ marg. 'beareth ' ] the sin of the world."

Plato, Republic, 1 : 380 — "When death approaches, cares and alarms awake, especially the fear of hell and its punishments." Cicero, De Divin., 1 : 30 — "Then comes remorse for evil deeds." Persius, Satire 3 — "His vice benumbs him; his fibre has become fat; he is conscious of no fault; he knows not the loss he suffers; he is so far sunk, that there is not even a bubble on the surface of the deep." Shakespeare, Hamlet, 3 : 1 — "Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all"; 4 : 5 — "To my sick soul, as sin's true nature is, Each toy seems prologue to some great amiss; So full of artless jealousy is guilt, It spills itself in fearing to be spilt"; Richard III, 5 : 3 — "O coward conscience, how thou dost afflict me! . . . My conscience hath a thousand several tongues, and every tongue brings in a several tale, And every tale condemns me for a villain"; Tempest, 3 : 3 — "All three of them are desperate; their great guilt, Like poison given to work a great time after, Now 'gins to bite the spirits"; Ant. and Cleop., 3 : 9 — "When we in our viciousness grow hard (O misery on 't!) the wise gods seal our eyes; In our own filth drop our clear judgments; make us Adore our errors; laugh at us, while we strut To our confusion."

Dr. Shedd said once to a graduating class of young theologians: "Would that upon the naked, palpitating heart of each one of you might be laid one red-hot coal of God Almighty's wrath!" Yes, we add, if only that red-hot coal might be quenched by one red drop of Christ's atoning blood. Dr. H. E. Robins: "To the convicted sinner a merely external hell would be a cooling flame, compared with the agony of his remorse." John Milton represents Satan as saying: "Which way I fly is hell; myself am hell." James Martineau, Life by Jackson, 190 — "It is of the essence of guilty declension to administer its own anaesthetics." But this deadening of conscience cannot last always. Conscience is a mirror of God's holiness. We may cover the mirror with the veil of this world's diversions and deceits. When the veil is removed, and conscience again reflects the sunlike purity of God's demands, we are visited with self-loathing and self-contempt. John Caird, Fund. Ideas, 2 : 25 — "Though it may cast off every other vestige of its divine origin, our nature retains at least this one terrible prerogative of it, the capacity of preying on itself." Lyttelton in Lux Mundi, 277 — "The common fallacy that a self-indulgent sinner is no one's enemy but his own would, were it true, involve the further inference that such a sinner would not feel himself guilty." If any dislike the doctrine of guilt, let them remember that without wrath there is no pardon, without guilt no forgiveness. See, on the nature of guilt, Julius Müller, Doct. Sin, 1 : 183-207; Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, 293-309; Thomastus, Christi Person und Werk, 1 : 246; Baird, Elohim Revealed, 461-473; Delitzsch, Bib. Psychologie, 121-148; Thornwell, Theology, 1 : 400-424.

## 2. Degrees of guilt.

The Scriptures recognize different degrees of guilt as attaching to different kinds of sin. The variety of sacrifices under the Mosaic law, and the variety of awards in the judgment, are to be explained upon this principle.

Luke 12: 47, 48—“shall be beaten with many stripes . . . shall be beaten with few stripes”; Rom. 2: 6—“who will render to every man according to his works.” See also John 19: 11—“he that delivered me unto thee hath greater sin”; Heb. 2: 2, 3—“if every transgression . . . received a just recompense of reward; how shall we escape, if we neglect so great a salvation?” 10: 26, 27—“A man that hath set at nought Moses' law dieth without compassion on the word of two or three witnesses: of how much sorer punishment, think ye, shall he be judged worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God?”

Casistry, however, has drawn many distinctions which lack Scriptural foundation. Such is the distinction between venial sins and mortal sins in the Roman Catholic Church,—every sin unpardoned being mortal, and all sins being venial, since Christ has died for all. Nor is the common distinction between sins of omission and sins of commission more valid, since the very omission is an act of commission.

Mat. 25: 45—“Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of these least”; James 4: 17—“To him therefore that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin.” John Ruskin: “The condemnation given from the Judgment Throne—most solemnly described—is for all the ‘undones’ and not the ‘dones.’ People are perpetually afraid of doing wrong; but unless they are doing its reverse energetically, they do it all day long, and the degree does not matter.” The Roman Catholic Church proceeds upon the supposition that she can determine the precise malignity of every offence, and assign its proper penance at the confessional. Thornwell, *Theology*, 1: 424-441, says that “all sins are venial but one—for there is a sin against the Holy Ghost,” yet “not one is venial in itself—for the least proceeds from an apostate state and nature.” We shall see, however, that the hindrance to pardon, in the case of the sin against the Holy Spirit, is subjective rather than objective.

J. Spencer Kennard: “Roman Catholicism in Italy presents the spectacle of the authoritative representatives and teachers of morals and religion themselves living in all forms of deceit, corruption, and tyranny; and, on the other hand, discriminating between venial and mortal sin, classing as venial sins lying, fraud, fornication, marital infidelity, and even murder, all of which may be atoned for and forgiven or even permitted by the mere payment of money; and at the same time classing as mortal sins disrespect and disobedience to the church.”

The following distinctions are indicated in Scripture as involving different degrees of guilt:

### A. Sin of nature, and personal transgression.

Sin of nature involves guilt, yet there is greater guilt when this sin of nature reasserts itself in personal transgression; for, while this latter includes in itself the former, it also adds to the former a new element, namely, the conscious exercise of the individual and personal will, by virtue of which a new decision is made against God, special evil habit is induced, and the total condition of the soul is made more depraved. Although we have emphasized the guilt of inborn sin, because this truth is most contested, it is to be remembered that men reach a conviction of their native depravity only through a conviction of their personal transgressions. For this reason, by far the larger part of our preaching upon sin should consist in applications of the law of God to the acts and dispositions of men's lives.

Mat. 19: 14—“to such belongeth the kingdom of heaven”—relative innocence of childhood; 23: 23—“Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers”—personal transgression added to inherited depravity. In preaching, we should first treat individual transgressions, and thence proceed to

heart-sin, and race-sin. Man is not wholly a spontaneous development of inborn tendencies, a manifestation of original sin. Motives do not *determine* but they *persuade* the will, and every man is guilty of conscious personal transgressions which may, with the help of the Holy Spirit, be brought under the condemning judgment of conscience. Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, 169-174—"Original sin does not do away with the significance of personal transgression. Adam was pardoned; but some of his descendants are unpardonable. The second death is referred, in Scripture, to our own personal guilt."

This is not to say that original sin does not involve as great a sin as that of Adam in the first transgression, for original sin is the sin of the first transgression; it is only to say that personal transgression is original sin *plus* the conscious ratification of Adam's act by the individual. "We are guilty for what we are, as much as for what we do. Our sin is not simply the sum total of all our sins. There is a *sinfulness* which is the common denominator of all our sins." It is customary to speak lightly of original sin, as if personal sins were all for which man is accountable. But it is only in the light of original sin that personal sins can be explained. Prov. 14:9, marg.—"Fools make a mock at sin." Simon, *Reconciliation*, 122—"The sinfulness of individual men varies; the sinfulness of humanity is a constant quantity." Robert Browning, *Ferishtah's Fancies*: "Man humps his kind! the mass. God singles thence unit by unit. Thou and God exist—So think! for certain: Think the mass—mankind—Disparta, disperses, leaves thysself alone! Ask thy lone soul what laws are plain to thee,—Thou and no other, stand or fall by them! That is the part for thee."

#### B. Sins of ignorance, and sins of knowledge.

Here guilt is measured by the degree of light possessed, or in other words, by the opportunities of knowledge men have enjoyed, and the powers with which they have been naturally endowed. Genius and privilege increase responsibility. The heathen are guilty, but those to whom the oracles of God have been committed are more guilty than they.

Isa. 49:15—"more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment, than for that city"; Luke 12:47, 48—"that servant, who knew his Lord's will . . . shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not . . . shall be beaten with few stripes"; 23:34—"Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do"—complete knowledge would put them beyond the reach of forgiveness. John 19:11—"he that delivered me unto thee hath greater sin"; Acts 17:30—"The times of ignorance therefore God overlooked"; Rom. 1:32—"who, knowing the ordinance of God, that they that practise such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but also consent with them that practise them"; 2:12—"For as many as have sinned without the law shall also perish without the law; and as many as have sinned under the law shall be judged by the law"; 1 Tim. 1:13, 15, 16—"I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief."

Is. 43:19—"Who is blind . . . as Jehovah's servant?" It was the Pharisees whom Jesus warned of the sin against the Holy Spirit. The guilt of the crucifixion rested on Jews rather than on Gentiles. Apostate Israel was more guilty than the pagans. The greatest sinners of the present day may be in Christendom, not in heathendom. Satan was an archangel; Judas was an apostle; Alexander Borgia was a pope. Jackson, James Martineau, 363—"Corruptio optimi pessima est, as seen in a drunken Webster, a treacherous Bacon, a licentious Goethe." Sir Roger de Coverley observed that none but men of fine parts deserve to be hanged. Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, 317—"The greater sin often involves the lesser guilt; the lesser sin the greater guilt." Robert Browning, *The Ring and the Book*, 227 (Pope, 1975)—"There's a new tribunal now Higher than God's, —the educated man's! Nice sense of honor in the human breast Supersedes here the old coarse oracle!" Dr. H. E. Robins holds that "palliation of guilt according to light is not possible under a system of pure law, and is possible only because the probation of the sinner is a probation of grace."

#### C. Sins of infirmity, and sins of presumption.

Here the guilt is measured by the energy of the evil will. Sin may be known to be sin, yet may be committed in haste or weakness. Though haste and weakness constitute a palliation of the offence which springs therefrom, yet they are themselves sins, as revealing an unbelieving and disordered heart. But of far greater guilt are those presumptuous choices of evil in which not weakness, but strength of will, is manifest.

Ps. 19: 12, 13—"Clear thou me from hidden faults. Keep back thy servant also from presumptuous sins"; Ia. 5: 18—"Wee unto them that draw iniquity with cords of falsehood, and sin as it were with a cart-rope"—not led away insensibly by sin, but earnestly, perseveringly, and wilfully working away at it; Gal. 6: 1—"overtaken in any trespass"; I Tim. 5: 24—"Some men's sins are evident, going before unto judgment; and some men also they follow after"—some men's sins are so open, that they act as officers to bring to justice those who commit them; whilst others require after-proof (An. Par. Bible). Luther represents one of the former class as saying to himself: "Esto peccator, et pecca fortiter." On sins of passion and of reflection, see Bittinger, in Princeton Rev., 1873: 219.

Miah 7: 3, marg.—"Both hands are put forth for evil, to do it diligently." So we ought to do good. "My art is my life," said Grisi, the prima donna of the opera, "I save myself all day for that one bound upon the stage." H. Bonar: "Sin worketh,—Let me work too. Busy as sin, my work I ply, Till I rest in the rest of eternity." German criminal law distinguishes between intentional homicide without deliberation, and intentional homicide with deliberation. There are three grades of sin: 1. Sins of ignorance, like Paul's persecuting; 2. sins of infirmity, like Peter's denial; 3. sins of presumption, like David's murder of Uriah. Sins of presumption were unpardonable under the Jewish law; they are not unpardonable under Christ.

#### D. Sin of incomplete, and sin of final, obduracy.

Here the guilt is measured, not by the objective sufficiency or insufficiency of divine grace, but by the degree of unreceptiveness into which sin has brought the soul. As the only sin unto death which is described in Scripture is the sin against the Holy Spirit, we here consider the nature of that sin.

Mat. 12: 31—"Every sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men; but the blasphemy against the Spirit shall not be forgiven"; 28—"And whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever shall speak against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in that which is to come"; Mark 3: 29—"whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath never forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin"; I John 5: 16, 17—"If any man see his brother sinning a sin not unto death, he shall ask, and God will give him life for them that sin not unto death. There is a sin unto death: not concerning this do I say that he should make request. All unrighteousness is sin: and there is a sin not unto death"; Heb. 10: 26—"if we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more a sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful expectation of judgment, and a fierceness of fire which shall devour the adversaries."

Ritschl holds all sin that comes short of definitive rejection of Christ to be ignorance rather than sin, and to be the object of no condemning sentence. This is to make the sin against the Holy Spirit the only real sin. Conscience and Scripture alike contradict this view. There is much incipient hardening of the heart that precedes the sin of final obduracy. See Denney, *Studies in Theology*, 80. The composure of the criminal is not always a sign of innocence. *S. S. Times*, April 12, 1902: 200—"Sensitiveness of conscience and of feeling, and responsiveness of countenance and bearing, are to be retained by purity of life and freedom from transgression. On the other hand composure of countenance and calmness under suspicion and accusation are likely to be a result of continuance in wrong doing, with consequent hardening of the whole moral nature."

Weismann, *Heredity*, 2: 8—"As soon as any organ falls into disuse, it degenerates, and finally is lost altogether. . . . In parasites the organs of sense degenerate." Marconi's wireless telegraphy requires an attuned "receiver." The "transmitter" sends out countless rays into space: only one capable of corresponding vibrations can understand them. The sinner may so destroy his receptivity, that the whole universe may be uttering God's truth, yet he be unable to hear a word of it. *The Outlook*: "If a man should put out his eyes, he could not see—nothing could make him see. So if a man should by obstinate wickedness destroy his power to believe in God's forgiveness, he would be in a hopeless state. Though God would still be gracious, the man could not see it, and so could not take God's forgiveness to himself."

The sin against the Holy Spirit is not to be regarded simply as an isolated act, but also as the external symptom of a heart so radically and finally set against God that no power which God can consistently use will ever save it. This sin, therefore, can be only the culmination of a long course of self-hardening and self-denraving. He who has committed it must be

either profoundly indifferent to his own condition, or actively and bitterly hostile to God; so that anxiety or fear on account of one's condition is evidence that it has not been committed. The sin against the Holy Spirit cannot be forgiven, simply because the soul that has committed it has ceased to be receptive of divine influences, even when those influences are exerted in the utmost strength which God has seen fit to employ in his spiritual administration.

The commission of this sin is marked by a loss of spiritual sight; the blind fish of the Mammoth Cave left light for darkness, and so in time lost their eyes. It is marked by a loss of religious sensibility; the sensitive-plant loses its sensitiveness, in proportion to the frequency with which it is touched. It is marked by a loss of power to will the good; "the lava hardens after it has broken from the crater, and in that state cannot return to its source" (Van Oosterzee). The same writer also remarks (Dogmatics, 2: 428): "Herod Antipas, after earlier doubt and slavishness, reached such deadness as to be able to mock the Savior, at the mention of whose name he had not long before trembled." Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 2: 425—"It is not that divine grace is absolutely refused to any one who in true penitence asks forgiveness of this sin; but he who commits it never fulfills the subjective conditions upon which forgiveness is possible, because the aggravation of sin to this ultimatum destroys in him all susceptibility of repentance. The way of return to God is closed against no one who does not close it against himself." Drummond, Natural Law in the Spiritual World, 97-120, illustrates the downward progress of the sinner by the law of degeneration in the vegetable and animal world: pigeons, roses, strawberries, all tend to revert to the primitive and wild type. "How shall we escape, if we neglect so great a salvation?" (Eph. 2: 3).

Shakespeare, Macbeth, 3: 5—"You all know security is mortals' chiefest enemy." Moulton, Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist, 90-124—"Richard III is the ideal villain. Villainy has become an end in itself. Richard is an artist in villainy. He lacks the emotions naturally attending crime. He regards villainy with the intellectual enthusiasm of the artist. His villainy is ideal in its success. There is a fascination of irresistibility in him. He is imperturbable in his crime. There is no effort, but rather humor, in it; a recklessness which suggests boundless resources; an inspiration which excludes calculation. Shakespeare relieves the representation from the charge of monstrosity by turning all this villainous history into the unconscious development of Nemesis." See also A. H. Strong, Great Poets, 188-198. Robert Browning's Guido, in The Ring and the Book, is an example of pure hatred of the good. Guido hates Pompilia for her goodness, and declares that, if he catches her in the next world, he will murder her there, as he murdered her here.

Alexander VI, the father of Caesar and Lucrezia Borgia, the pope of cruelty and lust, wore yet to the day of his death the look of unflinching joyousness and geniality, yes, of even retiring sensitiveness and modesty. No fear or reproach of conscience seemed to throw gloom over his life, as in the cases of Tiberius and Louis XI. He believed himself under the special protection of the Virgin, although he had her painted with the features of his paramour, Julia Farnese. He never scrupled at false witness, adultery, or murder. See Gregorovius, Lucrezia Borgia, 294, 295. Jeremy Taylor thus describes the progress of sin in the sinner: "First it startles him, then it becomes pleasing, then delightful, then frequent, then habitual, then confirmed; then the man is impenitent, then obstinate, then resolved never to repent, then damned."

There is a state of utter insensibility to emotions of love or fear, and man by his sin may reach that state. The act of blasphemy is only the expression of a hardened or a hateful heart. B. H. Payne: "The calcium flame will char the steel wire so that it is no longer affected by the magnet. . . . As the blazing cinders and black curling smoke which the volcano spews from its rumbling throat are the accumulation of months and years, so the sin against the Holy Spirit is not a thoughtless expression in a moment of passion or rage, but the giving vent to a state of heart and mind abounding in the accumulations of weeks and months of opposition to the gospel."

Dr. J. P. Thompson: "The unpardonable sin is the knowing, wilful, persistent, contemptuous, malignant spurning of divine truth and grace, as manifested to the soul by the convincing and illuminating power of the Holy Ghost." Dorner says that "therefore this sin does not belong to Old Testament times, or to the mere revelation of law. It implies the full revelation of the grace in Christ, and the conscious rejection of it by

a soul to which the Spirit has made it manifest (Acts 17:30—"The times of ignorance, therefore, God overlooked"; Rom. 2:25—"the passing over of the sins done aforetime")." But was it not under the Old Testament that God said: "My Spirit shall not strive with man forever" (Gen. 6:3), and "Spirits are joined to idols; let him alone" (Hosea 1:17)? The sin against the Holy Ghost is a sin against grace, but it does not appear to be limited to New Testament times.

It is still true that the unpardonable sin is a sin committed against the Holy Spirit rather than against Christ; Mat. 23:35—"whoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whoever shall speak against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in that which is to come." Jesus warns the Jews against it,—he does not say they had already committed it. They would seem to have committed it when, after Pentecost, they added to their rejection of Christ the rejection of the Holy Spirit's witness to Christ's resurrection. See Schaff, *Sin against the Holy Ghost*; Lemma, *Sünde wider den Heiligen Geist*; Davis, in *Bap. Rev.*, 1888:317-336; Nitzsch, *Christian Doctrine*, 283-289. On the general subject of kinds of sin and degrees of guilt, see Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 3:284, 296.

### III. PENALTY.

#### 1. *Idea of penalty.*

By penalty, we mean that pain or loss which is directly or indirectly inflicted by the Lawgiver, in vindication of his justice outraged by the violation of law.

Turretin, 1:213—"Justice necessarily demands that all sin be punished, but it does not equally demand that it be punished in the very person that sinned, or in just such time and degree." So far as this statement of the great Federal theologian is intended to explain our guilt in Adam and our justification in Christ, we can assent to his words; but we must add that the reason, in each case, why we suffer the penalty of Adam's sin, and Christ suffers the penalty of our sins, is not to be found in any covenant-relation, but rather in the fact that the sinner is one with Adam, and Christ is one with the believer,—in other words, not covenant-unity, but life-unity. The word 'penalty,' like 'pain,' is derived from *pena*, *penis*, and it implies the correlative notion of desert. As under the divine government there can be no constructive *guilt*, so there can be no *penalty* inflicted by legal fiction. Christ's sufferings were *penalty*, not arbitrarily inflicted, nor yet borne to expiate personal guilt, but as the just due of the human nature with which he had united himself, and a part of which he was. Prof. Wm. Adams Brown: "Loss, not suffering, is the supreme penalty for Christians. The real penalty is separation from God. If such separation involves suffering, that is a sign of God's mercy, for where there is life, there is hope. Suffering is always to be interpreted as an appeal from God to man."

In this definition it is implied that:

A. The natural consequences of transgression, although they constitute a part of the penalty of sin, do not exhaust that penalty. In all penalty there is a personal element—the holy wrath of the Lawgiver,—which natural consequences but partially express.

We do not deny, but rather assert, that the natural consequences of transgression are a part of the penalty of sin. Sensual sins are punished, in the deterioration and corruption of the body; mental and spiritual sins, in the deterioration and corruption of the soul. Prov. 5:22—"His own iniquities shall take the wicked, and he shall be holden with the cords of his sin"—as the hunter is caught in the toils which he has devised for the wild beast. Sin is self-detecting and self-tormenting. But this is only half the truth. Those who would confine all penalty to the reaction of natural laws are in danger of forgetting that God is not simply immanent in the universe, but is also transcendent, and that "to fall into the hands of the living God" (Job. 16:31) is to fall into the hands, not simply of the law, but also of the Lawgiver. Natural law is only the regular expression of God's mind and will. We abhor a person who is foul in body and in speech. There is no penalty of sin more dreadful than its being an object of abhorrence to God. Jer. 44:4—"Oh, do not this abominable thing that I hate!" Add to this the law of continuity which makes sin reproduce itself, and the law of conscience which makes sin its own detector, judge, and tormentor, and we have sufficient evidence of God's wrath against it, apart from any external inflictions.

The divine feeling toward sin is seen in Jesus' scourging the traffickers in the temple, his denunciation of the Pharisees, his weeping over Jerusalem, his agony in Gethsemane. Imagine the feeling of a father toward his daughter's betrayer, and God's feeling toward sin may be faintly understood.

The deed returns to the doer, and character determines destiny — this law is a revelation of the righteousness of God. Penalty will vindicate the divine character in the long run, though not always in time. This is recognized in all religions. Buddhist priest in Japan: "The evil doer weaves a web around himself, as the silkworm weaves its cocoon." Socrates made Circe's turning of men into swine a mere parable of the self-brutalizing influence of sin. In Dante's *Inferno*, the punishments are all of them the sins themselves; hence men are in hell before they die. Hegel: "Penalty is the other half of crime." R. W. Emerson: "Punishment not follows, but accompanies, crime." Sagebeer, *The Bible in Court*, 59—"Corruption is destruction, and the sinner is a suicide; penalty corresponds with transgression and is the outcome of it; sin is death in the making; death is sin in the final infliction." J. B. Thomas, Baptist Congress, 1901: 110—"What matters it whether I wait by night for the poacher and deliberately shoot him, or whether I set the pistol so that he shall be shot by it when he commits the depredation?" Tennyson, *Sea Dreams*: "His gain is loss; for he that wrongs his friend Wrongs himself more, and ever bears about A silent court of justice in his breast, Himself the judge and jury, and himself The prisoner at the bar, ever condemn'd: And that drags down his life: then comes what comes Hereafter."

B. The object of penalty is not the reformation of the offender or the ensuring of social or governmental safety. These ends may be incidentally secured through its infliction, but the great end of penalty is the vindication of the character of the Lawgiver. Penalty is essentially a necessary reaction of the divine holiness against sin. Inasmuch, however, as wrong views of the object of penalty have so important a bearing upon our future studies of doctrine, we make fuller mention of the two erroneous theories which have greatest currency.

(a) Penalty is not essentially reformatory.—By this we mean that the reformation of the offender is not its primary design,—as penalty, it is not intended to reform. Penalty, in itself, proceeds not from the love and mercy of the Lawgiver, but from his justice. Whatever reforming influences may in any given instance be connected with it are not parts of the penalty, but are mitigations of it, and they are added not in justice but in grace. If reformation follows the infliction of penalty, it is not the effect of the penalty, but the effect of certain benevolent agencies which have been provided to turn into a means of good what naturally would be to the offender only a source of harm.

That the object of penalty is not reformation appears from Scripture, where punishment is often referred to God's justice, but never to God's love; from the intrinsic ill-desert of sin, to which penalty is correlative; from the fact that punishment must be vindictive, in order to be disciplinary, and just, in order to be reformatory; from the fact that upon this theory punishment would not be just when the sinner was already reformed or could not be reformed, so that the greater the sin the less the punishment must be.

Punishment is essentially different from chastisement. The latter proceeds from love (*Jer. 16: 34*—"correct me, but in measure; not in thine anger"; *Heb. 12: 6*—"whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth"). Punishment proceeds not from love but from justice—see *Ex. 23: 23*—"I shall have executed judgment in her, and shall be sanctified in her"; *36: 21, 22*—in judgment, "I do not this for your sake, but for my holy name"; *Heb. 12: 29*—"our God is a consuming fire"; *Rev. 15: 1, 4*—"wrath of God . . . thou only art holy . . . thy righteous acts have been made manifest"; *16: 5*—"Righteous art thou, . . . thou Holy One, because thou didst thus judge"; *19: 2*—"true and righteous are his judgments; for he hath judged the great har-

let" So untrue is the saying of Sir Thomas More's Utopia: "The end of all punishment is the destruction of vice, and the saving of men." Luther: "God has two rods: one of mercy and goodness; another of anger and fury." Chastisement is the former; penalty the latter.

If the reform-theory of penalty is correct, then to punish crime, without asking about reformation, makes the state the transgressor; its punishments should be proportioned, not to the greatness of the crime, but to the sinner's state; the death-penalty should be abolished, upon the ground that it will preclude all hope of reformation. But the same theory would abolish any final judgment, or eternal punishment; for, when the soul becomes so wicked that there is no more hope of reform, there is no longer any justice in punishing it. The greater the sin, the less the punishment; and Satan, the greatest sinner, should have no punishment at all.

Modern denunciations of capital punishment are often based upon wrong conceptions of the object of penalty. Opposition to the doctrine of future punishment would give way, if the opposers realized what penalty is ordained to secure. Harris, *God the Creator*, 2: 447, 451— "Punishment is not primarily reformatory; it educates conscience and vindicates the authority of law." R. W. Dale: "It is not necessary to prove that hanging is beneficial to the person hanged. The theory that society has no right to send a man to jail, to feed him on bread and water, to make him pick hemp or work a treadmill, except to reform him, is utterly rotten. He must deserve to be punished, or else the law has no right to punish him." A House of Refuge or a State Industrial School is primarily a penal institution, for it deprives persons of their liberty and compels them against their will to labor. This loss and deprivation on their part cannot be justified except upon the ground that it is the desert of their wrong doing. Whatever gracious and philanthropic influences may accompany this confinement and compulsion, they cannot of themselves explain the penal element in the institution. If they could, a *habeas corpus* decree could be sought, and obtained, from any competent court.

God's treatment of men in this world also combines the elements of penalty and of chastisement. Suffering is first of all deserved, and this justifies its infliction. But it is at the beginning accompanied with all manner of alleviating influences which tend to draw men back to God. As these gracious influences are resisted, the punitive element becomes preponderating, and penalty reflects God's holiness rather than his love. Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, 1-25—"Pain is not the immediate object of punishment. It must be a means to an end, a moral end, namely, penitence. But where the depraved man becomes a human tiger, there punishment must reach its culmination. There is a punishment which is not restorative. According to the spirit in which punishment is received, it may be internal or external. All punishment begins as discipline. It tends to repentance. Its triumph would be the triumph within. It becomes retributive only as the sinner refuses to repent. Punishment is only the development of sin. The ideal penitent condemns himself, identifies himself with righteousness by accepting penalty. In proportion as penalty fails in its purpose to produce penitence, it acquires more and more a retributive character, whose climax is not Calvary but Hell."

Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, 327-328 (quoted in Ritchie, Darwin, and Hegel, 67)— "Punishment has three characters: It is retributive, in so far as it falls under the general law that resistance to the dominant type recoils on the guilty or resistant creature; it is preventive, in so far as, being a statutory enactment, it aims at securing the maintenance of the law irrespective of the individual's character. But this latter characteristic is secondary, and the former is comprehended in the third idea, that of reformation, which is the superior form in which retribution appears when the type is a mental ideal and is affected by conscious persons." Hyslop on Freedom, Responsibility, and Punishment, in *Mind*, April, 1894: 167-169—"In the Elmira Reformatory, out of 2295 persons paroled between 1876 and 1889, 1907 or 83 per cent. represent a probably complete reformation. Determinists say that this class of persons cannot do otherwise. Something is wrong with their theory. We conclude that 1. Causal responsibility justifies preventive punishment; 2. Potential moral responsibility justifies corrective punishment; 3. Actual moral responsibility justifies retributive punishment." Here we need only to point out the incorrect use of the word "punishment," which belongs only to the last class. In the two former cases the word "chastisement" should have been used. See Julius Müller, *Lehre von der Sünde*, 1: 324; Thornton, *Old Fashioned Ethics*, 70-73; Dörner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 232, 239 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 134, 135); Robertson's

Sermons, 4th Series, no. 18 (Harper's ed., 752); see also this Compendium, references on Holiness, A. (d), page 273.

(b) Penalty is not essentially deterrent and preventive.—By this we mean that its primary design is not to protect society, by deterring men from the commission of like offences. We grant that this end is often secured in connection with punishment, both in family and civil government and under the government of God. But we claim that this is a merely incidental result, which God's wisdom and goodness have connected with the infliction of penalty,—it cannot be the reason and ground for penalty itself. Some of the objections to the preceding theory apply also to this. But in addition to what has been said, we urge:

Penalty cannot be primarily designed to secure social and governmental safety, for the reason that it is never right to punish the individual simply for the good of society. No punishment, moreover, will or can do good to others that is not just and right in itself. Punishment does good, only when the person punished deserves punishment; and that *desert* of punishment, and not the good effects that will follow it, must be the ground and reason why it is inflicted. The contrary theory would imply that the criminal might go free but for the effect of his punishment on others, and that man might rightly commit crime if only he were willing to bear the penalty.

Kant, *Praktische Vernunft*, 151 (ed. Rosenkranz)—“The notion of ill-desert and punishableness is necessarily implied in the idea of voluntary transgression; and the idea of punishment excludes that of happiness in all its forms. For though he who inflicts punishment may, it is true, also have a benevolent purpose to produce by the punishment some good effect upon the criminal, yet the punishment must be justified first of all as pure and simple requital and retribution. . . . In every punishment as such, justice is the very first thing and constitutes the essence of it. A benevolent purpose, it is true, may be conjoined with punishment; but the criminal cannot claim this as his due, and he has no right to reckon on it.” These utterances of Kant apply to the deterrent theory as well as to the reformatory theory of penalty. The element of desert or retribution is the basis of the other elements in punishment. See James Seth, *Ethical Principles*, 333-338; Shedd, *Dogm. Theology*, 2: 717; Hodge, *Essays*, 133.

A certain English judge, in sentencing a criminal, said that he punished him, not for stealing sheep, but that sheep might not be stolen. But it is the greatest injustice to punish a man for the mere sake of example. Society cannot be benefited by such injustice. The theory can give no reason why one should be punished rather than another, nor why a second offence should be punished more heavily than the first. On this theory, moreover, if there were but one creature in the universe, and none existed beside himself to be affected by his suffering, he could not justly be punished, however great might be his sin. The only principle that can explain punishment is the principle of *desert*. See Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, 2: 348.

“Crime is most prevented by the conviction that crime deserves punishment; the greatest deterrent agency is conscience.” So in the government of God “there is no hint that future punishment works good to the lost or to the universe. The integrity of the redeemed is not to be maintained by subjecting the lost to a punishment they do not deserve. The wrong merits punishment, and God is bound to punish it, whether good comes of it or not. Sin is intrinsically ill-deserving. Impurity must be banished from God. God must vindicate himself, or cease to be holy” (see art. on the Philosophy of Punishment, by F. L. Patton, in *Brit. and For. Evang. Rev.*, Jan. 1878: 126-130).

Bowne, *Principles of Ethics*, 186, 274—Those who maintain punishment to be essentially deterrent and preventive “ignore the metaphysics of responsibility and treat the problem ‘positively and objectively’ on the basis of physiology, sociology, etc., and in the interests of public safety. The question of guilt or innocence is as irrelevant as the question concerning the guilt or innocence of wasps and hornets. An ancient holder of this view set forth the opinion that “it was expedient that one man should die for the people”

(John 8:14), and so Jesus was put to death. . . . A mob in eastern Europe might be persuaded that a Jew had slaughtered a Christian child as a sacrifice. The authorities might be perfectly sure of the man's innocence, and yet proceed to punish him because of the mob's clamor, and the danger of an outbreak." Men high up in the French government thought it was better that Ravryus should suffer for the sake of France, than that a scandal affecting the honor of the French army should be made public. In perfect consistency with this principle, McKim, *Heredity and Human Progress*, 192, advocates infliction of painless death upon idiots, imbeciles, epileptics, habitual drunkards, insane criminals, murderers, nocturnal house breakers, and all dangerous and incorrigible persons. He would change the place of slaughter from our streets and homes to our penal institutions; in other words, he would abandon punishment, but protect society.

Failure to recognize holiness as the fundamental attribute of God, and the affirmation of that holiness as conditioning the exercise of love, vitiates the discussion of penalty by A. H. Bradford, *Age of Faith*, 243-250—"What is penal suffering designed to accomplish? Is it to manifest the holiness of God? Is it to express the sanctity of the moral law? Is it simply a natural consequence? Does it manifest the divine Fatherhood? God does not inflict penalty simply to satisfy himself or to manifest his holiness, any more than an earthly father inflicts suffering on his child to show his wrath against the wrongdoer or to manifest his own goodness. The idea of punishment is essentially barbaric and foreign to all that is known of the Deity. Penalty that is not reformatory or protective is barbarism. In the home, punishment is always discipline. Its object is the welfare of the child and the family. Punishment as an expression of wrath or enmity, with no remedial purpose beyond, is a relic of barbarism. It carries with it the content of vengeance. It is the expression of anger, of passion, or at best of cold justice. Penal suffering is undoubtedly the divine holiness expressing its hatred of sin. But, if it stops with such expression, it is not holiness, but selfishness. If on the other hand that expression of holiness is used or permitted in order that the sinner may be made to hate his sin, then it is no more punishment, but chastisement. On any other hypothesis, penal suffering has no justification except the arbitrary will of the Almighty, and such a hypothesis is an impeachment both of his justice and his love." This view seems to us to ignore the necessary reaction of divine holiness against sin; to make holiness a mere form of love; a means to an end and that end utilitarian; and so to deny to holiness any independent, or even real, existence in the divine nature.

The wrath of God is calm and judicial, devoid of all passion or caprice, but it is the expression of eternal and unchangeable righteousness. It is vindictive but not vindictive. Without it there could be no government, and God would not be God. F. W. Robertson: "Does not the element of vengeance exist in all punishment, and does not the feeling exist, not as a sinful, but as an essential, part of human nature? If so, there must be wrath in God." Lord Bacon: "Revenge is a wild sort of justice." Stephen: "Criminal law provides legitimate satisfaction of the passions of revenge." Dörner, *Glaubenslehre*, 1: 287. *Per contra*, see Bib. Sac., Apr. 1881: 286-302; H. B. Smith, *System of Theology*, 46, 47; Chitty's ed. of Blackstone's Commentaries, 4: 7; Wharton, *Criminal Law*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 1.

## 2. *The actual penalty of sin.*

The one word in Scripture which designates the total penalty of sin is "death." Death, however, is twofold:

A. Physical death,—or the separation of the soul from the body, including all those temporal evils and sufferings which result from disturbance of the original harmony between body and soul, and which are the working of death in us. That physical death is a part of the penalty of sin, appears:

### (a) *From Scripture.*

This is the most obvious import of the threatening in Gen. 2:17—"thou shalt surely die"; cf. 3:19—"unto dust shalt thou return." Allusions to this threat in the O. T. confirm this interpretation: Num. 16:29—"visited

after the visitation of all men," where  $\Upsilon\text{P}\text{P}$  = judicial visitation, or punishment; 27 : 3 (LXX. —  $\delta\iota$   $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\iota\alpha\upsilon\alpha\upsilon$   $\alpha\beta\rho\acute{\omicron}\upsilon$ ). The prayer of Moses in Ps. 90 : 7-9, 11, and the prayer of Hezekiah in Is. 38 : 17, 18, recognize plainly the penal nature of death. The same doctrine is taught in the N. T., as for example, John 8 : 44; Rom. 5 : 12, 14, 16, 17, where the judicial phraseology is to be noted (cf. 1 : 32); see 6 : 23 also. In 1 Pet. 4 : 6, physical death is spoken of as God's judgment against sin. In 1 Cor. 15 : 21, 22, the bodily resurrection of all believers, in Christ, is contrasted with the bodily death of all men, in Adam. Rom. 4 : 24, 25; 6 : 9, 10; 8 : 3, 10, 11; Gal. 3 : 13, show that Christ submitted to physical death as the penalty of sin, and by his resurrection from the grave gave proof that the penalty of sin was exhausted and that humanity in him was justified. "As the resurrection of the body is a part of the redemption, so the death of the body is a part of the penalty."

Ps. 90 : 7, 9 — "we are consumed in thine anger . . . all our days are passed away in thy wrath"; Is. 38 : 17, 18 — "thou hast in love to my soul delivered it from the pit . . . thou hast cast all my sins behind thy back. For thou cannot praise thee"; John 8 : 44 — "He [Satan] was a murderer from the beginning"; 11 : 33 — Jesus "grieved in the spirit" — was moved with indignation at what sin had wrought; Rom. 5 : 12, 14, 16, 17 — "death through sin . . . death passed unto all men, for that all sinned . . . death reigned . . . even over them that had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression . . . the judgment came of one [trespasser] unto condemnation . . . by the trespass of the one, death reigned through the one"; cf. the legal phraseology in 1 : 32 — "who, knowing the ordinances of God, that they that practise such things are worthy of death." Rom. 6 : 23 — "the wages of sin is death" — death is sin's just due. 1 Pet. 4 : 6 — "that they might be judged indeed according to men in the flesh" — that they might suffer physical death, which to men in general is the penalty of sin. 1 Cor. 15 : 21, 22 — "as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive"; Rom. 4 : 24, 25 — "raised Jesus our Lord from the dead, who was delivered up for our trespasses, and was raised for our justification"; 6 : 9, 10 — "Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death no more hath dominion over him. For the death that he died, he died unto sin once; but the life that he liveth, he liveth unto God"; 8 : 3, 10, 11 — "God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh . . . the body is dead because of sin" (= a corpse, on account of sin — Meyer; so Julius Müller, *Doot. Sin.*, 2 : 201) . . . "he that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead shall give life also to your mortal bodies"; Gal. 3 : 13 — "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree."

On the relation between death and sin, see Griffith-Jones, *Ascent through Christ*, 160-165 — "They are not antagonistic, but complementary to each other — the one spiritual and the other biological. The natural fact is fitted to a moral use." Savage, *Life after Death*, 38 — "Men did not at first believe in natural death. If a man died, it was because some one had killed him. No ethical reason was desired or needed. At last however they sought some moral explanation, and came to look upon death as a punishment for human sin." If this has been the course of human evolution, we should conclude that the later belief represents the truth rather than the earlier. Scripture certainly affirms the doctrine that death itself, and not the mere accompaniments of death, is the consequence and penalty of sin. For this reason we cannot accept the very attractive and plausible theory which we have now to mention :

Newman Smyth, *Place of Death in Evolution*, holds that as the bow in the cloud was appointed for a moral use, so death, which before had been simply the natural law of the creation, was on occasion of man's sin appointed for a moral use. It is this *acquired* moral character of death with which Biblical Genesis has to do. Death becomes a curse, by being a fear and a torment. Animals have not this fear. But in man death stirs up conscience. Redemption takes away the fear, and death drops back into its natural aspect, or even becomes a gateway to life. Death is a curse to no animal but man. The retributive element in death is the effect of sin. When man has become perfected, death will cease to be of use, and will, as the last enemy, be destroyed. Death here is Nature's method of securing always fresh, young, thrifty life, and the greatest possible exuberance and joy of it. It is God's way of securing the greatest possible number and variety of immortal beings. There are many schoolrooms for eternity in God's universe, and a ceaseless succession of scholars through them. There are many flocks, but one flock. The reaper Death keeps making room. Four or five generations are as many as we can individually love, and get moral stimulus from.

Methuselahs too many would hold back the new generations. Bagehot says that civilization needs first to form a cake of custom, and secondly to break it up. Death, says Martineau, *Study*, 1: 372-374, is the provision for taking us abroad, before we have stayed too long at home to lose our receptivity. Death is the liberator of souls. The death of successive generations gives variety to heaven. Death perfects love, reveals it to itself, unites as life could not. As for Christ, so for us, it is expedient that we should go away.

While we welcome this reasoning as showing how God has overruled evil for good, we regard the explanation as unscriptural and unsatisfactory, for the reason that it takes no account of the ethics of natural law. The law of death is an expression of the nature of God, and specially of his holy wrath against sin. Other methods of propagating the race and reinforcing its life could have been adopted than that which involves pain and suffering and death. These do not exist in the future life, — they would not exist here, if it were not for the fact of sin. Dr. Smyth shows how the evil of death has been overruled, — he has not shown the reason for the original existence of the evil. The Scriptures explain this as the penalty and stigma which God has attached to sin: *Psalms* 90: 7, 8 makes this plain: "For we are consumed in thine anger, and in thy wrath are we troubled. Thou hast set our iniquities before thee, our secret sins in the light of thy countenance." The whole psalm has for its theme: Death as the wages of sin. And this is the teaching of Paul, in *Rom.* 5: 12 — "through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin."

(b) From reason.

The universal prevalence of suffering and death among rational creatures cannot be reconciled with the divine justice, except upon the supposition that it is a judicial infliction on account of a common sinfulness of nature belonging even to those who have not reached moral consciousness.

The objection that death existed in the animal creation before the Fall may be answered by saying that, but for the fact of man's sin, it would not have existed. We may believe that God arranged even the geologic history to correspond with the foreseen fact of human apostasy (*cf.* *Rom.* 8: 20-23 — where the creation is said to have been made subject to vanity by reason of man's sin).

On *Rom.* 8: 20-23 — "the creation was subjected to vanity, not of its own will" — see Meyer's *Com.*, and *Bap. Quar.*, 1: 143; also *Gen.* 3: 17-19 — "curst is the ground for thy sake." See also note on the Relation of Creation to the Holiness and Benevolence of God, and references, pages 402, 403. As the vertebral structure of the first fish was an "anticipative consequence" of man, so the suffering and death of fish pursued and devoured by other fish were an "anticipative consequence" of man's foreseen war with God and with himself.

The translation of Enoch and Elijah, and of the saints that remain at Christ's second coming, seems intended to teach us that death is not a necessary law of organized being, and to show what would have happened to Adam if he had been obedient. He was created a "natural," "earthly" body, but might have attained a higher being, the "spiritual," "heavenly" body, without the intervention of death. Sin, however, has turned the normal condition of things into the rare exception (*cf.* *1 Cor.* 15: 42-50). Since Christ endured death as the penalty of sin, death to the Christian becomes the gateway through which he enters into full communion with his Lord (see references below).

Through physical death all Christians will pass, except those few who like Enoch and Elijah were translated, and those many who shall be alive at Christ's second coming. Enoch and Elijah were possible types of those surviving saints. On *1 Cor.* 15: 51 — "We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed," see Edward Irving, *Works*, 5: 135. The apocryphal Assumption of Moses, verse 9, tells us that Joshua, being carried in vision to the spot at the moment of Moses' decease, beheld a double Moses, one dropped into the grave as belonging to the earth, the other mingling with the angels. The belief in Moses

immortality was not conditioned upon any resurrection of the earthly corpse; see Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, 364. When Paul was caught up to the third heaven, it may have been a temporary translation of the disembodied spirit. Set free for a brief space from the prison house which confined it, it may have passed within the veil and have seen and heard what mortal tongue could not describe; see Luckock, *Intermediate State*, 4. So Lazarus probably could not tell what he saw: "He told it not; or something sealed the lips of that Evangelist"; see Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, xxxi.

Nicoll, *Life of Christ*: "We have every one of us to face the last enemy, death. Ever since the world began, all who have entered it sooner or later have had this struggle, and the battle has always ended in one way. Two indeed escaped, but they did not escape by meeting and mastering their foe; they escaped by being taken away from the battle." But this physical death, for the Christian, has been turned by Christ into a blessing. A pardoned prisoner may be still kept in prison, as the best possible benefit to an exhausted body; so the external fact of physical death may remain, although it has ceased to be penalty. Macaulay: "The aged prisoner's chains are needed to support him; the darkness that has weakened his sight is necessary to preserve it." So spiritual death is not wholly removed from the Christian; a part of it, namely, depravity, still remains; yet it has ceased to be punishment,—it is only chastisement. When the finger unties the ligature that bound it, the body which previously had only chastised begins to cure the trouble. There is still pain, but the pain is no longer punitive,—it is now remedial. In the midst of the whipping, when the boy repents, his punishment is changed to chastisement.

John 14: 3—"And if I go and prepare a place for you, I come again, and will receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also"; 1 Cor. 15: 54-57—"Death is swallowed up in victory . . . O death, where is thy sting? The sting of death is sin; and the power of sin is the law"—i. e., the law's condemnation, its penal infliction; 2 Cor. 5: 1-9—"For we know that if the earthly house of our tabernacle be dissolved we have a building from God . . . we are of good courage, I say, and are willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be at home with the Lord"; Phil. 1: 21, 23—"to die is gain . . . having the desire to depart and be with Christ; for it is very far better." In Christ and his bearing the penalty of sin, the Christian has broken through the circle of natural race-connection, and is saved from corporate evil so far as it is punishment. The Christian may be chastised, but he is never punished: Rom. 8: 1—"There is therefore now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus." At the house of Jairus Jesus said: "Why make ye a tumult, and weep?" and having reproved the doleful clamorists, "he put them all forth" (Mark 5: 39, 40). The wakes and requiems and masses and vigils of the churches of Rome and of Russia are all heathen relics, entirely foreign to Christianity.

Palmer, *Theological Definition*, 57—"Death feared and fought against is terrible; but a welcome to death is the death of death and the way to life." The idea that punishment yet remains for the Christian is "the bridge to the papal doctrine of purgatorial fires." Browning's words, in *The Ring and the Book*, 2: 60—"In His face is light, but in his shadow healing too," are applicable to God's fatherly chastenings, but not to his penal retributions. On Acts 7: 60—"he fell asleep"—Arnot remarks: "When death becomes the property of the believer, it receives a new name, and is called sleep." Another has said: "Christ did not send, but came himself to save; The ransom-price he did not lend, but gave; *Christ died*, the shepherd for the sheep; *We only fall asleep*." *Per contra*, see Kreibitz, *Veröhnungslehre*, 375, and Hengstenberg, *Ev. K.-Z.*, 1864: 1065—"All suffering is punishment."

**B. Spiritual death,**—or the separation of the soul from God, including all that pain of conscience, loss of peace, and sorrow of spirit, which result from disturbance of the normal relation between the soul and God.

(a) Although physical death is a part of the penalty of sin, it is by no means the chief part. The term 'death' is frequently used in Scripture in a moral and spiritual sense, as denoting the absence of that which constitutes the true life of the soul, namely, the presence and favor of God.

Mat. 8: 22—"Follow me; and leave the [spiritually] dead to bury their own [physically] dead"; Luke 15: 32—"this thy brother was dead, and is alive again"; John 5: 24—"He that heareth my word, and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgment, but hath passed out of death into life"; 8: 51—"If a man keep my word, he shall never see death"; Rom. 8: 13—"if ye live after the flesh, ye must die; but if by the Spirit ye put to death the deeds of the body, ye shall live"; Eph. 2: 1—"when ye were dead through your trespasses and sins"; 5: 14—"Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead"; 1 Tim. 5: 6—"she that giveth herself to pleasure is dead while

she liveth"; James 5: 20 — "he who correcteth a sinner from the error of his way shall save a soul from death"; John 3: 14 — "He that loveth not abideth in death"; Rev. 3: 1 — "they have a name that they live, and they are dead."

(b) It cannot be doubted that the penalty denounced in the garden and fallen upon the race is primarily and mainly that death of the soul which consists in its separation from God. In this sense only, death was fully visited upon Adam in the day on which he ate the forbidden fruit (Gen. 2: 17). In this sense only, death is escaped by the Christian (John 11: 26). For this reason, in the parallel between Adam and Christ (Rom. 5: 12-21), the apostle passes from the thought of mere physical death in the early part of the passage to that of both physical and spiritual death at its close (verse 21 — "as sin reigned in death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord" — where "eternal life" is more than endless physical existence, and "death" is more than death of the body).

Gen. 2: 17 — "in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die"; John 11: 26 — "whosoever liveth and believeth on me shall never die"; Rom. 5: 14, 18, 21 — "justification of life . . . eternal life"; contrast these with "death reigned . . . sin reigned in death."

(c) Eternal death may be regarded as the culmination and completion of spiritual death, and as essentially consisting in the correspondence of the outward condition with the inward state of the evil soul (Acts 1: 25). It would seem to be inaugurated by some peculiar repellent energy of the divine holiness (Mat. 25: 41; 2 Thess. 1: 9), and to involve positive retribution visited by a personal God upon both the body and the soul of the evil-doer (Mat. 10: 28; Heb. 10: 31; Rev. 14: 11).

Acts 1: 25 — "Judas fell away, that he might go to his own place"; Mat. 25: 41 — "Depart from me, ye cursed, into the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels"; 2 Thess. 1: 9 — "who shall suffer punishment, even eternal destruction from the face of the Lord and from the glory of his might"; Mat. 10: 28 — "fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell"; Heb. 10: 31 — "It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God"; Rev. 14: 11 — "the smoke of their torment goeth up for ever and ever."

Kurtz, *Religionslehre*, 87 — "So long as God is holy, he must maintain the order of the world, and where this is destroyed, restore it. This however can happen in no other way than this: the injury by which the sinner has destroyed the order of the world falls back upon himself, — and this is penalty. Sin is the negation of the law. Penalty is the negation of that negation, that is, the reestablishment of the law. Sin is a thrust of the sinner against the law. Penalty is the adverse thrust of the elastic because living law, which encounters the sinner."

Plato, *Gorgias*, 472 B; 509 B; 513 A; 515 B — "Impunity is a more dreadful curse than any punishment, and nothing so good can befall the criminal as his retribution, the failure of which would make a double disorder in the universe. The offender himself may spend his arts in devices of escape and think himself happy if he is not found out. But all this plotting is but part of the delusion of his sin; and when he comes to himself and sees his transgression as it really is, he will yield himself up the prisoner of eternal justice and know that it is good for him to be afflicted, and so for the first time to be set at one with truth."

On the general subject of the penalty of sin, see Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin*, 1: 245 sq.; 2: 286-397; Baird; *Elohim Revealed*, 263-279; Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, 194-219; Krabbe, *Lehre von der Sünde und vom Tode*; Weiss, in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1836: 371; S. R. Mason, *Truth Unfolded*, 308-334; Bartlett, in *New Englander*, Oct. 1871: 677, 678.

#### SECTION VII.—THE SALVATION OF INFANTS.

The views which have been presented with regard to inborn depravity and the reaction of divine holiness against it suggest the question whether

infants dying before arriving at moral consciousness are saved, and if so, in what way. To this question we reply as follows:

(a) Infants are in a state of sin, need to be regenerated, and can be saved only through Christ.

Job 14:4—"Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? not one"; Ps. 51:5—"Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me"; John 3:6—"That which is born of the flesh is flesh"; Rom. 5:14—"Nevertheless death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression"; Eph. 2:3—"by nature children of wrath"; 1 Cor. 7:14—"also were your children unclean"—clearly intimate the naturally impure state of infants; and Mat. 19:14—"Suffer the little children, and forbid them not, to come unto me"—is not only consistent with this doctrine, but strongly confirms it; for the meaning is: "forbid them not to come unto me"—whom they need as a Savior. "Coming to Christ" is always the coming of a sinner, to him who is the sacrifice for sin; cf. Mat. 11:28—"Come unto me, all ye that labor."

(b) Yet as compared with those who have personally transgressed, they are recognized as possessed of a relative innocence, and of a submissiveness and trustfulness, which may serve to illustrate the graces of Christian character.

Deut. 1:39—"your little ones . . . and your children, that this day have no knowledge of good or evil"; Jonah 4:11—"sixscore thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand"; Rom. 9:11—"for the children being not yet born, neither having done anything good or bad"; Mat. 18:3, 4—"Except ye turn, and become as little children, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven. Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, the same is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven." See Julius Müller, *Doct. Sin.*, 2:265. Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus*, 2:80—"Unpretentious receptivity, . . . not the reception of the kingdom of God at a childlike age, but in a childlike character . . . is the condition of entering; . . . not blamelessness, but receptivity itself, on the part of those who do not regard themselves as too good or too bad for the offered gift, but receive it with hearty desire. Children have this unpretentious receptivity for the kingdom of God which is characteristic of them generally, since they have not yet other possessions on which they pride themselves."

(c) For this reason, they are the objects of special divine compassion and care, and through the grace of Christ are certain of salvation.

Mat. 18:5, 6, 10, 14—"whoever shall receive one such little child in my name receiveth me: but who shall cause one of these little ones that believe on me to stumble, it is profitable for him that a great millstone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be sunk in the depth of the sea. . . . See that ye despise not one of these little ones: for I say unto you, that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven. . . . Even so it is not the will of your Father who is in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish"; 19:14—"Suffer the little children, and forbid them not, to come unto me: for to such belongeth the kingdom of heaven"—not God's kingdom of nature, but his kingdom of grace, the kingdom of saved sinners. "Such" means, not children as children, but childlike believers. Meyer, on Mat. 19:14, refers the passage to spiritual infants only: "Not little children," he says, "but men of a childlike disposition." Geikie: "Let the little children come unto me, and do not forbid them, for the kingdom of heaven is given only to such as have a childlike spirit and nature like theirs." The Savior's words do not intimate that little children are either (1) sinless creatures, or (2) subjects for baptism; but only that their (1) humble teachableness, (2) intense eagerness, and (3) artless trust, illustrate the traits necessary for admission into the divine kingdom. On the passages in Matthew, see Commentaries of Bengel, De Wette, Lange; also Neander, *Planting and Training* (ed. Robinson), 407.

We therefore substantially agree with Dr. A. C. Kendrick, in his article in the *Sunday School Times*: "To infants and children, as such, the language cannot apply. It must be taken figuratively, and must refer to those qualities in childhood, its dependence, its trustfulness, its tender affection, its loving obedience, which are typical of the essential Christian graces. . . . If asked after the logic of our Savior's words—how he could assign, as a reason for allowing *literal* little children to be brought to him, that *spiritual* little children have a claim to the kingdom of heaven—I reply: the persons that thus, as a class, typify the subjects of God's spiritual kingdom cannot be in themselves objects of indifference to him, or be regarded otherwise than with intense interest. . . . The class that in its very nature thus shadows forth the brightest features of Christian excellence must be subjects of God's special concern and care."

To these remarks of Dr. Kendrick we would add, that Jesus' words seem to us to intimate more than special concern and care. While these words seem intended to exclude all idea that infants are saved by their natural holiness, or without application to them of the blessings of his atonement, they also seem to us to include infants among the number of those who have the right to these blessings; in other words, Christ's concern and care go so far as to choose infants to eternal life, and to make them subjects of the kingdom of heaven. Cf. Mat. 18: 14 — "It is not the will of your Father who is in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish" — those whom Christ has received here, he will not reject hereafter. Of course this is said to infants, as infants. To those, therefore, who die before coming to moral consciousness, Christ's words assure salvation. Personal transgression, however, involves the necessity, before death, of a personal repentance and faith, in order to salvation.

(d) The descriptions of God's merciful provision as coextensive with the ruin of the Fall also lead us to believe that those who die in infancy receive salvation through Christ as certainly as they inherit sin from Adam.

John 3: 16 — "For God so loved the world" — includes infants. Rom. 5: 14 — "death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression, who is a figure of him that was to come" — there is an application to infants of the life in Christ, as there was an application to them of the death in Adam; 11-12 — "For as through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, even so through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous. And the law came in besides, that the trespass might abound; but where sin abounded, grace did abound more exceedingly: that, as sin reigned in death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord" — as without personal act of theirs infants inherited corruption from Adam, so without personal act of theirs salvation is provided for them in Christ.

Hovey, Bib. Eschatology, 170, 171 — "Though the sacred writers say nothing in respect to the future condition of those who die in infancy, one can scarcely err in deriving from this silence a favorable conclusion. That no prophet or apostle, that no devout father or mother, should have expressed any solicitude as to those who die before they are able to discern good from evil is surprising, unless such solicitude was prevented by the Spirit of God. There are no instances of prayer for children taken away in infancy. The Savior nowhere teaches that they are in danger of being lost. We therefore heartily and confidently believe that they are redeemed by the blood of Christ and sanctified by his Spirit, so that when they enter the unseen world they will be found with the saints." David ceased to fast and weep when his child died, for he said: "I shall go to him, but he will not return to me" (2 Sam. 12: 23).

(e) The condition of salvation for adults is personal faith. Infants are incapable of fulfilling this condition. Since Christ has died for all, we have reason to believe that provision is made for their reception of Christ in some other way.

2 Cor. 5: 15 — "he died for all"; Mark 16: 16 — "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that disbelieveth shall be condemned" (verses 9-20 are of canonical authority, though probably not written by Mark). Dr. G. W. Northrop held that, as death to the Christian has ceased to be penalty, so death to all infants is no longer penalty, Christ having atoned for and removed the guilt of original sin for all men, infants included. But we reply that there is no evidence that there is any guilt taken away except for those who come into vital union with Christ. H. G. Robinson, Christian Theology, 166 — "The curse falls alike on every one by birth, but may be alleviated or intensified by every one who comes to years of responsibility, according as his nature which brings the curse rules, or is ruled by, his reason and conscience. So the blessings of salvation are procured for all alike, but may be lost or secured according to the attitude of everyone toward Christ who alone procures them. To infants, as the curse comes without their election, so in like manner comes its removal."

(f) At the final judgment, personal conduct is made the test of character. But infants are incapable of personal transgression. We have reason, therefore, to believe that they will be among the saved, since this rule of decision will not apply to them.

Mat. 25: 45, 46 — "Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of these least, ye did it not unto me. And these shall go away into eternal punishment"; Rom. 2: 6, 7 — "the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God; who

will render to every man according to his works." Norman Fox, *The Unfolding of Baptist Doctrine*, 24—"Not only the Roman Catholics believed in the damnation of infants. The Lutherans, in the Augsburg Confession, condemn the Baptists for affirming that children are saved without baptism—'damnant Anabaptistas qui . . . affirmant pueros sine baptismo salvos fieri'—and the favorite poet of Presbyterian Scotland, in his *Tam O'Shanter*, names among objects from hell 'Twa span-lang, wee, unchristened bairns.' The Westminster Confession, in declaring that 'elect infants dying in infancy' are saved, implies that non-elect infants dying in infancy are lost. This was certainly taught by some of the framers of that creed."

Yet John Calvin did not believe in the damnation of infants, as he has been charged with believing. In the Amsterdam edition of his works, 8:522, we read: "I do not doubt that the infants whom the Lord gathers together from this life are regenerated by a secret operation of the Holy Spirit." In his *Institutes*, book 4, chap. 16, p. 335, he speaks of the exemption of infants from the grace of salvation "as an idea not free from execrable blasphemy." The Presb. and Ref. Rev., Oct. 1890: 684-651, quotes Calvin as follows: "I everywhere teach that no one can be justly condemned and perish except on account of actual sin; and to say that the countless mortals taken from life while yet infants are precipitated from their mothers' arms into eternal death is a blasphemy to be universally detested." So also John Owen, Works, 8:522—"There are two ways by which God saveth infants. First, by interesting them in the covenant, if their immediate or remote parents have been believers; . . . Secondly, by his grace of election, which is most free and not tied to any conditions; by which I make no doubt but God taketh unto him in Christ many whose parents never knew, or were despisers of, the gospel."

*all infants  
are saved*

(g) Since there is no evidence that children dying in infancy are regenerated prior to death, either with or without the use of external means, it seems most probable that the work of regeneration may be performed by the Spirit in connection with the infant soul's first view of Christ in the other world. As the remains of natural depravity in the Christian are eradicated, not by death, but at death, through the sight of Christ and union with him, so the first moment of consciousness for the infant may be coincident with a view of Christ the Savior which accomplishes the entire sanctification of its nature.

2 Cor. 3:18—"But we all, beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as from the Lord the Spirit"; 1 John 3:2—"We know that, if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is." If asked why more is not said upon the subject in Scripture, we reply: It is according to the analogy of God's general method to hide things that are not of immediate practical value. In some passages, moreover, knowledge of the fact that all children dying in infancy are saved might have seemed to make infanticide a virtue.

While we agree with the following writers as to the salvation of all infants who die before the age of conscious and wilful transgression, we dissent from the seemingly Arminian tendency of the explanation which they suggest. H. E. Robins, *Harmony of Ethics with Theology*: "The judicial declaration of acquittal on the ground of the death of Christ which comes upon all men, into the benefits of which they are introduced by natural birth, is inchoate justification, and will become perfected justification through the new birth of the Holy Spirit, unless the working of this divine agent is resisted by the personal moral action of those who are lost." So William Ashmore, in *Christian Review*, 26:245-264. F. O. Dickey: "As infants are members of the race, and as they are justified from the penalty against inherited sin by the mediatorial work of Christ, so the race itself is justified from the same penalty and to the same extent as are they, and were the race to die in infancy it would be saved." The truth in the above utterances seems to us to be that Christ's union with the race secures the objective reconciliation of the race to God. But subjective and personal reconciliation depends upon a moral union with Christ which can be accomplished for the infant only by his own appropriation of Christ at death.

While, in the nature of things and by the express declarations of Scripture, we are precluded from extending this doctrine of regeneration at death

to any who have committed personal sins, we are nevertheless warranted in the conclusion that, certain and great as is the guilt of original sin, no human soul is eternally condemned solely for this sin of nature, but that, on the other hand, all who have not consciously and wilfully transgressed are made partakers of Christ's salvation.

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The advocates of a second probation, on the other hand, should logically hold that infants in the next world are in a state of sin, and that at death they only enter upon a period of probation in which they may, or may not, accept Christ,—a doctrine much less comforting than that propounded above. See Prentiss, in *Presb. Rev.*, July, 1883: 548-580—"Lyman Beecher and Charles Hodge first made current in this country the doctrine of the salvation of all who die in infancy. If this doctrine be accepted, then it follows: (1) that these partakers of original sin must be saved wholly through divine grace and power; (2) that in the child unborn there is the promise and potency of complete spiritual manhood; (3) that salvation is possible entirely apart from the visible church and the means of grace; (4) that to a full half of the race this life is not in any way a period of probation; (5) that heathen may be saved who have never even heard of the gospel; (6) that the providence of God includes in its scope both infants and heathen."

"Children exert a redeeming and reclaiming influence upon us, their casual acts and words and simple trust recalling our world-hardened and wayward hearts again to the feet of God. Elias Marner, the old weaver of Raveloe, so pathetically and vividly described in George Eliot's novel, was a hard, desolate, godless old miser, but after little Eppie strayed into his miserable cottage that memorable winter night, he began again to believe. 'I think now,' he said at last, 'I can trusten God until I die.' An incident in a Southern hospital illustrates the power of children to call men to repentance. A little girl was to undergo a dangerous operation. When she mounted the table, and the doctor was about to etherize her, he said: 'Before we can make you well, we must put you to sleep.' 'Oh then, if you are going to put me to sleep,' she sweetly said, 'I must say my prayers first.' Then, getting down on her knees, and folding her hands, she repeated that lovely prayer learned at every true mother's feet: 'Now I lay me down to sleep, I pray the Lord my soul to keep.' Just for a moment there were moist eyes in that group, for deep chords were touched, and the surgeon afterwards said: 'I prayed that night for the first time in thirty years.'" The child that is old enough to sin against God is old enough to trust in Christ as the Savior of sinners. See Van Dyke, *Christ and Little Children*; Whitatt and Warfield, *Infant Baptism and Infant Salvation*; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 1:26, 27; Ridgely, *Body of Div.*, 1:422-425; Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 1, 8; Westminster Larger Catechism, x, 3; Krauth, *Infant Salvation in the Calvinistic System*; Candlish on Atonement, part II, chap. 1; Geo. P. Fisher, in *New Englander*, Apr. 1838: 338; J. F. Clarke, *Truths and Errors of Orthodoxy*, 360.

\* which Evangelism. child old  
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Christ

## PART VI.

### SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION THROUGH THE WORK OF CHRIST AND OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

#### CHAPTER I.

#### CHRISTOLOGY, OR THE REDEMPTION BROUGHT BY CHRIST.

##### SECTION I.—HISTORICAL PREPARATION FOR REDEMPTION.

Since God had from eternity determined to redeem mankind, the history of the race from the time of the Fall to the coming of Christ was providentially arranged to prepare the way for this redemption. The preparation was two-fold:

##### I. NEGATIVE PREPARATION,—in the history of the heathen world.

This showed (1) the true nature of sin, and the depth of spiritual ignorance and of moral depravity to which the race, left to itself, must fall; and (2) the powerlessness of human nature to preserve or regain an adequate knowledge of God, or to deliver itself from sin by philosophy or art.

Why could not Eve have been the mother of the chosen seed, as she doubtless at the first supposed that she was? (Gen. 4:1—"and she conceived, and bare Cain [i. e., 'gotten', or 'acquired'], and said, I have gotten a man, even Jehovah"). Why was not the cross set up at the gates of Eden? Scripture intimates that a preparation was needful (Gal. 4:4—"but when the fulness of the time came, God sent forth his Son"). Of the two agencies made use of, we have called heathenism the negative preparation. But it was not wholly negative; it was partly positive also. Justin Martyr spoke of a *λόγος ἑσπεριώτικος* among the heathen. Clement of Alexandria called Plato a *Μωϋσῆς ἑλληνίζων*—a Greek-speaking Moses. Notice the priestly attitude of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Pindar, Sophocles. The Bible recognizes Job, Balaam, Melchisedek, as instances of priesthood, or divine communication, outside the bounds of the chosen people. Heathen religions either were not religions, or God had a part in them. Confucius, Buddha, Zoroaster, were at least reformers, raised up in God's providence. Gal. 4:3 classes Judaism with the 'rudiments of the world,' and Rom. 8:20 tells us that 'the law came in beside,' as a force coöperating with other human factors, primitive revelation, sin, etc."

The positive preparation in heathenism receives greater attention when we conceive of Christ as the immanent God, revealing himself in conscience and in history. This was the real meaning of Justin Martyr, Apol. 1:46; 2:10, 13—"The whole race of men partook of the Logos, and those who lived according to reason (*λόγῳ*), were Christians, even though they were accounted atheists. Such among the Greeks were Socrates and Heraclitus, and those who resembled them. . . . Christ was known in part even to Socrates. . . . The teachings of Plato are not alien to those of Christ, though not in all respects similar. For all the writers of antiquity were able to have a dim vision of realities by means of the indwelling seed of the implanted Word (*λόγῳ*)."  
Justin Martyr claimed inspiration for Socrates. Tertullian spoke of Socrates as "pene nos-

ter"—"almost one of us." Paul speaks of the Cretans as having "a prophet of their own" (Tit. 1: 12)—probably Epimenides (596 B. C.) whom Plato calls a θεός ἀνθρώπου—"a man of God," and whom Cicero couples with Bacis and the Erythrean Sibyl. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 1: 19; 6: 5—"The same God who furnished both the covenants was the giver of the Greek philosophy to the Greeks, by which the Almighty is glorified among the Greeks." Augustine: "Plato made me know the true God; Jesus Christ showed me the way to him."

Bruce, Apologetics, 207—"God gave to the Gentiles at least the starlight of religious knowledge. The Jews were elected for the sake of the Gentiles. There was some light even for pagans, though heathenism on the whole was a failure. But its very failure was a preparation for receiving the true religion." Hatch, Hibbert Lectures, 133, 238—"Neo-Platonism, that splendid vision of incomparable and irrecoverable cloudland in which the sun of Greek philosophy set. . . . On its ethical side Christianity had large elements in common with reformed Stoicism; on its theological side it moved in harmony with the new movements of Platonism." E. G. Robinson: "The idea that all religions but the Christian are the direct work of the devil is a Jewish idea, and is now abandoned. On the contrary, God has revealed himself to the race just so far as they have been capable of knowing him. . . . Any religion is better than none, for all religion implies restraint."

John 1: 9—"There was the true light, even the light which lighteth every man, coming into the world"—has its Old Testament equivalent in Ps. 94: 10—"He that chastiseth the nations, shall not be correct, even he that teacheth man knowledge?" Christ is the great educator of the race. The preincarnate Word exerted an influence upon the consciences of the heathen. He alone makes it true that "anima naturaliter Christiana est." Sabatier, Philos. Religion, 138-140—"Religion is union between God and the soul. That experience was first perfectly realized in Christ. Here are the ideal fact and the historical fact united and blended. Origen's and Tertullian's rationalism and orthodoxy each has its truth. The religious consciousness of Christ is the fountain head from which Christianity has flowed. He was a beginning of life to men. He had the spirit of sonship—God in man, and man in God. 'Quid interius Deo?' He showed us insistence on the moral ideal, yet the preaching of mercy to the sinner. The gospel was the acorn, and Christianity is the oak that has sprung from it. In the acorn, as in the tree, are some Hebraic elements that are temporary. Paganism is the materializing of religion; Judaism is the legalizing of religion. 'In me,' says Charles Secretan, 'lives some one greater than I.'"

But the positive element in heathenism was slight. Her altars and sacrifices, her philosophy and art, roused cravings which she was powerless to satisfy. Her religious systems became sources of deeper corruption. There was no hope, and no progress. "The Sphinx's moveless calm symbolizes the monotony of Egyptian civilization." Classical nations became more despairing, as they became more cultivated. To the best minds, truth seemed impossible of attainment, and all hope of general well-being seemed a dream. The Jews were the only forward-looking people; and all our modern confidence in destiny and development comes from them. They, in their turn, drew their hopefulness solely from prophecy. Not their "genius for religion," but special revelation from God, made them what they were.

Although God was in heathen history, yet so exceptional were the advantages of the Jews, that we can almost assent to the doctrine of the New Englander, Sept. 1833: 576—"The Bible does not recognize other revelations. It speaks of the 'face of the covering that covereth all peoples, and the veil that is spread over all nations' (Is. 25: 7); Acts 14: 16, 17—"who in the generations gone by suffered all the nations to walk in their own ways. And yet he left not himself without witness"—not an internal revelation in the hearts of sages, but an external revelation in nature, 'in that he did good and gave you from heaven rains and fruitful seasons, filling your hearts with food and gladness.' The convictions of heathen reformers with regard to divine inspiration were dim and intangible, compared with the consciousness of prophets and apostles that God was speaking through them to his people."

On heathenism as a preparation for Christ, see Tholuck, Nature and Moral Influence of Heathenism, in Bib. Repos., 1832: 30, 246, 441; Döllinger, Gentile and Jew; Pressensé, Religions before Christ; Max Müller, Science of Religion, 1-128; Cocker, Christianity and Greek Philosophy; Ackerman, Christian Element in Plato; Farrar, Seekers after God; Renaud, on Rome and Christianity, in Hibbert Lectures for 1880.

## II. POSITIVE PREPARATION,—in the history of Israel.

A single people was separated from all others, from the time of Abraham, and was educated in three great truths: (1) the majesty of God, in his

unity, omnipotence, and holiness; (2) the sinfulness of man, and his moral helplessness; (3) the certainty of a coming salvation. This education from the time of Moses was conducted by the use of three principal agencies:

A. Law.—The Mosaic legislation, (a) by its theophanies and miracles, cultivated faith in a personal and almighty God and Judge; (b) by its commands and threatenings, wakened the sense of sin; (c) by its priestly and sacrificial system, inspired hope of some way of pardon and access to God.

The education of the Jews was first of all an education by Law. In the history of the world, as in the history of the individual, law must precede gospel, John the Baptist must go before Christ, knowledge of sin must prepare a welcome entrance for knowledge of a Savior. While the heathen were studying God's works, the chosen people were studying God. Men teach by words as well as by works,—so does God. And words reveal heart to heart, as works never can. "The Jews were made to know, on behalf of all mankind, the guilt and shame of sin. Yet just when the disease was at its height, the physicians were beneath contempt." Wrightnour: "As if to teach all subsequent ages that no outward cleansing would furnish a remedy, the great deluge, which washed away the whole sinful antediluvian world with the exception of one comparatively pure family, had not cleansed the world from sin."

With this gradual growth in the sense of sin there was also a widening and deepening faith. Kuyper, *Work of the Holy Spirit*, 87—"Abel, Abraham, Moses—the individual, the family, the nation. By faith Abel obtained witness; by faith Abraham received the son of the promise; and by faith Moses led Israel through the Red Sea." Kurtz, *Religionslehre*, speaks of the relation between law and gospel as "Ein fließender Gegensatz"—"a flowing antithesis"—like that between flower and fruit. A. B. Davidson, *Expositor*, 8: 163—"The course of revelation is like a river, which cannot be cut up into sections." E. G. Robinson: "The two fundamental ideas of Judaism were: 1. theological—the unity of God; 2. philosophical—the distinctness of God from the material world. Judaism went to seed. Jesus, with the sledge-hammer of truth, broke up the dead forms, and the Jews thought he was destroying the Law." On methods pursued with humanity by God, see Simon, *Reconciliation*, 232-251.

B. Prophecy.—This was of two kinds: (a) verbal,—beginning with the protevangelium in the garden, and extending to within four hundred years of the coming of Christ; (b) typical,—in persons, as Adam, Melchisedek, Joseph, Moses, Joshua, David, Solomon, Jonah; and in acts, as Isaac's sacrifice, and Moses' lifting up the serpent in the wilderness.

The relation of law to gospel was like that of a sketch to the finished picture, or of David's plan for the temple to Solomon's execution of it. When all other nations were sunk in pessimism and despair, the light of hope burned brightly among the Hebrews. The nation was forward-bound. Faith was its very life. The O. T. saints saw all the troubles of the present "sub specie eternitatis," and believed that "Light is sown for the righteous, And gladness for the upright in heart" (Ps. 97: 11). The hope of Job was the hope of the chosen people: "I know that my Redeemer liveth, And at last he will stand up upon the earth" (Job 19: 25). Hutton, *Essays*, 2: 237—"Hebrew supernaturalism has transmuted forever the pure naturalism of Greek poetry. And now no modern poet can ever become really great who does not feel and reproduce in his writings the difference between the natural and the supernatural."

Christ was the reality, to which the types and ceremonies of Judaism pointed; and these latter disappeared when Christ had come, just as the petals of the blossom drop away when the fruit appears. Many promises to the O. T. saints which seemed to them promises of temporal blessing, were fulfilled in a better, because a more spiritual, way than they expected. Thus God cultivated in them a boundless trust—a trust which was essentially the same thing with the faith of the new dispensation, because it was the absolute reliance of a consciously helpless sinner upon God's method of salvation, and so was implicitly, though not explicitly, a faith in Christ.

The protevangelium (Gen. 3: 15) said "it [this promised seed] shall bruise thy head." The

"It" was rendered in some Latin manuscripts "*ipsa*." Hence Roman Catholic divines attributed the victory to the Virgin. Notice that Satan was cured, but not Adam and Eve; for they were candidates for restoration. The promise of the Messiah narrowed itself down as the race grew older, from Abraham to Judah, David, Bethlehem, and the Virgin. Prophecy spoke of "the scepter" and of "the seventy weeks." Haggai and Malachi foretold that the Lord should suddenly come to the second temple. Christ was to be true man and true God; prophet, priest, and king; humbled and exalted. When prophecy had become complete, a brief interval elapsed, and then he, of whom Moses in the law, and the prophets, did write, actually came.

All these preparations for Christ's coming, however, through the perversity of man became most formidable obstacles to the progress of the gospel. The Roman Empire put Christ to death. Philosophy rejected Christ as foolishness. Jewish ritualism, the mere shadow, usurped the place of worship and faith, the substance of religion. God's last method of preparation in the case of Israel was that of

C. Judgment.—Repeated divine chastisements for idolatry culminated in the overthrow of the kingdom, and the captivity of the Jews. The exile had two principal effects: (a) religious,—in giving monotheism firm root in the heart of the people, and in leading to the establishment of the synagogue-system, by which monotheism was thereafter preserved and propagated; (b) civil,—in converting the Jews from an agricultural to a trading people, scattering them among all nations, and finally imbuing them with the spirit of Roman law and organization.

Thus a people was made ready to receive the gospel and to propagate it throughout the world, at the very time when the world had become conscious of its needs, and, through its greatest philosophers and poets, was expressing its longings for deliverance.

At the junction of Europe, Asia, and Africa, there lay a little land through which passed all the caravan-routes from the East to the West. Palestine was "the eye of the world." The Hebrews throughout the Roman world were "the greater Palestine of the Dispersion." The scattering of the Jews through all lands had prepared a monotheistic starting point for the gospel in every heathen city. Jewish synagogues had prepared places of assembly for the hearing of the gospel. The Greek language—the universal literary language of the world—had prepared a medium in which that gospel could be spoken. "Cæsar had unified the Latin West, as Alexander the Greek East"; and universal peace, together with Roman roads and Roman law, made it possible for that gospel, when once it had got a foothold, to spread itself to the ends of the earth. The first dawn of missionary enterprise appears among the proselyting Jews before Christ's time. Christianity laid hold of this proselyting spirit, and sanctified it, to conquer the world to the faith of Christ.

Beyschlag, N. T. Theology, 2: 2, 10—"In his great expedition across the Hellespont, Paul reversed the course which Alexander took, and carried the gospel into Europe to the centres of the old Greek culture." In all these preparations we see many lines converging to one result, in a manner inexplicable, unless we take them as proofs of the wisdom and power of God preparing the way for the kingdom of his Son; and all this in spite of the fact that "a hardening in part hath befallen Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in" (Rom. 11: 25). James Robertson, *Early Religion of Israel*, 15—"Israel now instructs the world in the worship of Mammon, after having once taught it the knowledge of God."

On Judaism, as a preparation for Christ, see Döllinger, *Gentile and Jew*, 2: 201-419; Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 224-236; Hengstenberg, *Christology of the O. T.*; Smith, *Prophecy a Preparation for Christ*; Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 458-485; Fairbairn, *Typology*; MacWhorter, *Jahveh Christ*; Kurtz, *Christliche Religionslehre*, 114; Edwards' *History of Redemption*, in *Works*, 1: 297-395; Walker, *Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation*; Conybeare and Howson, *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, 1: 1-37; Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, 257-281; Schaff, *Hist. Christian Ch.*, 1: 32-49; Butler's *Analogy*, Bohn's ed., 228-238; Bushnell, *Vicarious Sac.*, 63-66; Max Müller, *Science of Language*, 2: 443; Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 463-485; Fisher, *Beginnings of Christianity*, 47-78.

## SECTION II.—THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

The redemption of mankind from sin was to be effected through a Mediator who should unite in himself both the human nature and the divine, in order that he might reconcile God to man and man to God. To facilitate an understanding of the Scriptural doctrine under consideration, it will be desirable at the outset to present a brief historical survey of views respecting the Person of Christ.

In the history of doctrine, as we have seen, beliefs held in solution at the beginning are only gradually precipitated and crystallized into definite formulas. The first question which Christians naturally asked themselves was "What think ye of the Christ" (Mat. 22: 42); then his relation to the Father; then, in due succession, the nature of sin, of atonement, of justification, of regeneration. Connecting these questions with the names of the great leaders who sought respectively to answer them, we have: 1. the Person of Christ, treated by Gregory Nazianzen (328); 2. the Trinity, by Athanasius (325-373); 3. Sin, by Augustine (353-430); 4. Atonement, by Anselm (1033-1109); 5. Justification by faith, by Luther (1483-1546); 6. Regeneration, by John Wesley (1703-1791);—six weekdays of theology, leaving only a seventh, for the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which may be the work of our age. John 10: 36—"him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world"—hints at some mysterious process by which the Son was prepared for his mission. Athanasius: "If the Word of God is in the world, as in a body, what is there strange in affirming that he has also entered into humanity?" This is the natural end of evolution from lower to higher. See Medd, *Bampton Lectures for 1882, on The One Mediator: The Operation of the Son of God in Nature and in Grace*; Orr, *God's Image in Man*.

## I. HISTORICAL SURVEY OF VIEWS RESPECTING THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

1. *The Ebionites* (עביונים = 'poor'; A. D. 107?) denied the reality of Christ's divine nature, and held him to be merely man, whether naturally or supernaturally conceived. This man, however, held a peculiar relation to God, in that, from the time of his baptism, an unmeasured fulness of the divine Spirit rested upon him. Ebionism was simply Judaism within the pale of the Christian church, and its denial of Christ's godhood was occasioned by the apparent incompatibility of this doctrine with monotheism.

First (Heb. Lexicon) derives the name 'Ebionite' from the word signifying 'poor'; see Ia. 25: 4—"thou hast been a stronghold to the poor"; Mat. 5: 3—"Blessed are the poor in spirit" It means "oppressed, pious souls." Epiphanius traces them back to the Christians who took refuge, A. D. 66, at Pella, just before the destruction of Jerusalem. They lasted down to the fourth century. Dörner can assign no age for the formation of the sect, nor any historically ascertained person as its head. It was not Judaic Christianity, but only a fraction of this. There were two divisions of the Ebionites:

(a) The Nazarenes, who held to the supernatural birth of Christ, while they would not go to the length of admitting the preëxisting hypostasis of the Son. They are said to have had the gospel of Matthew, in Hebrew.

(b) The Cerinthian Ebionites, who put the baptism of Christ in place of his supernatural birth, and made the ethical sonship the cause of the physical. It seemed to them a heathenish fable that the Son of God should be born of the Virgin. There was no personal union between the divine and human in Christ. Christ, as distinct from Jesus, was not a merely impersonal power descending upon Jesus, but a preëxisting hypostasis above the world-creating powers. The Cerinthian Ebionites, who on the whole best represent the spirit of Ebionism, approximated to Pharisaic Judaism, and were hostile to the writings of Paul. The Epistle to the Hebrews, in fact, is intended to counteract an Ebionitic tendency to overstrain law and to underrate Christ. In a complete view, however, should also be mentioned:

(c) The Gnostic Ebionism of the pseudo-Clementines, which in order to destroy the deity of Christ and save the pure monotheism, so-called, of primitive religion, gave up even the best part of the Old Testament. In all its forms, Ebionism conceives of God and man as external to each other. God could not become man. Christ was no more

than a prophet or teacher, who, as the reward of his virtue, was from the time of his baptism specially endowed with the Spirit. After his death he was exalted to kingship. But that would not justify the worship which the church paid him. A merely creaturely mediator would separate us from God, instead of uniting us to him. See Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 305-307 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 201-204), and *Hist. Doct. Person Christ*, A. 1: 187-217; Reuss, *Hist. Christ. Theol.*, 1: 100-107; Schaff, *Ch. Hist.*, 1: 212-215.

2. *The Docetæ* (*δοκῆς*—'to seem,' 'to appear'; A. D. 70-170), like most of the Gnostics in the second century and the Manichees in the third, denied the reality of Christ's human body. This view was the logical sequence of their assumption of the inherent evil of matter. If matter is evil and Christ was pure, then Christ's human body must have been merely phantasmal. Docetism was simply pagan philosophy introduced into the church.

The Gnostic Basilides held to a real human Christ, with whom the divine *voûs* became united at the baptism; but the followers of Basilides became Docetæ. To them, the body of Christ was merely a seeming one. There was no real life or death. Valentinus made the *Æon*, Christ, with a body purely pneumatic and worthy of himself, pass through the body of the Virgin, as water through a reed, taking up into himself nothing of the human nature through which he passed; or as a ray of light through colored glass which only imparts to the light a portion of its own darkness. Christ's life was simply a theophany. The Patripassians and Sabellians, who are only sects of the Docetæ, denied all real humanity to Christ. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 141—"He treads the thorns of death and shame 'like a triumphal path,' of which he never felt the sharpness. There was development only externally and in appearance. No ignorance can be ascribed to him amidst the omniscience of the Godhead." Shelley: "A mortal shape to him Was as the vapor dim Which the orient planet animates with light." The strong argument against Docetism was found in *Ish. 2: 14*—"Since then the children are sharers in flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner partook of the same."

That Docetism appeared so early, shows that the impression Christ made was that of a superhuman being. Among many of the Gnostics, the philosophy which lay at the basis of their Docetism was a pantheistic apotheosis of the world. God did not need to become man, for man was essentially divine. This view, and the opposite error of Judaism, already mentioned, both showed their insufficiency by attempts to combine with each other, as in the Alexandrian philosophy. See Dorner, *Hist. Doct. Person Christ*, A. 1: 218-252, and *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 307-310 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 204-206); Neander, *Ch. Hist.*, 1: 287.

3. *The Arians* (Arius, condemned at Nice, 325) denied the integrity of the divine nature in Christ. They regarded the Logos who united himself to humanity in Jesus Christ, not as possessed of absolute godhood, but as the first and highest of created beings. This view originated in a misinterpretation of the Scriptural accounts of Christ's state of humiliation, and in mistaking temporary subordination for original and permanent inequality.

Arianism is called by Dorner a reaction from Sabellianism. Sabellius had reduced the incarnation of Christ to a temporary phenomenon. Arius thought to lay stress on the hypostasis of the Son, and to give it fixity and substance. But, to his mind, the reality of Sonship seemed to require subordination to the Father. Origen had taught the subordination of the Son to the Father, in connection with his doctrine of eternal generation. Arius held to the subordination, and also to the generation, but this last, he declared, could not be eternal, but must be in time. See Dorner, *Person Christ*, A. 2: 227-244, and *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 307, 312, 318 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 203, 207-210); Herzog, *Encyclopædie*, art.: Arianismus. See also this Compendium, Vol. I: 328-330.

4. *The Apollinarians* (Apollinaris, condemned at Constantinople, 381) denied the integrity of Christ's human nature. According to this view, Christ had no human *voûs* or *πνεῦμα*, other than that which was furnished by

the divine nature. Christ had only the human *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*; the place of the human *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα* was filled by the divine Logos. Apollinarianism is an attempt to construe the doctrine of Christ's person in the forms of the Platonic trichotomy.

Lest divinity should seem a foreign element, when added to this curtailed manhood, Apollinaris said that there was an eternal tendency to the human in the Logos himself; that in God was the true manhood; that the Logos is the eternal, archetypal man. But here is no *becoming* man — only a manifestation in flesh of what the Logos already was. So we have a Christ of great head and dwarfed body. Justin Martyr preceded Apollinaris in this view. In opposing it, the church Fathers said that "what the Son of God has not taken to himself, he has not sanctified" — τὸ ἀπολάμβανον καὶ ἁγιασθένον. See Dorner, *Jahrbuch f. d. Theol.*, 1: 397-408 — "The impossibility, on the Arian theory, of making two finite souls into one, finally led to the [Apollinarian] denial of any human soul in Christ"; see also, Dorner, *Person Christ*, A. 2: 332-339, and *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 310 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 206, 207); Shedd, *Hist. Doctrine*, 1: 394.

Apollinaris taught that the eternal Word took into union with himself, not a complete human nature, but an irrational human animal. Simon, *Reconciliation*, 329, comes near to being an Apollinarian, when he maintains that the incarnate Logos was human, but was not a man. He is the constituter of man, self-limited, in order that he may save that to which he has given life. Gore, *Incarnation*, 93 — "Apollinaris suggested that the archetype of manhood exists in God, who made man in his own image, so that man's nature in some sense preëxisted in God. The Son of God was eternally human, and he could fill the place of the human mind in Christ without his ceasing to be in some sense divine. . . . This the church negatived, — man is not God, nor God man. The first principle of theism is that manhood at the bottom is not the same thing as Godhead. This is a principle intimately bound up with man's responsibility and the reality of sin. The interests of theism were at stake."

5. *The Nestorians* (Nestorius, removed from the Patriarchate of Constantinople, 431) denied the real union between the divine and the human natures in Christ, making it rather a moral than an organic one. They refused therefore to attribute to the resultant unity the attributes of each nature, and regarded Christ as a man in very near relation to God. Thus they virtually held to two natures and two persons, instead of two natures in one person.

Nestorius disliked the phrase: "Mary, mother of God." The Chalcedon statement asserted its truth, with the significant addition: "as to his humanity." Nestorius made Christ a peculiar temple of God. He believed in *συνάφεια*, not *ἕνωσις*, — junction and indwelling, but not absolute union. He made too much of the analogy of the union of the believer with Christ, and separated as much as possible the divine and the human. The two natures were, in his view, *ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος*, instead of being *ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο*, which together constitute *εἷς* — one personality. The union which he accepted was a moral union, which makes Christ simply God and man, instead of the God-man.

John of Damascus compared the passion of Christ to the felling of a tree on which the sun shines. The axe fells the tree, but does no harm to the sunbeams. So the blows which struck Christ's humanity caused no harm to his deity; while the flesh suffered, the deity remained impassible. This leaves, however, no divine efficacy of the human sufferings, and no personal union of the human with the divine. The error of Nestorius arose from a philosophic nominalism, which refused to conceive of nature without personality. He believed in nothing more than a local or moral union, like the marriage union, in which two become one; or like the state, which is sometimes called a moral person, because having a unity composed of many persons. See Dorner, *Person Christ*, B. 1: 52-79, and *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 315, 316 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 211-213); Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 4: 210; Wülfers, *Incarnation*, 152-154.

"There was no need here of the virgin-birth, — to secure a sinless father as well as mother would have been enough. Nestorianism holds to no real incarnation — only to an alliance between God and man. After the fashion of the Siamese twins, Chang and Eng, man and God are joined together. But the incarnation is not merely a higher degree of the mystical union." Gore, *Incarnation*, 94 — "Nestorius adopted and pop-

ularized the doctrine of the famous commentator, Theodore of Mopsuestia. But the Christ of Nestorius was simply a deified man, not God incarnate, — he was from below, not from above. If he was exalted to union with the divine essence, his exaltation was only that of one individual man."

6. *The Eutychians* (condemned at Chalcedon, 451) denied the distinction and coexistence of the two natures, and held to a mingling of both into one, which constituted a *tertium quid*, or third nature. Since in this case the divine must overpower the human, it follows that the human was really absorbed into or transmuted into the divine, although the divine was not in all respects the same, after the union, that it was before. Hence the Eutychians were often called Monophysites, because they virtually reduced the two natures to one.

They were an Alexandrian school, which included monks of Constantinople and Egypt. They used the words *σύγχυσις, μεταβολή*—confounding, transformation—to describe the union of the two natures in Christ. Humanity joined to deity was as a drop of honey mingled with the ocean. There was a change in either element, but as when a stone attracts the earth, or a meteorite the sun, or when a small boat pulls a ship, all the movement was virtually on the part of the smaller object. Humanity was so absorbed in deity, as to be altogether lost. The union was illustrated by electron, a metal compounded of silver and gold. A more modern illustration would be that of the chemical union of an acid and an alkali, to form a salt unlike either of the constituents.

In effect this theory denied the human element, and, with this, the possibility of atonement, on the part of human nature, as well as of real union of man with God. Such a magical union of the two natures as Eutyches described is inconsistent with any real *becoming man* on the part of the Logos,—the manhood is well-nigh as illusory as upon the theory of the Docetæ. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 140—"This turns not the Godhead only but the manhood also into something foreign—into some nameless nature, betwixt and between—the fabulous nature of a semi-human demigod," like the Centaur.

The author of "The German Theology" says that "Christ's human nature was utterly bereft of self, and was nothing else but a house and habitation of God." The Mystics would have human personality so completely the organ of the divine that "we may be to God what man's hand is to a man," and that "I" and "mine" may cease to have any meaning. Both these views savor of Eutychianism. On the other hand, the Unitarian says that Christ was "a mere man." But there cannot be such a thing as a mere man, exclusive of aught above and beyond him, self-centered and self-moved. The Trinitarian sometimes declares himself as believing that Christ is God and man, thus implying the existence of two substances. Better say that Christ is the God-man, who manifests all the divine powers and qualities of which all men and all nature are partial embodiments. See Dörner, *Person of Christ*, B. 1:83-93, and *Glaubenslehre*, 2:313, 319 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3:214-218); Guericke, *Ch. History*, 1:356-380.

The foregoing survey would seem to show that history had exhausted the possibilities of heresy, and that the future denials of the doctrine of Christ's person must be, in essence, forms of the views already mentioned. All controversies with regard to the person of Christ must, of necessity, hinge upon one of three points: first, the reality of the two natures; secondly, the integrity of the two natures; thirdly, the union of the two natures in one person. Of these points, Ebionism and Docetism deny the reality of the natures; Arianism and Apollinarianism deny their integrity; while Nestorianism and Eutychianism deny their proper union. In opposition to all these errors, the orthodox doctrine held its ground and maintains it to this day.

We may apply to this subject what Dr. A. P. Peabody said in a different connection: "The canon of infidelity was closed almost as soon as that of the Scriptures"—modern unbelievers having, for the most part, repeated the objections of their ancient predecessors. Brooks, *Foundations of Zoölogy*, 126—"As a shell which has failed to burst is

plucked up on some old battle-field, by some one on whom experience is thrown away, and is exploded by him in the bosom of his approving family, with disastrous results, so one of these abandoned beliefs may be dug up by the head of some intellectual family, to the confusion of those who follow him as their leader."

7. *The Orthodox doctrine* (promulgated at Chalcedon, 451) holds that in the one person Jesus Christ there are two natures, a human nature and a divine nature, each in its completeness and integrity, and that these two natures are organically and indissolubly united, yet so that no third nature is formed thereby. In brief, to use the antiquated dictum, orthodox doctrine forbids us either to divide the person or to confound the natures.

That this doctrine is Scriptural and rational, we have yet to show. We may most easily arrange our proofs by reducing the three points mentioned to two, namely: first, the reality and integrity of the two natures; secondly, the union of the two natures in one person.

The formula of Chalcedon is negative, with the exception of its assertion of a *ἕνωσις ὑπερσυναιτώσας*. It proceeds from the natures, and regards the result of the union to be the person. Each of the two natures is regarded as in movement toward the other. The symbol says nothing of an *ὑπερσυναιτώσας* of the human nature, nor does it say that the Logos furnishes the ego in the personality. John of Damascus, however, pushed forward to these conclusions, and his work, translated into Latin, was used by Peter Lombard, and determined the views of the Western church of the Middle Ages. Dörner regards this as having given rise to the Mariolatry, saint-invocation, and transubstantiation of the Roman Catholic Church. See Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 189 sq.; Dörner, Person Christ, B. 1: 93-119, and Glaubenslehre, 2: 320-328 (Syst. Doct., 3: 216-223), in which last passage may be found valuable matter with regard to the changing uses of the words *ὑπερσυναιτώσας*, *ὑπερσυναιτώσας*, *ὁμοία*, etc.

Gore, Incarnation, 96, 101—"These decisions simply express in a new form, without substantial addition, the apostolic teaching as it is represented in the New Testament. They express it in a new form for protective purposes, as a legal enactment protects a moral principle. They are developments only in the sense that they represent the apostolic teaching worked out into formulas by the aid of a terminology which was supplied by Greek dialectics. . . . What the church borrowed from Greek thought was her terminology, not the substance of her creed. Even in regard to her terminology we must make one important reservation; for Christianity laid all stress on the personality of God and man, of which Hellenism had thought but little."

## II. THE TWO NATURES OF CHRIST, — THEIR REALITY AND INTEGRITY.

### 1. *The Humanity of Christ.*

A. Its Reality. — This may be shown as follows:

(a) He expressly called himself, and was called, "man."

John 8: 40 — "ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth"; Acts 2: 22 — "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God unto you"; Rom. 5: 15 — "the one man, Jesus Christ"; 1 Cor. 15: 21 — "by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead"; 1 Tim. 2: 5 — "one mediator also between God and man, himself man, Christ Jesus." Compare the genealogies in Mat. 1: 1-17 and Luke 3: 23-38, the former of which proves Jesus to be in the royal line, and the latter of which proves him to be in the natural line, of succession from David; the former tracing back his lineage to Abraham, and the latter to Adam. Christ is therefore the son of David, and of the stock of Israel. Compare also the phrase "son of man," e. g., in Mat. 20: 28, which, however much it may mean in addition, certainly indicates the veritable humanity of Jesus. Compare, finally, the term "flesh" (= human nature), applied to him in John 1: 14 — "And the Word became flesh," and in 1 John 4: 2 — "every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God."

"Jesus is the true Son of man whom he proclaimed himself to be. This implies that he is the representative of all humanity. Consider for a moment what is implied in your being a man. How many parents had you? You answer, Two. How many grandparents? You answer, Four. How many great-grandparents? Eight. How many great-great-grandparents? Sixteen. So the number of your ancestors increases

as you go further back, and if you take in only twenty generations, you will have to reckon yourself as the outcome of more than a million progenitors. The name Smith, or Jones, which you bear, represents only one strain of all those million; you might almost as well bear any other name; your existence is more an expression of the race at large than of any particular family or line. What is true of you, was true, on the human side, of the Lord Jesus. In him all the lines of our common humanity converged. He was the Son of man, far more than he was Son of Mary"; see A. H. Strong, Sermon before the London Baptist Congress.

(b) He possessed the essential elements of human nature as at present constituted — a material body and a rational soul.

Mat. 26:38 — "My soul is exceeding sorrowful"; John 11:33 — "he groaned in the spirit"; Mat. 26:38 — "this is my body"; 28 — "this is my blood"; Luke 24:39 — "a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye behold me having"; Heb. 2:14 — "since then the children are sharers in flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner partook of the same"; 1 John 1:1 — "that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled, concerning the Word of life"; 4:2 — "every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God."

Yet Christ was not all men in one, and he did not illustrate the development of all human powers. Laughter, painting, literature, marriage — these provinces he did not invade. Yet we do not regard these as absent from the ideal man. The perfection of Jesus was the perfection of self-limiting love. For our sakes he sanctified himself (John 17:19), or separated himself from much that in an ordinary man would have been excellence and delight. He became an example to us, by doing God's will and reflecting God's character in his particular environment and in his particular mission — that of the world's Redeemer; see H. E. Robins, *Ethics of the Christian Life*, 269-303.

Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, 86-105 — "Christ was not a man only amongst men. His relation to the human race is not that he was another specimen, differing, by being another, from every one but himself. His relation to the race was not a differentiating but a consummating relation. He was not generically but inclusively man. . . . The only relation that can at all directly compare with it is that of Adam, who in a real sense was humanity. . . . That complete indwelling and possessing of even one other, which the yearnings of man toward man imperfectly approach, is only possible, in any fulness of the words, to that spirit of man which is the Spirit of God; to the Spirit of God become, through incarnation, the spirit of man. . . . If Christ's humanity were not the humanity of Deity, it could not stand in the wide, inclusive, consummating relation, in which it stands, in fact, to the humanity of all other men. . . . Yet the centre of Christ's being as man was not in himself but in God. He was the expression, by willing reflection, of Another."

(c) He was moved by the instinctive principles, and he exercised the active powers, which belong to a normal and developed humanity (hunger, thirst, weariness, sleep, love, compassion, anger, anxiety, fear, groaning, weeping, prayer).

Mat. 4:2 — "he afterward hungered"; John 19:28 — "I thirst"; 4:6 — "Jesus therefore, being wearied with his journey, sat thus by the well"; Mat. 8:24 — "the boat was covered with the waves: but he was asleep"; Mark 10:21 — "Jesus looking upon him loved him"; Mat. 9:36 — "when he saw the multitudes, he was moved with compassion for them"; Mark 3:5 — "looked round about on them with anger, being grieved at the hardening of their heart"; Heb. 5:7 — "supplications with strong crying and tears unto him that was able to save him from death"; John 12:27 — "Now is my soul troubled; and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour"; 11:33 — "he groaned in the spirit"; 35 — "Jesus wept"; Mat. 14:23 — "he went up into the mountain apart to pray." Heb. 2:16 — "For it is not doubtless angels whom he rescueth, but he rescueth the seed of Abraham" (Kendrick).

Prof. J. P. Silvernail, on *The Elocution of Jesus*, finds the following intimations as to his delivery. It was characterized by 1. Naturalness (sitting, as at Capernaum); 2. Deliberation (cultivates responsiveness in his hearers); 3. Circumspection (he looked at Peter); 4. Dramatic action (woman taken in adultery); 5. Self-control (authority, poise, no vociferation, denunciation of Scribes and Pharisees). All these are manifestations of truly human qualities and virtues. The epistle of James, the brother of our Lord, with its exaltation of a meek, quiet and holy life, may be an unconscious reflection of the character of Jesus, as it had appeared to James during the early days at Nazareth. So John the Baptist's exclamation, "I have need to be baptized of thee" (Mat. 3:14), may be an inference from his intercourse with Jesus in childhood and youth.

(d) He was subject to the ordinary laws of human development, both in body and soul (grew and waxed strong in spirit; asked questions; grew in wisdom and stature; learned obedience; suffered being tempted; was made perfect through sufferings).

Luke 2: 40—"the child grew, and waxed strong, filled with wisdom"; 46—"sitting in the midst of the teachers, both hearing them, and asking them questions" (here, at his twelfth year, he appears first to become fully conscious that he is the Sent of God, the Son of God; 49—"knew ye not that I must be in my Father's house?" lit. 'in the things of my Father'); 52—"advanced in wisdom and stature"; Heb. 5: 8—"learned obedience by the things which he suffered"; 2: 18—"in that he himself hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted"; 10—"it became him . . . to make the author of their salvation perfect through sufferings."

Keble: "Was not our Lord a little child, Taught by degrees to pray; By father dear and mother mild Instructed day by day?" Adamson, *The Mind in Christ*: "To Henry Drummond Christianity was the crown of the evolution of the whole universe. Jesus' growth in stature and in favor with God and men is a picture in miniature of the age-long evolutionary process." Forrest, *Christ of History and of Experience*, 185—"The incarnation of the Son was not his one revelation of God, but the interpretation to sinful humanity of all his other revelations of God in nature and history and moral experience, which had been darkened by sin. . . . The Logos, incarnate or not, is the *εὐλογος* as well as the *ἀποχρῆ* of creation."

Andrew Murray, *Spirit of Christ*, 26, 27—"Though now baptized himself, he cannot yet baptize others. He must first, in the power of his baptism, meet temptation and overcome it; must learn obedience and suffer; yea, through the eternal Spirit, offer himself a sacrifice to God and his Will; then only could he afresh receive the Holy Spirit as the reward of obedience, with the power to baptize all who belong to him"; see Acts 2: 33—"Being therefore by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, he hath poured forth this, which ye see and hear."

(e) He suffered and died (bloody sweat; gave up his spirit; his side pierced, and straightway there came out blood and water).

Luke 23: 44—"being in an agony he prayed more earnestly; and his sweat became as it were great drops of blood falling down upon the ground"; John 19: 30—"he bowed his head, and gave up his spirit"; 34—"one of the soldiers with a spear pierced his side, and straightway there came out blood and water"—held by Stroud, *Physical Cause of our Lord's Death*, to be proof that Jesus died of a broken heart.

Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, 1: 9-19—"The Lord is said to have grown in wisdom and favor with God, not because it was so, but because he acted as if it were so. So he was exalted after death, as if this exaltation were on account of death." But we may reply: Resolve all signs of humanity into mere appearance, and you lose the divine nature as well as the human; for God is truth and cannot act a lie. The babe, the child, even the man, in certain respects, was ignorant. Jesus, the boy, was not making crosses, as in Overbeck's picture, but rather yokes and plows, as Justin Martyr relates—serving a real apprenticeship in Joseph's workshop: Mark 6: 3—"Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary?"

See Holman Hunt's picture, "The Shadow of the Cross"—in which not Jesus, but only Mary, sees the shadow of the cross upon the wall. He lived a life of faith, as well as of prayer (Heb. 12: 2—"Jesus the author [captain, prince] and perfecter of our faith"), dependent upon Scripture, which was much of it, as Ps. 16 and 118, and Lk. 49, 50, 51, written for him, as well as about him. See Park, *Discourses*, 297-337; Deutsch, *Remains*, 181—"The boldest transcendental flight of the Talmud is its saying: 'God prays.'" In Christ's humanity, united as it is to deity, we have the fact answering to this piece of Talmudic poetry.

B. Its Integrity. We here use the term 'integrity' to signify, not merely completeness, but perfection. That which is perfect is, *a fortiori*, complete in all its parts. Christ's human nature was:

(a) Supernaturally conceived; since the denial of his supernatural conception involves either a denial of the purity of Mary, his mother, or a denial of the truthfulness of Matthew's and Luke's narratives.

Luke 1: 34, 35—"And Mary said unto the angel, How shall this be, seeing I know not a man? And the angel answered and said unto her, The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee."

The "seed of the woman" (Gen. 3:15) was one who had no earthly father. "Ive" — life, not only as being the source of physical life to the race, but also as bringing into the world him who was to be its spiritual life. Julius Müller, *Proof-texts*, 29 — Jesus Christ "had no earthly father; his birth was a creative act of God, breaking through the chain of human generation." Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2:447 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3:345) — "The new science recognizes manifold methods of propagation, and that too even in one and the same species."

Professor Loeb has found that the unfertilized egg of the sea-urchin may be made by chemical treatment to produce thrifty young, and he thinks it probable that the same effect may be produced among the mammalia. Thus parthenogenesis in the highest order of life is placed among the scientific possibilities. Romanes, even while he was an agnostic, affirmed that a virgin-birth even in the human race would be by no means out of the range of possibility; see his *Darwin and After Darwin*, 113, footnote — "Even if a virgin has ever conceived and borne a son, and even if such a fact in the human species has been unique, it would not betoken any breach of physiological continuity." Only a new impulse from the Creator could save the Redeemer from the long accruing fatalities of human generation. But the new creation of humanity in Christ is scientifically quite as possible as its first creation in Adam; and in both cases there may have been no violation of natural law, but only a unique revelation of its possibilities. "Birth from a virgin made it clear that a new thing was taking place in the earth, and that One was coming into the world who was not simply man." A. B. Bruce; "Thoroughgoing naturalism excludes the virgin life as well as the virgin birth." See Griffith-Jones, *Ascent through Christ*, 254-270; A. H. Strong, *Christ in Creation*, 176.

Paul Lobstein, *Incarnation of our Lord*, 217 — "That which is unknown to the teachings of St. Peter and St. Paul, St. John and St. James, and our Lord himself, and is absent from the earliest and the latest gospels, cannot be so essential as many people have supposed." This argument from silence is sufficiently met by the considerations that Mark passes over thirty years of our Lord's life in silence; that John presupposes the narratives of Matthew and of Luke; that Paul does not deal with the story of Jesus' life. The facts were known at first only to Mary and to Joseph; their very nature involved reticence until Jesus was demonstrated to be "the Son of God with power . . . by the resurrection from the dead" (Rom. 1:4); meantime the natural development of Jesus and his refusal to set up an earthly kingdom may have made the miraculous events of thirty years ago seem to Mary like a wonderful dream; so only gradually the marvellous tale of the mother of the Lord found its way into the gospel tradition and creeds of the church, and into the inmost hearts of Christians of all countries; see F. L. Anderson, in *Baptist Review and Expositor*, 1904: 25-44, and Machen, on the N. T. Account of the Birth of Jesus, in *Princeton Theol. Rev.*, Oct. 1906, and Jan. 1906.

Cooke, on The Virgin Birth of our Lord, in *Methodist Rev.*, Nov. 1904: 849-857 — "If there is a moral taint in the human race, if in the very blood and constitution of humanity there is an ineradicable tendency to sin, then it is utterly inconceivable that any one born in the race by natural means should escape the taint of that race. And, finally, if the virgin birth is not historical, then a difficulty greater than any that destructive criticism has yet evolved from documents, interpolations, psychological improbabilities and unconscious contradictions confronts the reason and upsets all the long results of scientific observation, — that a sinful and deliberately sinning and unmarried pair should have given life to the purest human being that ever lived or of whom the human race has ever dreamed, and that he, knowing and forgiving the sins of others, never knew the shame of his own origin." See also Gore, *Dissertations*, 1-68, on the Virgin Birth of our Lord, J. Armitage Robinson, *Some Thoughts on the Incarnation*, 42, both of whom show that without assuming the reality of the virgin birth we cannot account for the origin of the narratives of Matthew and of Luke, nor for the acceptance of the virgin birth by the early Christians. *Per contra*, see Hoben, in *Am. Jour. Theol.*, 1902: 473-506, 709-753. For both sides of the controversy, see Symposium by Bacon, Zeno, Rhees and Warfield, in *Am. Jour. Theol.*, Jan. 1906: 1-60; and especially Orr, *Virgin Birth of Christ*.

(b) Free, both from hereditary depravity, and from actual sin; as is shown by his never offering sacrifice, never praying for forgiveness, teaching that all but he needed the new birth, challenging all to convict him of a single sin.

Jesus frequently went up to the temple, but he never offered sacrifice. He prayed:

"Father, forgive me" (Luke 23:34); but he never prayed: "Father, forgive me." He said: "Ye must be born anew" (John 3:7); but the words indicated that he had no such need. "At no moment in all that life could a single detail have been altered, except for the worse." He not only yielded to God's will when made known to him, but he sought it: "I seek not mine own will, but the will of him that sent me" (John 5:30). The anger which he showed was no passionate or selfish or vindictive anger, but the indignation of righteousness against hypocrisy and cruelty — an indignation accompanied with grief: "looked round about on them with anger, being grieved at the hardening of their heart" (Mark 3:5). F. W. H. Myers, St. Paul, 19, 53 — "Thou with strong prayer and very much entreating Willest be asked, and thou wilt answer then, Show the hid heart beneath creation beating, Smile with kind eyes and be a man with men. . . . Yea, through life, death, through sorrow and through sinning, He shall suffice me, for he hath sufficed: Christ is the end, for Christ was the beginning, Christ the beginning, for the end is Christ." Not personal experience of sin, but resistance to it, fitted him to deliver us from it.

Luke 1:35 — "wherefore also the holy thing which is begotten shall be called the Son of God"; John 8:46 — "Which of you canst thou say of sin?" 14:30 — "the prince of the world cometh: and he hath nothing in me" — not the slightest evil inclination upon which his temptations can lay hold; Rom. 8:3 — "in the likeness of sinful flesh" — in flesh, but without the sin which in other men clings to the flesh; 2 Cor. 5:21 — "him who knew no sin"; Heb. 4:15 — "in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin"; 7:26 — "holy, guileless, undefiled, separated from sinners" — by the fact of his immaculate conception; 9:14 — "through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish unto God"; 1 Pet. 1:19 — "precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, even the blood of Christ"; 2:23 — "who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth"; 1 John 3:5, 7 — "in him is no sin . . . he is righteous."

Julius Müller, Proof-texts, 29 — "Had Christ been only human nature, he could not have been without sin. But life can draw out of the putrescent clod materials for its own living. Divine life appropriates the human." Dörner, Glaubenslehre, 2:446 (Syst. Doct., 3:844) — "What with us is regeneration, is with him the incarnation of God." In this origin of Jesus' sinlessness from his union with God, we see the absurdity, both doctrinally and practically, of speaking of an immaculate conception of the Virgin, and of making her sinlessness precede that of her Son. On the Roman Catholic doctrine of the immaculate conception of the Virgin, see H. B. Smith, System, 389-393; Mason, Faith of the Gospel, 129-131 — "It makes the regeneration of humanity begin, not with Christ, but with the Virgin. It breaks his connection with the race. Instead of springing sinless from the sinful race, he derives his humanity from something not like the rest of us." Thomas Aquinas and Liguori both call Mary the Queen of Mercy, as Jesus her Son is King of Justice; see Thomas, Præf. in Sept. Cath. Ep., Comment on Esther, 5:3, and Liguori, Glories of Mary, 1:80 (Dublin version of 1866). Bradford, Heredity, 239 — "The Roman church has almost apotheosized Mary; but it must not be forgotten that the process began with Jesus. From what he was, an inference was drawn concerning what his mother must have been."

"Christ took human nature in such a way that this nature, without sin, bore the consequences of sin." That portion of human nature which the Logos took into union with himself was, in the very instant and by the fact of his taking it, purged from all its inherent depravity. But if in Christ there was no sin, or tendency to sin, how could he be tempted? In the same way, we reply, that Adam was tempted. Christ was not omniscient: Mark 13:32 — "of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father." Only at the close of the first temptation does Jesus recognize Satan as the adversary of souls: Mat. 4:10 — "Get thee hence, Satan." Jesus could be tempted, not only because he was not omniscient, but also because he had the keenest susceptibility to all the forms of innocent desire. To these desires temptation may appeal. Sin consists, not in these desires, but in the gratification of them out of God's order, and contrary to God's will. Meyer: "Lust is appetite run wild. There is no harm in any natural appetite, considered in itself. But appetite has been spoiled by the Fall." So Satan appealed (Mat. 4:1-11) to our Lord's desire for food, for applause, for power; to "Ueberglaube, Aberglaube, Unglaube" (Kurtz); cf. Mat. 23:29; 27:43; 28:53. All temptation must be addressed either to desire or fear; so Christ "was in all points tempted like as we are" (Heb. 4:15). The first temptation, in the wilderness, was addressed to desire; the second, in the garden, was addressed to fear. Satan, after the first, "departed from him for a season" (Luke 4:13); but he returned, in Gethsemane — "the prince of the world cometh: and he hath nothing in me" (John 14:30) — if possible, to deter Jesus from his work, by rousing within him vast and agonizing fears of the suffering and death that lay before him. Yet, in spite of both the desire and the fear with which his holy soul was moved, he was "without sin" (Heb. 4:15). The tree on the edge of the precipice is fiercely blown by the winds: the

strain upon the roots is tremendous, but the roots hold. Even in Gethsemane and on Calvary, Christ never prays for forgiveness, he only imparts it to others. See Ullman, *Sinlessness of Jesus*; Thomaeus, *Christi Person und Werk*, 2: 7-17, 126-136, esp. 135, 136; Schaff, *Person of Christ*, 51-72; Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 3: 330-349.

(c) Ideal human nature, — furnishing the moral pattern which man is progressively to realize, although within limitations of knowledge and of activity required by his vocation as the world's Redeemer.

Psalms 8: 4-6 — "thou hast made him but little lower than God, and crownedst him with glory and honor. Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; Thou hast put all things under his feet" — a description of the ideal man, which finds its realization only in Christ. Heb. 2: 6-10 — "But now we see not yet all things subjected to him. But we behold him who hath been made a little lower than the angels, even Jesus, because of the suffering of death crowned with glory and honor." 1 Cor. 15: 45 — "The first . . . Adam . . . The last Adam" — implies that the second Adam realized the full concept of humanity, which failed to be realized in the first Adam; so verse 49 — "as we have borne the image of the earthly [man], we shall also bear the image of the heavenly" [man]. 2 Cor. 3: 18 — "the glory of the Lord" is the pattern, into whose likeness we are to be changed. Phil. 3: 21 — "who shall fashion anew the body of our humiliation, that it may be conformed to the body of his glory"; Col. 1: 18 — "that in all things he might have the pre-eminence"; 1 Pet. 2: 21 — "suffered for you, leaving you an example, that ye should follow his steps"; 1 John 3: 3 — "every one that hath this hope set on him purifieth himself, even as he is pure."

The phrase "Son of man" (John 5: 27; cf. Dan. 7: 13, Com. of Pusey, *in loco*, and Westcott, in Bible Com. on John, 32-35) seems to intimate that Christ answers to the perfect idea of humanity, as it at first existed in the mind of God. Not that he was surpassingly beautiful in physical form; for the only way to reconcile the seemingly conflicting intimations is to suppose that in all outward respects he took our average humanity — at one time appearing without form or comeliness (Is. 52: 2), and aged before his time (John 8: 57 — "Thou art not yet fifty years old"), at another time revealing so much of his inward grace and glory that men were attracted and awed (Ps. 45: 2 — "Thou art fairer than the children of men"; Luke 4: 22 — "the words of grace which proceeded out of his mouth"; Mark 10: 32 — "Jesus was going before them; and they were amazed; and they that followed were afraid"; Mat. 17: 1-8 — the account of the transfiguration). Compare the Byzantine pictures of Christ with those of the Italian painters, — the former ascetic and emaciated, the latter types of physical well-being. Modern pictures make Jesus too exclusively a Jew. Yet there is a certain truth in the words of Mozoomdar: "Jesus was an Oriental, and we Orientals understand him. He spoke in figure. We understand him. He was a mystic. You take him literally; you make an Englishman of him." So Japanese Christians will not swallow the Western system of theology, because they say that this would be depriving the world of the Japanese view of Christ.

But in all spiritual respects Christ was perfect. In him are united all the excellences of both the sexes, of all temperaments and nationalities and characters. He possesses, not simply passive innocence, but positive and absolute holiness, triumphant through temptation. He includes in himself all objects and reasons for affection and worship; so that, in loving him, "love can never love too much." Christ's human nature, therefore, and not human nature as it is in us, is the true basis of ethics and of theology. This absence of narrow individuality, this ideal, universal manhood, could not have been secured by merely natural laws of propagation, — it was secured by Christ's miraculous conception; see Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 446 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 344). John G. Whittier, on the Birmingham philanthropist, Joseph Sturge: "Tender as woman, manliness and meekness in him were so allied, That they who judged him by his strength or weakness saw but a single side."

Seth, *Ethical Principles*, 420 — "The secret of the power of the moral Ideal is the conviction which it carries with it that it is no mere ideal, but the expression of the supreme Reality." Bowne, *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, 364 — "The *a priori* only outlines a possible, and does not determine what shall be actual within the limits of the possible. If experience is to be possible, it must take on certain forms, but those forms are compatible with an infinite variety of experience." No *a priori* truths or ideals can guarantee Christianity. We want a historical basis, an actual Christ, a realization of the divine ideal. "Great men," says Amiel, "are the true men." Yes, we add, but only Christ, the greatest man, shows what the true man is. The heavenly perfection of Jesus discloses to us the greatness of our own possible being, while at the same time it reveals our infinite shortcoming and the source from which all restoration must come.

Gore, *Incarnation*, 168—"Jesus Christ is the catholic man. In a sense, all the greatest men have overlapped the boundaries of their time. 'The truly great Have all one age, and from one visible space Shed influence. They, both in power and act Are permanent, and time is not with them, Save as it worketh for them, they in it.' But in a unique sense the manhood of Jesus is catholic; because it is exempt, not from the limitations which belong to manhood, but from the limitations which make our manhood narrow and isolated, merely local or national." Dale, *Ephesians*, 42—"Christ is a servant and something more. There is an ease, a freedom, a grace, about his doing the will of God, which can belong only to a Son. . . . There is nothing constrained . . . he was born to it. . . . He does the will of God as a child does the will of its father, naturally, as a matter of course, almost without thought. . . . No irreverent familiarity about his communion with the Father, but also no trace of fear, or even of wonder. . . . Prophets had fallen to the ground when the divine glory was revealed to them, but Christ stands calm and erect. A subject may lose his self-possession in the presence of his prince, but not a son."

Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 148—"What once he had perceived, he thenceforth knew. He had no opinions, no conjectures; we are never told that he forgot, nor even that he remembered, which would imply a degree of forgetting; we are not told that he arrived at truths by the process of reasoning them out; but he reasons them out for others. It is not recorded that he took counsel or formed plans; but he desired, and he purposed, and he did one thing with a view to another." On Christ, as the ideal man, see Griffith-Jones, *Ascent through Christ*, 807-836; F. W. Robertson, *Sermon on The Glory of the Divine Son*, 2nd Series, Sermon XIX; Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, 22-39; Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 2: 25; Moorhouse, *Nature and Revelation*, 37; Tennyson, *Introduction to In Memoriam*; Farrar, *Life of Christ*, 1: 143-154, and 2: excursus iv; Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, 276-332; Thomas Hughes, *The Manliness of Christ*; Hopkins, *Scriptural Ideas of Man*, 121-145; Tyler, in *Bib. Sac.*, 22: 51, 620; Dörner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 451 sq.

(d) A human nature that found its personality only in union with the divine nature,—in other words, a human nature impersonal, in the sense that it had no personality separate from the divine nature, and prior to its union therewith.

By the impersonality of Christ's human nature, we mean only that it had no personality before Christ took it, no personality before its union with the divine. It was a human nature whose consciousness and will were developed only in union with the personality of the Logos. The Fathers therefore rejected the word *ἀνθρώπινα*, and substituted the word *ὑποστασια*,—they favored not *unpersonality* but *impersonality*. In still plainer terms, the Logos did not take into union with himself an already developed human person, such as James, Peter, or John, but human nature before it had become personal or was capable of receiving a name. It reached its personality only in union with his own divine nature. Therefore we see in Christ not two persons—a human person and a divine person—but one person, and that person possessed of a human nature as well as of a divine. For proof of this, see pages 683-700, also Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 2: 239-306.

Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 186—"We count it no defect in our bodies that they have no personal subsistence apart from ourselves, and that, if separated from ourselves, they are nothing. They share in a true personal life because we, whose bodies they are, are persons. What happens to them happens to us." In a similar manner the personality of the Logos furnished the organizing principle of Jesus' two-fold nature. As he looked backward he could see himself dwelling in eternity with God, so far as his divine nature was concerned. But as respects his humanity he could remember that it was not eternal,—it had had its beginnings in time. Yet this humanity had never had a separate personal existence,—its personality had been developed only in connection with the divine nature. Göschel, quoted in Dörner's *Person of Christ*, 5: 170—"Christ is humanity; we have it; he is it entirely; we participate therein. His personality precedes and lies at the basis of the personality of the race and its individuals. As idea, he is implanted in the whole of humanity; he lies at the basis of every human consciousness, without however attaining realization in an individual; for this is only possible in the entire race at the end of the times."

Emma Marie Caillard, on *Man in the Light of Evolution*, in *Contemp. Rev.*, Dec. 1893: 573-581—"Christ is not only the goal of the race which is to be conformed to him, but

he is also the vital principle which moulds each individual of that race into its own similitude. The perfect type exists potentially through all the intermediate stages by which it is more and more nearly approached, and, if it did not exist, neither could they. There could be no development of an absent life. The goal of man's evolution, the perfect type of manhood, is Christ. He exists and always has existed potentially in the race and in the individual, equally before as after his visible incarnation, equally in the millions of those who do not, as in the far fewer millions of those who do, bear his name. In the strictest sense of the words, he is the life of man, and that in a far deeper and more intimate sense than he can be said to be the life of the universe." Dale, Christian Fellowship, 159 — "Christ's incarnation was not an isolated and abnormal wonder. It was God's witness to the true and ideal relation of all men to God." The incarnation was no detached event, — it was the issue of an eternal process of utterance on the part of the Word "whose goings forth are from of old, from everlasting" (Micah 5: 2).

(e) A human nature germinal, and capable of self-communication, — so constituting him the spiritual head and beginning of a new race, the second Adam from whom fallen man individually and collectively derives new and holy life.

In Ia 9: 6, Christ is called "Everlasting Father." In Ia 53: 10, it is said that "he shall see his seed." In Rev. 22: 14, he calls himself "the root" as well as "the offspring of David." See also John 5: 21 — "the Son also giveth life to whom he will"; 15: 1 — "I am the true vine" — whose roots are planted in heaven, not on earth; the vine-man, from whom as its stock the new life of humanity is to spring, and into whom the half-withered branches of the old humanity are to be grafted that they may have life divine. See Trench, Sermon on Christ, the True Vine, in Hulsean Lectures. John 17: 2 — "thou gavest him authority over all flesh, that to all whom thou hast given him, he should give eternal life"; 1 Cor. 15: 45 — "the last Adam became a life-giving spirit" — here "spirit" = not the Holy Spirit, nor Christ's divine nature, but "the ego of his total divine-human personality."

Eph. 5: 23 — "Christ also is the head of the church" — the head to which all the members are united, and from which they derive life and power. Christ calls the disciples his "little children" (John 13: 33); when he leaves them they are "orphans" (14: 18 marg.). "He represents himself as a father of children, no less than as a brother" (29: 17 — "my brethren"; cf. Heb. 2: 11 — "brethren", and 12 — "Behold, I and the children whom God hath given me"; see Westcott, Com. on John 13: 33). The new race is propagated after the analogy of the old; the first Adam is the source of the physical, the second Adam of spiritual, life; the first Adam the source of corruption, the second of holiness. Hence John 12: 24 — "if it die, it beareth much fruit"; Mat. 10: 37 and Luke 14: 26 — "He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me" — none is worthy of me, who prefers his old natural ancestry to his new spiritual descent and relationship. Thus Christ is not simply the noblest embodiment of the old humanity, but also the fountain-head and beginning of a new humanity, the new source of life for the race. Cf. 1 Tim. 2: 15 — "she shall be saved through the child-bearing" — which brought Christ into the world. See Wilberforce, Incarnation, 227-241; Baird, Elohim Revealed, 688-694; Dorner, Glaubenslehre, 2: 451 sq. (Syst. Doct., 3: 349 sq.).

Lightfoot on Col. 1: 18 — "who is the beginning, the first fruits from the dead" — "Here ἀρχή = 1. priority in time. Christ was first fruits of the dead (1 Cor. 15: 20, 23); 2. originating power, not only *principle* *principle*, but also *principle* *principle*. As he is first with respect to the universe, so he becomes first with respect to the church; cf. Heb. 7: 15, 16 — 'another priest, who hath been made, not after the law of a carnal commandment, but after the power of an endless life.'" Paul teaches that "the head of every man is Christ" (1 Cor. 11: 3), and that "in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (Col. 2: 9). Whiton, Gloria Patri, 88-92, remarks on Eph. 1: 10, that God's purpose is "to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens, and the things upon the earth" — to bring all things to a head (ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι). History is a perpetually increasing incarnation of life, whose climax and crown is the divine fulness of life in Christ. In him the before unconscious sonship of the world awakes to consciousness of the Father. He is worthiest to bear the name of the Son of God, in a preëminent, but not exclusive right. We agree with these words of Whiton, if they mean that Christ is the only giver of life to man as he is the only giver of life to the universe.

Hence Christ is the only ultimate authority in religion. He reveals himself in nature, in man, in history, in Scripture, but each of these is only a mirror which reflects him to us. In each case the mirror is more or less blurred and the image obscured, yet he appears in the mirror notwithstanding. The mirror is useless unless there is an eye to look into it, and an object to be seen in it. The Holy Spirit gives the eyesight, while

Christ himself, living and present, furnished the object (James 1:23-25; 1 Cor. 3:12; 1 Cor. 13:12).

Over against mankind is Christ-kind; over against the fallen and sinful race is the new race created by Christ's indwelling. Therefore only when he ascended with his perfected manhood could he send the Holy Spirit, for the Holy Spirit which makes men children of God is the Spirit of Christ. Christ's humanity now, by virtue of its perfect union with Deity, has become universally communicable. It is as consonant with evolution to derive spiritual gifts from the second Adam, a solitary source, as it is to derive the natural man from the first Adam, a solitary source; see George Harris, *Moral Evolution*, 409; and A. H. Strong, *Christ in Creation*, 174.

Simon, *Reconciliation*, 808—"Every man is in a true sense essentially of divine nature—even as Paul teaches, *θεῖον γένος* (Acts 17:29). . . . At the centre, as it were, enswathed in fold after fold, after the manner of a bulb, we discern the living divine spark, impressing us qualitatively if not quantitatively, with the absoluteness of the great sun to which it belongs." The idea of truth, beauty, right, has in it an absolute and divine quality. It comes from God, yet from the depths of our own nature. It is the evidence that Christ, "the light that lighteth every man" (John 1:9), is present and is working within us.

Pfleiderer, *Philos. of Religion*, 1:273—"That the divine idea of man as 'the son of his love' (Gal. 1:13), and of humanity as the kingdom of this Son of God, is the immanent final cause of all existence and development even in the prior world of nature, this has been the fundamental thought of the Christian Gnosis since the apostolic age, and I think that no philosophy has yet been able to shake or to surpass this thought—the corner stone of an idealistic view of the world." But Mead, *Ritschl's Place in the History of Doctrine*, 10, says of Pfleiderer and Ritschl: "Both recognize Christ as morally perfect and as the head of the Christian Church. Both deny his pre-existence and his essential Deity. Both reject the traditional conception of Christ as an atoning Redeemer. Ritschl calls Christ God, though inconsistently; Pfleiderer declines to say one thing when he seems to mean another."

The passages here alluded to abundantly confute the Docetic denial of Christ's veritable human body, and the Apollinarian denial of Christ's veritable human soul. More than this, they establish the reality and integrity of Christ's human nature, as possessed of all the elements, faculties, and powers essential to humanity.

## 2. *The Deity of Christ.*

The reality and integrity of Christ's divine nature have been sufficiently proved in a former chapter (see pages 305-315). We need only refer to the evidence there given, that, during his earthly ministry, Christ:

### (a) Possessed a knowledge of his own deity.

John 3:13—"the Son of man, who is in heaven"—a passage which clearly indicates Christ's consciousness, at certain times in his earthly life at least, that he was not confined to earth but was also in heaven [here, however, Westcott and Hort, with K and B, omit *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*; for advocacy of the common reading, see Broadus, in Hovey's Com. on John 3:13]; 8:58—"Before Abraham was born, I am"—here Jesus declares that there is a respect in which the idea of birth and beginning does not apply to him, but in which he can apply to himself the name "I am" of the eternal God; 14:9, 10—"Have I been so long time with you, and dost thou not know me, Philip? he that hath seen me hath seen the Father; how sayest thou, Show us the Father? Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?"

Adamson, *The Mind in Christ*, 24-49, gives the following instances of Jesus' supernatural knowledge: 1. Jesus' knowledge of Peter (John 1:42); 2. his finding of Philip (1:43); 3. his recognition of Nathanael (1:47-50); 4. of the woman of Samaria (4:17-19, 39); 5. miraculous draughts of fishes (Luke 5:6-9; John 21:6); 6. death of Lazarus (John 11:14); 7. of the ass's colt (Mat. 21:2); 8. of the upper room (Mark 14:15); 9. of Peter's denial (Mat. 26:34); 10. of the manner of his own death (John 13:33; 13:32); 11. of the manner of Peter's death (John 21:19); 12. of the fall of Jerusalem (Mat. 24:2).

Jesus does not say "our Father" but "my Father" (John 20:17). Rejection of him is a greater sin than rejection of the prophets, because he is the "beloved Son" of God (Luke 20:13). He knows God's purposes better than the angels, because he is the Son of God (Mark 13:32). As Son of God, he alone knows, and he alone can reveal, the Father (Mat.

11:37). There is clearly something more in his Sonship than in that of his disciples (John 1:14 — "only begotten"; Heb. 1:6 — "first begotten"). See Chapman, *Jesus Christ and the Present Age*, 37; Denney, *Studies in Theology*, 33.

(b) Exercised divine powers and prerogatives.

John 2:24, 25 — "But Jesus did not trust himself unto them, for that he knew all men, and because he needed not that any one should bear witness concerning man; for he himself knew what was in man"; 18:4 — "Jesus therefore, knowing all the things that were coming upon him, went forth"; Mark 4:39 — "he awakes, and rebuked the wind, and said unto the sea, Peace, be still. And the wind ceased, and there was a great calm"; Mat. 9:6 — "But that ye may know that the Son of man hath authority on earth to forgive sins (then saith he to the sick of the palsy), Arise, and take up thy bed, and go unto thy house"; Mark 2:7 — "Why doth this man thus speak? he blasphemeth: who can forgive sins but one, even God?"

It is not enough to keep, like Alexander Severus, a bust of Christ, in a private chapel, along with Virgil, Orpheus, Abraham, Apollonius, and other persons of the same kind; see Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, chap. xvi. "Christ is all in all. The prince in the Arabian story took from a walnut-shell a miniature tent, but that tent expanded so as to cover, first himself, then his palace, then his army, and at last his whole kingdom. So Christ's being and authority expand, as we reflect upon them, until they take in, not only ourselves, our homes and our country, but the whole world of sinning and suffering men, and the whole universe of God"; see A. H. Strong, *Address at the Ecumenical Missionary Conference*, April 23, 1900.

Matheson, *Voices of the Spirit*, 39 — "What is that law which I call gravitation, but the sign of the Son of man in heaven? It is the gospel of self-surrender in nature. It is the inability of any world to be its own centre, the necessity of every world to center in something else. . . . In the firmament as on the earth, the many are made one by giving the one for the many." "Subtlest thought shall fail and learning falter; Churches change, forms perish, systems go; But our human needs, they will not alter, Christ no after age will e'er outgrow. Yea, amen, O changeless One, thou only Art life's guide and spiritual goal; Thou the light across the dark vale lonely, Thou the eternal haven of the soul."

But this is to say, in other words, that there were, in Christ, a knowledge and a power such as belong only to God. The passages cited furnish a refutation of both the Ebionite denial of the reality, and the Arian denial of the integrity, of the divine nature in Christ.

Napoleon to Count Montholon (*Bertrand's Memoirs*): "I think I understand somewhat of human nature, and I tell you all these [heroes of antiquity] were men, and I am a man; but not one is like him: Jesus Christ was more than man." See other testimonies in Schaaf, *Person of Christ*. Even Spinoza, *Tract. Theol.-Pol.*, cap. 1 (vol. 1: 333), says that "Christ communed with God, mind to mind . . . this spiritual closeness is unique" (*Martineau, Types*, 1: 254), and Channing speaks of Christ as more than a human being, — as having exhibited a spotless purity which is the highest distinction of heaven. F. W. Robertson has called attention to the fact that the phrase "Son of man" (*John 5: 27; cf. Dan. 7: 13*) itself implies that Christ was more than man; it would have been an impertinence for him to have proclaimed himself Son of man, unless he had claimed to be something more; could not every human being call himself the same? When one takes this for his characteristic designation, as Jesus did, he implies that there is something strange in his being Son of man; that this is not his original condition and dignity; in other words, that he is also Son of God.

It corroborates the argument from Scripture, to find that Christian experience instinctively recognizes Christ's Godhead, and that Christian history shows a new conception of the dignity of childhood and of womanhood, of the sacredness of human life, and of the value of a human soul, — all arising from the belief that, in Christ, the Godhead honored human nature by taking it into perpetual union with itself, by bearing its guilt and punishment, and by raising it up from the dishonors of the grave to the glory of heaven. We need both the humanity and the deity of Christ; the humanity, — for, as Michael Angelo's *Last Judgment* witnesses, the ages that neglect Christ's humanity must have some human advocate and Savior, and find a poor substitute for the ever-present Christ in Mariolatry, the invocation of the saints, and the 'real presence' of the wafer and the mass; the deity, — for, unless Christ is God, he cannot offer an infinite atonement for us, nor bring about a real union between our souls and the

Father. Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 325-327 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 221-223) — "Mary and the saints took Christ's place as intercessors in heaven; transubstantiation furnished a present Christ on earth." It might almost be said that Mary was made a fourth person in the Godhead.

Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christenthums*: "It is no paradox, and neither is it rationalism, but the simple expression of the actual position as it lies before us in the gospels: Not the Son, but the Father alone, has a place in the gospel as Jesus proclaimed it"; *i. e.*, Jesus has no place, authority, supremacy, in the gospel,—the gospel is a Christianity without Christ; see Nicoll, *The Church's One Foundation*, 48. And this in the face of Jesus' own words: "Come unto me" (*Mat. 11: 28*); "the Son of man . . . shall sit on the throne of his glory: and before him shall be gathered all the nations" (*Mat. 25: 31, 32*); "he that hath seen me hath seen the Father" (*Johs 14: 9*); "he that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him" (*Johs 3: 36*). Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, advocates the nut-theory in distinction from the onion-theory of doctrine. Does the fourth gospel appear a second century production? What of it? There is an evolution of doctrine as to Christ. "Harnack does not conceive of Christianity as a seed, at first a plant in potentiality, then a real plant, identical from the beginning of its evolution to the final limit, and from the root to the summit of the stem. He conceives of it rather as a fruit ripe, or over ripe, that must be peeled to reach the incorruptible kernel, and he peels his fruit so thoroughly that little remains at the end." R. W. Gilder: "If Jesus is a man, And only a man, I say That of all mankind I will cleave to him, And will cleave alway. If Jesus Christ is a God, And the only God, I swear I will follow him through heaven and hell, The earth, the sea, and the air."

On Christ manifested in Nature, see Jonathan Edwards, *Observations on Trinity*, ed. Smyth, 92-97 — "He who, by his immediate influence, gives being every moment, and by his Spirit actuates the world, because he inclines to communicate himself and his excellencies, doth doubtless communicate his excellency to bodies, as far as there is any consent or analogy. And the beauty of face and sweet airs in men are not always the effect of the corresponding excellencies of the mind; yet the beauties of nature are really emanations or shadows of the excellencies of the Son of God. So that, when we are delighted with flowery meadows and gentle breezes of wind, we may consider that we see only the emanations of the sweet benevolence of Jesus Christ. When we behold the fragrant rose and lily, we see his love and purity. So the green trees and fields, and singing of birds, are the emanations of his infinite joy and benignity. The easiness and naturalness of trees and vines are shadows of his beauty and loveliness. The crystal rivers and murmuring streams are the footsteps of his favor, grace and beauty. When we behold the light and brightness of the sun, the golden edges of an evening cloud, or the beautiful bow, we behold the adumbrations of his glory and goodness, and in the blue sky, of his mildness and gentleness. There are also many things wherein we may behold his awful majesty: in the sun in his strength, in comets, in thunder, in the hovering thunder clouds, in ragged rocks and the brows of mountains. That beautiful light wherewith the world is filled in a clear day is a lively shadow of his spotless holiness, and happiness and delight in communicating himself. And doubtless this is a reason why Christ is compared so often to these things, and called by their names, as the Sun of Righteousness, the Morning Star, the Rose of Sharon, and Lily of the Valley, the apple tree among trees of the wood, a bundle of myrrh, a roe, or a young hart." By this we may discover the beauty of many of those metaphors and similes which to an unphilosophical person do seem so uncouth. In like manner, when we behold the beauty of man's body in its perfection, we still see like emanations of Christ's divine perfections, although they do not always flow from the mental excellencies of the person that has them. But we see the most proper image of the beauty of Christ when we see beauty in the human soul."

On the deity of Christ, see Shedd, *History of Doctrine*, 1: 262, 261; Liddon, *Our Lord's Divinity*, 127, 207, 458; Thomastus, *Christi Person und Werk*, 1: 61-64; Hovey, *God with Us*, 17-23; Bengel on *Johs 10: 30*. On the two natures of Christ, see A. H. Strong, *Philosophy and Religion*, 201-212.

### III. THE UNION OF THE TWO NATURES IN ONE PERSON.

Distinctly as the Scriptures represent Jesus Christ to have been possessed of a divine nature and of a human nature, each unaltered in essence and undivested of its normal attributes and powers, they with equal distinctness

represent Jesus Christ as a single undivided personality in whom these two natures are vitally and inseparably united, so that he is properly, not God and man, but the God-man. The two natures are bound together, not by the moral tie of friendship, nor by the spiritual tie which links the believer to his Lord, but by a bond unique and inscrutable, which constitutes them one person with a single consciousness and will, — this consciousness and will including within their possible range both the human nature and the divine.

Whitton, *Gloria Patri*, 79-81, would give up speaking of the union of God and man; for this, he says, involves the fallacy of two natures. He would speak rather of the manifestation of God *in* man. The ordinary Unitarian insists that Christ was "a mere man." As if there could be such a thing as *mere* man, exclusive of aught above him and beyond him, self-centered and self-moved. We can sympathize with Whitton's objection to the phrase "God and man," because of its implication of an imperfect union. But we prefer the term "God-man" to the phrase "God *in* man," for the reason that this latter phrase might equally describe the union of Christ with every believer. Christ is "the only begotten," in a sense that every believer is not. Yet we can also sympathize with Dean Stanley, *Life and Letters*, 1:115 — "Alas that a Church that has so divine a service should keep its long list of Articles! I am strengthened more than ever in my opinion that there is only needed, that there only should be, one, *viz.*, 'I believe that Christ is both God and man.'"

#### 1. *Proof of this Union.*

(a) Christ uniformly speaks of himself, and is spoken of, as a single person. There is no interchange of 'I' and 'thou' between the human and the divine natures, such as we find between the persons of the Trinity (John 17:23). Christ never uses the plural number in referring to himself, unless it be in John 8:11 — "we speak that we do know," — and even here "we" is more probably used as inclusive of the disciples. 1 John 4:2 — "is come in the flesh" — is supplemented by John 1:14 — "became flesh"; and these texts together assure us that Christ so came in human nature as to make that nature an element in his single personality.

John 17:23 — "I in them, and thou in me, that they may be perfected into one; that the world may know that thou didst send me, and lovest them, even as thou lovest me"; 8:11 — "We speak that which we know, and bear witness of that which we have seen; and ye receive not our witness"; 1 John 4:2 — "every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God"; John 1:14 — "And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us" — he so came in human nature that human nature and himself formed, not two persons, but one person. In the Trinity, the Father is objective to the Son, the Son to the Father, and both to the Spirit. But Christ's divinity is never objective to his humanity, nor his humanity to his divinity. Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, 97 — "He is not so much God and man, as God *in*, and *through*, and *as* man. He is one indivisible personality throughout. . . . We are to study the divine in and through the human. By looking for the divine side by side with the human, instead of discerning the divine within the human, we miss the significance of them both." We mistake when we say that certain words of Jesus with regard to his ignorance of the day of the end (Mark 13:32) were spoken by his human nature, while certain other words with regard to his being in heaven at the same time that he was on earth (John 3:13) were spoken by his divine nature. There was never any separation of the human from the divine, or of the divine from the human, — all Christ's words were spoken, and all Christ's deeds were done, by the one person, the God-man. See Forrest, *The Authority of Christ*, 49-100.

(b) The attributes and powers of both natures are ascribed to the one Christ, and conversely the works and dignities of the one Christ are ascribed to either of the natures, in a way inexplicable, except upon the principle that these two natures are organically and indissolubly united in a single person (examples of the former usage are Rom. 1:3 and 1 Pet.

3:18; of the latter, 1 Tim. 2:5 and Heb. 1:2, 3). Hence we can say, on the one hand, that the God-man existed before Abraham, yet was born in the reign of Augustus Cæsar, and that Jesus Christ wept, was weary, suffered, died, yet is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever; on the other hand, that a divine Savior redeemed us upon the cross, and that the human Christ is present with his people even to the end of the world (Eph. 1:23; 4:10; Mat. 28:20).

Rom. 1:3—"his Son, who was born of the seed of David according to the flesh"; 1 Pet. 3:18—"Christ also suffered for sins once . . . being put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit"; 1 Tim. 2:5—"one mediator also between God and man, himself man, Christ Jesus"; Heb. 1:2, 3—"his Son, whom he appointed heir of all things . . . who being the effulgence of his glory . . . when he had made purification of sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high"; Eph. 1:22, 23—"put all things in subjection under his feet, and gave him to be head over all things to the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all"; 4:10—"He that descended is the same also that ascended far above all the heavens, that he might fill all things"; Mat. 28:20—"In, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world."

Mason, Faith of the Gospel, 142-145—"Mary was Theotokos, but she was not the mother of Christ's Godhood, but of his humanity. We speak of the blood of God the Son, but it is not as God that he has blood. The hands of the babe Jesus made the worlds, only in the sense that he whose hands they were was the Agent in creation. . . Spirit and body in us are not merely put side by side, and insulated from each other. The spirit does not have the rheumatism, and the reverent body does not commune with God. The reason why they affect each other is because they are equally ours. . . Let us avoid sensuous, fondling, modes of addressing Christ—modes which dishonor him and enfeeble the soul of the worshiper. . . Let us also avoid, on the other hand, such phrases as 'the dying God', which loses the manhood in the Godhead." Charles H. Spurgeon remarked that people who "dear" everybody reminded him of the woman who said she had been reading in "dear Hebrews."

(c) The constant Scriptural representations of the infinite value of Christ's atonement and of the union of the human race with God which has been secured in him are intelligible only when Christ is regarded, not as a man of God, but as the God-man, in whom the two natures are so united that what each does has the value of both.

1 John 2:2—"he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the whole world,"—as John in his gospel proves that Jesus is the Son of God, the Word, God, so in his first Epistle he proves that the Son of God, the Word, God, has become man; Eph. 2:16-18—"might reconcile them both [Jew and Gentile] in one body unto God through the cross, having slain the enmity thereby; and he came and preached peace to you that were far off, and peace to them that were nigh: for through him we both have our access in one Spirit unto the Father"; 21, 22—"in whom each several building, fitly framed together, groweth into a holy temple in the Lord; in whom ye also are builded together for a habitation of God in the Spirit"; 2 Pet. 1:4—"that through these [promises] ye may become partakers of the divine nature." John Caird, Fund. Ideas of Christianity, 2:107—"We cannot separate Christ's divine from his human acts, without rending in twain the unity of his person and life."

(d) It corroborates this view to remember that the universal Christian consciousness recognizes in Christ a single and undivided personality, and expresses this recognition in its services of song and prayer.

The foregoing proof of the union of a perfect human nature and of a perfect divine nature in the single person of Jesus Christ suffices to refute both the Nestorian separation of the natures and the Eutychian confounding of them. Certain modern forms of stating the doctrine of this union, however—forms of statement into which there enter some of the misconceptions already noticed—need a brief examination, before we proceed to our own attempt at elucidation.

Dorner, Glaubenslehre, 2:403-411 (Syst. Doot., 3:300-308)—"Three ideas are included in incarnation: (1) assumption of human nature on the part of the Logos (Mat. 2:14—

'partook of . . . flesh and blood'; 2 Cor. 5: 13—'God was in Christ'; Col. 2: 9—'in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily'; (2) new creation of the second Adam, by the Holy Ghost and power of the Highest (Rom. 5: 14—'Adam's transgression, who is a figure of him that was to come'; 1 Cor. 15: 22—'as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive'; 15: 45—'The first man Adam became a living soul. The last Adam became a life-giving Spirit'; Luke 1: 35—'the Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee'; Mat. 1: 20—'that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit'); (3) becoming flesh, without contraction of deity or humanity (1 Tim. 3: 16—'who was manifested in the flesh'; 1 John 4: 2—'Jesus Christ is come in the flesh'; John 8: 41, 51—'I am the bread which came down out of heaven . . . I am the living bread'; 3 John 7—'Jesus Christ cometh in the flesh'; John 1: 14—'the Word became flesh'). This last text cannot mean: The Logos ceased to be what he was, and began to be only man. Nor can it be a mere theophany, in human form. The reality of the humanity is intimated, as well as the reality of the Logos."

The Lutherans hold to a communion of the natures, as well as to an impartation of their properties: (1) *genus idiomaticum*—impartation of attributes of both natures to the one person; (2) *genus apotelesmaticum* (from ἀποτελεσμα, 'that which is finished or completed,' i. e., Jesus' work)—attributes of the one person imparted to each of the constituent natures. Hence Mary may be called "the mother of God," as the Chalcedon symbol declares, "as to his humanity," and what each nature did has the value of both; (3) *genus majesticum*—attributes of one nature imparted to the other, yet so that the divine nature imparts to the human, not the human to the divine. The Lutherans do not believe in a *genus tapeinoticon*, i. e., that the human elements communicated themselves to the divine. The only communication of the human was to the person, not to the divine nature, of the God-man. Examples of this third *genus majesticum* are found in John 3: 13—"no one hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended out of heaven, even the Son of man who is in heaven" [here, however, Westcott and Hort, with N and B, omit ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ]; 5: 27—"he gave him authority to execute judgment, because he is a son of man." Of the explanation that this is the figure of speech called "*allogesie*," Luther says: "*Allagesis est larva quedam diaboli, secundum cujus rationes ego certe nolim esse Christianus.*"

The *genus majesticum* is denied by the Reformed Church, on the ground that it does not permit a clear distinction of the natures. And this is one great difference between it and the Lutheran Church. So Hooker, in commenting upon the Son of man's "ascending up where he was before," says: "By the 'son of man' must be meant the whole person of Christ, who, being man upon earth, filled heaven with his glorious presence; but not according to that nature for which the title of man is given him." For the Lutheran view of this union and its results in the communion of natures, see Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, 11th ed., 195-197; Thomastus, *Christi Person und Werk*, 2: 24, 25. For the Reformed view, see Turretin, loc. 13, *quest. 8*; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 387-387, 407-418.

## 2. Modern misrepresentations of this Union.

A. Theory of an incomplete humanity.—Gess and Beecher hold that the immaterial part in Christ's humanity is only contracted and metamorphosed deity.

The advocates of this view maintain that the divine Logos reduced himself to the condition and limits of human nature, and thus literally became a human soul. The theory differs from Apollinarianism, in that it does not necessarily presuppose a trichotomous view of man's nature. While Apollinarianism, however, denied the human origin only of Christ's *πνεῦμα*, this theory extends the denial to his entire immaterial being,—his body alone being derived from the Virgin. It is held, in slightly varying forms, by the Germans, Hofmann and Ebrard, as well as by Gess; and Henry Ward Beecher was its chief representative in America.

Gess holds that Christ gave up his eternal holiness and divine self-consciousness, to become man, so that he never during his earthly life thought, spoke, or wrought as God, but was at all times destitute of divine attributes. See Gess, *Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ*; and synopsis of his view, by Reubelt, in *Bib. Sac.*, 1870: 1-38; Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, 1: 284-241, and 2: 20; Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, 2: 144-151, and in Herzog, *Encyclopädie*, art.: Jesus Christ, der Gottmensch; also Liebner, *Christliche Dogmatik*. Henry Ward Beecher, in his *Life of Jesus the Christ*, chap. 3, emphasizes the word

"flesh," in John 1:14, and declares the passage to mean that the divine Spirit enveloped himself in a human body, and in that condition was subject to the indispensable limitations of material laws. All these advocates of the view hold that Deity was dormant, or paralyzed, in Christ during his earthly life. Its essence is there, but not its efficiency at any time.

Against this theory we urge the following objections:

(a) It rests upon a false interpretation of the passage John 1:14—*ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*. The word *σὰρξ* here has its common New Testament meaning. It designates neither soul nor body alone, but human nature in its totality (cf. John 3:6—*τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σὰρξ ἐστίν*; Rom. 7:18—*οὐκ οἶκτι ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτ' ἐστίν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἀγαθόν*). That *ἐγένετο* does not imply a transmutation of the *λόγος* into human nature, or into a human soul, is evident from *ἐσκήνωσεν* which follows—an allusion to the Shekinah of the Mosaic tabernacle; and from the parallel passage 1 John 4:2—*ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα*—where we are taught not only the oneness of Christ's person, but the distinctness of the constituent natures.

John 1:14—"the Word became flesh, and dwelt [tabernacled] among us, and we beheld his glory"; 3:8—"That which is born of the flesh is flesh"; Rom. 7:18—"in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing"; 1 John 4:3—"Jesus Christ is come in the flesh." Since "flesh," in Scriptural usage, denotes human nature in its entirety, there is as little reason to infer from these passages a change of the Logos into a human body, as a change of the Logos into a human soul. There is no curtailed humanity in Christ. One advantage of the monistic doctrine is that it avoids this error. Omnipresence is the presence of the whole of God in every place. Ps. 85:9—"surely his salvation is nigh them that fear him, that glory may dwell in our land"—was fulfilled when Christ, the true Shekinah, tabernacled in human flesh and men "beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth" (John 1:14). And Paul can say in 2 Cor. 13:9—"Next gladly therefore will I rather glory in my weaknesses, that the power of Christ may spread a tabernacle over me."

(b) It contradicts the two great classes of Scripture passages already referred to, which assert on the one hand the divine knowledge and power of Christ and his consciousness of oneness with the Father, and on the other hand the completeness of his human nature and its derivation from the stock of Israel and the seed of Abraham (Mat. 1:1-16; Heb. 2:16). Thus it denies both the true humanity, and the true deity, of Christ.

See the Scripture passages cited in proof of the Deity of Christ, pages 305-315. Gess himself acknowledges that, if the passages in which Jesus avers his divine knowledge and power and his consciousness of oneness with the Father refer to his earthly life, his theory is overthrown. "Apollinarianism had a certain sort of grotesque grandeur, in giving to the human body and soul of Christ an infinite, divine *πνεῦμα*. It maintained at least the divine side of Christ's person. But the theory before us denies both sides." While it so curtails deity that it is no proper deity, it takes away from humanity all that is valuable in humanity; for a manhood that consists only in body is no proper manhood. Such manhood is like the "half length" portrait which depicted only the lower half of the man. Mat. 1:1-16, the genealogy of Jesus, and Heb. 2:16—"takeh his of the seed of Abraham"—intimate that Christ took all that belonged to human nature.

(c) It is inconsistent with the Scriptural representations of God's immutability, in maintaining that the Logos gives up the attributes of Godhead, and his place and office as second person of the Trinity, in order to contract himself into the limits of humanity. Since attributes and substance are correlative terms, it is impossible to hold that the substance of God is in Christ, so long as he does not possess divine attributes. As we shall see hereafter, however, the possession of divine attributes by Christ does not necessarily imply his constant exercise of them. His humiliation indeed consisted in his giving up their independent exercise.

See Dorner, *Unveränderlichkeit Gottes*, in *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie*, 1: 361; 2: 440; 3: 579; esp. 1: 390-412.—“Gess holds that, during the thirty-three years of Jesus' earthly life, the Trinity was altered; the Father no more poured his fulness into the Son; the Son no more, with the Father, sent forth the Holy Spirit; the world was upheld and governed by Father and Spirit alone, without the mediation of the Son; the Father ceased to beget the Son. He says the Father alone has *aseity*; he is the only *Monas*. The Trinity is a family, whose head is the Father, but whose number and condition is variable. To Gess, it is indifferent whether the Trinity consists of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, or (as during Jesus' life) of only one. But this is a Trinity in which two members are accidental. A Trinity that can get along without one of its members is not the Scriptural Trinity. The Father depends on the Son, and the Spirit depends on the Son, as much as the Son depends on the Father. To take away the Son is to take away the Father and the Spirit. This giving up of the actuality of his attributes, even of his holiness, on the part of the Logos, is in order to make it possible for Christ to sin. But can we ascribe the possibility of sin to a being who is really God? The reality of temptation requires us to postulate a veritable human soul.”

(d) It is destructive of the whole Scriptural scheme of salvation, in that it renders impossible any experience of human nature on the part of the divine,—for when God becomes man he ceases to be God; in that it renders impossible any sufficient atonement on the part of human nature,—for mere humanity, even though its essence be a contracted and dormant deity, is not capable of a suffering which shall have infinite value; in that it renders impossible any proper union of the human race with God in the person of Jesus Christ,—for where true deity and true humanity are both absent, there can be no union between the two.

See Dorner, *Jahrbuch f. d. Theologie*, 1: 390.—“Upon this theory only an exhibitory atonement can be maintained. There is no real humanity that, in the strength of divinity, can bring a sacrifice to God. Not substitution, therefore, but obedience, on this view, reconciles us to God. Even if it is said that God's Spirit is the real soul in all men, this will not help the matter; for we should then have to make an essential distinction between the indwelling of the Spirit in the unregenerate, the regenerate, and Christ, respectively. But in that case we lose the likeness between Christ's nature and our own,—Christ's being preëxistent, and ours not. Without this pantheistic doctrine, Christ's unlikeness to us is yet greater; for he is really a wandering God, clothed in a human body, and cannot properly be called a human soul. We have then no middle-point between the body and the Godhead; and in the state of exaltation, we have no manhood at all,—only the infinite Logos, in a glorified body as his garment.”

Isaac Watts's theory of a preëxistent humanity in like manner implies that humanity is originally in deity; it does not proceed from a human stock, but from a divine; between the human and the divine there is no proper distinction; hence there can be no proper redeeming of humanity; see *Bib. Sac.*, 1875: 421. A. A. Hodge, *Pop. Lectures*, 236.—“If Christ does not take a human *ἡμετέραν*, he cannot be a high-priest who feels with us in all our infirmities, having been tempted like us.” Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 138.—“The conversion of the Godhead into flesh would have only added one more man to the number of men—a sinless one, perhaps, among sinners—but it would have effected no union of God and men.” On the theory in general, see Hovey, *God with Us*, 62-69; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 439-440; Philippl, *Glaubenslehre*, 4: 386-408; Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 358-359; Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, 187, 230; Schaaf, *Christ and Christianity*, 115-119.

B. Theory of a gradual incarnation.—Dorner and Rothe hold that the union between the divine and the human natures is not completed by the incarnating act.

The advocates of this view maintain that the union between the two natures is accomplished by a gradual communication of the fulness of the divine Logos to the man Christ Jesus. This communication is mediated by the human consciousness of Jesus. Before the human consciousness begins, the personality of the Logos is not yet divine-human. The per-

sonal union completes itself only gradually, as the human consciousness is sufficiently developed to appropriate the divine.

Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 680 (*Syst. Doct.*, 4: 125) — "In order that Christ might show his high-priestly love by suffering and death, the different sides of his personality yet stood to one another in relative separableness. The divine-human union in him, accordingly, was before his death not yet completely actualized, although its completion was from the beginning divinely assured." 2: 431 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 323) — "In spite of this *becoming*, inside of the *Unto*, the Logos is from the beginning united with Jesus in the deepest foundation of his being, and Jesus' life has ever been a divine-human one, in that a present receptivity for the Godhead has never remained without its satisfaction. . . . Even the unconscious humanity of the babe turns receptively to the Logos, as the plant turns toward the light. The initial union makes Christ already the God-man, but not in such a way as to prevent a subsequent *becoming*; for surely he did become omniscient and incapable of death, as he was not at the beginning."

2: 464 sq. (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 363 sq.) — "The actual life of God, as the Logos, reaches beyond the beginnings of the divine-human life. For if the *Unto* is to complete itself by growth, the relation of impartation and reception must continue. In his personal consciousness, there was a distinction between duty and being. The will had to take up practically, and turn into action, each new revelation or perception of God's will on the part of intellect or conscience. He had to maintain, with his will, each revelation of his nature and work. In his twelfth year, he says: 'I must be about my Father's business.' To Satan's temptation: 'Art thou God's Son?' he must reply with an affirmation that suppresses all doubt, though he will not prove it by miracle. This moral growth, as it was the will of the Father, was his task. He hears from his Father, and obeys. In him, imperfect knowledge was never the same with false conception. In us, ignorance has error for its obverse side. But this was never the case with him, though he grew in knowledge unto the end." Dorner's view of the Person of Christ may be found in his *Hist. Doct. Person Christ*, 5: 243-261; *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 347-474 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 243-373).

A summary of his views is also given in *Princeton Rev.*, 1873: 71-87 — Dorner illustrates the relation between the humanity and the deity of Christ by the relation between God and man, in conscience, and in the witness of the Spirit. "So far as the human element was immature or incomplete, so far the Logos was not present. Knowledge advanced to unity with the Logos, and the human will afterwards confirmed the best and highest knowledge. A resignation of both the Logos and the human nature to the union is involved in the incarnation. The growth continues until the idea, and the reality, of divine humanity perfectly coincide. The assumption of unity was gradual, in the life of Christ. His exaltation began with the perfection of this development." Rothe's statement of the theory can be found in his *Dogmatik*, 2: 49-182; and in *Bib. Sac.*, 27: 888.

It is objectionable for the following reasons:

(a) The Scripture plainly teaches that that which was born of Mary was as completely Son of God as Son of man (Luke 1: 35); and that in the incarnating act, and not at his resurrection, Jesus Christ became the God-man (Phil. 2: 7). But this theory virtually teaches the birth of a man who subsequently and gradually became the God-man, by consciously appropriating the Logos to whom he sustained ethical relations — relations with regard to which the Scripture is entirely silent. Its radical error is that of mistaking an incomplete consciousness of the union for an incomplete union.

In Luke 1: 35 — "the holy thing which is begotten shall be called the Son of God" — and Phil. 2: 7 — "emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men" — we have evidence that Christ was both Son of God and Son of man from the very beginning of his earthly life. But, according to Dorner, before there was any human consciousness, the personality of Jesus Christ was not divine-human.

(b) Since consciousness and will belong to personality, as distinguished from nature, the hypothesis of a mutual, conscious, and voluntary appro-

priation of divinity by humanity and of humanity by divinity, during the earthly life of Christ, is but a more subtle form of the Nestorian doctrine of a double personality. It follows, moreover, that as these two personalities do not become absolutely one until the resurrection, the death of the man Jesus Christ, to whom the Logos has not yet fully united himself, cannot possess an infinite atoning efficacy.

Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 2:68-70, objects to Dörner's view, that it "leads us to a man who is in intimate communion with God,—a man of God, but not a man who is God." He maintains, against Dörner, that "the union between the divine and human in Christ exists before the consciousness of it." 199-195—Dörner's view "makes each element, the divine and the human, long for the other, and reach its truth and reality only in the other. This, so far as the divine is concerned, is very like pantheism. Two *willing* personalities are presupposed, with ethical relation to each other,—two persons, at least at the first. Says Dörner: 'So long as the manhood is yet unconscious, the person of the Logos is not yet the central ego of this man. At the beginning, the Logos does not impart himself, so far as he is person or self-consciousness. He keeps apart by himself, just in proportion as the manhood falls in power of perception.' At the beginning, then, this man is not yet the God-man; the Logos only works in him, and on him. 'The *unto personalis* grows and completes itself,— becomes ever more all-sided and complete. Till the resurrection, there is a relative separability still.' Thus Dörner. But the Scripture knows nothing of an ethical relation of the divine to the human in Christ's person. It knows only of one divine-human subject." See also Thomasius, 2:80-82.

(c) While this theory asserts a final complete union of God and man in Jesus Christ, it renders this union far more difficult to reason, by involving the merging of two persons in one, rather than the union of two natures in one person. We have seen, moreover, that the Scripture gives no countenance to the doctrine of a double personality during the earthly life of Christ. The God-man never says: "I and the Logos are one"; "he that hath seen me hath seen the Logos"; "the Logos is greater than I"; "I go to the Logos." In the absence of all Scripture evidence in favor of this theory, we must regard the rational and dogmatic arguments against it as conclusive.

Liebner, in *Jahrbuch f. d. Theologie*, 3:349-353, urges, against Dörner, that there is no sign in Scripture of such communion between the two natures of Christ as exists between the three persons of the Trinity. Philippi also objects to Dörner's view: (1) that it implies a pantheistic identity of essence in both God and man; (2) that it makes the resurrection, not the birth, the time when the Word became flesh; (3) that it does not explain how two personalities can become one; see Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 4:364-380. Philippi quotes Dörner as saying: "The unity of essence of God and man is the great discovery of this age." But that Dörner was no pantheist appears from the following quotations from his *Hist. Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, II, 3:5, 23, 69, 115— "Protestant philosophy has brought about the recognition of the essential connection and unity of the human and the divine. . . . To the theology of the present day, the divine and human are not mutually exclusive but connected magnitudes, having an inward relation to each other and reciprocally confirming each other, by which view both separation and identification are set aside. . . . And now the common task of carrying on the union of faculties and qualities to a union of essence was devolved on both. The difference between them is that only God has aseity. . . . Were we to set our face against every view which represents the divine and human as intimately and essentially related, we should be wilfully throwing away the gains of centuries, and returning to a soil where a Christology is an absolute impossibility."

See also Dörner, *System*, 1:123—"Faith postulates a difference between the world and God, between whom religion seeks a union. Faith does not wish to be a mere relation to itself or to its own representations and thoughts. That would be a monologue; faith desires a dialogue. Therefore it does not consent with a monism which recognizes only God or the world (with the ego). The duality (not the dualism, which

is opposed to such monism, but which has no desire to oppose the rational demand for unity) is in fact a condition of true and vital unity." The unity is the foundation of religion; the difference is the foundation of morality. Morality and religion are but different manifestations of the same principle. Man's moral endeavor is the working of God within him. God can be revealed only in the perfect character and life of Jesus Christ. See Jones, Robert Browning, 144.

Stalker, *Imago Christi*: "Christ was not half a God and half a man, but he was perfectly God and perfectly man." Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, 95—"The Incarnate did not oscillate between being God and being man. He was indeed *always* God, and yet never otherwise God than as expressed within the possibilities of human consciousness and character." He knew that he was something more than he was as incarnate. His miracles showed what humanity might become. John Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, 14—"The divinity of Christ was not that of a divine nature in local or mechanical juxtaposition with a human, but of a divine nature that suffused, blended, identified itself with the thoughts, feelings, volitions of a human individuality. Whatever of divinity could not organically unite itself with and breathe through a human spirit, was not and could not be present in one who, whatever else he was, was really and truly human." See also Biedermann, *Dogmatik*, 351-353; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 428-430.

### 3. *The real nature of this Union.*

(a) Its great importance.—While the Scriptures represent the person of Christ as the crowning mystery of the Christian scheme (Matt. 11:27; Col. 1:27; 2:2; 1 Tim. 3:16), they also incite us to its study (John 17:3; 20:27; Luke 24:39; Phil. 3:8, 10). This is the more needful, since Christ is not only the central point of Christianity, but is Christianity itself—the embodied reconciliation and union between man and God. The following remarks are offered, not as fully explaining, but only as in some respects relieving, the difficulties of the subject.

Matt. 11:27—"no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him." Here it seems to be intimated that the mystery of the nature of the Son is even greater than that of the Father. Shedd, *Hist. Doct.*, 1: 406—"The Person of Christ is in some respects more baffling to reason than the Trinity. Yet there is a profane neglect, as well as a profane curiosity: Col. 1:27—"the riches of the glory of this mystery . . . which is Christ in you, the hope of glory"; 2:2, 3—"the mystery of God, even Christ, in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden"; 1 Tim. 3:16—"great is the mystery of godliness; He who was manifested in the flesh"—here the Vulgate, the Latin Fathers, and Buttmann make *μυστήριον* the antecedent of *ἐς*, the relative taking the natural gender of its antecedent, and *μυστήριον* referring to Christ; Heb. 2:11—"both he that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of one [not father, but race, or substance]" (cf. Acts 17:26—"he made of one every nation of men")—an allusion to the solidarity of the race and Christ's participation in all that belongs to us.

John 17:3—"this is life eternal, that they should know thee the only true God, and him who thou didst send, even Jesus Christ"; 20:27—"Reach hither thy finger, and see my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and put it into my side; and be not faithless, but believing"; Luke 24:39—"See my hands and my feet, that it is I myself: handle me, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye behold me having"; Phil. 3:8, 10—"I count all things to be loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord . . . that I may know him"; 1 John 1:1—"that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled, concerning the Word of life."

Nash, *Ethics and Revelation*, 254, 255—"Ranke said that Alexander was one of the few men in whom biography is identical with universal history. The words apply far better to Christ." Crane, *Religion of To-morrow*, 227—"Religion being merely the personality of God, Christianity the personality of Christ." Pascal: "Jesus Christ is the centre of everything and the object of everything, and he who does not know him knows nothing of the order of nature and nothing of himself." Goethe in his last years wrote: "Humanity cannot take a retrograde step, and we may say that the Christian religion, now that it has once appeared, can never again disappear; now that it has once found a divine embodiment, cannot again be dissolved." H. B. Smith, that man of clear and devout thought, put his whole doctrine into one sentence: "Let us come to Jesus,—the person of Christ is the centre of theology." Dean Stanley never tired of

quoting as his own Confession of Faith the words of John Bunyan: "Blest Cross—blest Sepulchre—blest rather he—The man who there was put to shame for me!" And Charles Wesley wrote on Catholic Love: "Weary of all this wordy strife, These motions, forms, and modes and names, To thee, the Way, the Truth, the Life, Whose love my simple heart inflames—Divinely taught, at last I fly, With thee and thine to live and die."

"We have two great lakes, named Erie and Ontario, and these are connected by the Niagara River through which Erie pours its waters into Ontario. The whole Christian Church throughout the ages has been called the overflow of Jesus Christ, who is infinitely greater than it. Let Lake Erie be the symbol of Christ, the pre-existent Logos, the Eternal Word, God revealed in the universe. Let Niagara River be a picture to us of this same Christ now confined to the narrow channel of His manifestation in the flesh, but within those limits showing the same eastward current and downward gravitation which men perceived so imperfectly before. The tremendous cataract, with its waters plunging into the abyss and shaking the very earth, is the suffering and death of the Son of God, which for the first time makes palpable to human hearts the forces of righteousness and love operative in the Divine nature from the beginning. The law of universal life has been made manifest; now it is seen that justice and judgment are the foundations of God's throne; that God's righteousness everywhere and always makes penalty to follow sin; that the love which creates and upholds sinners must itself be numbered with the transgressors, and must bear their iniquities. Niagara has demonstrated the gravitation of Lake Erie. And not in vain. For from Niagara there widens out another peaceful lake, Ontario is the offspring and likeness of Erie. So redeemed humanity is the overflow of Jesus Christ, but only of Jesus Christ after He has passed through the measureless self-abandonment of His earthly life and of His tragic death on Calvary. As the waters of Lake Ontario are ever fed by Niagara, so the Church draws its life from the cross. And Christ's purpose is, not that we should repeat Calvary, for that we can never do, but that we should reflect in ourselves the same onward movement and gravitation towards self-sacrifice which He has revealed as characterizing the very life of God" (A. H. Strong, Sermon before the Baptist World Congress, London, July 12, 1905).

(b) The chief problems. — These problems are the following: 1. one personality and two natures; 2. human nature without personality; 3. relation of the Logos to the humanity during the earthly life of Christ; 4. relation of the humanity to the Logos during the heavenly life of Christ. We may throw light on 1, by the figure of two concentric circles; on 2, by remembering that two earthly parents unite in producing a single child; on 3, by the illustration of latent memory, which contains so much more than present recollection; on 4, by the thought that body is the manifestation of spirit, and that Christ in his heavenly state is not confined to place.

Luther said that we should need "new tongues" before we could properly set forth this doctrine,—particularly a new language with regard to the nature of man. The further elucidation of the problems mentioned above will immediately occupy our attention. Our investigation should not be prejudiced by the fact that the divine element in Jesus Christ manifests itself within human limitations. This is the condition of all revelation. John 14:9—"he that hath seen me hath seen the Father"; Col. 2:9—"in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily"—up to the measure of human capacity to receive and to express the divine. Heb. 2:11 and Acts 17:28 both attribute to man a consubstantiality with Christ, and Christ is the manifested God. It is a law of hydrostatics that the smallest column of water will balance the largest. Lake Erie will be no higher than the water in the tube connected therewith. So the person of Christ reached the level of God, though limited in extent and environment. He was God manifest in the flesh.

Robert Browning, *Death in the Desert*: "I say, the acknowledgment of God in Christ Accepted by thy reason, solves for thee All questions in the earth and out of it, And has so far advanced thee to be wise"; *Epilogue to Dramatis Personæ*: "That one Face, far from vanish, rather grows, Or decomposes but to recompose, Become my Universe that feels and knows." "That face," said Browning to Mrs. Orr, as he finished reading the poem. "is the face of Christ. That is how I feel him." This is his

answer to those victims of nineteenth century scepticism for whom incarnate Love has disappeared from the universe, carrying with it the belief in God. He thus attests the continued presence of God in Christ, both in nature and humanity. On Browning as a Christian Poet, see A. H. Strong, *The Great Poets and their Theology*, 378-447; S. Law Wilson, *Theology of Modern Literature*, 181-226.

(c) Reason for mystery.—The union of the two natures in Christ's person is necessarily inscrutable, because there are no analogies to it in our experience. Attempts to illustrate it on the one hand from the union and yet the distinctness of soul and body, of iron and heat, and on the other hand from the union and yet the distinctness of Christ and the believer, of the divine Son and the Father, are one-sided and become utterly misleading, if they are regarded as furnishing a rationale of the union and not simply a means of repelling objection. The first two illustrations mentioned above lack the essential element of two natures to make them complete: soul and body are not two natures, but one, nor are iron and heat two substances. The last two illustrations mentioned above lack the element of single personality: Christ and the believer are two persons, not one, even as the Son and the Father are not one person, but two.

The two illustrations most commonly employed are the union of soul and body, and the union of the believer with Christ. Each of these illustrates one side of the great doctrine, but each must be complemented by the other. The former, taken by itself, would be Eutychian; the latter, taken by itself, would be Nestorian. Like the doctrine of the Trinity, the Person of Christ is an absolutely unique fact, for which we can find no complete analogies. But neither do we know how soul and body are united. See Blunt, *Dict. Doct. and Hist. Theol.*, art.: Hypostasis; Sartorius, *Person and Work of Christ*, 27-36; Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, 39-77; Luthardt, *Fund. Truths*, 331-334.

A. A. Hodge, *Popular Lectures*, 218, 230—"Many people are Unitarians, not because of the difficulties of the Trinity, but because of the difficulties of the Person of Christ. . . . The union of the two natures is not mechanical, as between oxygen and nitrogen in our air; nor chemical, as between oxygen and hydrogen in water; nor organic, as between our hearts and our brains; but personal. The best illustration is the union of body and soul in our own persons,—how perfectly joined they are in the great orator! Yet here are not two natures, but one human nature. We need therefore to add the illustration of the union between the believer and Christ." And here too we must confess the imperfection of the analogy, for Christ and the believer are two persons, and not one. The person of the God-man is unique and without adequate parallel. But this constitutes its dignity and glory.

(d) Ground of possibility.—The possibility of the union of deity and humanity in one person is grounded in the original creation of man in the divine image. Man's kinship to God, in other words, his possession of a rational and spiritual nature, is the condition of incarnation. Brute-life is incapable of union with God. But human nature is capable of the divine, in the sense not only that it lives, moves, and has its being in God, but that God may unite himself indissolubly to it and endue it with divine powers, while yet it remains all the more truly human. Since the moral image of God in human nature has been lost by sin, Christ, the perfect image of God after which man was originally made, restores that lost image by uniting himself to humanity and filling it with his divine life and love.

1 Pet. 1:4—"partakers of the divine nature." Creation and providence do not furnish the last limit of God's indwelling. Beyond these, there is the spiritual union between the believer and Christ, and even beyond this, there is the unity of God and man in the person of Jesus Christ. Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2:233 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3:180)—"Humanity in Christ is related to divinity, as woman to man in marriage. It is receptive, but it is exalted by receiving. Christ is the offspring of the [marriage] covenant between God and Israel."

*Id.*, 2: 408-411 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 301-308)—“The question is: How can Christ be both Creator and creature? The Logos, as such, stands over against the creature as a distinct object. How can he become, and be, that which exists only as object of his activity and inworking? Can the cause become its own effect? The problem is solved, only by remembering that the divine and human, though distinct from each other, are not to be thought of as foreign to each other and mutually exclusive. The very thing that distinguishes them binds them together. Their essential distinction is that God has aseity, while man has simply dependence. ‘Deep calleth unto deep’ (Ps. 42:7)—the deep of the divine riches, and the deep of human poverty, call to each other. ‘From me a cry,—from him reply.’ God’s infinite resources and man’s infinite need, God’s measureless supply and man’s boundless receptivity, attract each other, until they unite in him in whom dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. The mutual attraction is of an ethical sort, but the divine love has ‘first loved’ (1 John 4:19).

“The new second creation is therefore not merely, like the first creation, one that distinguishes from God,—it is one that unites with God. Nature is distinct from God, yet God moves and works in nature. Much more does human nature find its only true reality, or realization, in union with God. God’s uniting act does not violate or unmake it, but rather first causes it to be what, in God’s idea, it was meant to be.” Incarnation is therefore the very fulfilment of the idea of humanity. The supernatural assumption of humanity is the most natural of all things. Man is not a mere tangent to God, but an empty vessel to be filled from the infinite fountain. *Natura humana in Christo capax divinae.* See Talbot, in *Bap. Quar.*, 1868: 129; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 270.

God could not have become an angel, or a tree, or a stone. But he could become man, because man was made in his image. God in man, as Phillips Brooks held, is the absolutely natural. Channing said that “all minds are of one family.” E. B. Andrews: “Divinity and humanity are not contradictory predicates. If this had been properly understood, there would have been no Unitarian movement. Man is in a true sense divine. This is also true of Christ. But he is infinitely further along in the divine nature than we are. If we say his divinity is a new kind, then the new kind arises out of the degree.” “Were not the eye itself a sun, No light for it could ever shine: By nothing godlike could the soul be won, Were not the soul itself divine.”

John Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, 1: 165—“A smaller circle may represent a larger in respect of its circularity; but a circle, small or large, cannot be the image of a square.” . . . 2: 101—“God would not be God without union with man, and man would not be man without union with God. Immanent in the spirits he has made, he shares their pains and sorrows. . . . Showing the infinite element in man, Christ attracts us toward his own moral excellence.” Lyman Abbott, *Theology of an Evolutionist*, 190—“Incarnation is the indwelling of God in his children, of which the type and pattern is seen in him who is at once the manifestation of God to man, and the revelation to men of what humanity is to be when God’s work in the world is done—perfect God and perfect man, because God perfectly dwelling in a perfect man.”

We have quoted these latter utterances, not because we regard them as admitting the full truth with regard to the union of the divine and human in Christ; but because they recognize the essential likeness of the human to the divine, and so help our understanding of the union between the two. We go further than the writers quoted, in maintaining not merely an indwelling of God in Christ, but an organic and essential union. Christ moreover is not the God-man by virtue of his possessing a larger measure of the divine than we, but rather by being the original source of all life, both human and divine. We hold to his deity as well as to his divinity, as some of these authors apparently do not. See Job. 7: 15, 16—“another priest, who hath been made . . . after the power of an endless life”; John 1: 4—“in him was life; and the life was the light of men.”

(c) No double personality.—This possession of two natures does not involve a double personality in the God-man, for the reason that the Logos takes into union with himself, not an individual man with already developed personality, but human nature which has had no separate existence before its union with the divine. Christ’s human nature is impersonal, in the sense that it attains self-consciousness and self-determination only in the personality of the God-man. Here it is important to mark the distinction between nature and person. Nature is substance possessed in

common; the persons of the Trinity have one nature; there is a common nature of mankind. Person is nature separately subsisting, with powers of consciousness and will. Since the human nature of Christ has not and never had a separate subsistence, it is impersonal, and in the God-man the Logos furnishes the principle of personality. It is equally important to observe that self-consciousness and self-determination do not belong to nature as such, but only to personality. For this reason, Christ has not two consciousnesses and two wills, but a single consciousness and a single will. This consciousness and will, moreover, is never simply human, but is always theanthropic — an activity of the one personality which unites in itself the human and the divine (Mark 13 : 32; Luke 22 : 42).

The human father and the human mother are distinct persons, and they each give something of their own peculiar nature to their child; yet the result is, not two persons in the child, but only one person, with one consciousness and one will. So the Fatherhood of God and the motherhood of Mary produced not a double personality in Christ, but a single personality. Dörner illustrates the union of human and divine in Jesus by the *Holy Spirit* in the Christian, — nothing foreign, nothing distinguishable from the human life into which it enters; and by the *moral sense*, which is the very presence and power of God in the human soul, — yet conscience does not break up the unity of the life; see C. C. Everett, *Essays*, 32. These illustrations help us to understand the interpenetration of the human by the divine in Jesus; but they are defective in suggesting that his relation to God was different from ours not in kind but only in degree. Only Jesus could say: "Before Abraham was born, I am" (John 8 : 58); "I and the Father are one" (John 10 : 30).

The theory of two consciousnesses and two wills, first elaborated by John of Damascus, was an unwarranted addition to the orthodox doctrine propounded at Chalcedon. Although the view of John of Damascus was sanctioned by the Council of Constantinople (381), "this Council has never been regarded by the Greek Church as oecumenical, and its composition and spirit deprive its decisions of all value as indicating the true sense of Scripture"; see Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, 90. Nature has consciousness and will, only as it is manifested in *person*. The one person has a single consciousness and will, which embraces within its scope at all times a human nature, and sometimes a divine. Notice that we do not say Christ's human nature had no will, but only that it had none before its union with the divine nature, and none separately from the one will which was made up of the human and the divine united; *versus* *Current Discussions in Theology*, 5 : 233.

Sartorius uses the illustration of two concentric circles: the one ego of personality in Christ is at the same time the centre of both circles, the human nature and the divine. Or, still better, illustrate by a smaller vessel of air inverted and sunk, sometimes below its centre, sometimes above, in a far larger vessel of water. See Mark 13 : 32 — "of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son"; Luke 22 : 43 — "Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me: nevertheless not my will, but thine, be done." To say that, although in his capacity as man he was ignorant, yet at that same moment in his capacity as God he was omniscient, is to accuse Christ of unverity. Whenever Christ spoke, it was not one of the natures that spoke, but the person in whom both natures were united.

We subjoin various definitions of personality: Boëthius, quoted in Dörner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2 : 415 (Syst. Doct., 3 : 313) — "Persona est animas rationalis individua substantia"; F. W. Robertson, *Lect. on Gen.*, p. 3 — "Personality = self-consciousness, will, character"; Porter, *Human Intellect*, 626 — "Personality = distinct subsistence, either actually or latently self-conscious and self-determining"; Harris, *Philos. Basis of Theism*, 408 — "Person = being, conscious of self, subsisting in individuality and identity, and endowed with intuitive reason, rational sensibility, and free-will." Dr. E. G. Robinson defines "nature" as "that substratum or condition of being which determines the kind and attributes of the person, but which is clearly distinguishable from the person itself."

Lotze, *Metaphysics*, § 244 — "The identity of the subject of inward experience is all that we require. So far as, and so long as, the soul knows itself as this identical subject, it is and is named, simply for that reason, substance." Illingworth, *Personality, Human*

and Divine, 33—"Our conception of substance is not derived from the physical, but from the mental, world. Substance is first of all that which underlies our mental affections and manifestations. Kant declared that the idea of freedom is the source of our idea of personality. Personality consists in the freedom of the whole soul from the mechanism of nature." On personality, see Windelband, *Hist. Philos.*, 238. For the theory of two consciousnesses and two wills, see Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 4: 129, 234; Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 2: 314; Ridgeley, *Body of Divinity*, 1: 476; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 378-391; Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 2: 239-308, esp. 288. *Per contra*, see Hovey, *God with Us*, 66; Schaff, *Church Hist.*, 1: 757, and 3: 751; Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, 13-14; Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, 149-169; Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 513-518.

(f) Effect upon the human.—The union of the divine and the human natures makes the latter possessed of the powers belonging to the former; in other words, the attributes of the divine nature are imparted to the human without passing over into its essence,—so that the human Christ even on earth had power to be, to know, and to do, as God. That this power was latent, or was only rarely manifested, was the result of the self-chosen state of humiliation upon which the God-man had entered. In this state of humiliation, the communication of the contents of his divine nature to the human was mediated by the Holy Spirit. The God-man, in his servant-form, knew and taught and performed only what the Spirit permitted and directed (Mat. 3: 16; John 3: 34; Acts 1: 2; 10: 38; Heb. 9: 14). But when thus permitted, he knew, taught, and performed, not, like the prophets, by power communicated from without, but by virtue of his own inner divine energy (Mat. 17: 2; Mark 5: 41; Luke 5: 20, 21; 6: 19; John 2: 11, 24, 25; 3: 13; 20: 19).

Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, 2d ed., 2: 77—"Human nature does not become divine, but (as Chemnitz has said) only the medium of the divine; as the moon has not a light of her own, but only shines in the light of the sun. So human nature may derivatively exercise divine attributes, because it is united to the divine in one person." Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 151—"Our souls spiritualize our bodies, and will one day give us the spiritual body, while yet the body does not become spirit. So the Godhead gives divine powers to the humanity in Christ, while yet the humanity does not cease to be humanity."

Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 4: 131—"The union exalts the human, as light brightens the air, heat gives glow to the iron, spirit exalts the body, the Holy Spirit hallows the believer by union with his soul. Fire gives to iron its own properties of lighting and burning; yet the iron does not become fire. Soul gives to body its life-energy; yet the body does not become soul. The Holy Spirit sanctifies the believer, but the believer does not become divine; for the divine principle is the determining one. We do not speak of airy light, of iron heat, or of a bodily soul. So human nature possesses the divine only derivatively. In this sense it is our destiny to become 'partakers of the divine nature' (2 Pet. 1: 4)." Even in his earthly life, when he wished to be, or more correctly, when the Spirit permitted, he was omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, could walk the sea, or pass through closed doors. But, in his state of humiliation, he was subject to the Holy Spirit.

In Mat. 3: 16, the anointing of the Spirit at his baptism was not the descent of a material dove ("as a dove"). The dove-like appearance was only the outward sign of the coming forth of the Holy Spirit from the depths of his being and pouring itself like a flood into his divine-human consciousness. John 3: 34—"for he giveth not the Spirit by measure"; Acts 1: 2—"after that he had given commandment through the Holy Spirit unto the apostles"; 10: 38—"Jesus of Nazareth, how God anointed him with the Holy Spirit and with power: who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of the devil; for God was with him"; Heb. 9: 14—"the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish unto God."

When permitted by the Holy Spirit, he knew, taught, and wrought as God: Mat. 17: 2—"he was transfigured before them"; Mark 5: 41—"Damsel, I say unto thee, Arise"; Luke 5: 20, 21—"Man, thy sins are forgiven thee . . . Who can forgive sins, but God alone?"; Luke 6: 19—"power came forth from him, and healed them all"; John 2: 11—"This beginning of his signs did Jesus in Cana of Galilee, and manifested his glory"; 24, 25—"he knew all men . . . he himself knew what was in man"; 3: 13—"the Son of man, who is

in heaven" [here, however, Westcott and Hort, with N and B, omit  $\delta \delta \nu \epsilon \nu \tau \eta \sigma \nu \beta \alpha \rho \alpha \nu$ ,— for advocacy of the common reading, see Broadus, in Hovey's Com., on John 2:13]; 20:19— "when the doors were shut . . . Jesus came and stood in the midst."

Christ is the "servant of Jehovah" (Is. 42:1-7; 49:1-42; 52:13; 53:11) and the meaning of  $\sigma \lambda \nu \nu \sigma$  (Acts 3:13, 26; 4:27, 30) is not "child" or "Son"; it is "servant," as in the Revised Version. But, in the state of exaltation, Christ is the "Lord of the Spirit" (2 Cor. 3:18—Meyer), giving the Spirit (John 16:7—"I will send him unto you"), present in the Spirit (John 14:18—"I come unto you"; Mat. 28:20—"I am with you always, even unto the end of the world"), and working through the Spirit (1 Cor. 15:45—"The last Adam became a life-giving spirit"); 2 Cor. 5:17—"Now the Lord is the Spirit"). On Christ's relation to the Holy Spirit, see John Owen, Works, 282-297; Robins, in Bib. Sac., Oct. 1874: 615; Wilberforce, Incarnation, 208-241.

Delitzsch: "The conception of the servant of Jehovah is, as it were, a pyramid, of which the base is the people of Israel as a whole; the central part, Israel according to the Spirit; and the summit, the Mediator of Salvation who rises out of Israel." Cheyne on Isaiah, 3:253, agrees with this view of Delitzsch, which is also the view of Oehler. The O. T. is the life of a nation; the N. T. is the life of a man. The chief end of the nation was to produce the man; the chief end of the man was to save the world. Sabatier, Philos. Religion, 59—"If humanity were not potentially and in some degree an Immanuel, God with us, there would never have issued from its bosom he who bore and revealed this blessed name." We would enlarge and amend this illustration of the pyramid, by making the base to be the Logos, as Creator and Upholder of all (Eph. 1:23; Col. 1:16); the stratum which rests next upon the Logos is universal humanity (Ps. 3:5, 6); then comes Israel as a whole (Mat. 2:15); spiritual Israel rests upon Israel after the flesh (Is. 42:1-7); as the acme and cap stone of all, Christ appears, to crown the pyramid, the true servant of Jehovah and Son of man (Is. 53:11; Mat. 20:28). We may go even further and represent Christ as forming the basis of another inverted pyramid of redeemed humanity ever growing and rising to heaven (Is. 9:6—"Everlasting Father"; Is. 53:10—"he shall see his seed"; Rev. 22:16—"root and offspring of David"; Heb. 2:13—"I and the children whom God hath given me.")

(g) Effect upon the divine.—This communion of the natures was such that, although the divine nature in itself is incapable of ignorance, weakness, temptation, suffering, or death, the one person Jesus Christ was capable of these by virtue of the union of the divine nature with a human nature in him. As the human Savior can exercise divine attributes, not in virtue of his humanity alone, but derivatively, by virtue of his possession of a divine nature, so the divine Savior can suffer and be ignorant as man, not in his divine nature, but derivatively, by virtue of his possession of a human nature. We may illustrate this from the connection between body and soul. The soul suffers pain from its union with the body, of which apart from the body it would be incapable. So the God-man, although in his divine nature impassible, was capable, through his union with humanity, of absolutely infinite suffering.

Just as my soul could never suffer the pains of fire if it were only soul, but can suffer those pains in union with the body, so the otherwise impassible God can suffer mortal pangs through his union with humanity, which he never could suffer if he had not joined himself to my nature. The union between the humanity and the deity is so close, that deity itself is brought under the curse and penalty of the law. Because Christ was God, did he pass unscorched through the fires of Gethsemane and Calvary? Rather let us say, because Christ was God, he underwent a suffering that was absolutely infinite. Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4:800 sq.; Lawrence, in Bib. Sac., 24:41; Schöberlein, in Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie, 1871: 459-501.

A. J. F. Behrends, in The Examiner, April 21, 1868—"Jesus Christ is God in the form of man; as completely God as if he were not man; as completely man as if he were not God. He is always divine and always human. . . . The infirmities and pains of his body pierced his divine nature. . . . The demand of the law was not laid upon Christ from without, but proceeded from within. It is the righteousness in him which makes his death necessary."

(h) *Necessity of the union.*—The union of two natures in one person is necessary to constitute Jesus Christ a proper mediator between man and God. His two-fold nature gives him fellowship with both parties, since it involves an equal dignity with God, and at the same time a perfect sympathy with man (Heb. 2 : 17, 18 ; 4 : 15, 16). This two-fold nature, moreover, enables him to present to both God and man proper terms of reconciliation : being man, he can make atonement for man ; being God, his atonement has infinite value ; while both his divinity and his humanity combine to move the hearts of offenders and constrain them to submission and love (1 Tim. 2 : 5 ; Heb. 7 : 25).

Heb. 2 : 17, 18.—“Wherefore it behooved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren, that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people. For in that he himself hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted” ; 4 : 15, 16.—“For we have not a high priest that cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities ; but one that hath been in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin. Let us therefore draw near with boldness unto the throne of grace, that we may receive mercy, and may find grace to help us in time of need” ; 1 Tim. 2 : 5.—“one God, one mediator also between God and men, himself man, Christ Jesus” ; Heb. 7 : 25.—“Wherefore also he is able to save to the uttermost them that draw near unto God through him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them.”

Because Christ is man, he can make atonement for man and can sympathize with man. Because Christ is God, his atonement has infinite value, and the union which he effects with God is complete. A merely human Savior could never reconcile or reunite us to God. But a divine-human Savior meets all our needs. See Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, 170-208. As the high priest of old bore on his mitre the name Jehovah, and on his breastplate the names of the tribes of Israel, so Christ Jesus is God with us, and at the same time our propitiatory representative before God. In Virgil's *Æneid*, Dido says well : “*Haud ignara mali, miseris succurrere disco*”—“Myself not ignorant of woe, Compassion I have learned to show.” And Terence uttered almost a Christian word when he wrote : “*Homo sum, et humani nihil a me alienum puto*”—“I am a man, and I count nothing human as foreign to me.” Christ's experience and divinity made these words far more true of him than of any merely human being.

(i) *The union eternal.*—The union of humanity with deity in the person of Christ is indissoluble and eternal. Unlike the avatars of the East, the incarnation was a permanent assumption of human nature by the second person of the Trinity. In the ascension of Christ, glorified humanity has attained the throne of the universe. By his Spirit, this same divine-human Savior is omnipresent to secure the progress of his kingdom. The final subjection of the Son to the Father, alluded to in 1 Cor. 15 : 28, cannot be other than the complete return of the Son to his original relation to the Father ; since, according to John 17 : 5, Christ is again to possess the glory which he had with the Father before the world was (cf. Heb. 1 : 8 ; 7 : 24, 25).

1 Cor. 15 : 28.—“And when all things have been subjected unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subjected to him that did subject all things unto him, that God may be all in all” ; John 17 : 5.—“Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was” ; Heb. 1 : 8.—“of the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever” ; 7 : 24.—“he, because he abideth forever, hath his priesthood unchangeable.” Dörner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2 : 281-283 (Syst. Doct. 3 : 177-179), holds that there is a present and relative distinction between the Son's will, as Mediator, and that of the Father (Mat. 26 : 39—“not as I will, but as thou wilt”)—a distinction which shall cease when Christ becomes Judge (John 16 : 26—“In that day ye shall ask in my name : and I say not unto you, that I will pray the Father for you”) If Christ's reign ceased, he would be inferior to the saints, who are themselves to reign. But they are to reign only in and with Christ, their head.

The best illustration of the possible meaning of Christ's giving up the kingdom is found in the Governor of the East India Company giving up his authority to the Queen and merging it in that of the home government, he himself, however, at the same time becoming Secretary of State for India. So Christ will give up his vicegerency, but not

his mediatorship. Now he reigns by delegated authority; then he will reign in union with the Father. So Kendrick, in *Bib. Sac.*, Jan. 1890: 68-83. Wrightnour: "When the great remedy has wrought its perfect cure, the physician will no longer be looked upon as the physician. When the work of redemption is completed, the mediatorial office of the Son will cease." We may add that other offices of friendship and instruction will then begin.

Melanchthon: "Christ will finish his work as Mediator, and then will reign as God, immediately revealing to us the Deity." Quenstedt, quoted in Schmid, *Dogmatik*, 298, thinks the giving up of the kingdom will be only an exchange of outward administration for inward,—not a surrender of all power and authority, but only of one mode of exercising it. Hanna, on Resurrection, lect. 4.—"It is not a giving up of his mediatorial authority,—that throne is to endure forever,—but it is a simple public recognition of the fact that God is all in all, that Christ is God's medium of accomplishing all." An. Par. Bible, on 1 Cor. 15: 28.—"Not his mediatorial relation to his own people shall be given up; much less his personal relation to the Godhead, as the divine Word; but only his mediatorial relation to the world at large." See also Edwards, *Observations on the Trinity*, 85 sq. Expositor's Greek Testament, on 1 Cor. 15: 28, "affirms no other subjection than is involved in Sonship. . . . This implies no inferiority of nature, no extrusion from power, but the free submission of love . . . which is the essence of the filial spirit which actuated Christ from first to last. . . . Whatever glory he gains is devoted to the glory and power of the Father, who glorifies him in turn."

Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 3: 402 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3: 297-299)—"We are not to imagine incarnations of Christ in the angel-world, or in other spheres. This would make incarnation only the change of a garment, a passing theophany; and Christ's relation to humanity would be a merely external one." Bishop of Salisbury, quoted in Swayne, *Our Lord's Knowledge as Man*, XX—"Are we permitted to believe that there is something parallel to the progress of our Lord's humanity in the state of humiliation, still going on even now, in the state of exaltation? that it is, in fact, becoming more and more adequate to the divine nature? See Col. 1: 24—'fill up that which is lacking'; Heb. 10: 12, 13—'expecting till his enemies'; 1 Cor. 15: 28—'when all things have been subjected unto him.'" In our judgment such a conclusion is unwarranted, in view of the fact that the God-man in his exaltation has the glory of his preexistent state (John 17: 5); that all the heavenly powers are already subject to him (Eph. 1: 22, 23); and that he is now omnipresent (Mat. 28: 20).

(j) Infinite and finite in Christ.—Our investigation of the Scripture teaching with regard to the Person of Christ leads us to three important conclusions: 1. that deity and humanity, the infinite and the finite, in him are not mutually exclusive; 2. that the humanity in Christ differs from his deity not merely in degree but also in kind; and 3. that this difference in kind is the difference between the infinite original and the finite derivative, so that Christ is the source of life, both physical and spiritual, for all men.

Our doctrine excludes the view that Christ is only quantitatively different from other men in whom God's Spirit dwells. He is qualitatively different, in that he is the source of life, and they the recipients. Not only is it true that the fulness of the Godhead is in him alone,—it is also true that he is himself God, self-revealing and self-communicating, as men are not. Yet we cannot hold with E. H. Johnson, *Outline of Syst. Theol.*, 176-178, that Christ's humanity was of one species with his deity, but not of one substance. We know of but one underlying substance and ground of being. This one substance is self-limiting, and so self-manifesting, in Jesus Christ. The determining element is not the human but the divine. The infinite Source has a finite manifestation; but in the finite we see the Infinite; 2 Cor. 5: 19—"God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself"; John 14: 9—"he that hath seen me hath seen the Father." We can therefore agree with the following writers who regard all men as partakers of the life of God, while yet we deny that Christ is only a man, distinguished from his fellows by having a larger share in that life than they have.

J. M. Whitton: "How is the divine spirit which is manifest in the life of the man Christ Jesus to be distinguished, *que divine*, from the same divine spirit as manifested in the life of humanity? I answer, that in him, the person Christ, dwelleth the *fulness* of the Godhead bodily. I emphasize *fulness*, and say: The God-head is alike in the race and in its spiritual head, but the *fulness* is in the head alone—a fulness of course not

absolute, since circumscribed by a human organism, but a fulness to the limits of the organism. Essential deity cannot be ascribed to the human Christ, except as in common with the race created in the image of God. Life is one, and all life is divine." . . . Gloria Patri, 88, 28—"Every incarnation of life is *pro tanto* and in its measure an incarnation of God . . . and God's way is a perpetually increasing incarnation of life whose climax and crown is the divine fulness of life in Christ. . . . The *Homocustos* of the Nicene Creed was a great victory of the truth. But the Nicene Fathers builded better than they knew. The Unitarian Dr. Hedge praised them because they got at the truth, the logical conclusion of which was to come so long after, that God and man are of one substance." So Momerie, *Inspiration*, holds man's nature to be the same in kind with God's. See criticism of this view in Watts, *New Apologetic*, 123, 134. *Homocustos* he regards as involving *homocustos*; the divine nature capable of fission or segmentation, broken off in portions, and distributed among finite moral agents; the divine nature undergoing perpetual curtailment; every man therefore to some extent inspired, and evil as truly an inspiration of God as is good. Watts seems to us to lack the proper conception of the infinite as the ground of the finite, and so not excluding it.

Lyman Abbott affirms that Christ is, "not God *and* man, but God *in* man." Christ differs from other men only as the flower differs from the bulb. As the true man, he is genuinely divine. Deity and humanity are not two distinct natures, but one nature. The ethico-spiritual nature which is finite in man is identical with the nature which is infinite in God. Christ's distinction from other men is therefore in the degree in which he shared this nature and possessed a unique fulness of life—"sanctified with the Holy Spirit and with power" (Acts 10:38). Phillips Brooks: "To this humanity of man as a part of God—to this I cling; for I do love it, and I will know nothing else . . . Man is, in virtue of his essential humanity, partaker of the life of the essential Word. . . . Into every soul, just so far as it is possible for that soul to receive it, God beats his life and gives his help." Phillips Brooks believes in the redemptive indwelling of God in man, so that salvation is of man, for man, and by man. He does not scruple to say to every man: "You are a part of God."

While we shrink from the expressions which seem to imply a partition of the divine nature, we are compelled to recognize a truth which these writers are laboring to express, the truth namely of the essential oneness of all life, and of God in Christ as the source and giver of it. "Jesus quotes approvingly the words of Psalm 82:6—"I said, Ye are gods." Microscopic, indeed, but divine are we—sparks from the flame of deity. God is the Creator, but it is through Christ as the mediating and as the final Cause. "And we through him" (1 Cor. 3:6)—we exist for him, for the realization of a divine humanity in solidarity with him. Christ is at once the end and the instrumental cause of the whole process." Samuel Harris, *God the Creator and Lord of All*, speaks of "the essentially human in God, and the essentially divine in man." The Son, or Word of God, "when manifested in the forms of a finite personality, is the essential Christ, revealing that in God which is essentially and eternally human."

Pfeiderer, *Philos. Religion*, 1:126—"The whole of humanity is the object of the divine love; it is an Immanuel and son of God; its whole history is a continual incarnation of God; as indeed it is said in Scripture that we are a divine offspring, and that we live and move and have our being in God. But what lies potentially in the human consciousness of God is not on that account also manifestly revealed to it from the beginning." Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, 175-180, on Stoic monism and Platonic dualism, tells us that the Stoics believed in a personal *λόγος* and an impersonal *δύναμις*, both of them modes of a single substance. Some regarded God as a mode of matter, *natura naturata*: "Jupiter est quodcumque vides, quodcumque moveris" (Lucan, *Phars.*, 9:579); others conceived of him as the *natura naturans*,—this became the governing conception. . . . The products are all divine, but not equally divine. . . . Nearest of all to the pure essence of God is the human soul; it is an emanation or outflow from him, a sapling which is separate from and yet continues the life of the parent tree, a colony in which some members of the parent state have settled. Plato followed Anaxagoras in holding that mind is separate from matter and acts upon it. God is outside the world. He shapes it as a carpenter shapes wood. On the general subject of the union of deity and humanity in the person of Christ, see Herzog, *Encyclopædia*, art.: *Christology*; Barrows, in *Bib. Sac.*, 10:765; 23:83; also, *Bib. Sac.*, 17:525; John Owen, *Person of Christ*, in *Works*, 1:223; Hooker, *Ecol. Polity*, book v, chap. 51-56; Boyce, in *Bap. Quar.*, 1870:285; Shedd, *Hist. Doct.*, 1:408 sq.; Hovey, *God with Us*, 61-88; Plumtre, *Christ and Christendom*, appendix; E. H. Johnson, *The Idea of Law in Christology*, in *Bib. Sac.*, Oct. 1889:599-625.

## SECTION III.—THE TWO STATES OF CHRIST.

## I. THE STATE OF HUMILIATION.

1. *The nature of this humiliation.*

We may dismiss, as unworthy of serious notice, the views that it consisted essentially either in the union of the Logos with human nature,—for this union with human nature continues in the state of exaltation; or in the outward trials and privations of Christ's human life,—for this view casts reproach upon poverty, and ignores the power of the soul to rise superior to its outward circumstances.

E. G. Robinson, *Christian Theology*, 224—"The error of supposing it too humiliating to obey law was derived from the Roman treasury of merit and works of supererogation. Better was Frederick the Great's sentiment when his sturdy subject and neighbor, the miller, whose windmill he had attempted to remove, having beaten him in a lawsuit, the thwarted monarch exclaimed: 'Thank God, there is law in Prussia!'" Palmer, *Theological Definition*, 79—"God reveals himself in the rock, vegetable, animal, man. Must not the process go on? Must there not appear in the fulness of time a man who will reveal God as perfectly as is possible in human conditions—a man who is God under the limitations of humanity? Such incarnation is humiliation only in the eyes of men. To Christ it is lifting up, exaltation, glory; John 12: 33—"And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto myself." George Harris, *Moral Evolution*, 409—"The divinity of Christ is not obscured, but is more clearly seen, shining through his humanity."

We may devote more attention to the

A. Theory of Thomasius, Delitzsch, and Crosby, that the humiliation consisted in the surrender of the relative divine attributes.

This theory holds that the Logos, although retaining his divine self-consciousness and his immanent attributes of holiness, love, and truth, surrendered his relative attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence, in order to take to himself veritable human nature. According to this view, there are, indeed, two natures in Christ, but neither of these natures is infinite. Thomasius and Delitzsch are the chief advocates of this theory in Germany. Dr. Howard Crosby has maintained a similar view in America.

The theory of Thomasius, Delitzsch, and Crosby has been, though improperly, called the theory of the *Kenosis* (from *ἐκένωσεν*—"emptied himself"—in Phil. 2: 7); and its advocates are often called Kenotic theologians. There is a Kenosis of the Logos, but it is of a different sort from that which this theory supposes. For statements of this theory, see Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 2: 233-256, 542-550; Delitzsch, *Biblische Psychologie*, 323-333; Howard Crosby, in *Bap. Quar.*, 1870: 350-363—a discourse subsequently published in a separate volume, with the title: *The True Humanity of Christ*, and reviewed by Shedd, in *Presb. Rev.*, April, 1881: 429-431. Crosby emphasizes the word "became," in John 1: 14—"and the Word became flesh"—and gives the word "flesh" the sense of "man," or "human." Crosby, then, should logically deny, though he does not deny, that Christ's body was derived from the Virgin.

We object to this view that:

(a) It contradicts the Scriptures already referred to, in which Christ asserts his divine knowledge and power. Divinity, it is said, can give up its world-functions, for it existed without these before creation. But to give up divine attributes is to give up the substance of Godhead. Nor is it a sufficient reply to say that only the relative attributes are given up,

while the immanent attributes, which chiefly characterize the Godhead, are retained; for the immanent necessarily involve the relative, as the greater involve the less.

Lehner, *Jahrbuch f. d. Theol.*, 3: 349-356—“Is the Logos here? But wherein does he show his presence, that it may be known?” Hase, *Hutterus Redivivus*, 11th ed., 217, note. John Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, 2: 125-146, criticises the theory of the Kenosis, but grants that, with all its self-contradictions, as he regards them, it is an attempt to render conceivable the profound truth of a sympathizing, self-sacrificing God.

(b) Since the Logos, in uniting himself to a human soul, reduces himself to the condition and limitations of a human soul, the theory is virtually a theory of the coexistence of two human souls in Christ. But the union of two finite souls is more difficult to explain than the union of a finite and an infinite,—since there can be in the former case no intelligent guidance and control of the human element by the divine.

Dorner, *Jahrbuch f. d. Theol.*, 1: 397-408—“The impossibility of making two finite souls into one finally drove Arianism to the denial of any human soul in Christ” (Apollinarianism). This statement of Dorner, which we have already quoted in our account of Apollinarianism, illustrates the similar impossibility, upon the theory of Thomasius, of constructing out of two finite souls the person of Christ. See also Hovey, *God with Us*, 68.

(c) This theory fails to secure its end, that of making comprehensible the human development of Jesus,—for even though divested of the relative attributes of Godhood, the Logos still retains his divine self-consciousness, together with his immanent attributes of holiness, love, and truth. This is as difficult to reconcile with a purely natural human development as the possession of the relative divine attributes would be. The theory logically leads to a further denial of the possession of any divine attributes, or of any divine consciousness at all, on the part of Christ, and merges itself in the view of Gess and Beecher, that the Godhead of the Logos is actually transformed into a human soul.

Kahn, *Dogmatik*, 3: 343—“The old theology conceived of Christ as in full and unbroken use of the divine self-consciousness, the divine attributes, and the divine world-functions, from the conception until death. Though Jesus, as foetus, child, boy, was not almighty and omnipresent according to his human nature, yet he was so, as to his divine nature, which constituted one *ego* with his human. Thomasius, however, declared that the Logos gave up his relative attributes, during his sojourn in flesh. Dorner's objection to this, on the ground of the divine unchangeableness, overshoots the mark, because it makes any *becoming* impossible.

“But some things in Thomasius' doctrine are still difficult: 1st, divinity can certainly give up its world-functions, for it has existed without these before the world was. In the nature of an absolute personality, however, lies an absolute knowing, willing, feeling, which it cannot give up. Hence Phil. 2: 6-11 speaks of a giving-up of divine glory, but not of a giving-up of divine attributes or nature. 2d, little is gained by such an assumption of the giving-up of *relative* attributes, since the Logos, even while divested of a part of his attributes, still has full possession of his divine self-consciousness, which must make a purely human development no less difficult. 3d, the expressions of divine self-consciousness, the works of divine power, the words of divine wisdom, prove that Jesus was in possession of his divine self-consciousness and attributes.

“The essential thing which the Kenotics aim at, however, stands fast; namely, that the divine personality of the Logos divested itself of its glory (John 17: 5), riches (2 Cor. 8: 6), divine form (Phil. 2: 6). This divesting is the becoming man. The humiliation, then, was a giving up of the use, not of the possession, of the divine nature and attributes. That man can thus give up self-consciousness and powers, we see every day in ~~man~~. But man does not, thereby, cease to be man. So we maintain that the Logos,

when he became man, did not divest himself of his divine person and nature, which was impossible; but only divested himself of the use and exercise of these—these being latent to him—in order to unfold themselves to use in the measure to which his human nature developed itself—a use which found its completion in the condition of exaltation." This statement of Kahnis, although approaching correctness, is still neither quite correct nor quite complete.

B. Theory that the humiliation consisted in the surrender of the independent exercise of the divine attributes.

This theory, which we regard as the most satisfactory of all, may be more fully set forth as follows. The humiliation, as the Scriptures seem to show, consisted:

(a) In that act of the preëxistent Logos by which he gave up his divine glory with the Father, in order to take a servant-form. In this act, he resigned not the possession, nor yet entirely the use, but rather the independent exercise, of the divine attributes.

John 17: 5—"glorify them me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was"; Phil. 2: 6, 7—"who, existing in the form of God, counted not the being on an equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men"; 2 Cor. 8: 9—"For ye knew the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might become rich." Pompilia, in Robert Browning's *The Ring and the Book*: "Now I see how God is likest God in being born."

Omniscience gives up all knowledge but that of the child, the infant, the embryo, the infinitesimal germ of humanity. Omnipotence gives up all power but that of the impregnated ovum in the womb of the Virgin. The Godhead narrows itself down to a point that is next to absolute extinction. Jesus washing his disciples' feet, in John 13: 1-10, is the symbol of his coming down from his throne of glory and taking the form of a servant, in order that he may purify us, by regeneration and sanctification, for the marriage-supper of the Lamb.

b) In the submission of the Logos to the control of the Holy Spirit and the limitations of his Messianic mission, in his communication of the divine fullness of the human nature which he had taken into union with himself.

Acts 1: 2—Jesus, "after that he had given commandment through the Holy Spirit unto the apostles whom he had chosen"; Heb. 9: 14—"Jesus of Nazareth, how God anointed him with the Holy Spirit and with power"; Heb. 9: 14—"the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish unto God." A minor may have a great estate left to him, yet may have only such use of it as his guardian permits. In Homer's *Iliad*, when Andromache brings her infant son to part with Hector, the boy is terrified by the warlike plumes of his father's helmet, and Hector puts them off to embrace him. So God lays aside "That glorious form, that light unsufferable And that far-beaming blaze of majesty." Arthur H. Hallam, in *John Brown's Bab and his Friends*, 232, 233—"Revelation is the voluntary approximation of the infinite Being to the ways and thoughts of finite humanity."

(c) In the continuous surrender, on the part of the God-man, so far as his human nature was concerned, of the exercise of those divine powers with which it was endowed by virtue of its union with the divine, and in the voluntary acceptance, which followed upon this, of temptation, suffering, and death.

Mat. 26: 53—"thinkest thou that I cannot beseech my Father, and he shall even now send me more than twelve legions of angels?" John 10: 17, 18—"Therefore doth the Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I may take it again. No one taketh it away from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again"; Phil. 2: 8—"and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the cross." Cf. Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*: "Such music is there in immortal souls, That while this muddy vesture of decay Doth close it in, we cannot see it."

Each of these elements of the doctrine has its own Scriptural support. We must therefore regard the humiliation of Christ, not as consisting in a single act, but as involving a continuous self-renunciation, which began with the Kenosis of the Logos in becoming man, and which culminated in the self-subjection of the God-man to the death of the cross.

Our doctrine of Christ's humiliation will be better understood if we put it midway between two pairs of erroneous views, making it the third of five. The list would be as follows: (1) Gess: The Logos gave up all divine attributes; (2) Thomasius: The Logos gave up relative attributes only; (3) True View: The Logos gave up the independent exercise of divine attributes; (4) Old Orthodoxy: Christ gave up the use of divine attributes; (5) Anselm: Christ acted as if he did not possess divine attributes. The full exposition of the classical passage with reference to the humiliation, namely, Phil. 2: 5-8, we give below, under the next paragraph, pages 705, 706. Brentius illustrated Christ's humiliation by the king who travels incognito. But Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 158, says well that "to part in appearance with only the fruition of the divine attributes would be to impose upon us with a pretence of self-sacrifice; but to part with it in reality was to manifest most perfectly the true nature of God."

This same objection lies against the explanation given in the *Church Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1891: 1-30, on Our Lord's Knowledge as Man: "If divine knowledge exists in a different form from human, and a translation into a different form is necessary before it can be available in the human sphere, our Lord might know the day of judgment as God, and yet be ignorant of it as man. This must have been the case if he did not choose to translate it into the human form. But it might also have been incapable of translation. The processes of divine knowledge may be far above our finite comprehension." This seems to us to be a virtual denial of the unity of Christ's person, and to make our Lord play fast and loose with the truth. He either knew, or he did not know; and his denial that he knew makes it impossible that he should have known in any sense.

## 2. *The stages of Christ's humiliation.*

We may distinguish: (a) That act of the preincarnate Logos by which, in becoming man, he gave up the independent exercise of the divine attributes. (b) His submission to the common laws which regulate the origin of souls from a preëxisting sinful stock, in taking his human nature from the Virgin,—a human nature which only the miraculous conception rendered pure. (c) His subjection to the limitations involved in a human growth and development,—reaching the consciousness of his sonship at his twelfth year, and working no miracles till after the baptism. (d) The subordination of himself, in state, knowledge, teaching, and acts, to the control of the Holy Spirit,—so living, not independently, but as a servant. (e) His subjection, as connected with a sinful race, to temptation and suffering, and finally to the death which constituted the penalty of the law.

Peter Lombard asked whether God could know more than he was aware of? It is only another way of putting the question whether, during the earthly life of Christ, the Logos existed outside of the flesh of Jesus. We must answer in the affirmative. Otherwise the number of the persons in the Trinity would be variable, and the universe could do without him who is ever "upholding all things by the word of his power" (Heb. 1: 3), and in whom "all things consist" (Col. 1: 17). Let us recall the nature of God's omnipresence (see pages 279-282). Omnipresence is nothing less than the presence of the whole of God in every place. From this it follows, that the whole Christ can be present in every believer as fully as if that believer were the only one to receive of his fulness, and that the whole Logos can be united to and be present in the man Christ Jesus, while at the same time he fills and governs the universe. By virtue of this omnipresence, therefore, the whole Logos can suffer on earth, while yet the whole Logos reigns in heaven. The Logos outside of Christ has the perpetual consciousness of his Godhead, while yet the Logos, as united to humanity in Christ, is subject to ignorance, weakness, and death. Shedd, *Dogm. Theol.*, 1: 153—"Jehovah, though present in the form of the burning

though, was at the same time omnipresent also"; 2: 285-284, esp. 282—"Because the sun is shining in and through a cloud, it does not follow that it cannot at the same time be shining through the remainder of universal space, unobstructed by any vapor whatever." Gordon, *Ministry of the Spirit*, 21—"Not with God, as with finite man, does arrival in one place necessitate withdrawal from another." John Calvin: "The whole Christ was there; but not all that was in Christ; was there." See Adamson, *The Mind of Christ*.

How the independent exercise of the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence can be surrendered, even for a time, would be inconceivable, if we were regarding the Logos as he is in himself, seated upon the throne of the universe. The matter is somewhat easier when we remember that it was not the Logos *per se*, but rather the God-man, Jesus Christ, in whom the Logos submitted to this humiliation. South, *Sermons*, 2: 9—"Be the fountain never so full, yet if it communicate itself by a little pipe, the stream can be but small and inconsiderable, and equal to the measure of its conveyance." Sartorius, *Person and Work of Christ*, 89—"The human eye, when open, sees heaven and earth; but when shut, it sees little or nothing. Yet its inherent capacity does not change. So divinity does not change its nature, when it drops the curtain of humanity before the eyes of the God-man."

The divine in Christ, during most of his earthly life, is latent, or only now and then present to his consciousness or manifested to others. Illustrate from second childhood, where the mind itself exists, but is not capable of use; or from first childhood, where even a Newton or a Humboldt, if brought back to earth and made to occupy an infant body and brain, would develop as an infant, with infantile powers. There is more in memory than we can at this moment recall,—memory is greater than recollection. There is more of us at all times than we know,—only the sudden emergency reveals the largeness of our resources of mind and heart and will. The new nature, in the regenerate, is greater than it appears: "Beloved, now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him" (1 John 3: 2). So in Christ there was an ocean-like fulness of resource, of which only now and then the Spirit permitted the consciousness and the exercise.

Without denying (with Dorner) the completeness, even from the moment of the conception, of the union between the deity and the humanity, we may still say with Kahnis: "The human nature of Christ, according to the measure of its development, appropriates more and more to its conscious use the latent fulness of the divine nature." So we take the middle ground between two opposite extremes. On the one hand, the Kenosis was not the extinction of the Logos. Nor, on the other hand, did Christ hunger and sleep by miracle,—this is Docetism. We must not minimize Christ's humiliation, for this was his glory. There was no limit to his descent, except that arising from his sinlessness. His humiliation was not merely the giving-up of the appearance of Godhead. Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 585—"Should any one aim to celebrate the condescension of the emperor Charles the Fifth, by dwelling on the fact that he laid aside the robes of royalty and assumed the style of a subject, and altogether ignore the more important matter that he actually became a private person, it would be very weak and absurd." Cf. 2 Cor. 8: 9—"though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor"—he beggared himself. Mat. 27: 46—"My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"—non-exercise of divine omniscience.

Inasmuch, however, as the passage Phil. 2: 6-8 is the chief basis and support of the doctrine of Christ's humiliation, we here subjoin a more detailed examination of it.

EXPOSITION OF PHILIPPIANS, 2: 6-8. The passage reads: "who, existing in the form of God, counted not the being on an equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the cross."

The subject of the sentence is at first (verses 6, 7) Christ Jesus, regarded as the pre-existent Logos; subsequently (verse 8), this same Christ Jesus, regarded as incarnate. This change in the subject is indicated by the contrast between *μορφῆ θεοῦ* (verse 6) and *μορφῆν δουλοῦ* (verse 7), as well as by the participles *λαβών* and *γενόμενος* (verse 7) and *εὑρέθεῖς* (verse 8). It is asserted, then, that the pre-existing Logos, "although subsisting in the form of God, did not regard his equality with God as a thing to be forcibly retained, but emptied himself by taking the form of a servant, (that is,) by being made in the likeness of men. And being found in outward condition as a man, he (the incarnate son of God, yet further) humbled himself, by becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross" (verse 8).

Here notice that what the Logos divested himself of, in becoming man, is not the

substance of his Godhead, but the "form of God" in which this substance was manifested. This "form of God" can be only that independent exercise of the powers and prerogatives of Deity which constitutes his "equality with God." This he surrenders, in the act of "taking the form of a servant"—or becoming subordinate, as man. (Here other Scriptures complete the view, by their representations of the controlling influence of the Holy Spirit in the earthly life of Christ.) The phrases "made in the likeness of man" and "found in fashion as a man" are used to intimate, not that Jesus Christ was not really man, but that he was God as well as man, and therefore free from the sin which clings to man (*cf.* Rom. 8: 3—*ἐν ὁμοιωματι σαρκὸς ἀμαρτίας*—Meyer). Finally, this one person, now God and man united, submits himself, consciously and voluntarily, to the humiliation of an ignominious death.

See Lightfoot, on Phil. 2: 8—"Christ divested himself, not of his divine nature, for that was impossible, but of the glories and prerogatives of Deity. This he did by taking the form of a servant." Evans, in *Presb. Rev.*, 1888: 237—"Two stages in Christ's humiliation, each represented by a finite verb defining the central act of the particular stage, accompanied by two modal participles. 1st stage indicated in v. 7. Its central act is: 'he emptied himself.' Its two modalities are: (1) 'taking the form of servant'; (2) 'being made in the likeness of man.' Here we have the humiliation of the Kenosis,—that by which Christ became man. 2d stage, indicated in v. 8. Its central act is: 'he humbled himself.' Its two modalities are: (1) 'being found in fashion as a man'; (2) 'becoming obedient unto death, yea, the death of the cross.' Here we have the humiliation of his obedience and death,—that by which, *in* humanity, he became a sacrifice for our sins."

Meyer refers Eph. 5: 31 exclusively to Christ and the church, making the completed union future, however, *i. e.*, at the time of the Parousia. "For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother"—"in the incarnation, Christ leaves father and mother (his seat at the right hand of God), and cleaves to his wife (the church), and then the two (the descended Christ and the church) become one flesh (one ethical person, as the married pair become one by physical union). The Fathers, however, (Jerome, Theodoret, Chrysostom), referred it to the incarnation." On the interpretation of Phil. 2: 6-11, see *Comm. of Neander, Meyer, Lange, Ellicott.*

On the question whether Christ would have become man had there been no sin, theologians are divided. Dörner, Martensen, and Westcott answer in the affirmative; Robinson, Watts, and Denny in the negative. See Dörner, *Hist. Doct. Person of Christ*, 5: 236; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 327-329; Westcott, *Com. on Hebrews*, page 8—"The Incarnation is in its essence independent of the Fall, though conditioned by it as to its circumstances." *Per contra*, see Robinson, *Christ. Theol.*, 219, note—"It would be difficult to show that a like method of argument from *a priori* premises will not equally avail to prove sin to have been a necessary part of the scheme of creation." Denny, *Studies in Theology*, 101, objects to the doctrine of necessary incarnation irrespective of sin, that it tends to obliterate the distinction between nature and grace, to blur the definite outlines of the redemption wrought by Christ, as the supreme revelation of God and his love. See also Watts, *New Apologetic*, 198-203; Julius Müller, *Dogmat. Abhandlungen*, 66-126; Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, 512-523, 543-548; Forrest, *The Authority of Christ*, 340-345. On the general subject of the Kenosis of the Logos, see Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*; Robins, in *Bib. Sac.*, Oct. 1874: 615; Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, 4: 123-150, 336-475; Pöppel, *Person of Christ*, 33; Bodemeyer, *Lehre von der Kenosis*; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 610-625.

## II. THE STATE OF EXALTATION.

### 1. *The nature of this exaltation.*

It consisted essentially in: (a) A resumption, on the part of the Logos, of his independent exercise of divine attributes. (b) The withdrawal, on the part of the Logos, of all limitations in his communication of the divine fulness to the human nature of Christ. (c) The corresponding exercise, on the part of the human nature, of those powers which belonged to it by virtue of its union with the divine.

The eighth Psalm, with its account of the glory of human nature, is at present fulfilled only in Christ (see *Eph.* 2: 9—"but we behold . . . Jesus"). *Eph.* 2: 7—*ἡδύμορον αἰῶνος* *ἔσχηκεν ἡμᾶς ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσι*—may be translated, as in the margin of the Rev. Vers.: "That nature

like for a little while lower than the angels." Christ's human body was not necessarily subject to death; only by outward compulsion or voluntary surrender could he die. Hence resurrection was a natural necessity (Acts 2: 24 — "whom God raised up, having loosed the pangs of death: because it was not possible that he should be holden of it"; 31 — "neither was he left unto Hades, nor did his flesh see corruption"). This exaltation, which then affected humanity only in its head, is to be the experience also of the members. Our bodies also are to be delivered from the bondage of corruption, and we are to sit with Christ upon his throne.

## 2. *The stages of Christ's exaltation.*

### (a) The quickening and resurrection.

Both Lutherans and Romanists distinguish between these two, making the former precede, and the latter follow, Christ's "preaching to the spirits in prison." These views rest upon a misinterpretation of 1 Pet. 3: 18-20. Lutherans teach that Christ descended into hell, to proclaim his triumph to evil spirits. But this is to give *ἐκφρασεως* the unusual sense of proclaiming his triumph, instead of his gospel. Romanists teach that Christ entered the underworld to preach to Old Testament saints, that they might be saved. But the passage speaks only of the disobedient; it cannot be pressed into the support of a sacramental theory of the salvation of Old Testament believers. The passage does not assert the descent of Christ into the world of spirits, but only a work of the preincarnate Logos in offering salvation, through Noah, to the world then about to perish.

Augustine, *Ad Euodiam*, ep. 99 — "The spirits shut up in prison are the unbelievers who lived in the time of Noah, whose spirits or souls were shut up in the darkness of ignorance as in a prison; Christ preached to them, not in the flesh, for he was not yet incarnate, but in the spirit, that is, in his divine nature." Calvin taught that Christ descended into the underworld and suffered the pains of the lost. But not all Calvinists hold with him here; see *Princeton Essays*, I: 188. Meyer, on *Rom. 10: 7*, regards the question — "Who shall descend into the abyss? (that is, to bring Christ up from the dead)" — as an allusion to, and so indirectly a proof-text for, Christ's descent into the underworld. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 211, favors a preaching to the dead: "During that time [the three days] he did not return to heaven and his Father." But though *John 20: 17* is referred to for proof, is not this statement true only of his body? So far as the soul is concerned, Christ can say: "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit," and "To-day thou shalt be with me in Paradise" (*Luke 23: 43, 46*).

Zahn and Dörner best represent the Lutheran view. Zahn, in *Expositor*, March, 1886: 216-233 — "If Jesus was truly man, then his soul, after it left the body, entered into the fellowship of departed spirits. . . . If Jesus is he who lives forevermore and even his dying was his act, this tarrying in the realm of the dead cannot be thought of as a purely passive condition, but must have been known to those who dwelt there. . . . If Jesus was the Redeemer of mankind, the generations of those who had passed away must have thus been brought into personal relation to him, his work and his kingdom, without waiting for the last day."

Dörner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 663 (*Syst. Doct.*, 4: 127), thinks "Christ's descent into Hades marks a new era of his pneumatic life, in which he shows himself free from the limitations of time and space." He rejects "Luther's notion of a merely triumphal progress and proclamation of Christ. Before Christ," he says, "there was no abode peopled by the damned. The descent was an application of the benefit of the atonement (implied in *ἐκφρασεως*). The work was prophetic, not high-priestly nor kingly. Going to the spirits in prison is spoken of as a spontaneous act, not one of physical necessity. No power of Hades led him over into Hades. Deliverance from the limitations of a mortal body is already an indication of a higher stage of existence. Christ's soul is bodiless for a time — *πνευμα* only — as the departed were.

"The ceasing of this preaching is neither recorded, nor reasonably to be supposed, — indeed the ancient church supposed it carried on through the apostles. It expresses the universal significance of Christ for former generations and for the entire kingdom of the dead. No physical power is a limit to him. The gates of hell, or Hades, shall not prevail over or against him. The intermediate state is one of blessedness for him, and

he can admit the penitent thief into it. Even those who were not laid hold of by Christ's historic manifestation in this earthly life still must, and may, be brought into relation with him, in order to be able to accept or to reject him. And thus the universal relation of Christ to humanity and the absoluteness of the Christian religion are confirmed." So Dornér, for substance.

All this *versus* Strauss, who thought that the dying of vast masses of men, before and after Christ, who had not been brought into relation to Christ, proves that the Christian religion is not necessary to salvation, because not universal. For advocacy of Christ's preaching to the dead, see also Jahrbuch für d. Theol., 23: 177-223; W. W. Patton, in N. Eng., July, 1882: 460-478; John Miller, Problems Suggested by the Bible, part 1: 93-98; part 2: 38; Plumtree, The Spirits in Prison; Kendrick, in Bap. Rev., Apl. 1883; Clemen, Niedergefahren zu den Toten.

For the opposite view, see "No Preaching to the Dead," in Princeton Rev., March, 1875: 197; 1878: 451-491; Hovey, in Bap. Quar., 4: 486 sq., and Bib. Eschatology, 97-107; Love, Christ's Preaching to the Spirits in Prison; Cowles, in Bib. Sac., 1875: 401; Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 616-622; Salmond, in Popular Commentary; and Johnstone, Com., *in loco*. So Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Bishop Pearson. See also E. D. Morris, Is There Salvation after Death? and Wright, Relation of Death to Probation, 22: 28—"If Christ preached to spirits in Hades, it may have been to demonstrate the hopelessness of adding in the other world to the privileges enjoyed in this. We do not read that it had any favorable effect upon the hearers. If men will not hear Moses and the Prophets, then they will not hear one risen from the dead. 'To-day thou shalt be with me in Paradise' (Luke 23: 43) was not comforting, if Christ was going that day to the realm of lost spirits. The antediluvians, however, were specially favored with Noah's preaching, and were specially wicked."

For full statement of the view presented in the text, that the preaching referred to was the preaching of Christ as preëxisting Logos to the spirits, now in prison, when once they were disobedient in the days of Noah, see Bartlett, in New Englander, Oct. 1872: 601 sq., and in Bib. Sac., Apr. 1883: 363-378. Before giving the substance of Bartlett's exposition, we transcribe in full the passage in question, 1 Pet. 3: 18-20—"Because Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God; being put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit; in which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison, that aforetime were disobedient, when the longsuffering of God waited in the days of Noah."

Bartlett expounds as follows: "In which [*πνεύματι*, divine nature] he went and preached to the spirits in prison when once they disobeyed." *ἀπεδήξατο* is circumstantial aorist, indicating the time of the preaching as a definite past. It is an anarthrous dative, as in Luke 8: 27; Mat 8: 28; Acts 15: 25; 22: 17. It is an appositive, or predicative, participle. [That the aorist participle does not necessarily describe an action preliminary to that of the principal verb appears from its use in verse 18 (*ἠναρτωθεὶς*), in 1 Thes. 1: 6 (*ὑπέμνητοι*), and in Col. 2: 11, 12.] The connection of thought is: Peter exhorts his readers to endure suffering bravely, because Christ did so, in his lower nature being put to death, in his higher nature enduring the opposition of sinners before the flood. Sinners of that time only are mentioned, because this permits an introduction of the subsequent reference to baptism. Cf. Gen. 6: 3; 1 Pet. 1: 10, 11; 2 Pet. 2: 4, 5."

(b) The ascension and sitting at the right hand of God.

As the resurrection proclaimed Christ to men as the perfected and glorified man, the conqueror of sin and lord of death, the ascension proclaimed him to the universe as the reinstated God, the possessor of universal dominion, the omnipresent object of worship and hearer of prayer. *Dextra Dei ubique est.*

Mat. 28: 18, 20—"All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth. . . . I, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world"; Mark 16: 19—"So then the Lord Jesus, after he had spoken unto them, was received up into heaven, and sat down at the right hand of God"; Acts 7: 55—"But he, being full of the Holy Spirit, looked up steadfastly into heaven, and saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God"; 2 Cor. 12: 4—"he was crucified through weakness, yet he liveth through the power of God"; Eph. 1: 22, 23—"he put all things in subjection under his feet, and gave him to be head over all things to the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all"; 4: 10—"He that descended is the same also that ascended far above all the heavens, that he might fill all things." Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 184-189—"Before the resurrection, Christ was the God-man; since the resurrection, he is the God-man. . . . He ate with his disciples, not to show the quality, but the reality, of his human body." Nicoll, Life of Christ:

X and the thought of baptism representing salvation from the world system.

"It was hard for Elijah to ascend"—it required chariot and horses of fire—"but it was easier for Christ to ascend than to descend."—there was a gravitation upwards. Mac-laren: "He has not left the world, though he has ascended to the Father, any more than he left the Father when he came into the world"; John 1: 18—"the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father"; 3: 13—"the Son of man, who is in heaven."

We are compelled here to consider the problem of the relation of the humanity to the Logos in the state of exaltation. The Lutherans maintain the ubiquity of Christ's human body, and they make it the basis of their doctrine of the sacraments. Dörner, Glaubenslehre, 2: 674-676 (Syst. Doct., 4: 138-142), holds to "a presence, not simply of the Logos, but of the whole God-man, with all his people, but not necessarily likewise a similar presence in the world; in other words, his presence is morally conditioned by men's receptivity." The old theologians said that Christ is not in heaven, *quasi carcere*. Calvin, Institutes, 2: 16—he is "incarnate, but not incarcerated." He has gone into heaven, the place of spirits, and he manifests himself there; but he has also gone far above all heavens, that he may fill all things. He is with his people always. All power is given into his hand. The church is the fulness of him that filleth all in all. So the Acts of the Apostles speak constantly of the Son of man, of the man Jesus as God, ever present, the object of worship, seated at the right hand of God, having all the powers and prerogatives of Deity. See Westcott, Bible Com., on John 20: 22—"he breathed on them, and said unto them, Receive ye the Holy Spirit"—"The characteristic effect of the Paschal gift was shown in the new faith by which the disciples were gathered into a living society; the characteristic effect of the Pentecostal gift was shown in the exercise of supremacy potentially universal."

Who and what is this Christ who is present with his people when they pray? It is not enough to say, He is simply the Holy Spirit; for the Holy Spirit is the "Spirit of Christ" (Rom. 8: 9), and in having the Holy Spirit we have Christ himself (John 16: 7—"I will send him [the Comforter] unto you"; 14: 18—"I come unto you"). The Christ, who is thus present with us when we pray, is not simply the Logos, or the divine nature of Christ,—his humanity being separated from the divinity and being localized in heaven. This would be inconsistent with his promise, "Lo, I am with you," in which the "I" that spoke was not simply Deity, but Deity and humanity inseparably united; and it would deny the real and indissoluble union of the two natures. The elder brother and sympathizing Savior who is with us when we pray is man, as well as God. This manhood is therefore ubiquitous by virtue of its union with the Godhead.

But this is not to say that Christ's human body is everywhere present. It would seem that body must exist in spatial relations, and be confined to place. We do not know that this is so with regard to soul. Heaven would seem to be a place, because Christ's body is there; and a spiritual body is not a body which is spirit, but a body which is suited to the uses of the spirit. But even though Christ may manifest himself, in a glorified human body, only in heaven, his human soul, by virtue of its union with the divine nature, can at the same moment be with all his scattered people over the whole earth. As, in the days of his flesh, his humanity was confined to place, while as to his Deity he could speak of the Son of man who is in heaven, so now, although his human body may be confined to place, his human soul is ubiquitous. Humanity can exist without body; for during the three days in the sepulchre, Christ's body was on earth, but his soul was in the other world; and in like manner there is, during the intermediate state, a separation of the soul and the body of believers. But humanity cannot exist without soul; and if the human Savior is with us, then his humanity, at least so far as respects its immaterial part, must be everywhere present. *Per contra*, see Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2: 326, 327. Since Christ's human nature has derivatively become possessed of divine attributes, there is no validity in the notion of a progressiveness in that nature, now that it has ascended to the right hand of God. See Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 4: 131; Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 558, 576.

Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2: 327—"Suppose the presence of the divine nature of Christ in the soul of a believer in London. This divine nature is at the same moment conjoined with, and present to, and modified by, the human nature of Christ, which is in heaven and not in London." So Hooker, Eocl. Pol., 54, 55, and E. G. Robinson: "Christ is in heaven at the right hand of the Father, interceding for us, while he is present in the church by his Spirit. We pray to the theanthropic Jesus. Possession of a human body does not now constitute a limitation. We know little of the nature of the present body." We add to this last excellent remark the expression of our own conviction that the modern conception of the merely relative nature of space, and the idealistic view of matter as only the expression of mind and will, have relieved this subject of many of

its former difficulties. If Christ is omnipresent and if his body is simply the manifestation of his soul, then every soul may feel the presence of his humanity even now and "every eye" may "see him" at his second coming, even though believers may be separated as far as is Boston from Pekin. The body from which his glory flashes forth may be visible in ten thousand places at the same time; (Mat. 28: 20; Rev. 1: 7).

## SECTION IV.—THE OFFICES OF CHRIST.

The Scriptures represent Christ's offices as three in number,—prophetic, priestly, and kingly. Although these terms are derived from concrete human relations, they express perfectly distinct ideas. The prophet, the priest, and the king, of the Old Testament, were detached but designed prefigurations of him who should combine all these various activities in himself, and should furnish the ideal reality, of which they were the imperfect symbols.

1 Cor. 1: 30—"of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who was made unto us wisdom from God, and righteousness and sanctification, and redemption." Here "wisdom" seems to indicate the prophetic, "righteousness" (or "justification") the priestly, and "sanctification and redemption" the kingly work of Christ. Denovan: "Three offices are necessary. Christ must be a prophet, to save us from the ignorance of sin; a priest, to save us from its guilt; a king, to save us from its dominion in our flesh. Our faith cannot have firm basis in any one of these alone, any more than a stool can stand on less than three legs." See Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 563-566; Archer Butler, Sermons, 1: 314.

A. A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, 225—"For 'office,' there are two words in Latin: *munus* = position (of Mediator), and *officia* = functions (of Prophet, Priest, and King). They are not separate offices, as are those of President, Chief-Justice, and Senator. They are not separate functions, capable of successive and isolated performance. They are rather like the several functions of the one living human body—lungs, heart, brain—functionally distinct, yet interdependent, and together constituting one life. So the functions of Prophet, Priest, and King mutually imply one another; Christ is always a prophetic Priest, and a priestly Prophet; and he is always a royal Priest, and a priestly King; and together they accomplish one redemption, to which all are equally essential. Christ is both *μωϋσης* and *πατριάρχης*."

## I. THE PROPHETIC OFFICE OF CHRIST.

1. *The nature of Christ's prophetic work.*

(a) Here we must avoid the narrow interpretation which would make the prophet a mere foreteller of future events. He was rather an inspired interpreter or revealer of the divine will, a medium of communication between God and men (*προφήτης* = not foreteller, but forteller, or forth-teller. Cf. Gen. 20: 7,—of Abraham; Ps. 105: 15,—of the patriarchs; Mat. 11: 9,—of John the Baptist; 1 Cor. 12: 28, Eph. 2: 20, and 3: 5,—of N. T. expounders of Scripture).

Gen. 20: 7—"rectore the man's wife; for he is a prophet"—spoken of Abraham; Ps. 105: 15—"I speak not mine anointed ones, and do my prophets no harm"—spoken of the patriarchs; Mat. 11: 9—"But whosoever went ye out? to see a prophet? Yes, I say unto you, and much more than a prophet"—spoken of John the Baptist, from whom we have no recorded predictions, and whose pointing to Jesus as the "Lamb of God" (John 1: 29) was apparently but an echo of Isaiah 53. 1 Cor. 12: 28—"first apostles, secondly prophets"; Eph. 2: 20—"built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets"; 3: 5—"revealed unto his holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit"—all these latter texts speaking of New Testament expounders of Scripture.

Any organ of divine revelation, or medium of divine communication, is a prophet. "Hence," says Philippi, "the books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings are called 'prophetas priores,' or 'the earlier prophets.' Bernard's *Respicit, Aspicit, Prospicit*

describes the work of the prophet; for the prophet might see and might disclose things in the past, things in the present, or things in the future. Daniel was a prophet, in telling Nebuchadnezzar what his dream had been, as well as in telling its interpretation (Dan. 2:28, 36). The woman of Samaria rightly called Christ a prophet, when he told her all things that ever she did (John 4:22). "On the work of the prophet, see Stanley, Jewish Church, 1:491.

(b) The prophet commonly united three methods of fulfilling his office, — those of teaching, predicting, and miracle-working. In all these respects, Jesus calls himself a prophet (Deut. 18:15; cf. Acts 3:22; Mat. 13:57; Luke 13:33; John 6:14). He taught (Mat. 5-7), he uttered predictions (Mat. 24 and 25), he wrought miracles (Mat. 8 and 9), while in his person, his life, his work, and his death, he revealed the Father (John 8:26; 14:9; 17:8).

Deut. 18:15— "I Jehovah thy God will raise up unto thee a prophet, from the midst of thee, of thy brethren, like unto me; unto him shall ye hearken"; cf. Acts 3:22— where this prophecy is said to be fulfilled in Christ. Jesus calls himself a prophet in Mat. 13:57— "A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country, and in his own house"; Luke 13:33— "Nevertheless I must go on my way to-day and to-morrow and the day following: for it cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem." He was called a prophet: John 6:14— "When therefore the people saw the sign which he did, they said, This is of a truth the prophet that cometh into the world." John 8:26— "the things which I heard from him [the Father], these speak I unto the world"; 14:9— "he that hath seen me hath seen the Father"; 17:8— "the words which thou gavest me I have given unto them."

Denevan: "Christ teaches us by his word, his Spirit, his example." Christ's miracles were mainly miracles of healing. "Only sickness is contagious with us. But Christ was an example of perfect health, and his health was contagious. By its overflow, he healed others. Only a 'touch' (Mat. 9:21) was necessary."

Edwin P. Parker, on Horace Bushnell: "The two fundamental elements of prophecy are insight and expression. Christian prophecy implies insight or discernment of spiritual things by divine illumination, and expression of them, by inspiration, in terms of Christian truth or in the tones and cadences of Christian testimony. We may define it, then, as the publication, under the impulse of inspiration, and for edification, of truths perceived by divine illumination, apprehended by faith, and assimilated by experience. . . . It requires a natural basis and rational preparation in the human mind, a suitable stock of natural gifts on which to graft the spiritual gift for support and nourishment. These gifts have had devout culture. They have been crowned by illuminations and inspirations. Because insight gives foresight, the prophet will be a seer of things as they are unfolding and becoming; will discern far-signals and intimations of Providence; will forerun men to prepare the way for them, and them for the way of God's coming kingdom."

## 2. The stages of Christ's prophetic work.

These are four, namely:

(a) The preparatory work of the Logos, in enlightening mankind before the time of Christ's advent in the flesh. — All preliminary religious knowledge, whether within or without the bounds of the chosen people, is from Christ, the revealer of God.

Christ's prophetic work began before he came in the flesh. John 1:9— "There was the true light, even the light which lighteth every man, coming into the world" — all the natural light of conscience, science, philosophy, art, civilization, is the light of Christ. Tennyson: "Our little systems have their day, They have their day and cease to be; They are but broken lights of thee, And thou, O Lord, art more than they." Heb. 12:25, 26— "See that ye refuse not him that speaketh. . . . whose voice then [at Sinai] shook the earth: but now he hath promised, saying, Yet once more will I make to tremble not the earth only, but also the heaven"; Luke 11:49— "Therefore said the wisdom of God, I will send unto them prophets and apostles"; cf. Mat. 23:34— "behold, I send unto you prophets, and wise men, and scribes: some of them shall ye kill and crucify" — which shows that Jesus was referring to his own teachings, as well as to those of the earlier prophets.

(b) The earthly ministry of Christ incarnate. — In his earthly ministry, Christ showed himself the prophet *par excellence*. While he submitted,

like the Old Testament prophets, to the direction of the Holy Spirit, unlike them, he found the sources of all knowledge and power within himself. The word of God did not *come* to him, — he was *himself* the Word.

Luke 6:19 — "And all the multitude sought to touch him; for power came forth from him, and healed them all"; John 2:11 — "This beginning of his signs did Jesus in Cana of Galilee, and manifested *his glory*"; 8:38, 58 — "I speak the things which I have seen with my Father . . . Before Abraham was born, I am"; cf. Jer. 2:1 — "the word of Jehovah came to me"; John 1:1 — "In the beginning was the Word." Mat. 26:53 — "twelve legions of angels"; John 10:18 — of his life: "I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again"; 34 — "Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods? If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came . . . say ye of him, whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God?" Martensen, Dogmatics, 296-301, says of Jesus' teaching that "its source was not inspiration, but incarnation." Jesus was not inspired, — he was the Inspirer. Therefore he is the true "Master of those who know." His disciples act in his name; he acts in his own name.

(c) The guidance and teaching of his church on earth, since his ascension. — Christ's prophetic activity is continued through the preaching of his apostles and ministers, and by the enlightening influences of his Holy Spirit (John 16:12-14; Acts 1:1). The apostles unfolded the germs of doctrine put into their hands by Christ. The church is, in a derivative sense, a prophetic institution, established to teach the world by its preaching and its ordinances. But Christians are prophets, only as being proclaimers of Christ's teaching (Num. 11:29; Joel 2:28).

John 16:12-14 — "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he shall guide you into all the truth. . . . He shall glorify me: for he shall take of mine and shall declare it unto you"; Acts 1:1 — "The former treatise I made, O Theophilus, concerning all that Jesus began both to do and to teach" — Christ's prophetic work was only *begun*, during his earthly ministry; it is continued since his ascension. The inspiration of the apostles, the illumination of all preachers and Christians to understand and to unfold the meaning of the word they wrote, the conviction of sinners, and the sanctification of believers, — all these are parts of Christ's prophetic work, performed through the Holy Spirit.

By virtue of their union with Christ and participation in Christ's Spirit, all Christians are made in a secondary sense prophets, as well as priests and kings. Num. 11:29 — "Would that all Jehovah's people were prophets, that Jehovah would put his Spirit upon them"; Joel 2:28 — "I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy." All modern prophecy that is true, however, is but the republication of Christ's message — the proclamation and expounding of truth already revealed in Scripture. "All so-called new prophecy, from Montanus to Swedenborg, proves its own falsity by its lack of attesting miracles."

A. A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, 242 — "Every human prophet presupposes an infinite eternal divine Prophet from whom his knowledge is received, just as every stream presupposes a fountain from which it flows. . . . As the telescope of highest power takes into its field the narrowest segment of the sky, so Christ the prophet sometimes gives the intensest insight into the glowing centre of the heavenly world to those whom this world regards as unlearned and foolish, and the church recognizes as only babes in Christ."

(d) Christ's final revelation of the Father to his saints in glory (John 16:25; 17:24, 26; cf. Isa. 64:4; 1 Cor. 13:12). — Thus Christ's prophetic work will be an endless one, as the Father whom he reveals is infinite.

John 16:25 — "the hour cometh, when I shall no more speak unto you in dark sayings, but shall tell you plainly of the Father"; 17:24 — "I desire that where I am, they also may be with me; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me"; 26 — "I made known unto them thy name, and will make it known." The revelation of his own glory will be the revelation of the Father, in the Son. Isa. 64:4 — "For from of old man have not heard, nor perceived by the ear, neither hath the eye seen a God besides thee, who worketh for him that waiteth for him"; 1 Cor. 13:12 — "now we see in a mirror, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know fully even as also I was fully known." Rev. 21:23 — "And the city hath no need of the sun, neither of the moon, to shine upon it: for the glory of God did lighten it, and the lamp thereof is the Lamb" — not light, but lamp. Light is something generally diffused; one sees *by* it, but one cannot see *it*.

Lamp is the narrowing down, the concentrating, the focusing of light, so that the light becomes definite and visible. So in heaven Christ will be the visible God. We shall never see the Father separate from Christ. No man or angel has at any time seen God, "whom no man hath seen, nor can see." "The only begotten Son . . . he hath declared him," and he will forever declare him (John 1:18; 1 Tim. 6:16).

The ministers of the gospel in modern times, so far as they are joined to Christ and possessed by his spirit, have a right to call themselves prophets. The prophet is one—1. sent by God and conscious of his mission; 2. with a message from God which he is under compulsion to deliver; 3. a message grounded in the truth of the past, setting it in new lights for the present, and making new applications of it for the future. The word of the Lord must come to him; it must be his gospel; there must be things new as well as old. All mathematics are in the simplest axiom; but it needs divine illumination to discover them. All truth was in Jesus' words, nay, in the first prophecy uttered after the Fall, but only the apostles brought it out. The prophet's message must be 4. a message for the place and time—primarily for contemporaries and present needs; 5. a message of eternal significance and worldwide influence. As the prophet's word was for the whole world, so our word may be for other worlds, that "unto the principalities and the powers in the heavenly places might be made known through the church the manifold wisdom of God" (Eph. 3:10). It must be also 6. a message of the kingdom and triumph of Christ, which puts over against the distractions and calamities of the present time the glowing ideal and the perfect consummation to which God is leading his people: "Blessed be the glory of Jehovah from his place"; "Jehovah is in his holy temple: let all the earth keep silence before him" (Is. 6:1; Hab. 2:20). On the whole subject of Christ's prophetic office, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, IV, 2: 24-27; Bruce, Humiliation of Christ, 330-339; Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2: 332-370.

## II. THE PRIESTLY OFFICE OF CHRIST.

The priest was a person divinely appointed to transact with God on man's behalf. He fulfilled his office, first by offering sacrifice, and secondly by making intercession. In both these respects Christ is priest.

Hebrews 7: 24-28—"he, because he abideth forever, hath his priesthood unchangeable. Wherefore also he is able to save to the uttermost them that draw near unto God through him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them. For such a high priest became us, holy, guileless, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens; who needeth not daily, like those high priests, to offer up sacrifices, first for his own sins, and then for the sins of the people: for this he did once for all, when he offered up himself. For the law appointeth men high priests, having infirmity; but the word of the oath, which was after the law, appointeth a Son, perfected for evermore." The whole race was shut out from God by its sin. But God chose the Israelites as a priestly nation, Levi as a priestly tribe, Aaron as a priestly family, the high priest out of this family as type of the great high priest, Jesus Christ. J. S. Candlish, in Bib. World, Feb. 1897: 87-97, cites the following facts with regard to our Lord's sufferings as proofs of the doctrine of atonement: 1. Christ gave up his life by a perfectly free act; 2. out of regard to God his Father and obedience to his will; 3. the bitterest element of his suffering was that he endured it at the hand of God; 4. this divine appointment and infliction of suffering is inexplicable, except as Christ endured the divine judgment against the sin of the race.

### 1. *Christ's Sacrificial Work, or the Doctrine of the Atonement.*

The Scriptures teach that Christ obeyed and suffered in our stead, to satisfy an immanent demand of the divine holiness, and thus remove an obstacle in the divine mind to the pardon and restoration of the guilty. This statement may be expanded and explained in a preliminary way as follows:—

(a) The fundamental attribute of God is holiness, and holiness is not self-communicating love, but self-affirming righteousness. Holiness limits and conditions love, for love can will happiness only as happiness results from or consists with righteousness, that is, with conformity to God.

We have shown in our discussion of the divine attributes (vol. 1, pages 268-275) that holiness is neither self-love nor love, but self-affirming purity and right. Those who maintain that love is self-affirming as well as self-communicating, and therefore that

holiness is God's love for himself, must still admit that this self-affirming love which is holiness conditions and furnishes the standard for the self-communicating love which is benevolence. But we hold that holiness is not identical with, nor a manifestation of, love. Since self-maintenance must precede self-impartation; and since benevolence finds its object, motive, standard, and limit in righteousness, holiness, the self-affirming attribute, can in no way be resolved into love, the self-communicating. God must first maintain his own being before he can give to another; and this self-maintenance must have its reason and motive in the worth of that which is maintained. Holiness cannot be love, because love is irrational and capricious except as it has a standard by which it is regulated, and this standard cannot be itself love, but must be holiness. To make holiness a form of love is really to deny its existence, and with this to deny that any atonement is necessary for man's salvation.

(b) The universe is a reflection of God, and Christ the Logos is its life. God has constituted the universe, and humanity as a part of it, so as to express his holiness, positively by connecting happiness with righteousness, negatively by attaching unhappiness or suffering to sin.

We have seen, in vol. I, pages 100, 300-311, 335-338, that since Christ is the Logos, the immanent God, God revealed in nature, in humanity, and in redemption, the universe must be recognized as created, upheld and governed by the same Being who in the course of history was manifest in human form and who made atonement for human sin by his death on Calvary. As all God's creative activity has been exercised through Christ (vol. I, page 310), so it is Christ in whom all things consist or are held together (vol. I, page 311). Providence, as well as preservation, is his work. He makes the universe to reflect God, and especially God's ethical nature. That pain or loss universally and inevitably follow sin is the proof that God is unalterably opposed to moral evil; and the demands and reproaches of conscience witness that holiness is the fundamental attribute of God's being.

(c) Christ the Logos, as the Revealer of God in the universe and in humanity, must condemn sin by visiting upon it the suffering which is its penalty; while at the same time, as the Life of humanity, he must endure the reaction of God's holiness against sin which constitutes that penalty.

Here is a double work of Christ which Paul distinctly declares in Rom. 8: 3 — "For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh." The meaning is that God did through Christ what the law could not do, namely, accomplish deliverance for humanity; and did this by sending his son in a nature which in us is identified with sin. In connection with sin (*συνεπι ἀμαρτίας*), and as an offering for sin, God condemned sin, by condemning Christ. Expositor's Greek Testament, *in loco*: "When the question is asked, In what sense did God send his Son 'in connection with sin', there is only one answer possible. He sent him to expiate sin by his sacrificial death. This is the centre and foundation of Paul's gospel; see Rom. 3: 25 *sq.*" But whatever God did in condemning sin he did through Christ; "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself" (2 Cor. 5: 19); Christ was the condemner, as well as the condemned; conscience in us, which unites the accuser and the accused, shows us how Christ could be both the Judge and the Sin-bearer.

(d) Our personality is not self-contained. We live, move, and have our being naturally in Christ the Logos. Our reason, affection, conscience, and will are complete only in him. He is generic humanity, of which we are the offshoots. When his righteousness condemns sin, and his love voluntarily endures the suffering which is sin's penalty, humanity ratifies the judgment of God, makes full propitiation for sin, and satisfies the demands of holiness.

My personal existence is grounded in God. I cannot perceive the world outside of me nor recognize the existence of my fellow men, except as he bridges the gulf between me and the universe. Complete self-consciousness would be impossible if we did not partake of the universal Reason. The smallest child makes assumptions and uses processes of logic which are all instinctive, but which indicate the working in him of an

absolute and infinite Intelligence. True love is possible only as God's love flows into us and takes possession of us; so that the poet can truly say: "Our loves in higher love endure." No human will is truly free, unless God emancipates it; only he whom the Son of God makes free is free indeed; "work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to work" (Phil. 2:12, 13). Our moral nature, even more than our intellectual nature, witnesses that we are not sufficient to ourselves, but are complete only in him in whom we live and move and have our being (Col. 2:10; Acts 17:28). No man can make a conscience for himself. There is a common conscience, over and above the finite and individual conscience. That common conscience is one in all moral beings. John Watson: "There is no consciousness of self apart from the consciousness of other selves and things, and no consciousness of the world apart from the consciousness of the single Reality presupposed in both." This single Reality is Jesus Christ, the manifested God, the Light that lighteth every man, and the Life of all that lives (John 1:4, 9). He can represent humanity before God, because his immanent Deity constitutes the very essence of humanity.

(e) While Christ's love explains his willingness to endure suffering for us, only his holiness furnishes the reason for that constitution of the universe and of human nature which makes this suffering necessary. As respects us, his sufferings are substitutionary, since his divinity and his sinlessness enable him to do for us what we could never do for ourselves. Yet this substitution is also a sharing — not the work of one external to us, but of one who is the life of humanity, the soul of our soul and the life of our life, and so responsible with us for the sins of the race.

Most of the recent treatises on the Atonement have been descriptions of the effects of the Atonement upon life and character, but have thrown no light upon the Atonement itself, if indeed they have not denied its existence. We must not emphasize the effects by ignoring the cause. Scripture declares the ultimate aim of the Atonement to be that God "might himself be just" (Rom. 3:26); and no theory of the atonement will meet the demands of reason or conscience that does not ground its necessity in God's righteousness, rather than in his love. We acknowledge that our conceptions of atonement have suffered some change. To our fathers the atonement was a mere historical fact, a sacrifice offered in a few brief hours upon the Cross. It was a literal substitution of Christ's suffering for ours, the payment of our debt by another, and upon the ground of that payment we are permitted to go free. Those sufferings were soon over, and the hymn, "Love's Redeeming Work is Done," expressed the believer's joy in a finished redemption. And all this is true. But it is only a part of the truth. The atonement, like every other doctrine of Christianity, is a fact of life; and such facts of life cannot be crowded into our definitions, because they are greater than any definitions that we can frame. We must add to the idea of *substitution* the idea of *sharing*. Christ's doing and suffering is not that of one external and foreign to us. He is bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh; the bearer of our humanity; yes, the very life of the race.

(f) The historical work of the incarnate Christ is not itself the atonement,—it is rather the revelation of the atonement. The suffering of the incarnate Christ is the manifestation in space and time of the eternal suffering of God on account of human sin. Yet without the historical work which was finished on Calvary, the age-long suffering of God could never have been made comprehensible to men.

The life that Christ lived in Palestine and the death that he endured on Calvary were the revelation of a union with mankind which antedated the Fall. Being thus joined to us from the beginning, he has suffered in all human sin; "in all our affliction he has been afflicted" (Is. 63:9); so that the Psalmist can say: "Blessed be the Lord, who daily beareth our burden, even the God who is our salvation" (Ps. 68:19). The historical sacrifice was a burning-glass which focused the diffused rays of the Sun of righteousness and made them effective in the melting of human hearts. The sufferings of Christ take deepest hold upon us only when we see in them the two contrasted but complementary truths: that holiness must make penalty to follow sin, and that love must share that penalty with the transgressor. The Cross was the concrete exhibition of the holiness that required, and of

the love that provided, man's redemption. Those six hours of pain could never have procured our salvation if they had not been a revelation of eternal facts in the being of God. The heart of God and the meaning of all previous history were then unveiled. The whole evolution of humanity was there depicted in its essential elements, on the one hand the sin and condemnation of the race, on the other hand the grace and suffering of him who was its life and salvation. As he who hung upon the cross was God, manifest in the flesh, so the suffering of the cross was God's suffering for sin, manifest in the flesh. The imputation of our sins to him is the result of his natural union with us. He has been our substitute from the beginning. We cannot quarrel with the doctrine of substitution when we see that this substitution is but the sharing of our griefs and sorrows by him whose very life pulsates in our veins. See A. H. Strong, *Christ in Creation*, 78-80, 177-180.

(g) The historical sacrifice of our Lord is not only the final revelation of the heart of God, but also the manifestation of the law of universal life — the law that sin brings suffering to all connected with it, and that we can overcome sin in ourselves and in the world only by entering into the fellowship of Christ's sufferings and Christ's victory, or, in other words, only by union with him through faith.

We too are subject to the same law of life. We who enter into fellowship with our Lord "all up . . . that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ . . . for his body's sake, which is the church" (Gal. 1:24). The Christian Church can reign with Christ only as it partakes in his suffering. The atonement becomes a model and stimulus to self-sacrifice, and a test of Christian character. But it is easy to see how the subjective effect of Christ's sacrifice may absorb the attention, to the exclusion of its ground and cause. The moral influence of the atonement has taken deep hold upon our minds, and we are in danger of forgetting that it is the holiness of God, and not the salvation of men, that primarily requires it. When sharing excludes substitution; when reconciliation of man to God excludes reconciliation of God to man; when the only peace secured is peace in the sinner's heart and no thought is given to that peace with God which it is the first object of the atonement to secure; then the whole evangelical system is weakened, God's righteousness is ignored, and man is practically put in place of God. We must not go back to the old mechanical and arbitrary conceptions of the atonement, — we must go forward to a more vital apprehension of the relation of the face to Christ. A larger knowledge of Christ, the life of humanity, will enable us to hold fast the objective nature of the atonement, and its necessity as grounded in the holiness of God; while at the same time we appropriate all that is good in the modern view of the atonement, as the final demonstration of God's constraining love which moves men to repentance and submission. See A. H. Strong, *Cleveland Address, 1904*: 16-18; *Dinamore, The Atonement in Literature and in Life*, 213-250.

#### A. Scripture Methods of Representing the Atonement.

We may classify the Scripture representations according as they conform to moral, commercial, legal or sacrificial analogies.

##### (a) MORAL. — The atonement is described as

*A provision originating in God's love, and manifesting this love to the universe; but also as an example of disinterested love, to secure our deliverance from selfishness.* — In these latter passages, Christ's death is referred to as a source of moral stimulus to men.

*A provision*: John 3:16 — "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son"; Rom. 5:8 — "God commendeth his own love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us"; 1 John 4:9 — "Herein was the love of God manifested in us, that God hath sent his only begotten Son into the world that we might live through him"; Heb. 2:9 — "Jesus, because of the suffering of death crowned with glory and honor, that by the grace of God he should taste of death for every man" — redemption originated in the love of the Father, as well as in that of the Son. — *An example*: Luke 9:22-24 — "The Son of man must suffer . . . and be killed. . . . If any man would come after me, let him . . . take up his cross daily, and follow me . . . whosoever shall lose his life for my sake, the same shall save it"; 2 Cor. 5:15 — "he died for all, that they that live should no longer live unto themselves"; Gal. 1:4 — "gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us out of this present"

evil world"; Eph. 5: 25-27 — "Christ also loved the church, and gave himself up for it; that he might sanctify it"; Gal. 1: 38 — "reconciled in the body of his flesh through death, to present you holy"; Titus 2: 14 — "gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify"; 1 Pet. 2: 21-24 — "Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, that ye should follow his steps: who did no sin . . . who his own self bare our sins in his body upon the tree, that we, having died unto sins, might live unto righteousness." Mason, Faith of the Gospel, 181 — "A pious cottager, on hearing the text, 'God so loved the world,' exclaimed: 'Ah, that was love! I could have given myself, but I could never have given my son.'" There was a wounding of the Father through the heart of the Son: "they shall look unto me whom they have pierced; and they shall mourn for him, as one mourneth for his only son" (Zech. 12: 10).

(b) COMMERCIAL. — The atonement is described as

A *ransom*, paid to free us from the bondage of sin (note in these passages the use of *ἀντί*, the preposition of price, bargain, exchange). — In these passages, Christ's death is represented as the price of our deliverance from sin and death.

Mat. 20: 28, and Mark 10: 45 — "to give his life a ransom for many" — *ἀντίλυτρον* ἀντί πολλῶν. 1 Tim. 2: 6 — "who gave himself a ransom for all" — *ἀντίλυτρον*. *ἀντί* ("for," in the sense of "instead of") is never confounded with *ὄτις* ("for," in the sense of "in behalf of," "for the benefit of"). *ἀντί* is the preposition of price, bargain, exchange; and this signification is traceable in every passage where it occurs in the N. T. See Mat. 2: 23 — "Archelaus was reigning over Judaea in the room of [*ἀντί*] his father Herod"; Luke 11: 11 — "shall his son ask . . . a fish, and he for [*ἀντί*] a fish give him a serpent?" Heb. 12: 2 — "Jesus the author and perfecter of our faith, who for [*ἀντί* — as the price of] the joy that was set before him endured the cross"; 16 — "Eau, who for [*ἀντί* — in exchange for] one mess of meat sold his own birthright." See also Mat. 16: 26 — "what shall a man give in exchange for (*ἀντάλλαγμα*) his life" — how shall he buy it back, when once he has lost it? *ἀντίλυτρον* — substitutionary ransom. The connection in 1 Tim. 2: 6 requires that *ὄτις* should mean "instead of." We should interpret this *ὄτις* by the *ἀντί* in Mat. 20: 28. "Something befell Christ, and by reason of that, the same thing need not befall sinners" (E. Y. Mullins).

Meyer, on Mat. 20: 28 — "to give his life a ransom for many" — "The ψυχή is conceived of as *λύτρον*, a ransom, for, through the shedding of the blood, it becomes the τιμή (price) of redemption." See also 1 Cor. 6: 20; 7: 23 — "ye were bought with a price"; and 2 Pet. 2: 1 — "denying even the Master that bought them." The word "redemption," indeed, means simply "repurchase," or "the state of being repurchased" — i. e., delivered by the payment of a price. Rev. 5: 9 — "then wast slain, and didst purchase unto God with thy blood men of every tribe." Winer, N. T. Grammar, 268 — "In Greek, *ἀντί* is the preposition of price." Buttman, N. T. Grammar, 321 — "In the signification of the preposition *ἀντί* (instead of, for), no deviation occurs from ordinary usage." See Grimm's Wilke, Lexicon Græco-Lat.: "*ἀντί*, in vicem, anstatt"; Thayer, Lexicon N. T. — "*ἀντί*, of that for which anything is given, received, endured; . . . of the price of sale (or purchase) Mat. 20: 28"; also Cremer, N. T. Lex., on *ἀντάλλαγμα*.

Pfleiderer, in New World, Sept. 1899, doubts whether Jesus ever really uttered the words "give his life a ransom for many" (Mat. 20: 28). He regards them as essentially Pauline, and the result of later dogmatic reflection on the death of Jesus as a means of redemption. So Paine, Evolution of Trinitarianism, 377-381. But these words occur not in Luke, the Pauline gospel, but in Matthew, which is much earlier. They represent at any rate the apostolic conception of Jesus' teaching, a conception which Jesus himself promised should be formed under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, who should bring all things to the remembrance of his apostles and should guide them into all the truth (John 14: 26; 16: 13). As will be seen below, Pfeleiderer declares the Pauline doctrine to be that of substitutionary suffering.

(c) LEGAL. — The atonement is described as

An act of *obedience* to the law which sinners had violated; a *penalty*, borne in order to rescue the guilty; and an *exhibition* of God's righteousness, necessary to the vindication of his procedure in the pardon and restoration of sinners. — In these passages the death of Christ is represented as demanded by God's law and government.

*Obedience*: Gal. 4: 4, 5 — "born of a woman, born under the law, that he might redeem them that were under the law"; Mat. 3: 15 — "thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness" — Christ's baptism prefigured

his death, and was a consecration to death; cf. Mark 10: 38—"Are ye able to drink the cup that I drink? or to be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with?" Luke 12: 50—"I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!" Mat. 26: 39—"My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away from me: nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt"; 5: 17—"Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfil"; Phil. 2: 8—"becoming obedient even unto death"; Rom. 5: 19—"through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous"; 10: 4—"Christ is the end of the law unto righteousness to every one that believeth."—*Penalty*: Rom. 4: 25—"who was delivered up for our trespasses, and was raised for our justification"; 8: 3—"God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh"; 2 Cor. 5: 21—"Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf"—here "sin"—a sinner, an accursed one (Meyer); Gal. 1: 4—"gave himself for our sins"; 3: 13—"Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree"; cf. Deut. 21: 23—"he that is hanged is accursed of God." Heb. 9: 28—"Christ also, having been once offered to bear the sins of many"; cf. Lev. 5: 17—"if any one sin . . . yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity"; Num. 14: 34—"for every day a year, shall ye bear your iniquities, even forty years"; Lam. 5: 7—"Our fathers sinned and are not; and we have borne their iniquities."—*Exhibition*: Rom. 3: 25, 26—"whom God set forth to be a propitiation, through faith, in his blood, to show his righteousness because of the passing over of the sins done aforetime, in the forbearance of God"; cf. Heb. 9: 15—"a death having taken place for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first covenant."

On these passages, see an excellent section in Pfleiderer, *Die Ritschl'sche Theologie*, 38-53. Pfleiderer severely criticizes Ritschl's evasion of their natural force and declares Paul's teaching to be that Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law by suffering as a substitute the death threatened by the law against sinners. So Orelli Cone, Paul, 261. On the other hand, L. I. Paine, *Evolution of Trinitarianism*, 288-307, chapter on the New Christian Atonement, holds that Christ taught only reconciliation on condition of repentance. Paul added the idea of mediation drawn from the Platonic dualism of Philo. The Epistle to the Hebrews made Christ a sacrificial victim to propitiate God, so that the reconciliation became Godward instead of manward. But Professor Paine's view that Paul taught an Arian Mediatorship is incorrect. "God was in Christ" (2 Cor. 5: 19) and God "manifested in the flesh" (1 Tim. 3: 16) are the keynote of Paul's teaching, and this is identical with John's doctrine of the Logos: "the Word was God," and "the Word became flesh" (John 1: 1, 14).

The Outlook, December 15, 1900, in criticizing Prof. Paine, states three postulates of the New Trinitarianism as: 1. The essential kinship of God and man,—in man there is an essential divineness, in God there is an essential humanness. 2. The divine immanence,—this universal presence gives nature its physical unity, and humanity its moral unity. This is not pantheism, any more than the presence of man's spirit in all he thinks and does proves that man's spirit is only the sum of his experiences. 3. God transcends all phenomena,—though in all, he is greater than all. He entered perfectly into one man, and through this indwelling in one man he is gradually entering into all men and filling all men with his fulness, so that Christ will be the first-born among many brethren. The defects of this view, which contains many elements of truth, are: 1. That it regards Christ as the product instead of the Producer, the divinely formed man instead of the humanly acting God, the head man among men instead of the Creator and Life of humanity; 2. That it therefore renders impossible any divine bearing of the sins of all men by Jesus Christ, and substitutes for it such a histrionic exhibition of God's feeling and such a beauty of example as are possible within the limits of human nature,—in other words, there is no real Deity of Christ and no objective atonement.

(d) SACRIFICIAL. — The atonement is described as

A work of *priestly meditation*, which reconciles God to men,—notice here that the term 'reconciliation' has its usual sense of removing enmity, not from the offending, but from the offended party;—a *sin-offering*, presented on behalf of transgressors;—a *propitiation*, which satisfies the demands of violated holiness;—and a *substitution*, of Christ's obedience and sufferings for ours.—These passages, taken together, show that Christ's death is demanded by God's attribute of justice, or holiness, if sinners are to be saved.

*Priestly meditation*: Heb. 9: 11: 12—"Christ having come a high priest, . . . nor yet through the blood of goats and calves, but through his own blood, entered in once for all into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemp-

tion"; Rom. 5: 10—"while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son"; 2 Cor. 5: 18, 19—"all things are of God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ . . . God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not reckoning unto them their trespasses"; Eph. 2: 16—"might reconcile them both in one body unto God through the cross, having slain the enmity thereby"; cf. 12, 13, 19—"strangers from the covenants of the promise . . . far off . . . no more strangers and sojourners, but ye are fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God"; Gal. 1: 20—"through him to reconcile all things unto himself, having made peace through the blood of his cross."

On all these passages, see Meyer, who shows the meaning of the apostle to be, that "we were 'enemies,' not actively, as hostile to God, but passively, as those with whom God was angry." The epistle to the Romans begins with the revelation of wrath against Gentile and Jew alike (Rom. 1: 18). "While we were enemies" (Rom. 5: 10)—"when God was hostile to us." "Reconciliation" is therefore the removal of God's wrath toward man. Meyer, on this last passage, says that Christ's death does not remove man's wrath toward God [this is not the work of Christ, but of the Holy Spirit]. The offender reconciles the person offended, not himself. See Denney, Com. on Rom. 5: 9-11, in Expositor's Gk. Test.

Cf. Num. 25: 13, where Phinehas, by slaying Zimri, is said to have "made atonement for the children of Israel." Surely, the "atonement" here cannot be a reconciliation of Israel. The action terminates, not on the subject, but on the object—God. So, 1 Sam. 29: 4—"wherewith should this fellow reconcile himself unto his lord? should it not be with the heads of these men?" Mat. 5: 23, 24—"If therefore thou art offering thy gift at the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way, first be reconciled to thy brother [i. e., remove his enmity, not thine own], and then come and offer thy gift." See Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2: 387-398.

Pfeiderer, Die Ritschl'sche Theologie, 42—"Ἐχθροὶ ἑντες (Rom. 5: 10)—not the active disposition of enmity to God on our part, but our passive condition under the enmity or wrath of God." Paul was not the author of this doctrine,—he claims that he received it from Christ himself (Gal. 1: 12). Simon, Reconciliation, 167—"The idea that only man needs to be reconciled arises from a false conception of the unchangeableness of God. But God would be unjust, if his relation to man were the same after his sin as it was before." The old hymn expressed the truth: "My God is reconciled; His pardoning voice I hear; He owns me for his child; I can no longer fear; With filial trust I now draw nigh, And 'Father, Abba, Father' cry."

A *sin-offering*: John 1: 29—"Behold, the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world"—here *αἰσῶν* means to take away by taking or bearing; to take, and so take away. It is an allusion to the sin-offering of Isaiah 53: 6-12—"when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin . . . as a lamb that is led to the slaughter . . . Jehovah hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." Mat. 26: 28—"this is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many unto remission of sins"; cf. Ps. 50: 5—"made a covenant with me by sacrifice." 1 John 1: 7—"the blood of Jesus his Son cleanseth us from all sin"—not sanctification, but justification; 1 Cor. 5: 7—"our passover also hath been sacrificed, even Christ"; cf. Deut. 16: 2-6—"thou shalt sacrifice the passover unto Jehovah thy God." Eph. 5: 2—"gave himself up for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God for an odor of a sweet smell" (see Com. of Salmond, in Expositor's Greek Testament); Heb. 9: 14—"the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish unto God"; 23, 26—"apart from shedding of blood there is no remission . . . now once in the end of the ages hath he been manifested to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself"; 1 Pet. 1: 18, 19—"redeemed . . . with precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, even the blood of Christ." See Expos. Gk. Test., on Eph. 1: 7.

Lowrie, Doctrine of St. John, 85, points out that John 6: 52-59—"eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood"—is Christ's reference to his death in terms of sacrifice. So, as we shall see below, it is a propitiation (1 John 2: 2). We therefore strongly object to the statement of Wilson, Gospel of Atonement, 64—"Christ's death is a sacrifice, if sacrifice means the crowning instance of that suffering of the innocent for the guilty which springs from the solidarity of mankind; but there is no thought of substitution or expiation." Wilson forgets that this necessity of suffering arises from God's righteousness; that without this suffering man cannot be saved; that Christ endures what we, on account of the insensibility of sin, cannot feel or endure; that this suffering takes the place of ours, so that we are saved thereby. Wilson holds that the Incarnation constituted the Atonement, and that all thought of expiation may be eliminated. Henry B. Smith far better summed up the gospel in the words: "Incarnation in order to Atonement." We regard as still better the words: "Incarnation in order to reveal the Atonement."

A *propitiation*: Rom. 3: 25, 26—"whom God set forth to be a propitiation, . . . in his blood . . . that he might himself be just, and the justifier of him that hath faith in Jesus." A full and critical exposition of this passage will be found under the Ethical Theory of the Atonement, pages 750-760. Here it is sufficient to say that it shows: (1) that Christ's death is a propitiatory sacrifice; (2) that its first and main effect is upon God; (3) that the particular attribute

in God which demands the atonement is his justice, or holiness; (4) that the satisfaction of this holiness is the necessary condition of God's justifying the believer.

Compare Luke 18: 13, marg.—"God, be thou merciful unto me the sinner"; lit.: "God be propitiated toward me the sinner"—by the sacrifice, whose smoke was ascending before the publican, even while he prayed. Heb. 2: 17—"a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people"; 1 John 2: 2—"and he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the whole world"; 4: 10—"Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins"; cf. Gen. 32: 20, LXX.—"I will appease [*ἑπιλάσσωμαι*, 'propitiate'] him with the present that goeth before me"; Prov. 16: 14, LXX.—"The wrath of a king is as messengers of death; but a wise man will pacify it" [*ἑπιλάσσει*, 'propitiate it'].

On propitiation, see Foster, *Christian Life and Theology*, 216—"Something was thereby done which rendered God inclined to pardon the sinner. God is made inclined to forgive sinners by the sacrifice, because his righteousness was exhibited by the infliction of the penalty of sin; but not because he needed to be inclined in heart to love the sinner or to exercise his mercy. In fact, it was he himself who 'set forth' Jesus as 'a propitiation' (Rom. 3: 25, 26)." Paul never merges the objective atonement in its subjective effects, although no writer of the New Testament has more fully recognized these subjective effects. With him Christ for us upon the Cross is the necessary preparation for Christ *in* us by his Spirit. Gould, *Bib. Theol. N. T.*, 74, 75, 89, 172, unwar- rantly contrasts Paul's representation of Christ as priest with what he calls the representation of Christ as prophet in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "The priest says: Man's return to God is not enough,—there must be an expiation of man's sin. This is Paul's doctrine. The prophet says: There never was a divine provision for sacrifice. Man's return to God is the thing wanted. But this return must be completed. Jesus is the perfect prophet who gives us an example of restored obedience, and who comes in to perfect man's imperfect work. This is the doctrine of the Epistle to the Hebrews." This recognition of expiation in Paul's teaching, together with denial of its validity and interpretation of the Epistle to the Hebrews as prophetic rather than priestly, is a curiosity of modern exegesis.

Lyman Abbott, *Theology of an Evolutionist*, 107-127, goes still further and affirms: "In the N. T. God is never said to be propitiated, nor is it ever said that Jesus Christ propitiates God or satisfies God's wrath." Yet Dr. Abbott adds that in the N. T. God is represented as self-propitiated: "Christianity is distinguished from paganism by representing God as appeasing his own wrath and satisfying his own justice by the forth-putting of his own love." This self-propitiation however must not be thought of as a bearing of penalty: "Nowhere in the O. T. is the idea of a sacrifice coupled with the idea of penalty,—it is always coupled with purification—'with his stripes we are healed' (Is. 53: 5). And in the N. T., 'the Lamb of God . . . taketh away the sin of the world' (John 1: 29); 'the blood of Jesus . . . cleanseth' (1 John 1: 7). . . . What humanity needs is not the removal of the penalty, but removal of the sin." This seems to us a distinct contradiction of both Paul and John, with whom propitiation is an essential of Christian doctrine (see Rom. 3: 25; 1 John 2: 2), while we grant that the propitiation is made, not by sinful man, but by God himself in the person of his Son. See George B. Gow, on *The Place of Expiation in Human Redemption*, *Am. Jour. Theol.*, 1900: 734-756.

*A substitution*: Luke 22: 37—"he was reckoned with transgressors"; cf. Lev. 16: 21, 22—"and Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel . . . he shall put them upon the head of the goat . . . and the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a solitary land"; Is. 53: 5, 6—"he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and Jehovah hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." John 10: 11—"the good shepherd layeth down his life for the sheep"; Rom. 5: 6-8—"while we were yet weak, in due season Christ died for the ungodly. For scarcely for a righteous man will one die: for peradventure for the good man some one would even dare to die. But God commendeth his own love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us"; 1 Pet. 2: 18—"Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God."

To these texts we must add all those mentioned under (b) above, in which Christ's death is described as a ransom. Besides Meyer's comment, there quoted, on Mat. 20: 28—"to give his life a ransom for many," *λύτρον ἀντι πολλῶν*—Meyer also says: "*ἀντι* denotes substitution. That which is given as a ransom takes the place of, is given instead of, those who are to be set free in consideration thereof. '*ἀντι*' can only be understood in the sense of substitution in the act of which the ransom is presented as an equivalent, to secure the deliverance of those on whose behalf the ransom is paid,—a view which is only confirmed by the fact that, in other parts of the N. T., this ransom is usually spoken of as an expiatory sacrifice. That which they [those for whom the ransom is paid] are

redeemed from, is the eternal *ἀνάστασις* in which, as having the wrath of God abiding upon them, they would remain imprisoned, as in a state of hopeless bondage, unless the guilt of their sins were expiated."

Cramer, N. T. Lex., says that "in both the N. T. texts, Mat 16: 26 and Mark 8: 37, the word *ἀντάλλαγμα*, like *λύτρον*, is akin to the conception of atonement: cf. L. 43: 3, 4; 51: 11; Acts 5: 12. This is a confirmation of the fact that satisfaction and substitution essentially belong to the idea of atonement." Dorner, Glaubenslehre, 2: 515 (Syst. Doct., 3: 414)—"Mat 20: 28 contains the thought of a substitution. While the whole world is not of equal worth with the soul, and could not purchase it, Christ's death and work are so valuable, that they can serve as a ransom."

The sufferings of the righteous were recognized in Rabbinical Judaism as having a substitutionary significance for the sins of others; see Weber, *Altynagog. Palestin. Theologie*, 314; Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes*, 2: 466 (translation, div. II, vol. 2: 186). But Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus*, 2: 225-232, says this idea of vicarious satisfaction was an addition of Paul to the teaching of Jesus. Wendt grants that both Paul and John taught substitution, but he denies that Jesus did. He claims that *ἀντί* in Mat 20: 28 means simply that Jesus gave his life as a means whereby he obtains the deliverance of many. But this interpretation is a non-natural one, and violates linguistic usage. It holds that Paul and John misunderstood or misrepresented the words of our Lord. We prefer the frank acknowledgment by Pfeiderer that Jesus, as well as Paul and John, taught substitution, but that neither one of them was correct. Coe-stock, on *Substitution as a Stage in Theological Thought*, similarly holds that the idea of substitution must be abandoned. We grant that the idea of substitution needs to be supplemented by the idea of sharing, and so relieved of its external and mechanical implications, but that to abandon the conception itself is to abandon faith in the evangelists and in Jesus himself.

Dr. W. N. Clarke, in his *Christian Theology*, rejects the doctrine of retribution for sin, and denies the possibility of penal suffering for another. A proper view of penalty, and of Christ's vital connection with humanity, would make these rejected ideas not only credible but inevitable. Dr. Alvah Hovey reviews Dr. Clarke's *Theology*, *Am. Jour. Theology*, Jan. 1869: 206—"If we do not import into the endurance of penalty some degree of sinful feeling or volition, there is no ground for denying that a holy being may bear it in place of a sinner. For nothing but wrong-doing, or approval of wrong-doing, is impossible to a holy being. Indeed, for one to bear for another the just penalty of his sin, provided that other may thereby be saved from it and made a friend of God, is perhaps the highest conceivable function of love or good-will." Denney, *Studies*, 126, 127, shows that "substitution means simply that man is dependent for his acceptance with God upon something which Christ has done for him, and which he could never have done and never needs to do for himself. . . . The forfeiting of his free life has freed our forfeited lives. This substitution can be preached, and it binds men to Christ by making them forever dependent on him. The condemnation of our sins in Christ upon his cross is the barb on the hook,—without it your bait will be taken, but you will not catch men; you will not annihilate pride, and make Christ the Alpha and Omega in man's redemption." On the Scripture proofs, see Crawford, *Atonement*, 1: 1-123; Dale, *Atonement*, 65-256; Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, iv. 3: 243-342; Smeaton, *Our Lord's and the Apostles' Doctrine of Atonement*.

An examination of the passages referred to shows that, while the forms in which the atoning work of Christ is described are in part derived from moral, commercial, and legal relations, the prevailing language is that of sacrifice. A correct view of the atonement must therefore be grounded upon a proper interpretation of the institution of sacrifice, especially as found in the Mosaic system.

The question is sometimes asked: Why is there so little in Jesus' own words about atonement? Dr. R. W. Dale replies: Because Christ did not come to preach the gospel,—he came that there might be a gospel to preach. The Cross had to be endured, before it could be explained. Jesus came to *be* the sacrifice, not to *spea*k about it. But his reticence is just what he told us we should find in his words. He proclaimed their incompleteness, and referred us to a subsequent Teacher—the Holy Spirit. The testimony of the Holy Spirit we have in the words of the apostles. We must remember that the gospels were supplementary to the epistles, not the epistles to the gospels.

The gospels merely fill out our knowledge of Christ. It is not for the Redeemer to magnify the cost of salvation, but for the redeemed. "None of the ransomed ever knew." The doer of a great deed has the least to say about it.

Harnack: "There is an inner law which compels the sinner to look upon God as a wrathful Judge. . . . Yet no other feeling is possible." We regard this confession as a demonstration of the psychological correctness of Paul's doctrine of a vicarious atonement. Human nature has been so constituted by God that it reflects the demand of his holiness. That conscience needs to be appeased is proof that God needs to be appeased. When Whiton declares that propitiation is offered only to our conscience, which is the wrath of that which is of God within us, and that Christ bore our sins, not in substitution for us, but in fellowship with us, to rouse our consciences to hatred of them, he forgets that God is not only immanent in the conscience but also transcendent, and that the verdicts of conscience are only indications of the higher verdicts of God: 1 John 3:20—"If our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things." Lyman Abbott, *Theology of an Evolutionist*, 57—"A people half emancipated from the paganism that imagines that God must be placated by sacrifice before he can forgive sins gave to the sacrificial system that Israel had borrowed from paganism the same divine authority which they gave to those revolutionary elements in the system which were destined eventually to sweep it entirely out of existence." So Bowne, *Atonement*, 74—"The essential moral fact is that, if God is to forgive unrighteous men, some way must be found of making them righteous. The difficulty is not forensic, but moral." Both Abbott and Bowne regard righteousness as a mere form of benevolence, and the atonement as only a means to a utilitarian end, namely, the restoration and happiness of the creature. A more correct view of God's righteousness as the fundamental attribute of his being, as inwrought into the constitution of the universe, and as infallibly connecting suffering with sin, would have led these writers to see a divine wisdom and inspiration in the institution of sacrifice, and a divine necessity that God should suffer if man is to go free.

B. The Institution of Sacrifice, more especially as found in the Mosaic system.

(a) We may dismiss as untenable, on the one hand, the theory that sacrifice is essentially the presentation of a gift (Hofmann, Baring-Gould) or a feast (Spencer) to the Deity; and on the other hand the theory that sacrifice is a symbol of renewed fellowship (Keil), or of the grateful offering to God of the whole life and being of the worshiper (Bähr). Neither of these theories can explain the fact that the sacrifice is a bloody offering, involving the suffering and death of the victim, and brought, not by the simply grateful, but by the conscience-stricken soul.

For the views of sacrifice here mentioned, see Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, II, 1: 214-224; Baring-Gould, *Origin and Devel. of Relig. Belief*, 268-290; Spencer, *De Legibus Hebræorum*; Keil, *Bib. Archæologie*, sec. 43, 47; Bähr, *Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus*, 2: 196, 209; also synopsis of Bähr's view, in *Bib. Sac.*, Oct. 1870: 593; Jan. 1871: 171. *Per contra*, see Crawford, *Atonement*, 228-240; Lange, *Introd. to Com. on Exodus*, 83—"The heathen change God's symbols into myths (rationalism), as the Jews change God's sacrifices into meritorious service (ritualism)." Westcott, *Hebrews*, 231-234, seems to hold with Spencer that sacrifice is essentially a feast made as an offering to God. So Philo: "God receives the faithful offerer to his own table, giving him back part of the sacrifice." Compare with this the ghosts in Homer's *Odyssey*, who receive strength from drinking the blood of the sacrifices. Bähr's view is only half of the truth. Reunion presupposes Expiation. Lyttleton, in *Lux Mundi*, 231—"The sinner must first expiate his sin by suffering,—then only can he give to God the life thus purified by an expiatory death." Jahn, *Bib. Archæologie*, sec. 373, 378—"It is of the very idea of the sacrifice that the victim shall be presented directly to God, and in the presentation shall be destroyed." Bowne, *Philos. of Theism*, 253, speaks of the delicate feeling of the Biblical critic who, with his mouth full of beef or mutton, professes to be shocked at the cruelty to animals involved in the temple sacrifices. Lord Bacon: "Hieroglyphics came before letters, and parables before arguments." "The old dispensation was God's great parable to man. The Theocracy was graven all over with divine hieroglyphics. Does there exist the Rosetta stone by which we can read these hieroglyphics?"

The shadows, that have been shortening up into faintness of outline, pass away and vanish utterly under the full meridian splendor of the Sun of Righteousness." On Eph. 1:7—"the blood of Christ," as an expiatory sacrifice which secures our justification, see Salmon, in Expositor's Greek Testament.

(b) The true import of the sacrifice, as is abundantly evident from both heathen and Jewish sources, embraced three elements,—first, that of satisfaction to offended Deity, or propitiation offered to violated holiness; secondly, that of substitution of suffering and death on the part of the innocent, for the deserved punishment of the guilty; and, thirdly, community of life between the offerer and the victim. Combining these three ideas, we have as the total import of the sacrifice: Satisfaction by substitution, and substitution by incorporation. The bloody sacrifice among the heathen expressed the consciousness that sin involves guilt; that guilt exposes man to the righteous wrath of God; that without expiation of that guilt there is no forgiveness; and that through the suffering of another who shares his life the sinner may expiate his sin.

Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 170, quotes from Nögelsbach, *Nachhomerische Theologie*, 338 sq. — "The essence of punishment is retribution (*Vergeltung*), and retribution is a fundamental law of the world-order. In retribution lies the atoning power of punishment. This consciousness that the nature of sin demands retribution, in other words, this certainty that there is in Deity a righteousness that punishes sin, taken in connection with the consciousness of personal transgression, awakens the longing for atonement," — which is expressed in the sacrifice of a slaughtered beast. The Greeks recognized representative expiation, not only in the sacrifice of beasts, but in human sacrifices. See examples in Tyler, *Theol. Gk. Poets*, 196, 197, 245-253; see also Virgil, *Æneid*, 5: 815 — "Unum pro multis dabitur caput"; Ovid, *Fasti*, vi — "Cor pro corde, precor; pro fibris sumite fibras. Hanc animam vobis pro meliore damus."

Stahl, *Christliche Philosophie*, 148 — "Every unperverted conscience declares the eternal law of righteousness that punishment shall follow inevitably on sin. In the moral realm, there is another way of satisfying righteousness — that of atonement. This differs from punishment in its effect, that is, reconciliation, — the moral authority asserting itself, not by the destruction of the offender, but by taking him up into itself and uniting itself to him. But the offender cannot offer his own sacrifice, — that must be done by the priest." In the *Prometheus Bound*, of Æschylus, Hermes says to Prometheus: "Hope not for an end to such oppression, until a god appears as thy substitute in torment, ready to descend for thee into the unilluminated realm of Hades and the dark abysses of Tartarus." And this is done by Chiron, the wisest and most just of the Centaurs, the son of Chronos, sacrificing himself for Prometheus, while Hercules kills the eagle at his breast and so delivers him from torment. This legend of Æschylus is almost a prediction of the true Redeemer. See article on Sacrifice, by Paterson, in Hastings, *Bible Dictionary*.

Westcott, *Hebrews*, 282, maintains that the idea of expiatory offerings, answering to the consciousness of sin, does not belong to the early religion of Greece. We reply that Homer's *Iliad*, in its first book, describes just such an expiatory offering made to Phœbus Apollo, so turning away his wrath and causing the plague that wastes the Greeks to cease. E. G. Robinson held that there is "no evidence that the Jews had any idea of the efficacy of sacrifice for the expiation of moral guilt." But in approaching either the tabernacle or the temple the altar always presented itself before the laver. H. Clay Trumbull, *S. S. Times*, Nov. 30, 1901: 801 — "The Passover was not a passing by of the houses of Israelites, but a passing over or crossing over by Jehovah to enter the homes of those who would welcome him and who had entered into covenant with him by sacrifice. The Oriental sovereign was accompanied by his executioner, who entered to smite the first-born of the house only when there was no covenanting at the door." We regard this explanation as substituting an incidental result and effect of sacrifice for the sacrifice itself. This always had in it the idea of reparation for wrong-doing by substitutionary suffering.

Curtis, *Primitive Semitic Religion of To-day*, on the Significance of Sacrifice, 218-237, tells us that he went to Palestine prepossessed by Robertson Smith's explanation that

sacrifice was a feast symbolizing friendly communion between man and his God. He came to the conclusion that the sacrificial meal was not the primary element, but that there was a substitutionary value in the offering. Gift and feast are not excluded; but these are sequences and incidentals. Misfortune is evidence of sin; sin needs to be expiated; the anger of God needs to be removed. The sacrifice consisted principally in the shedding of the blood of the victim. The "bursting forth of the blood" satisfied and bought off the Deity. George Adam Smith on Isaiah 53 (2:364)—"Innocent as he is, he gives his life as a satisfaction to the divine law for the guilt of his people. His death was no mere martyrdom or miscarriage of human justice; in God's intent and purpose, but also by its own voluntary offering, it was an expiatory sacrifice. There is no exegete but agrees to this. 353—The substitution of the servant of Jehovah for the guilty people and the redemptive force of that substitution are no arbitrary doctrine."

*Satisfaction* means simply that there is a principle in God's being which not simply refuses sin passively, but also opposes it actively. The judge, if he be upright, must repel a bribe with indignation, and the pure woman must flume out in anger against an infamous proposal. R. W. Emerson: "Your goodness must have some edge to it, — else it is none." But the judge and the woman do not enjoy this repelling, — they suffer rather. So God's satisfaction is no gloating over the pain or loss which he is compelled to inflict. God has a wrath which is calm, judicial, inevitable — the natural reaction of holiness against unholiness. Christ suffers both as one with the inflictor and as one with those on whom punishment is inflicted: "For Christ also pleased not himself; but, as it is written, The reproaches of them that reproached thee fell on me" (Rom. 15:3; cf. Ps. 69:9).

(c) In considering the exact purport and efficacy of the Mosaic sacrifices, we must distinguish between their theocratical, and their spiritual, offices. They were, on the one hand, the appointed means whereby the offender could be restored to the outward place and privileges, as member of the theocracy, which he had forfeited by neglect or transgression; and they accomplished this purpose irrespectively of the temper and spirit with which they were offered. On the other hand, they were symbolic of the vicarious sufferings and death of Christ, and obtained forgiveness and acceptance with God only as they were offered in true penitence, and with faith in God's method of salvation.

Lev. 9:13, 14 — "For if the blood of goats and bulls, and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling them that have been defiled, sanctify unto the cleanness of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish unto God, cleanse your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" 10:3, 4 — "But in those sacrifices there is a remembrance made of sins year by year. For it is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins." Christ's death also, like the O. T. sacrifices, works temporal benefit even to those who have no faith; see pages 771, 772.

Robertson, Early Religion of Israel, 441, 448, answers the contention of the higher critics that, in the days of Isaiah, Micah, Hosea, Jeremiah, no Levitical code existed; that these prophets expressed disapproval of the whole sacrificial system, as a thing of mere human device and destitute of divine sanction. But the Book of the Covenant surely existed in their day, with its command: "An altar of earth shalt thou make unto me, and shalt sacrifice thereon thy burnt-offerings" (Ex. 20:24). Or, if it is maintained that Isaiah condemned even that early piece of legislation, it proves too much, for it would make the prophet also condemn the Sabbath as a piece of will-worship, and even reject prayer as displeasing to God, since in the same connection he says: "new moon and Sabbath . . . I cannot away with . . . when ye spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes from you" (Is. 1:13-15). Isaiah was condemning simply *heartless* sacrifice; else we make him condemn all that went on at the temple. Micah 6:3 — "what doth Jehovah require of thee, but to do justly?" This does not exclude the offering of sacrifice, for Micah anticipates the time when "the mountain of Jehovah's house shall be established on the top of the mountains, . . . And many nations shall go and say, Come ye and let us go up to the mountain of Jehovah" (Micah 4:1, 2). Hos. 6:6 — "I desire goodness, and not sacrifice," is interpreted by what follows, "and the knowledge of God more than burnt-offerings." Compare Prov. 8:10; 17:12; and Samuel's words: "to obey is better than sacrifice" (1 Sam. 15:22). What was the altar from which Isaiah drew his description of God's theophany and from which was taken the live coal that touched his lips and prepared him to be a prophet? (Is. 6:1-3). Jer. 7:22 — "I speak not . . . concerning burnt-offerings or sacrifices . . . but this thing . . . Hearken unto my voice." Jeremiah insists only on the worthlessness of sacrifice where there is no heart.

(d) Thus the Old Testament sacrifices, when rightly offered, involved a consciousness of sin on the part of the worshiper, the bringing of a victim to atone for the sin, the laying of the hand of the offerer upon the victim's head, the confession of sin by the offerer, the slaying of the beast, the sprinkling or pouring-out of the blood upon the altar, and the consequent forgiveness of the sin and acceptance of the worshiper. The sin-offering and the scape-goat of the great day of atonement symbolized yet more distinctly the two elementary ideas of sacrifice, namely, satisfaction and substitution, together with the consequent removal of guilt from those on whose behalf the sacrifice was offered.

Lev. 1:4—"And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering; and it shall be accepted for him, to make atonement for him"; 4:20—"Thus shall he do with the bullock; as he did with the bullock of the sin-offering, so shall he do with this; and the priest shall make atonement for them, and they shall be forgiven"; so 31 and 35—"and the priest shall make atonement for him as touching his sin that he hath sinned, and he shall be forgiven"; so 5:10, 18; 6:7. Lev. 17:11—"For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life."

The patriarchal sacrifices were sin-offerings, as the sacrifice of Job for his friends witnesses; Job 42:7-9—"My wrath is kindled against thee [Eliphaz] . . . therefore, take unto you seven bullocks . . . and offer up for yourselves a burnt-offering"; cf. 33:24—"Then God is gracious unto him, and saith, Deliver him from going down to the pit, I have found a ransom"; 1:5—Job offered burnt-offerings for his sons, for he said, "It may be that my sons have sinned, and renounced God in their hearts"; Gen. 8:20—Noah "offered burnt-offerings on the altar"; 21—"and Jehovah smelled the sweet savor; and Jehovah said in his heart, I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake."

That vicarious suffering is intended in all these sacrifices, is plain from Lev. 16:1-34—the account of the sin-offering and the scape-goat of the great day of atonement, the full meaning of which we give below; also from Gen. 22:13—"Abraham went and took the ram, and offered him up for a burnt-offering in the stead of his son"; Ex. 32:30-33—where Moses says: "Ye have sinned a great sin; and now I will go up unto Jehovah; peradventure I shall make atonement for your sin. And Moses returned unto Jehovah, and said, Oh, this people have sinned a great sin, and have made them gods of gold. Yet now, if thou wilt forgive their sin—; and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast written." See also Deut. 21:1-9—the explanation of an uncertain murder, by the sacrifice of a heifer,—where Oehler, O. T. Theology, 1:389, says: "Evidently the punishment of death incurred by the manslayer is executed symbolically upon the heifer." In Isa. 53:1-12—"All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and Jehovah hath laid on him the iniquity of us all . . . stripes . . . offering for sin"—the ideas of both satisfaction and substitution are still more plain.

Wallace, Representative Responsibility: "The animals offered in sacrifice must be animals brought into direct relation to man, subject to him, his property. They could not be spoils of the chase. They must bear the mark and impress of humanity. Upon the sacrifice human hands must be laid—the hands of the offerer and the hands of the priest. The offering is the substitute of the offerer. The priest is the substitute of the offerer. The priest and the sacrifice were *one symbol*. [Hence, in the new dispensation, the priest and the sacrifice are one—both are found in Christ.] The high priest must enter the holy of holies with his own finger dipped in blood; the blood must be in contact with his own person,—another indication of the identification of the two. Life is nourished and sustained by life. All life lower than man may be sacrificed for the good of man. The blood must be spilled on the ground. 'In the blood is the life.' The life is reserved by God. It is given for man, but not to him. Life for life is the law of the creation. So the life of Christ, also, for *our* life.—Adam was originally priest of the family and of the race. But he lost his representative character by the one act of disobedience, and his redemption was that of the individual, not that of the race. The race ceased to have a representative. The subjects of the divine government were henceforth to be, not the natural offspring of Adam as such, but the redeemed. That the body and the blood are both required, indicates the demand that the death should be by a violence that sheds blood. The sacrifices showed forth, not Christ himself [his character, his life], but Christ's death."

This following is a tentative scheme of the JEWISH SACRIFICES. The general reason for sacrifice is expressed in Lev. 17:11 (quoted above). I. *For the individual*: 1. The sin-offering—sacrifice to expiate sins of ignorance (thoughtlessness and plausible temptation): Lev. 4:14, 20, 31. 2. The trespass-offering—sacrifice to expiate sins of omis-

sion: Lev. 5:5 & 8. The burnt-offering — sacrifice to expiate general sinfulness: Lev. 1:3 (the offering of Mary, Luke 2:24). II. *For the family*: The Passover: Ex. 12:27. III. *For the people*: 1. The daily morning and evening sacrifice: Ex. 29:38-46. 2. The offering of the great day of atonement: Lev. 16:5-10. In this last, two victims were employed, one to represent the means — death, and the other to represent the result — forgiveness. One victim could not represent both the atonement — by shedding of blood, and the justification — by putting away sin.

Jesus died for our sins at the Passover feast and at the hour of daily sacrifice. McLaren, in S. S. Times, Nov. 30, 1901:301 — "Shedding of blood and consequent safety were only a part of the teaching of the Passover. There is a double identification of the person offering with his sacrifice: first, in that he offers it as his representative, laying his hand on its head, or otherwise transferring his personality, as it were, to it; and secondly, in that, receiving it back again from God to whom he gave it, he feeds on it, so making it part of his life and nourishing himself thereby: 'My flesh . . . which I will give . . . for the life of the world . . . he that eateth me, he also shall live because of me' (John 6:51, 57)."

Chambers, in Presb. and Ref. Rev., Jan. 1892:22-34 — On the great day of atonement "the double offering — one for Jehovah and the other for Azazel — typified not only the removing of the guilt of the people, but its transfer to the odious and detestable being who was the first cause of its existence," *i. e.*, Satan. Lidgett, Spir. Principle of the Atonement, 112, 113 — "It was not the punishment which the goat bore away into the wilderness, for the idea of punishment is not directly associated with the scape-goat. It bears the sin — the whole unfaithfulness of the community which had defiled the holy places — out from them, so that henceforth they may be pure. . . . The sin-offering — representing the sinner by receiving the burden of his sin — makes expiation by yielding up and yielding back its life to God, under conditions which represent at once the wrath and the placability of God."

On the Jewish sacrifices, see Fairbairn, *Typology*, 1:200-223; Wünsche, *Die Leiden des Messias*; Jukes, O. T. Sacrifices; Smeaton, *Apostle's Doctrine of Atonement*, 25-53; Kurtz, *Sacrificial Worship of O. T.*, 120; Bible Com., 1:502-508, and *Introd. to Leviticus*; Candlish on Atonement, 123-142; Weber, *Vom Zorne Gottes*, 161-180. On passages in Leviticus, see Com. of Knobel, in *Exeg. Handb. d. Alt. Test.*

(e) It is not essential to this view to maintain that a formal divine institution of the rite of sacrifice, at man's expulsion from Eden, can be proved from Scripture. Like the family and the state, sacrifice may, without such formal inculcation, possess divine sanction, and be ordained of God. The well-nigh universal prevalence of sacrifice, however, together with the fact that its nature, as a bloody offering, seems to preclude man's own invention of it, combines with certain Scripture intimations to favor the view that it was a primitive divine appointment. From the time of Moses, there can be no question as to its divine authority.

Compare the origin of prayer and worship, for which we find no formal divine injunctions at the beginnings of history. Heb. 11:4 — "By faith Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain, through which he had witness borne to him that he was righteous, God bearing witness in respect of his gifts" — here it may be argued that since Abel's faith was not presumption, it must have had some injunction and promise of God to base itself upon. Gen. 4:3, 4 — "Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an offering unto Jehovah. And Abel, as also brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof. And Jehovah had respect unto Abel and to his offering: but unto Cain and to his offering he had not respect."

It has been urged, in corroboration of this view, that the previous existence of sacrifice is intimated in Gen. 3:21 — "And Jehovah God made for Adam and for his wife coats of skins, and clothed them." Since the killing of animals for food was not permitted until long afterwards (Gen. 9:3 — to Noah: "Every moving thing that liveth shall be food for you"), the inference has been drawn, that the skins with which God clothed our first parents were the skins of animals slain for sacrifice, — this clothing furnishing a type of the righteousness of Christ which secures our restoration to God's favor, as the death of the victims furnished a type of the suffering of Christ which secures for us remission of punishment. We must regard this, however, as a pleasing and possibly correct hypothesis, rather than as a demonstrated truth of Scripture. Since the unperverted instincts of human nature are an expression of God's will, Abel's faith may have consisted in trusting these, rather than the promptings of selfishness and self-righteousness. The death of

animals in sacrifice, like the death of Christ which it signified, was only the hastening of what belonged to them because of their connection with human sin. Faith recognized this connection. On the divine appointment of sacrifice, see Park, in *Bib. Sac.*, Jan. 1876: 102-132. Westcott, *Hebrews*, 281 — "There is no reason to think that sacrifice was instituted in obedience to a direct revelation. . . . It is mentioned in Scripture at first as natural and known. It was practically universal in prechristian times. . . . In due time the popular practice of sacrifice was regulated by revelation as disciplinary, and also used as a vehicle for typical teaching." We prefer to say that sacrifice probably originated in a fundamental instinct of humanity, and was therefore a divine ordinance as much as were marriage and government.

On Gen. 4:3, 4, see C. H. M. — "The entire difference between Cain and Abel lay, not in their natures, but in their sacrifices. Cain brought to God the sin-stained fruit of a cursed earth. Here was no recognition of the fact that he was a sinner, condemned to death. All his toil could not satisfy God's holiness, or remove the penalty. But Abel recognized his sin, condemnation, helplessness, death, and brought the bloody sacrifice — the sacrifice of another — the sacrifice provided by God, to meet the claims of God. He found a substitute, and he presented it in faith — the faith that looks away from self to Christ, or God's appointed way of salvation. The difference was not in their persons, but in their gifts. Of Abel it is said, that God 'bore witness in respect of his gifts' (Heb. 11:4). To Cain it is said, 'if thou dost well (LXX.: ἀδικῶς προσεβόησας — if thou offerest correctly) shalt thou not be accepted?' But Cain desired to get away from God and from God's way, and to lose himself in the world. This is 'the way of Cain' (Jude 11)." *Per contra*, see Crawford, *Atonement*, 259 — "Both in Levitical and patriarchal times, we have no formal institution of sacrifice, but the regulation of sacrifice already existing. But Abel's faith may have had respect, not to a revelation with regard to sacrificial worship, but with regard to the promised Redeemer; and his sacrifice may have expressed that faith. If so, God's acceptance of it gave a divine warrant to future sacrifices. It was not will-worship, because it was not substituted for some other worship which God had previously instituted. It is not necessary to suppose that God gave an expressed command. Abel may have been moved by some inward divine monition. Thus Adam said to Eve, 'This is now bone of my bones . . .' (Gen. 2:23), before any divine command of marriage. No fruits were presented during the patriarchal dispensation. Heathen sacrifices were corruptions of primitive sacrifice." Von Lasaulx, *Die Sühnopfer der Griechen und Römer, und ihr Verhältnis zu dem einen auf Golgotha*, 1 — "The first word of the *original* man was probably a prayer, the first action of *fallen* man a sacrifice"; see translation in *Bib. Sac.*, 1: 368-406. Bishop Butler: "By the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, the notion of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt appears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind."

(f) The New Testament assumes and presupposes the Old Testament doctrine of sacrifice. The sacrificial language in which its descriptions of Christ's work are clothed cannot be explained as an accommodation to Jewish methods of thought, since this terminology was in large part in common use among the heathen, and Paul used it more than any other of the apostles in dealing with the Gentiles. To deny to it its Old Testament meaning, when used by New Testament writers to describe the work of Christ, is to deny any proper inspiration both in the Mosaic appointment of sacrifices and in the apostolic interpretations of them. We must therefore maintain, as the result of a simple induction of Scripture facts, that the death of Christ is a vicarious offering, provided by God's love for the purpose of satisfying an internal demand of the divine holiness, and of removing an obstacle in the divine mind to the renewal and pardon of sinners.

"The epistle of James makes no allusion to sacrifice. But he would not have failed to allude to it, if he had held the moral view of the atonement; for it would then have been an obvious help to his argument against merely formal service. Christ protested against washing hands and keeping Sabbath days. If sacrifice had been a piece of human formality, how indignantly would he have inveighed against it! But instead

of this he received from John the Baptist, without rebuke, the words: 'Behold, the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world' (John 1:29)."

A. A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, 247 — "The sacrifices of bulls and goats were like token-money, as our paper-promises to pay, accepted at their face-value till the day of settlement. But the sacrifice of Christ was the gold which absolutely extinguished all debt by its intrinsic value. Hence, when Christ died, the veil that separated man from God was rent from the top to the bottom by supernatural hands. When the real expiation was finished, the whole symbolical system representing it became *functum officio*, and was abolished. Soon after this, the temple was razed to the ground, and the ritual was rendered forever impossible."

For denial that Christ's death is to be interpreted by heathen or Jewish sacrifices, see Maurice on Sac., 154 — "The heathen signification of words, when applied to a Christian use, must be not merely modified, but inverted"; Jowett, Epistles of St. Paul, 3: 479 — "The heathen and Jewish sacrifices rather show us what the sacrifice of Christ was not, than what it was." Bushnell and Young do not doubt the expiatory nature of heathen sacrifices. But the main terms which the N. T. uses to describe Christ's sacrifice are borrowed from the Greek sacrificial ritual, *e. g.*, *θύσια*, *προσφορά*, *ἱλασμός*, *ἀγίασμα*, *καθαίρω*, *ἰλάσκεμαι*. To deny that these terms, when applied to Christ, imply expiation and substitution, is to deny the inspiration of those who used them. See Cave, Scripture Doctrine of Sacrifice; art. on Sacrifice, in Smith's Bible Dictionary.

With all these indications of our dissent from the modern denial of expiatory sacrifice, we deem it desirable by way of contrast to present the clearest possible statement of the view from which we dissent. This may be found in Pfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion, 1: 238, 260, 261 — "The gradual distinction of the moral from the ceremonial, the repression and ultimate replacement of ceremonial expiation by the moral purification of the sense and life, and consequently the transformation of the mystical conception of redemption into the corresponding ethical conception of education, may be designated as the kernel and the teleological principle of the development of the history of religion. . . . But to Paul the question in what sense the death of the Cross could be the means of the Messianic redemption found its answer simply from the pre-suppositions of the Pharisaic theology, which beheld in the innocent suffering, and especially in the martyr-death, of the righteous, an expiatory means compensating for the sins of the whole people. What would be more natural than that Paul should contemplate the death on the Cross in the same way, as an expiatory means of salvation for the redemption of the sinful world?"

"We are thus led to see in this theory the symbolical presentment of the truth that the new man suffers, as it were, vicariously, for the old man; for he takes upon himself the daily pain of self-subjugation, and bears guiltlessly in patience the evils which the old man could not but necessarily impute to himself as punishment. Therefore as Christ is the exemplification of the moral idea of man, so his death is the symbol of that moral process of painful self-subjugation in obedience and patience, in which the true inner redemption of man consists. . . . In like manner Fichte said that the only proper means of salvation is the death of selfhood, death *with* Jesus, regeneration.

"The defect in the Kant-Fichteian doctrine of redemption consisted in this, that it limited the process of ethical transformation to the individual, and endeavored to explain it from his subjective reason and freedom alone. How could the individual deliver himself from his powerlessness and become free? This question was unsolved. The Christian doctrine of redemption is that the moral liberation of the individual is not the effect of his own natural power, but the effect of the divine Spirit, who, from the beginning of human history, put forth his activity as the power educating to the good, and especially has created for himself in the Christian community a permanent organ for the education of the people and of individuals. It was the moral individualism of Kant which prevented him from finding in the historically realized common spirit of the good the real force available for the individual becoming good."

### C. Theories of the Atonement.

#### 1st. The Socinian, or Example Theory of the Atonement.

This theory holds that subjective sinfulness is the sole barrier between man and God. Not God, but only man, needs to be reconciled. The only method of reconciliation is to better man's moral condition. This can be effected by man's own will, through repentance and reformation. The

death of Christ is but the death of a noble martyr. He redeems us, only as his human example of faithfulness to truth and duty has a powerful influence upon our moral improvement. This fact the apostles, either consciously or unconsciously, clothed in the language of the Greek and Jewish sacrifices. This theory was fully elaborated by Lælius Socinus and Faustus Socinus of Poland, in the 16th century. Its modern advocates are found in the Unitarian body.

The Socinian theory may be found stated, and advocated, in *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, 1:588-600; Martineau, *Studies of Christianity*, 88-176; J. F. Clarke, *Orthodoxy, Its Truths and Errors*, 235-265; Ellis, *Unitarianism and Orthodoxy*; Sheldon, *Sin and Redemption*, 146-210. The text which at first sight most seems to favor this view is 1 Pet. 2:21—"Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, that ye should follow his steps." But see under (c) below. When Correggio saw Raphael's picture of St. Cecilia, he exclaimed: "I too am a painter." So Socinus held that Christ's example roused our humanity to imitation. He regarded expiation as heathenish and impossible; every one must receive according to his deeds; God is ready to grant forgiveness on simple repentance.

E. G. Robinson, *Christian Theology*, 277—"The theory first insists on the inviolability of moral sequences in the conduct of every moral agent; and then insists that, on a given condition, the consequences of transgression may be arrested by almighty fiat. . . . Unitarianism errs in giving a transforming power to that which works beneficently only after the transformation has been wrought." In ascribing to human nature a power of self-reformation, it ignores man's need of regeneration by the Holy Spirit. But even this renewing work of the Holy Spirit presupposes the atoning work of Christ. "Ye must be born anew" (John 3:7) necessitates "Even so must the Son of man be lifted up" (John 3:14). It is only the Cross that satisfies man's instinct of reparation. Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christenthums*, 99—"Those who regarded Christ's death soon ceased to bring any other bloody offering to God. This is true both in Judaism and in heathenism. Christ's death put an end to all bloody offerings in religious history. The impulse to sacrifice found its satisfaction in the Cross of Christ." We regard this as proof that the Cross is essentially a satisfaction to the divine justice, and not a mere example of faithfulness to duty. The Socinian theory is the first of six theories of the Atonement, which roughly correspond with our six previously treated theories of sin, and this first theory includes most of the false doctrine which appears in mitigated forms in several of the theories following.

To this theory we make the following objections:

(a) It is based upon false philosophical principles,—as, for example, that will is merely the faculty of volitions; that the foundation of virtue is in utility; that law is an expression of arbitrary will; that penalty is a means of reforming the offender; that righteousness, in either God or man, is only a manifestation of benevolence.

If the will is simply the faculty of volitions, and not also the fundamental determination of the being to an ultimate end, then man can, by a single volition, effect his own reformation and reconciliation to God. If the foundation of virtue is in utility, then there is nothing in the divine being that prevents pardon, the good of the creature, and not the demands of God's holiness, being the reason for Christ's suffering. If law is an expression of arbitrary will, instead of being a transcript of the divine nature, it may at any time be dispensed with, and the sinner may be pardoned on mere repentance. If penalty is merely a means of reforming the offender, then sin does not involve objective guilt, or obligation to suffer, and sin may be forgiven, at any moment, to all who forsake it,—indeed, *must* be forgiven, since punishment is out of place when the sinner is reformed. If righteousness is only a form or manifestation of benevolence, then God can show his benevolence as easily through pardon as through penalty, and Christ's death is only intended to attract us toward the good by the force of a noble example.

Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus*, 2: 218-224, is essentially Socinian in his view of Jesus' death. Yet he ascribes to Jesus the idea that suffering is *necessary*, even for one who stands in perfect love and blessed fellowship with God, since earthly blessedness is not the

true blessedness, and since a true piety is impossible without renunciation and stooping to minister to others. The earthly life-sacrifice of the Messiah was his necessary and greatest act, and was the culminating point of his teaching. Suffering made him a perfect example, and so ensured the success of his work. But why God should have made it necessary that the holiest must suffer, Wendt does not explain. This constitution of things we can understand only as a revelation of the holiness of God, and of his punitive relation to human sin. Simon, *Reconciliation*, 267, shows well that example might have sufficed for a race that merely needed leadership. But what the race needed most was energizing, the fulfilment of the conditions of restoration to God on their behalf by one of themselves, by one whose very essence they shared, who created them, in whom they consisted, and whose work was therefore their work. Christ condemned with the divine condemnation the thoughts and impulses arising from his subconscious life. Before the sin, which for the moment seemed to be his, could become his, he condemned it. He sympathized with, nay, he revealed, the very justice and sorrow of God. *Hebrews 2: 16-18*—“For verily not to angels doth he give help, but he giveth help to the seed of Abraham. Wherefore it behooved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren, that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people. For in that he himself hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted.”

(b) It is a natural outgrowth from the Pelagian view of sin, and logically necessitates a curtailment or surrender of every other characteristic doctrine of Christianity—inspiration, sin, the deity of Christ, justification, regeneration, and eternal retribution.

The Socinian theory requires a surrender of the doctrine of inspiration; for the idea of vicarious and expiatory sacrifice is woven into the very warp and woof of the Old and New Testaments. It requires an abandonment of the Scripture doctrine of sin; for in it all idea of sin as perversion of nature rendering the sinner unable to save himself, and as objective guilt demanding satisfaction to the divine holiness, is denied. It requires us to give up the deity of Christ; for if sin is a slight evil, and man can save himself from its penalty and power, then there is no longer need of either an infinite suffering or an infinite Savior, and a human Christ is as good as a divine. It requires us to give up the Scripture doctrine of justification, as God's act of declaring the sinner just in the eye of the law, solely on account of the righteousness and death of Christ to whom he is united by faith; for the Socinian theory cannot permit the counting to a man of any other righteousness than his own. It requires a denial of the doctrine of regeneration; for this is no longer the work of God, but the work of the sinner; it is no longer a change of the affections below consciousness, but a self-reforming volition of the sinner himself. It requires a denial of eternal retribution; for this is no longer appropriate to finite transgression of arbitrary law, and to superficial sinning that does not involve nature.

(c) It contradicts the Scripture teachings, that sin involves objective guilt as well as subjective defilement; that the holiness of God must punish sin; that the atonement was a bearing of the punishment of sin for men; and that this vicarious bearing of punishment was necessary, on the part of God, to make possible the showing of favor to the guilty.

The Scriptures do not make the main object of the atonement to be man's subjective moral improvement. It is to God that the sacrifice is offered, and the object of it is to satisfy the divine holiness, and to remove from the divine mind an obstacle to the showing of favor to the guilty. It was something external to man and his happiness or virtue, that required that Christ should suffer. What Emerson has said of the martyr is yet more true of Christ: “Though love repine, and reason chafe, There comes a voice without reply, 'Tis man's perdition to be safe, When for the truth he ought to die.” The truth for which Christ died was truth internal to the nature of God; not simply truth externalized and published among men. What the truth of God required, that Christ rendered—full satisfaction to violated justice. “Jesus paid it all”; and no obedience or righteousness of ours can be added to his work, as a ground of our salvation.

E. G. Robinson, *Christian Theology*, 276.—“This theory fails of a due recognition of that deep-seated, universal and innate sense of ill-desert, which in all times and everywhere has prompted men to aim at some expiation of their guilt. For this sense of

guilt and its requirements the moral influence theory makes no adequate provision, either in Christ or in those whom Christ saves. Supposing Christ's redemptive work to consist merely in winning men to the practice of righteousness, it takes no account of penalty, either as the sanction of the law, as the reaction of the divine holiness against sin, or as the upbraiding of the individual conscience. . . . The Socinian theory overlooks the fact that there must be some objective manifestation of God's wrath and displeasure against sin."

(d) It furnishes no proper explanation of the sufferings and death of Christ. The unmartyrlike anguish cannot be accounted for, and the forsaking by the Father cannot be justified, upon the hypothesis that Christ died as a mere witness to truth. If Christ's sufferings were not propitiatory, they neither furnish us with a perfect example, nor constitute a manifestation of the love of God.

Compare Jesus' feeling, in view of death, with that of Paul: "having the desire to depart" (Phil. 1:23). Jesus was filled with anguish: "Now is my soul troubled; and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour" (John 12:27). If Christ was simply a martyr, then he is not a perfect example; for many a martyr has shown greater courage in prospect of death, and in the final agony has been able to say that the fire that consumed him was "a bed of roses." Gethsemane, with its mental anguish, is apparently recorded in order to indicate that Christ's sufferings even on the cross were not mainly physical sufferings. The Roman Catholic Church unduly emphasizes the physical side of our Lord's passion, but loses sight of its spiritual element. The Christ of Rome indeed is either a babe or dead, and the crucifix presents to us not a risen and living Redeemer, but a mangled and lifeless body.

Stroud, in his Physical Cause of our Lord's Death, has made it probable that Jesus died of a broken heart, and that this alone explains John 19:34—"one of the soldiers with a spear pierced his side, and straightway there came out blood and water"—i. e., the heart had already been ruptured by grief. That grief was grief at the forsaking of the Father (Mat. 27:46—"My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"), and the resulting death shows that that forsaking was no imaginary one. Did God make the holiest man of all to be the greatest sufferer of all the ages? This heart broken by the forsaking of the Father means more than martyrdom. If Christ's death is not propitiatory, it fills me with terror and despair; for it presents me not only with a very imperfect example in Christ, but with a proof of measureless injustice on the part of God. Luke 23:28—"weep not for me, but weep for yourselves"—Jesus rejects all pity that forgets his suffering for others.

To the above view of Stroud, Westcott objects that blood does not readily flow from an ordinary corpse. The separation of the red corpuscles of the blood from the serum, or water, would be the beginning of decomposition, and would be inconsistent with the statement in Isa. 53:12—"neither did his flesh see corruption." But Dr. W. W. Keen of Philadelphia, in his article on The Bloody Sweat of our Lord (Bib. Sac., July, 1897:469-484) endorses Stroud's view as to the physical cause of our Lord's death. Christ's being forsaken by the Father was only the culmination of that relative withdrawal which constituted the source of Christ's loneliness through life. Through life he was a servant of the Spirit. On the cross the Spirit left him to the weakness of unassisted humanity, destitute of conscious divine resources. Compare the curious reading of Heb. 2:13—"that he apart from God (χωρίς Θεού) should taste death for every man."

If Christ merely supposed himself to be deserted by God, "not only does Christ become an erring man, and, so far as the predicate deity is applicable to him, an erring God; but, if he cherished unfounded distrust of God, how can it be possible still to maintain that his will was in abiding, perfect agreement and identity with the will of God?" See Kant, Lotze, and Ritschl, by Stählin, 219. Charles C. Everett, Gospel of Paul, says Jesus was not crucified because he was accursed, but he was accursed because he was crucified, so that, in wreaking vengeance upon him, Jewish law abrogated itself. This interpretation however contradicts 2 Cor. 5:21—"him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf"—where the divine identification of Christ with the race of sinners antedates and explains his sufferings. John 1:29—"the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world"—does not refer to Jesus as a lamb for gentleness, but as a lamb for sacrifice. Maclaren: "How does Christ's death prove God's love? Only on one supposition, namely, that Christ is the incarnate Son of God, sent by the Father's love and being his express image"; and, we may add, suffering vicariously for us and removing the obstacle in God's mind to our pardon.

(e) The influence of Christ's example is neither declared in Scripture, nor found in Christian experience, to be the chief result secured by his death. Mere example is but a new preaching of the law, which repels and condemns. The cross has power to lead men to holiness, only as it first shows a satisfaction made for their sins. Accordingly, most of the passages which represent Christ as an example also contain references to his propitiatory work.

There is no virtue in simply setting an example. Christ did nothing, simply for the sake of example. Even his baptism was the symbol of his propitiatory death; see pages 761, 762. The apostle's exhortation is not "abstain from all appearance of evil" (1 Thes. 5:22, A. Vers.), but "abstain from every form of evil" (Rev. Vers.). Christ's death is the payment of a real debt due to God; and the convicted sinner needs first to see the debt which he owes to the divine justice paid by Christ, before he can think hopefully of reforming his life. The hymns of the church: "I lay my sins on Jesus," and "Not all the blood of beasts," represent the view of Christ's sufferings which Christians have derived from the Scriptures. When the sinner sees that the mortgage is cancelled, that the penalty has been borne, he can devote himself freely to the service of his Redeemer. Rev. 12:11—"they overcame him [Satan] because of the blood of the Lamb"—as Christ overcame Satan by his propitiatory sacrifice, so we overcome by appropriating to ourselves Christ's atonement and his Spirit; cf. 1 Joh. 5:4—"this is the victory that hath overcome the world, even our faith." The very text upon which Socinians most rely, when it is taken in connection with the context, proves their theory to be a misrepresentation of Scripture, 1 Pet. 2:21—"Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, that ye should follow his steps"—is succeeded by verse 24—"who his own self bare our sins in his body upon the tree, that we, having done unto him, might live unto righteousness; by whose stripes ye were healed"—the latter words being a direct quotation from Isaiah's description of the substitutionary sufferings of the Messiah (Is. 53:5).

When a deeply convicted sinner was told that God could cleanse his heart and make him over anew, he replied with righteous impatience: "That is not what I want,—I have a debt to pay first!" A. J. Gordon, *Ministry of the Spirit*, 23, 89—"Nowhere in tabernacle or temple shall we ever find the laver placed before the altar. The altar is Calvary, and the laver is Pentecost,—one stands for the sacrificial blood, the other for the sanctifying Spirit. . . . So the oil which symbolized the sanctifying Spirit was always put 'upon the blood of the trespass-offering' (Lev. 14:17)." The extremity of Christ's suffering on the Cross was coincident with the extremest manifestation of the guilt of the race. The greatness of this he theoretically knew from the beginning of his ministry. His baptism was not intended merely to set an example. It was a recognition that sin deserved death; that he was numbered with the transgressors; that he was sent to die for the sin of the world. He was not so much a teacher, as he was the subject of all teaching. In him the great suffering of the holy God on account of sin is exhibited to the universe. The pain of a few brief hours saves a world, only because it sets forth an eternal fact in God's being and opens to us God's very heart.

Shakespeare, *Henry V*, 4:1—"There is some soul of goodness in things evil, Would men observingly distill it out." It is well to preach on Christ as an example. Lyman Abbott says that Jesus' blood purchases our pardon and redeems us to God, just as a patriot's blood redeems his country from servitude and purchases its liberty. But even Ritschl, *Just. and Recon.*, 2, goes beyond this, when he says: "Those who advocate the example theory should remember that Jesus withdraws himself from imitation when he sets himself over against his disciples as the Author of forgiveness. And they perceive that pardon must first be appropriated, before it is possible for them to imitate his piety and moral achievement." This is a partial recognition of the truth that the removal of objective guilt by Christ's atonement must precede the removal of subjective defilement by Christ's regenerating and sanctifying Spirit. Lidgett, *Spr. Princ. of Atonement*, 265-266, shows that there is a fatherly demand for satisfaction, which must be met by the filial response of the child. Thomas Chalmers at the beginning of his ministry urged on his people the reformation of their lives. But he confesses: "I never heard of any such reformations being effected amongst them." Only when he preached the alienation of men from God, and forgiveness through the blood of Christ, did he hear of their betterment.

Gordon, *Christ of To-day*, 129—"The consciousness of sin is largely the creation of Christ." Men like Paul, Luther, and Edwards show this impressively. Foster, *Chris-*

man life and Theology, 198-201—"There is of course a sense in which the Christian must imitate Christ's death, for he is to 'take up his cross daily' (Luke 9:23) and follow his Master; but in its highest meaning and fullest scope the death of Christ is no more an object set for our imitation than is the creation of the world. . . . Christ does for man in his sacrifice what man could not do for himself. We see in the Cross: 1. the magnitude of the guilt of sin; 2. our own self-condemnation; 3. the adequate remedy, —for the object of law is gained in the display of righteousness; 4. the objective ground of forgiveness." Maclaren: "Christianity without a dying Christ is a dying Christianity."

(f) This theory contradicts the whole tenor of the New Testament, in making the life, and not the death, of Christ the most significant and important feature of his work. The constant allusions to the death of Christ as the source of our salvation, as well as the symbolism of the ordinances, cannot be explained upon a theory which regards Christ as a mere example, and considers his sufferings as incidents, rather than essentials, of his work.

Dr. H. B. Hackett frequently called attention to the fact that the recording in the gospels of only three years of Jesus' life, and the prominence given in the record to the closing scenes of that life, are evidence that not his life, but his death, was the great work of our Lord. Christ's death, and not his life, is the central truth of Christianity. The cross is *par excellence* the Christian symbol. In both the ordinances—in Baptism as well as in the Lord's Supper—it is the death of Christ that is primarily set forth. Neither Christ's example, nor his teaching, reveals God as does his death. It is the death of Christ that links together all Christian doctrines. The mark of Christ's blood is upon them all, as the scarlet thread running through every cord and rope of the British navy gives sign that it is the property of the crown.

Did Jesus' death have no other relation to our salvation than Paul's death had? Paul was a martyr, but his death is not even recorded. Gould, Bib. Theol. N. T., 92—"Paul does not dwell in any way upon the life or work of our Lord, except as they are involved in his death and resurrection." What did Jesus' words: "It is finished" (John 19:30) mean? What was finished on the Socinian theory? The Socinian salvation had not yet begun. Why did not Jesus make the ordinances of Baptism and the Lord's Supper to be memorials of his birth, rather than of his death? Why was not the veil of the temple rent at his baptism, or at the Sermon on the Mount? It was because only his death opened the way to God. In talking with Nicodemus, Jesus brushed aside the complimentary: "we know that thou art a teacher come from God" (John 3:2). Recognizing Jesus as teacher is not enough. There must be a renewal by the Spirit of God, so that one recognises also the lifting up of the Son of man as atoning Savior (John 3:14, 15). And to Peter, Jesus said: "If I wash thee not, thou hast no part with me" (John 13:8). One cannot have part with Christ as Teacher, while one rejects him as Redeemer from sin. On the Socinian doctrine of the Atonement, see Crawford, Atonement, 279-286; Shedd, History of Doctrines, 2:576-586; Doctrines of the Early Socinians, in Princeton Essays, 1:194-211; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, IV, 2:156-180; Fock, Socinianismus.

#### 2nd. The Bushnellian, or Moral Influence Theory of the Atonement.

This holds, like the Socinian, that there is no principle of the divine nature which is propitiated by Christ's death; but that this death is a manifestation of the love of God, suffering in and with the sins of his creatures. Christ's atonement, therefore, is the merely natural consequence of his taking human nature upon him; and is a suffering, not of penalty in man's stead, but of the combined woes and griefs which the living of a human life involves. This atonement has effect, not to satisfy divine justice, but so to reveal divine love as to soften human hearts and to lead them to repentance; in other words, Christ's sufferings were necessary, not in order to remove an obstacle to the pardon of sinners which exists in the mind of God, but in order to convince sinners that there exists no such obstacle. This theory, for substance, has been advocated by Bushnell, in

America; by Robertson, Maurice, Campbell, and Young, in Great Britain; by Schleiermacher and Ritschl, in Germany.

Origen and Abelard are earlier representatives of this view. It may be found stated in Bushnell's *Vicarious Sacrifice*. Bushnell's later work, *Forgiveness and Law*, contains a modification of his earlier doctrine, to which he was driven by the criticisms upon his *Vicarious Sacrifice*. In the later work, he acknowledges what he had so strenuously denied in the earlier, namely, that Christ's death has effect upon God as well as upon man, and that God cannot forgive without thus "making cost to himself." He makes open confession of the impotence of his former teaching to convert sinners, and, as the only efficient homiletic, he recommends the preaching of the very doctrine of propitiatory sacrifice which he had written his book to supersede. Even in *Forgiveness and Law*, however, there is no recognition of the true principle and ground of the Atonement in God's punitive holiness. Since the original form of Bushnell's doctrine is the only one which has met with wide acceptance, we direct our objections mainly to this.

F. W. Robertson, *Sermons*, 1: 168-178, holds that Christ's sufferings were the necessary result of the position in which he had placed himself of conflict or collision with the evil that is in the world. He came in contact with the whirling wheel, and was crushed by it; he planted his heel upon the cockatrice's den, and was pierced by its fang. Maurice, on *Sacrifice*, 200, and *Theol. Essays*, 141, 228, regards Christ's sufferings as an illustration, given by the ideal man, of the self-sacrifice due to God from the humanity of which he is the root and head, all men being redeemed in him, irrespective of their faith, and needing only to have brought to them the news of this redemption. Young, *Life and Light of Man*, holds a view essentially the same with Robertson's. Christ's death is the necessary result of his collision with evil, and his sufferings extirpate sin, simply by manifesting God's self-sacrificing love.

Campbell, *Atonement*, 129-191, quotes from Edwards, to show that infinite justice might be satisfied in either one of two ways: (1) by an infinite punishment; (2) by an adequate repentance. This last, which Edwards passed by as impracticable, Campbell declares to have been the real atonement offered by Christ, who stands as the great Penitent, confessing the sin of the world. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, 160-210, takes substantially the view of Campbell, denying substitution, and emphasizing Christ's oneness with the race and his confession of human sin. He grants indeed that our Lord bore penalty, but only in the sense that he realized how great was the condemnation and penalty of the race.

Schleiermacher denies any satisfaction to God by substitution. He puts in its place an influence of Christ's personality on men, so that they feel themselves reconciled and redeemed. The atonement is purely subjective. Yet it is the work of Christ, in that only Christ's oneness with God has taught men that *they* can be one with God. Christ's consciousness of his being in God and knowing God, and his power to impart this consciousness to others, make him a Mediator and Savior. The idea of reparation, compensation, satisfaction, substitution, is wholly Jewish. He regarded it as possible only to a narrow-minded people. He tells us that he hates in religion that kind of historic relation. He had no such sense of the holiness of God, or of the guilt of man, as would make necessary any suffering of punishment or offering to God for human sin. He desires to replace external and historical Christianity by a Christianity that is internal and subjective. See Schleiermacher, *Der Christliche Glaube*, 2: 94-161.

Ritschl however is the most recent and influential representative of the Moral Influence theory in Germany. His view is to be found in his *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, or in English translation, *Justification and Reconciliation*. Ritschl is anti-Hegelian and libertarian, but like Schleiermacher he does not treat sin with seriousness; he regards the sense of guilt as an illusion which it is the part of Christ to dispel; there is an inadequate conception of Christ's person, a practical denial of his pre-existence and work of objective atonement; indeed, the work of Christ is hardly put into any precise relation to sin at all; see Denney, *Studies in Theology*, 136-151. E. H. Johnson: "Many Ritschlians deny both the miraculous conception and the bodily resurrection of Jesus. Sin does not particularly concern God; Christ is Savior only as Buddha was, achieving lordship over the world by indifference to it; he is the Word of God, only as he reveals this divine indifference to things. All this does not agree with the N. T. teaching that Christ is the only begotten Son of God, that he was with the Father before the world was, that he made expiation of sins to God, and that sin is that abominable thing that God hates." For a general survey of the Ritschlian theology, see Orr, *Ritschlian The-*

ology, 231-271; Presb. and Ref. Rev., July, 1891: 448-458 (art. by Zahn), and Jan. 1892: 1-21 (art. by C. M. Mead); Andover Review, July, 1893: 440-461; Am. Jour. Theology, Jan. 1899: 22-44 (art. by H. R. Mackintosh); Lidgett, Spir. Prin. of Atonement, 190-207; Foster, Christ. Life and Theology; and the work of Garvie on Ritschl. For statement and criticism of other forms of the Moral Influence theory, see Crawford, Atonement, 297-306; Watts, New Apologetic, 210-247.

To this theory we object as follows:

(a) While it embraces a valuable element of truth, namely, the moral influence upon men of the sufferings of the God-man, it is false by defect, in that it substitutes a subordinate effect of the atonement for its chief aim, and yet unfairly appropriates the name 'vicarious,' which belongs only to the latter. Suffering *with* the sinner is by no means suffering *in his stead*.

Dale, Atonement, 137, illustrates Bushnell's view by the loyal wife, who suffers exile or imprisonment with her husband; by the philanthropist, who suffers the privations and hardships of a savage people, whom he can civilize only by enduring the miseries from which he would rescue them; by the Moravian missionary, who enters for life the lepers' enclosure, that he may convert its inmates. So Potwin says that suffering and death are the *cost* of the atonement, not the atonement *itself*.

But we reply that such sufferings as these do not make Christ's sacrifice *vicarious*. The word 'vicarious' (from *vicis*) implies substitution, which this theory denies. The vicar of a parish is not necessarily one who performs service with, and in sympathy with, the rector, — he is rather one who stands in the rector's place. A vice-president is one who acts in place of the president; 'A. B., appointed consul, *vice* C. D., resigned,' implies that A. B. is now to serve in the stead of C. D. If Christ is a 'vicarious sacrifice,' then he makes atonement to God *in the place and stead* of sinners. Christ's suffering *in and with* sinners, though it is a most important and affecting fact, is not the suffering in their stead in which the atonement consists. Though suffering in and with sinners may be in part the *medium* through which Christ was enabled to endure God's wrath against sin, it is not to be confounded with the *reason* why God lays this suffering upon him; nor should it blind us to the fact that this reason is his standing in the sinner's place to answer for sin to the retributive holiness of God.

(b) It rests upon false philosophical principles, — as, that righteousness is identical with benevolence, instead of conditioning it; that God is subject to an eternal law of love, instead of being himself the source of all law; that the aim of penalty is the reformation of the offender.

Hovey, God with Us, 181-271, has given one of the best replies to Bushnell. He shows that if God is subject to an eternal law of love, then God is necessarily a Savior; that he must have created man as soon as he could; that he makes men holy as fast as possible; that he does all the good he can; that he is no better than he should be. But this is to deny the transcendence of God, and reduce omnipotence to a mere nature-power. The conception of God as subject to law imperils God's self-sufficiency and freedom. For Bushnell's statements with regard to the identity of righteousness and love, and for criticisms upon them, see our treatment of the attribute of Holiness, vol. I, pages 238-275.

Watts, New Apologetic, 277-280, points out that, upon Bushnell's principles, there must be an atonement for fallen angels. God was bound to assume the angelic nature and to do for angels all that he has done for us. There is also no reason for restricting either the atonement or the offer of salvation to the present life. B. B. Warfield, in Princeton Review, 1903:81-92, shows well that all the forms of the Moral Influence theory rest upon the assumption that God is only love, and that all that is required as ground of the sinner's forgiveness is penitence, either Christ's, or his own, or both together.

Ignoring the divine holiness and minimizing the guilt of sin, many modern writers make atonement to be a mere incident of Christ's incarnation. Phillips Brooks, Life, 2: 350, 351 — "Atonement by suffering is the result of the Incarnation; atonement being the necessary, and suffering the incidental element of that result. But sacrifice is an essential element, for sacrifice truly signifies here the consecration of human nature to its highest use and utterance, and does not necessarily involve the thought of

pain. It is not the destruction but the fulfilment of human life. Inasmuch as the human life thus consecrated and fulfilled is the same in us as in Jesus, and inasmuch as his consecration and fulfilment makes morally possible for us the same consecration and fulfilment of it which he achieved, therefore his atonement and his sacrifice, and incidentally his suffering, become vicarious. It is not that they make unnecessary, but that they make possible and successful in us, the same processes which were perfect in him."

(c) The theory furnishes no proper reason for Christ's suffering. While it shows that the Savior necessarily suffers from his contact with human sin and sorrow, it gives no explanation of that constitution of the universe which makes suffering the consequence of sin, not only to the sinner, but also to the innocent being who comes into connection with sin. The holiness of God, which is manifested in this constitution of things and which requires this atonement, is entirely ignored.

B. W. Lockhart, in a recent statement of the doctrine of the atonement, shows this defect of apprehension: "God in Christ reconciled the world to himself; Christ did not reconcile God to man, but man to God. Christ did not enable God to save men; God enabled Christ to save men. The sufferings of Christ were vicarious as the highest illustration of that spiritual law by which the good soul is impelled to suffer that others may not suffer, to die that others may not die. The vicarious sufferings of Jesus were also the great revelation to man of the vicarious nature of God; a revelation of the cross as eternal in his nature; that it is in the heart of God to bear the sin and sorrow of his creatures in his eternal love and pity; a revelation moreover that the law which saves the lost through the vicarious labors of godlike souls prevails wherever the godlike and the lost soul can influence each other."

While there is much in the above statement with which we agree, we charge it with misapprehending the reason for Christ's suffering. That reason is to be found only in that holiness of God which expresses itself in the very constitution of the universe. Not love but holiness has made suffering invariably to follow sin, so that penalty falls not only upon the transgressor but upon him who is the life and sponsor of the transgressor. God's holiness brings suffering to God, and to Christ who manifests God. Love bears the suffering, but it is holiness that necessitates it. The statement of Lockhart above gives account of the effect—reconciliation; but it fails to recognize the cause—propitiation. The words of E. G. Robinson furnish the needed complement: "The work of Christ has two sides, propitiatory and reconciling. Christ felt the pang of association with a guilty race. The divine displeasure rested on him as possessing the guilty nature. In his own person he redeems this nature by bearing its penalty. Propitiation must precede reconciliation. The Moral Influence theory recognizes the necessity of a subjective change in man, but makes no provision of an objective agency to secure it."

(d) It contradicts the plain teachings of Scripture, that the atonement is necessary, not simply to reveal God's love, but to satisfy his justice; that Christ's sufferings are propitiatory and penal; and that the human conscience needs to be propitiated by Christ's sacrifice, before it can feel the moral influence of his sufferings.

That the atonement is primarily an offering to God, and not to the sinner, appears from Eph. 5: 2—"gave himself up for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God"; Heb. 9: 14—"offered himself without blemish unto God." Conscience, the reflection of God's holiness, can be propitiated only by propitiating holiness itself. Mere love and sympathy are maudlin, and powerless to move, unless there is a background of righteousness. Spear: "An appeal to man, without anything back of it to emphasize and enforce the appeal, will never touch the heart. The mere appearance of an atonement has no moral influence." Crawford, *Atonement*, 353-367—"Instead of delivering us from penalty, in order to deliver us from sin, this theory makes Christ to deliver us from sin, in order that he may deliver us from penalty. But this reverses the order of Scripture. And Dr. Bushnell concedes, in the end, that the moral view of the atonement is morally powerless; and that the objective view he condemns is, after all, indispensable to the salvation of sinners."

Some men are quite ready to forgive those whom they have offended. The Ritschlian school sees no guilt to be atoned for, and no propitiation to be necessary. Only man needs to be reconciled. Ritschlians are quite ready to forgive God. The only atonement is an atonement, made by repentance, to the human conscience. Shedd says well: "All that is requisite in order to satisfaction and peace of conscience in the sinful soul is also requisite in order to the satisfaction of God himself." Walter Besant: "It is not enough to be forgiven,—one has also to forgive one's self." The converse proposition is yet more true: It is not enough to forgive one's self,—one has also to be forgiven; indeed, one cannot rightly forgive one's self, unless one has been first forgiven; 1 John 2: 20— "if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things." A. J. Gordon, Ministry of the Spirit, 201—"As the high priest carried the blood into the Holy of Holies under the old dispensation, so does the Spirit take the blood of Christ into the inner sanctuary of our spirit in the new dispensation, in order that he may 'cleanse your conscience from dead works to serve the living God' (Heb. 9: 14)."

(c) It can be maintained, only by wresting from their obvious meaning those passages of Scripture which speak of Christ as suffering for our sins; which represent his blood as accomplishing something for us in heaven, when presented there by our intercessor; which declare forgiveness to be a remitting of past offences upon the ground of Christ's death; and which describe justification as a pronouncing, not a making, just.

We have seen that the forms in which the Scriptures describe Christ's death are mainly drawn from sacrifice. Notice Bushnell's acknowledgment that these "altar-forms" are the most vivid and effective methods of presenting Christ's work, and that the preacher cannot dispense with them. Why he should not dispense with them, if the meaning has gone out of them, is not so clear.

In his later work, entitled Forgiveness and Law, Bushnell appears to recognize this inconsistency, and represents God as affected by the atonement, after all; in other words, the atonement has an objective as well as a subjective influence. God can forgive, only by "making cost to himself." He "works down his resentment, by suffering for us." This verges toward the true view, but it does not recognize the demand of divine holiness for satisfaction; and it attributes passion, weakness, and imperfection to God. Dörner, Glaubenslehre, 2: 591 (Syst. Doct., 4: 59, 60), objects to this modified Moral Influence theory, that the love that can do good to an enemy is already forgiving love; so that the benefit to the enemy cannot be, as Bushnell supposes, a condition of the forgiveness.

To Campbell's view, that Christ is the great Penitent, and that his atonement consists essentially in his confessing the sins of the world, we reply, that no confession or penitence is possible without responsibility. If Christ had no substitutionary office, the ordering of his sufferings on the part of God was manifest injustice. Such sufferings, moreover, are impossible upon grounds of mere sympathy. The Scripture explains them by declaring that he bore our curse, and became a ransom in our place. There was more therefore in the sufferings of Christ than "a perfect Amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of man." Not Phinehas's zeal for God, but his execution of judgment, made an atonement (Ps. 106: 30—"circum judgment"—LXX: *ἐξ ἁγιάσεως*, "made propitiation") and turned away the wrath of God. Observe here the contrast between the priestly atonement of Aaron, who stood between the living and the dead, and the judicial atonement of Phinehas, who executed righteous judgment, and so turned away wrath. In neither case did mere confession suffice to take away sin. On Campbell's view see further, on page 700.

Moberly, Atonement and Personality, 96, has the great merit of pointing out that Christ shares our sufferings in virtue of the fact that our personality has its ground in him; but that this sharing of our penalty was necessitated by God's righteousness he has failed to indicate. He tells us that "Christ sanctified the present and cancels the past. He offers to God a living holiness in human conditions and character; he makes the awful sacrifice in humanity of a perfect contrition. The one is the offering of obedience, the other the offering of atonement; the one the offering of the life, the other the offering of the death." This modification of Campbell's view can be rationally maintained only by connecting with it a prior declaration that the fundamental attribute of God is holiness; that holiness is self-affirming righteousness; that this righteousness necessarily expresses itself in the punishment of sin; that Christ's relation to

the race as its upholder and life made him the bearer of its guilt and justly responsible for its sin. Scripture declares the ultimate aim of the atonement to be that God "might himself be just" (Rom. 3:26), and no theory of the atonement will meet the demands of either reason or conscience that does not ground its necessity in God's righteousness, rather than in his love.

E. Y. Mullins: "If Christ's union with humanity made it possible for him to be 'the representative Penitent,' and to be the Amen of humanity to God's just condemnation of sin, his union with God made it also possible for him to be the representative of the Judge, and to be the Amen of the divine nature to suffering, as the expression of condemnation." Dennéy, *Studies in Theology*, 102, 103—"The serious element in sin is not man's dislike, suspicion, alienation from God, nor the debilitating, corrupting effects of vice in human nature, but rather God's condemnation of man. This Christ endured, and died that the condemnation might be removed. 'Bearing shame and scoffing rude, In my place condemned he stood; Sealed my pardon with his blood; Hallelujah!'"

Bushnell regards Mat 8:17—"Himself took our infirmities, and bare our diseases"—as indicating the nature of Christ's atoning work. The meaning then would be, that he sympathized so fully with all human ills that he made them his own. Hovey, however, has given a more complete and correct explanation. The words mean rather: "His deep sympathy with these effects of sin so moved him, that it typified his final bearing of these sins themselves, or constituted a preliminary and partial endurance of the suffering which was to expiate the sins of men." His sighing when he cured the deaf man (Mark 7:34) and his weeping at the grave of Lazarus (John 11:35) were caused by the anticipatory realization that he was one with the humanity which was under the curse, and that he too had "become a curse for us" (Gal. 3:13). The great error of Bushnell is his denial of the objective necessity and effect of Jesus' death, and all Scripture which points to an influence of the atonement outside of us is a refutation of his theory.

(f) This theory confounds God's method of saving men with men's experience of being saved. It makes the atonement itself consist of its effects in the believer's union with Christ and the purifying influence of that union upon the character and life.

Stevens, in his *Doctrine of Salvation*, makes this mistake. He says: "The old forms of the doctrine of the atonement—that the suffering of Christ was necessary to appease the wrath of God and induce him to forgive; or to satisfy the law of God and enable him to forgive; or to move upon man's heart to induce him to accept forgiveness; have all proved inadequate. Yet to reject the passion of Christ is to reject the chief element of power in Christianity. . . . To me the words 'eternal atonement' denote the dateless passion of God on account of sin; they mean that God is, by his very nature, a sin-bearer—that sin grieves and wounds his heart, and that he sorrows and suffers in consequence of it. It results from the divine love—alike from its holiness and from its sympathy—that 'in our affliction he is afflicted.' Atonement on its 'Godward side' is a name for the grief and pain inflicted by sin upon the paternal heart of God. Of this divine sorrow for sin, the afflictions of Christ are a revelation. In the bitter grief and anguish which he experienced on account of sin we see reflected the pain and sorrow which sin brings to the divine love."

All this is well said, with the exception that holiness is regarded as a form of love, and the primary offence of sin is regarded as the grieving of the Father's heart. Dr. Stevens fails to consider that if love were supreme there would be nothing to prevent unholy tolerance of sin. Because holiness is supreme, love is conditioned thereby. It is holiness and not love that connects suffering with sin, and requires that the Redeemer should suffer. Dr. Stevens asserts that the theories hitherto current in Protestant churches and the theory for which he pleads are "forever irreconcilable"; they are "based on radically different conceptions of God." *The British Weekly*, Nov. 16, 1906—"The doctrine of the atonement is not the doctrine that salvation is deliverance from sin, and that this deliverance is the work of God, a work the motive of which is God's love for men; these are truths which every one who writes on the Atonement assumes. The doctrine of the Atonement has for its task to explain how this work is done. . . . Dr. Stevens makes no contribution whatever to its fulfilment. He grants that we have in Paul 'the theory of a substitutionary expiation.' But he finds something else in Paul which he thinks a more adequate rendering of the apostle's Christian experience—the idea, namely, of dying with Christ and rising with him; and on the strength of accepting this last he feels at liberty to drop the substitutionary expiation overboard as

something to be explained from Paul's controversial position, or from his Pharisaic inheritance, something at all events which has no permanent value for the Christian mind. . . . The experience is dependent on the method. Paul did not die with Christ as an alternative to having Christ die with him; he died with Christ wholly and solely because Christ died for him. It was the meaning carried by the last two words—the meaning unfolded in the theory of substitutionary expiation—which had the moral motive in it to draw Paul into union with his Lord in life and death. . . . On Dr. Stevens' own showing, Paul held the two ideas side by side; for him the mystical union with Christ was only possible through the acceptance of truths with which Dr. Stevens does not know what to do."

(g) This theory would confine the influence of the atonement to those who have heard of it,—thus excluding patriarchs and heathen. But the Scriptures represent Christ as being the Savior of all men, in the sense of securing them grace, which, but for his atoning work, could never have been bestowed consistently with the divine holiness.

Hovey: "The manward influence of the atonement is far more extensive than the moral influence of it." Christ is Advocate, not with the sinner, but with the Father. While the Spirit's work has moral influence over the hearts of men, the Son secures, through the presentation of his blood, in heaven, the pardon which can come only from God (1 John 2:1—"we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation for our sins"). Hence 1:9—"If we confess our sins, he [God] is faithful and righteous [faithful to his promise and righteous to Christ] to forgive us our sins." Hence the publican does not first pray for change of heart, but for mercy upon the ground of sacrifice (Luke 18:13—"God, be thou merciful to me a sinner," but literally: "God be propitiated toward me the sinner"). See Balfour, in Brit. and For. Ev. Rev., Apr. 1864: 230-254; Martin, Atonement, 216-237; Theol. Eclectic, 4: 364-400.

Gravitation kept the universe stable, long before it was discovered by man. So the atonement of Christ was inuring to the salvation of men, long before they suspected its existence. The "light of the world" (John 8:12) has many "X rays," beyond the visible spectrum, but able to impress the image of Christ upon patriarchs or heathen. This light has been shining through all the ages, but "the darkness apprehended it not" (John 1:5). Its rays register themselves only where there is a sensitive heart to receive them. Let them shine through a man, and how much unknown sin, and unknown possibilities of good, they reveal! The Moral Influence theory does not take account of the pre-existent Christ and of his atoning work before his manifestation in the flesh. It therefore leads logically to belief in a second probation for the many imbeciles, outcasts, and heathen who in this world do not hear of Christ's atonement. The doctrine of Bushnell in this way undermines the doctrine of future retribution.

To Lyman Abbott, the atonement is the self-propitiation of God's love, and its influence is exerted through education. In his Theology of an Evolutionist, 118, 190, he maintains that the atonement is "a true reconciliation between God and man, making them at one through the incarnation and passion of Jesus Christ, who lived and suffered, not to redeem men from future torment, but to purify and perfect them in God's likeness by uniting them to God. . . . Sacrifice is not a penalty borne by an innocent sufferer for guilty men,—a doctrine for which there is no authority either in Scripture or in life (1 Peter 3:18?)—but a laying down of one's life in love, that another may receive life. . . . Redemption is not restoration to a lost state of innocence, impossible to be restored, but a culmination of the long process when man shall be presented before his Father 'not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing' (Eph. 5:27). . . . We believe not in the propitiation of an angry God by another suffering to appease the Father's wrath, but in the perpetual self-propitiation of the Father, whose mercy, going forth to redeem from sin, satisfies as nothing else could the divine indignation against sin, by abolishing it. . . . Mercy is hate pitying; it is the pity of wrath. The pity conquers the hate only by lifting the sinner up from his degradation and restoring him to purity." And yet in all this there is no mention of the divine righteousness as the source of the indignation and the object of the propitiation!

It is interesting to note that some of the greatest advocates of the Moral Influence theory have reverted to the older faith when they came to die. In his dying moments, as L. W. Munhall tells us, Horace Bushnell said: "I fear what I have written and said upon the moral idea of the atonement is misleading and will do great harm;" and, as he thought of it further, he cried: "Oh Lord Jesus, I trust for mercy only in the shed

blood that thou didst offer on Calvary!" Schleiermacher, on his deathbed, assembled his family and a few friends, and himself administered the Lord's Supper. After praying and blessing the bread, and after pronouncing the words: "This is my body, broken for you," he added: "This is our foundation!" As he started to bless the cup, he cried: "Quick, quick, bring the cup! I am so happy!" Then he sank quietly back, and was no more; see life of Rothe, by Nippold, 2: 53, 54. Ritschl, in his History of Pietism, 2: 65, had severely criticized Paul Gerhardt's hymn: "O Haupt voll Blut und Wunden," as describing physical suffering; but he begged his son to repeat the two last verses of that hymn: "O sacred head now wounded!" when he came to die. And in general, the convicted sinner finds peace most quickly and surely when he is pointed to the Redeemer who died on the Cross and endured the penalty of sin in his stead.

### 3d. The Grotian, or Governmental Theory of the Atonement.

This theory holds that the atonement is a satisfaction, not to any internal principle of the divine nature, but to the necessities of government. God's government of the universe cannot be maintained, nor can the divine law preserve its authority over its subjects, unless the pardon of offenders is accompanied by some exhibition of the high estimate which God sets upon his law, and the heinous guilt of violating it. Such an exhibition of divine regard for the law is furnished in the sufferings and death of Christ. Christ does not suffer the precise penalty of the law, but God graciously accepts his suffering as a substitute for the penalty. This bearing of substituted suffering on the part of Christ gives the divine law such hold upon the consciences and hearts of men, that God can pardon the guilty upon their repentance, without detriment to the interests of his government. The author of this theory was Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist and theologian (1583-1645). The theory is characteristic of the New England theology, and is generally held by those who accept the New School view of sin.

Grotius was a precocious genius. He wrote good Latin verses at nine years of age; was ripe for the University at twelve; edited the encyclopedic work of Marcellus Capella at fifteen. Even thus early he went with an embassy to the court of France, where he spent a year. Returning home, he took the degree of doctor of laws. In literature he edited the remains of Aratus, and wrote three dramas in Latin. At twenty he was appointed historiographer of the United Provinces; then advocate-general of the fisc for Holland and Zealand. He wrote on international law; was appointed deputy to England; was imprisoned for his theological opinions; escaped to Paris; became ambassador of Sweden to France. He wrote commentaries on Scripture, also history, theology, and poetry. He was indifferent to dogma, a lover of peace, a compromiser, an unpartisan believer, dealing with doctrine more as a statesman than as a theologian. Of Grotius, Dr. E. G. Robinson used to say: "It is ordained of almighty God that the man who dips into everything never gets to the bottom of anything."

Grotius, the jurist, conceived of law as a mere matter of political expediency—a device to procure practical governmental results. The text most frequently quoted in support of his theory, is *Is. 48: 21*—"It pleased Jehovah, for his righteousness' sake, to magnify the law, and make it honorable." Strangely enough, the explanation is added: "even when its demands are unfulfilled." Park: "Christ satisfied the law, by making it desirable and consistent for God not to come up to the demands of the law. Christ suffers a divine chastisement in consequence of our sins. Christ was cursed for Adam's sin, just as the heavens and the earth were cursed for Adam's sin,—that is, he bore pains and sufferings on account of it."

Grotius used the word *acceptilatio*, by which he meant God's sovereign provision of a suffering which was not itself penalty, but which he had determined to accept as a substitute for penalty. Here we have a virtual denial that there is anything in God's nature that requires Christ to suffer; for if penalty may be remitted in part, it may be remitted in whole, and the reason why Christ suffers at all is to be found, not in any demand of God's holiness, but solely in the beneficial influence of these sufferings upon

man; so that in principle this theory is allied to the Example theory and the Moral Influence theory, already mentioned.

Notice the difference between holding to a *substitute for penalty*, as Grotius did, and holding to an *equivalent substituted penalty*, as the Scriptures do. Grotius's own statement of his view may be found in his *Defensio Fidei Catholice de Satisfactione* (Works, 4: 297-308). More modern statements of it are those of Wardlaw, in his *Systematic Theology*, 2: 352-365, and of Albert Barnes, on the Atonement. The history of New England thought upon the subject is given in *Discourses and Treatises on the Atonement*, edited by Prof. Park, of Andover. President Woolsey: "Christ's suffering was due to a deep and awful sense of responsibility, a conception of the supreme importance to man of his standing firm at this crisis. He bore, not the wrath of God, but suffering, as the only way of redemption so far as men's own feeling of sin was concerned, and so far as the government of God was concerned." This unites the Governmental and the Moral Influence theories.

Foster, *Christian Life and Theology*, 226, 227 — "Grotius emphasized the idea of law rather than that of justice, and made the sufferings of Christ a legal example and the occasion of the relaxation of the law, and not the strict penalty demanded by justice. But this view, however it may have been considered and have served in the clarification of the thinking of the times, met with no general reception, and left little trace of itself among those theologians who maintained the line of evangelical theological descent."

To this theory we urge the following objections :

(a) While it contains a valuable element of truth, namely, that the sufferings and death of Christ secure the interests of God's government, it is false by defect, in substituting for the chief aim of the atonement one which is only subordinate and incidental.

In our discussion of Penalty (pages 655, 656), we have seen that the object of punishment is not primarily the security of government. It is not right to punish a man for the beneficial effect on society. Ill-desert must go before punishment, or the punishment can have no beneficial effect on society. No punishment can work good to society, that is not just and right in itself.

(b) It rests upon false philosophical principles, — as, that utility is the ground of moral obligation; that law is an expression of the will, rather than of the nature, of God; that the aim of penalty is to deter from the commission of offences; and that righteousness is resolvable into benevolence.

Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 572-581; 3: 188, 189 — "For God to take that as satisfaction which is not really such, is to say that there is no truth in anything. God may take a part for the whole, error for truth, wrong for right. The theory really denies the necessity for the work of Christ. If every created thing offered to God is worth just so much as God accepts it for, then the blood of bulls and goats might take away sins, and Christ is dead in vain." Dörner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 570, 571 (*Syst. Doct.*, 4: 38-40) — "Acceptatio implies that nothing is good and right in itself. God is indifferent to good or evil. Man is bound by authority and force alone. There is no necessity of punishment or atonement. The doctrine of indulgences and of supererogation logically follows."

(c) It ignores and virtually denies that immanent holiness of God of which the law with its threatened penalties, and the human conscience with its demand for punishment, are only finite reflections. There is something back of government; if the atonement satisfies government, it must be by satisfying that justice of God of which government is an expression.

No deeply convicted sinner feels that his controversy is with government. Undone and polluted, he feels himself in antagonism to the purity of a personal God. Government is not greater than God, but less. What satisfies God must satisfy government. Hence the sinner prays: "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned" (Ps. 51: 4); "God be propitiated toward me the sinner" (literal translation of Luke 18: 13) — propitiated through God's own appointed sacrifice whose smoke is ascending in his behalf even while he prays.

In the divine government this theory recognizes no constitution, but only legislative enactment; even this legislative enactment is grounded in no necessity of God's nature, but only in expediency or in God's arbitrary will; law may be abrogated for merely economic reasons, if any incidental good may be gained thereby. J. M. Campbell, *Atonement*, 81, 144—"No awakened sinner, into whose spirit the terrors of the law have entered, ever thinks of rectoral justice, but of absolute justice, and of absolute justice only. . . . Rectoral justice so presupposes absolute justice, and so throws the mind back on that absolute justice, that the idea of an atonement that will satisfy the one, though it might not the other, is a delusion."

N. W. Taylor's *Theology* was entitled: "Moral Government," and C. G. Finney's *Systematic Theology* was a treatise on Moral Government, although it called itself by another name. But because New England ideas of government were not sufficiently grounded in God's holiness, but were rather based upon utility, expediency, or happiness, the very idea of government has dropped out of the New School theology, and its advocates with well-nigh one accord have gone over to the Moral Influence theory of the atonement, which is only a modified Socinianism. Both the Andover atonement and that of Oberlin have become purely subjective. For this reason the Grotian or Governmental theory has lost its hold upon the theological world and needs to have no large amount of space devoted to it.

(d) It makes that to be an exhibition of justice which is not an exercise of justice; the atonement being, according to this theory, not an execution of law, but an exhibition of regard for law, which will make it safe to pardon the violators of law. Such a merely scenic representation can inspire respect for law, only so long as the essential unreality of it is unsuspected.

To teach that sin will be punished, there must be punishment. Potwin: "How the exhibition of what sin deserves, but does not get, can satisfy justice, is hard to see." The Socinian view of Christ as an example of virtue is more intelligible than the Grotian view of Christ as an example of chastisement. Lyman Abbott: "If I thought that Jesus suffered and died to produce a moral impression on me, it would not produce a moral impression on me." William Ashmore: "A stage tragedian commits a mock murder in order to move people to tears. If Christ was in no sense a substitute, or if he was not co-responsible with the sinner he represents, then God and Christ are participants in a real tragedy the most awful that ever darkened human history, simply for the sake of its effect on men to move their callous sensibilities—a stage-trick for the same effect."

The mother pretends to cry in order to induce her child to obey. But the child will obey only while it thinks the mother's grief a reality, and the last state of that child is worse than the first. Christ's atonement is no passion-play. Hell cannot be cured by homoeopathy. The sacrifice of Calvary is no dramatic exhibition of suffering for the purpose of producing a moral impression on awe-stricken spectators. It is an object-lesson, only because it is a reality. All God's justice and all God's love are focused in the Cross, so that it teaches more of God and his truth than all space and time beside.

John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, book 5, speaks of "mist, the common gloss of theologians." Such mist is the legal fiction by which Christ's suffering is taken in place of legal penalty, while yet it is not the legal penalty itself. E. G. Robinson: "Atonement is not an arbitrary contrivance, so that if one person will endure a certain amount of suffering, a certain number of others may go scot-free." Mercy never cheats justice. Yet the New School theory of atonement admits that Christ cheated justice by a trick. It substituted the penalty of Christ for the penalty of the redeemed, and then substituted something else for the penalty of Christ.

(e) The intensity of Christ's sufferings in the garden and on the cross is inexplicable upon the theory that the atonement was a histrionic exhibition of God's regard for his government, and can be explained only upon the view that Christ actually endured the wrath of God against human sin.

Christ refused the "vine mingled with myrrh" (*Mark 15:23*), that he might to the last have full possession of his powers and speak no words but words of truth and soberness. His cry of agony: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (*Mat. 27:46*), was not an ejaculation of thoughtless or delirious suffering. It expressed the deepest meaning of the crucifixion. The darkening of the heavens was only the outward symbol of the hiding

of the countenance of God from him who was "made to be sin on our behalf" (2 Cor. 5:21). In the case of Christ, above that of all others, *finis coronat*, and dying words are undying words. "The tongues of dying men enforce attention like deep harmony; when words are scarce they're seldom spent in vain. For they breathe truth that breathe their words in pain." *Versus Park, Discourses, 328-335.*

A pure woman needs to meet an infamous proposition with something more than a mild refusal. She must flame up and be angry. Ps. 97:10—"O ye that love Jehovah, hate evil"; Eph. 4:26—"Be ye angry, and sin not." So it belongs to the holiness of God not to let sin go unchallenged. God not only shows anger, but he is angry. It is the wrath of God which sin must meet, and which Christ must meet when he is numbered with the transgressors. Death was the cup of which he was to drink (Mat. 20:23; John 18:11), and which he drained to the dregs. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel, 196*—"Jesus alone of all men truly 'tasted death' (Eph. 2:9). Some men are too stolid and unimaginative to taste it. To Christians the bitterness of death is gone, just because Christ died and rose again. But to Jesus its terrors were as yet undiminished. He resolutely set all his faculties to sound to the depths the dreadfulness of dying."

We therefore cannot agree with either Wendt or Johnson in the following quotations. Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus, 2:249, 250*—"The forsaking of the Father was not an absolute one, since Jesus still called him 'My God' (Mat. 27:46). Jesus felt the failing of that energy of spirit which had hitherto upheld him, and he expresses simply his ardent desire and prayer that God would once more grant him his power and assistance." E. H. Johnson, *The Holy Spirit, 143, 144*—"It is not even necessary to believe that God hid his face from Christ at the last moment. It is necessary only to admit that Christ no longer saw the Father's face. . . . He felt that it was so; but it was not so." These explanations make Christ's sufferings and Christ's words unreal, and to our mind they are inconsistent with both his deity and his atonement.

(f) The actual power of the atonement over the human conscience and heart is due, not to its exhibiting God's regard for law, but to its exhibiting an actual execution of law, and an actual satisfaction of violated holiness made by Christ in the sinner's stead.

Whiton, *Gloria Patri, 143, 144*, claims that Christ is the propitiation for our sins only by bringing peace to the conscience and satisfying the divine demand that is felt therein. Whiton regards the atonement not as a governmental work outside of us, but as an educational work within. Aside from the objection that this view merges God's transcendence in his immanence, we urge the words of Matthew Henry: "Nothing can satisfy an offended conscience but that which satisfied an offended God." C. J. Baldwin: "The lake spread out has no moving power; it turns the mill-wheel only when contracted into the narrow stream and pouring over the fall. So the wide love of God moves men, only when it is concentrated into the sacrifice of the cross."

(g) The theory contradicts all those passages of Scripture which represent the atonement as necessary; as propitiating God himself; as being a revelation of God's righteousness; as being an execution of the penalty of the law; as making salvation a matter of debt to the believer, on the ground of what Christ has done; as actually purging our sins, instead of making that purging possible; as not simply assuring the sinner that God may now pardon him on account of what Christ has done, but that Christ has actually wrought out a complete salvation, and will bestow it upon all who come to him.

John Bunyan, *Pilgrim's Progress, chapter vi*—"Upon that place stood a Cross, and a little below, in the bottom, a Sepulchre. So I saw in my dream, that just as Christian came up with the Cross, his burden loosed from off his shoulders, and fell from off his back, and began to tumble, and so continued to do, till it came to the mouth of the Sepulchre, where it fell in, and I saw it no more. Then was Christian glad and light-some, and said with a merry heart, He hath given me rest by his sorrow, and life by his death. Then he stood still awhile to look and wonder; for it was very surprising to him that the sight of the Cross should thus ease him of his burden."

John Bunyan's story is truer to Christian experience than is the Governmental

theory. The sinner finds peace, not by coming to God with a distant respect to Christ, but by coming directly to the "Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world" (John 1:29). Christ's words to every conscious sinner are simply: "Come unto me" (Mat. 11:28). Upon the ground of what Christ has done, salvation is a matter of debt to the believer. 1 John 1:9—"If we confess our sins, he is faithful and righteous to forgive us our sins"—faithful to his promise, and righteous to Christ. The Governmental theory, on the other hand, tends to discourage the sinner's direct access to Christ, and to render the way to conscious acceptance with God more circuitous and less certain.

When The Outlook says: "Not even to the Son of God must we come instead of coming to God," we can see only plain denial of the validity of Christ's demands and promises, for he demands immediate submission when he bids the sinner follow him, and he promises immediate salvation when he assures all who come to him that he will not cast them out. The theory of Grotius is legal and speculative, but it is not Scriptural, nor does it answer the needs of human nature. For criticism of Albert Barnes's doctrine, see Watts, *New Apologetic*, 210-300. For criticism of the Grotian theory in general, see Shedd, *Hist. Doctrine*, 2:347-369; Crawford, *Atonement*, 367; Cunningham, *Hist. Theology*, 2:355; Princeton Essays, 1:259-282; Essay on Atonement, by Abp. Thomson, in *Aids to Faith*; McIlvaine, *Wisdom of Holy Scripture*, 194-196; S. H. Tyng, *Christian Pastor*; Charles Hodge, *Essays*, 129-134; Lidgett, *Spir. Prin. of Atonement*, 151-154.

#### 4th. The Irvingian Theory, or Theory of Gradually Extirpated Depravity.

This holds that, in his incarnation, Christ took human nature as it was in Adam, not before the Fall, but after the Fall,—human nature, therefore, with its inborn corruption and predisposition to moral evil; that, notwithstanding the possession of this tainted and depraved nature, Christ, through the power of the Holy Spirit, or of his divine nature, not only kept his human nature from manifesting itself in any actual or personal sin, but gradually purified it, through struggle and suffering, until in his death he completely extirpated its original depravity, and reunited it to God. This subjective purification of human nature in the person of Jesus Christ constitutes his atonement, and men are saved, not by any objective propitiation, but only by becoming through faith partakers of Christ's new humanity. This theory was elaborated by Edward Irving, of London (1792-1834), and it has been held, in substance, by Menken and Dippel in Germany.

Irving was in this preceded by Felix of Urgella, in Spain (+813), whom Alonin opposed. Felix said that the Logos united with human nature, without sanctifying it beforehand. Edward Irving, in his early life colleague of Dr. Chalmers, at Glasgow, was in his later years a preacher, in London, of the National Church of Scotland. For his own statement of his view of the Atonement, see his *Collected Works*, 5:9-398. See also *Life of Irving*, by Mrs. Oliphant; Menken, *Schriften*, 3:279-404; 6:351 sq.; Guericke, in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1842: Heft 2; David Brown, in *Expositor*, Oct. 1837: 264 sq., and letter of Irving to Marcus Dods, in *British Weekly*, Mch. 25, 1837. For other references, see Hagenbach, *Hist. Doct.*, 2:493-498.

Irving's followers differ in their representation of his views. Says Miller, *Hist. and Doct. of Irvingism*, 1:85—"If indeed we made Christ a sinner, then indeed all creeds are at an end and we are worthy to die the death of blasphemers. . . . The miraculous conception depriveth him of human personality, and it also depriveth him of original sin and guilt needing to be atoned for by another, but it doth not deprive him of the substance of sinful flesh and blood,—that is, flesh and blood the same with the flesh and blood of his brethren." 2:14—Freer says: "So that, despite it was fallen flesh he had assumed, he was, through the Eternal Spirit, born into the world 'the Holy Thing.'" 11-15, 282-305—"Unfallen humanity needed not redemption, therefore, Jesus did not take it. He took fallen humanity, but purged it in the act of taking it. The nature of which he took part was sinful in the lump, but in his person most holy."

So, says an Irvingian tract, "Being part of the very nature that had incurred the penalty of sin, though in his person never having committed or even thought it, part

of the common humanity could suffer that penalty, and did so suffer, to make atonement for that nature, though he who took it knew no sin." Dr. Curry, quoted in McClintock and Strong, *Encyclopaedia*, 4:663, 664—"The Godhead came into vital union with humanity fallen and under the law. The last thought carried, to Irving's realistic mode of thinking, the notion of Christ's participation in the fallen character of humanity, which he designated by terms that implied a real sinfulness in Christ. He attempted to get rid of the odiousness of that idea, by saying that this was overborne, and at length wholly expelled, by the indwelling Godhead."

We must regard the later expounders of Irvingian doctrine as having softened down, if they have not wholly expunged, its most characteristic feature, as the following quotation from Irving's own words will show: Works, 5:115—"That Christ took our fallen nature, is most manifest, because there was no other in existence to take." 123—"The human nature is thoroughly fallen; the mere apprehension of it by the Son doth not make it holy." 128—"His soul did mourn and grieve and pray to God continually, that it might be delivered from the mortality, corruption, and temptation which it felt in its fleshly tabernacle." 152—"These sufferings came not by imputation merely, but by actual participation of the sinful and cursed thing." Irving frequently quoted Heb. 2:10—"make the author of their salvation perfect through sufferings."

Irving's followers deny Christ's sinfulness, only by assuming that inborn infirmity and congenital tendencies to evil are not sin,—in other words, that not native depravity, but only actual transgression, is to be denominated sin. Irving, in our judgment, was rightly charged with asserting the sinfulness of Christ's human nature, and it was upon this charge that he was deposed from the ministry by the Presbytery in Scotland.

Irving was of commanding stature, powerful voice, natural and graceful oratory. He loved the antique and the grand. For a time in London he was the great popular sensation. But shortly after the opening of his new church in Regent's Square in 1827, he found that fashion had taken its departure and that his church was no longer crowded. He concluded that the world was under the reign of Satan; he became a fanatical millenarian; he gave himself wholly to the study of prophecy. In 1830 he thought the apostolic gifts were revived, and he held to the hope of a restoration of the primitive church, although he himself was relegated to a comparatively subordinate position. He exhausted his energies, and died at the age of forty-two. "If I had married Irving," said Mrs. Thomas Carlyle, "there would have been no tongues."

To this theory we offer the following objections:

(a) While it embraces an important element of truth, namely, the fact of a new humanity in Christ of which all believers become partakers, it is chargeable with serious error in denying the objective atonement which makes the subjective application possible.

Bruce, in his *Humiliation of Christ*, calls this a theory of "redemption by sample." It is a purely subjective atonement which Irving has in mind. Deliverance from sin, in order to deliverance from penalty, is an exact reversal of the Scripture order. Yet this deliverance from sin, in Irving's view, was to be secured in an external and mechanical way. He held that it was the Old Testament economy which should abide, while the New Testament economy should pass away. This is Sacramentarianism, or dependence upon the external rite, rather than upon the internal grace, as essential to salvation. The followers of Irving are Sacramentarians. The crucifix and candles, incense and gorgeous vestments, a highly complicated and symbolic ritual, they regard as a necessary accompaniment of religion. They feel the need of external authority, visible and permanent, but one that rests upon inspiration and continual supernatural help. They do not find this authority, as the Romanists do, in the Pope,—they find it in their new Apostles and Prophets. The church can never be renewed, as they think, except by the restoration of all the ministering orders mentioned in Eph. 4:11—"apostles . . . prophets . . . evangelists . . . pastors . . . teachers." But the N. T. mark of an apostle is that Christ has appeared to him. Irving's apostles cannot stand this test. See Luthardt, *Erinnerungen aus vergangenen Tagen*, 237.

(b) It rests upon false fundamental principles,—as, that law is identical with the natural order of the universe, and as such, is an exhaustive expression of the will and nature of God; that sin is merely a power of moral evil within the soul, instead of also involving an objective guilt and desert of

punishment; that penalty is the mere reaction of law against the transgressor, instead of being also the revelation of a personal wrath against sin; that the evil taint of human nature can be extirpated by suffering its natural consequences,—penalty in this way reforming the transgressor.

Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2:468 (*Syst. Doct.*, 3:361, 362)—“On Irving’s theory, evil inclinations are not sinful. Sinfulness belongs only to evil acts. The loose connection between the Logos and humanity savors of Nestorianism. It is the work of the *person* to rid itself of something in the humanity which does not render it really sinful. If Jesus’ sinfulness of nature did not render his person sinful, this must be true of us,—which is a Pelagian element, revealed also in the denial that for our redemption we need Christ as an atoning sacrifice. It is not necessary to a complete incarnation for Christ to take a *sinful* nature, unless sin is *essential* to human nature. In Irving’s view, the death of Christ’s body works the regeneration of his sinful nature. But this is to make sin a merely physical thing, and the body the only part of man needing redemption.” Penalty would thus become a reformer, and death a Savior.

Irving held that there are two kinds of sin: 1. guiltless sin; 2. guilty sin. Passive depravity is not guilty; it is a part of man’s sensual nature; without it we would not be human. But the moment this fallen nature expresses itself in action, it becomes guilty. Irving near the close of his life claimed a sort of sinless perfection; for so long as he could keep this sinful nature inactive, and be guided by the Holy Spirit, he was free from sin and guilt. Christ took this passive sin, that he might be like unto his brethren, and that he might be able to suffer.

(c) It contradicts the express and implicit representations of Scripture, with regard to Christ’s freedom from all taint of hereditary depravity; misrepresents his life as a growing consciousness of the underlying corruption of his human nature, which culminated at Gethsemane and Calvary; and denies the truth of his own statements, when it declares that he must have died on account of his own depravity, even though none were to be saved thereby.

“I shall maintain until death,” said Irving, “that the flesh of Christ was as rebellious as ours, as fallen as ours. . . . Human nature was corrupt to the core and black as hell, and this is the human nature the Son of God took upon himself and was clothed with.” The Rescuer must stand as deep in the mire as the one he rescues. There was no substitution. Christ waged war with the sin of his own flesh and he expelled it. His glory was not in saving others, but in saving himself, and so demonstrating the power of man through the Holy Spirit to cast out sin from his heart and life. Irving held that his theory was the only one taught in Scripture and held from the first by the church.

Nicoll, *Life of Christ*, 183—“All others, as they grow in holiness, grow in their sense of sin. But when Christ is forsaken of the Father, he asks ‘Why?’ well knowing that the reason is not in his sin. He never makes confession of sin. In his longest prayer, the preface is an assertion of righteousness: ‘I glorified thee’ (John 17:4). His last utterance from the cross is a quotation from Ps. 31:5—‘Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit’ (Luke 23:46), but he does not add, as the Psalm does, ‘thou hast redeemed me, O Lord God of truth,’ for he needed no redemption, being himself the Redeemer.”

(d) It makes the active obedience of Christ, and the subjective purification of his human nature, to be the chief features of his work, while the Scriptures make his death and passive bearing of penalty the centre of all, and ever regard him as one who is personally pure and who vicariously bears the punishment of the guilty.

In Irving’s theory there is no imputation, or representation, or substitution. His only idea of sacrifice is that sin itself shall be sacrificed, or annihilated. The many subjective theories of the atonement show that the offence of the cross has not ceased (Gal. 5:11—“then hath the stumbling-block of the cross been done away”). Christ crucified is still a stumbling-block to modern speculation. Yet it is, as of old, “the power of God unto salvation” (Rom. 1:16; cf. 1 Cor. 1:23, 24—“we preach Christ crucified, unto Jews a stumbling-block and unto Gentiles foolishness; but unto them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God”).

As the ocean receives the impurities of the rivers and purges them, so Irving represented Christ as receiving into himself the impurities of humanity and purging the race from its sin. Here is the sense of defilement, but no sense of guilt; subjective pollution, but no objective condemnation. We take precisely opposite ground from that of Irving, namely, that Christ had, not hereditary depravity, but hereditary guilt; that he was under obligation to suffer for the sins of the race to which he had historically united himself, and of which he was the creator, the upholder, and the life. He was "made to be sin on our behalf" (2 Cor. 5: 21), not in the sense of one defiled, as Irving thought, but in the sense of one condemned to bear our iniquities and to suffer their penal consequences. The test of a theory of the atonement, as the test of a religion, is its power to "cleanse that red right hand" of Lady Macbeth; in other words, its power to satisfy the divine justice of which our condemning conscience is only the reflection. The theory of Irving has no such power. Dr. E. G. Robinson verged toward Irving's view, when he claimed that "Christ took human nature as he found it."

(e) It necessitates the surrender of the doctrine of justification as a merely declaratory act of God; and requires such a view of the divine holiness, expressed only through the order of nature, as can be maintained only upon principles of pantheism.

Thomas Aquinas inquired whether Christ was slain by himself, or by another. The question suggests a larger one — whether God has constituted other forces than his own, personal and impersonal, in the universe, over against which he stands in his transcendence; or whether all his activity is merged in, and identical with, the activity of the creature. The theory of a merely subjective atonement is more consistent with the latter view than the former. For criticism of Irvingian doctrine, see *Studien und Kritiken*, 1845: 319; 1877: 354-374; *Princeton Rev.*, April, 1863: 207; *Christian Rev.*, 23: 234 sq.; *Ullmann, Sinlessness of Jesus*, 219-232.

##### 5th. The Anselmic, or Commercial Theory of the Atonement.

This theory holds that sin is a violation of the divine honor or majesty, and, as committed against an infinite being, deserves an infinite punishment; that the majesty of God requires him to execute punishment, while the love of God pleads for the sparing of the guilty; that this conflict of divine attributes is eternally reconciled by the voluntary sacrifice of the God-man, who bears in virtue of the dignity of his person the intensively infinite punishment of sin, which must otherwise have been suffered extensively and eternally by sinners; that this suffering of the God-man presents to the divine majesty an exact equivalent for the deserved sufferings of the elect; and that, as the result of this satisfaction of the divine claims, the elect sinners are pardoned and regenerated. This view was first broached by Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) as a substitute for the earlier patristic view that Christ's death was a ransom paid to Satan, to deliver sinners from his power. It is held by many Scotch theologians, and, in this country, by the Princeton School.

The old patristic theory, which the Anselmic view superseded, has been called the Military theory of the Atonement. Satan, as a captor in war, had a right to his captives, which could be bought off only by ransom. It was Justin Martyr who first propounded this view that Christ paid a ransom to Satan. Gregory of Nyssa added that Christ's humanity was the bait with which Satan was attracted to the hidden hook of Christ's deity, and so was caught by artifice. Peter Lombard, *Sent.*, 3: 19 — "What did the Redeemer to our captor? He held out to him his cross as a mouse-trap; in it he set, as a bait, his blood." Even Luther compares Satan to the crocodile which swallows the ichneumon, only to find that the little animal eats its insides out.

These metaphors show this, at least, that no age of the church has believed in a merely subjective atonement. Nor was this relation to Satan the only aspect in which the atonement was regarded even by the early church. So early as the fourth century, we find a great church Father maintaining that the death of Christ was required by the

truth and goodness of God. See Crippen, *History of Christian Doctrine*, 129—"Athanasius (325-373) held that the death of Christ was the payment of a debt due to God. His argument is briefly this: God, having threatened death as the punishment of sin, would be untrue if he did not fulfil his threatening. But it would be equally unworthy of the divine goodness to permit rational beings, to whom he had imparted his own spirit, to incur this death in consequence of an imposition practiced on them by the devil. Seeing then that nothing but death could solve this dilemma, the Word, who could not die, assumed a mortal body, and, offering his human nature a sacrifice for all, fulfilled the law by his death." Gregory Nazianzen (390) "retained the figure of a ransom, but, clearly perceiving that the analogy was incomplete, he explained the death of Christ as an expedient to reconcile the divine attributes."

But, although many theologians had recognized a relation of atonement to God, none before Anselm had given any clear account of the nature of this relation. Anselm's acute, brief, and beautiful treatise entitled "*Cur Deus Homo*" constitutes the greatest single contribution to the discussion of this doctrine. He shows that "whatever man owes, he owes to God, not to the devil. . . . He who does not yield due honor to God, withholds from him what is his, and dishonors him; and this is sin. . . . It is necessary that either the stolen honor be restored, or that punishment follow." Man, because of original sin, cannot make satisfaction for the dishonor done to God,— "a sinner cannot justify a sinner." Neither could an angel make this satisfaction. None can make it but God. "If then none can make it but God, and none owes it but man, it must needs be wrought out by God, made man." The God-man, to make satisfaction for the sins of all mankind, must "give to God, of his own, something that is more valuable than all that is under God." Such a gift of infinite value was his death. The reward of his sacrifice turns to the advantage of man, and thus the justice and love of God are reconciled.

The foregoing synopsis is mainly taken from Crippen, *Hist. Christ. Doct.*, 124, 128. The *Cur Deus Homo* of Anselm is translated in *Bib. Sac.*, 11: 729; 12: 52. A synopsis of it is given in Lichtenberger's *Encyclopédie des Sciences Religieuses*, vol. 1, art.: Anselm. The treatises on the Atonement by Symington, Candlish, Martin, Smeaton, in Great Britain, advocate for substance the view of Anselm, as indeed it was held by Calvin before them. In America, the theory is represented by Nathanael Emmons, A. Alexander, and Charles Hodge (*Syst. Theol.*, 2: 470-540).

To this theory we make the following objections:

(a) While it contains a valuable element of truth, in its representation of the atonement as satisfying a principle of the divine nature, it conceives of this principle in too formal and external a manner,—making the idea of the divine honor or majesty more prominent than that of the divine holiness, in which the divine honor and majesty are grounded.

The theory has been called the "Criminal theory" of the Atonement, as the old patristic theory of a ransom paid to Satan has been called the "Military theory." It had its origin in a time when exaggerated ideas prevailed respecting the authority of popes and emperors, and when dishonor done to their majesty (*crimen læsæ majestatis*) was the highest offence known to law. See article by Cramer, in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1880: 7, on *Wurzeln des Anselm'schen Satisfactionsbegriffes*.

Allen, Jonathan Edwards, 88, 89—"From the point of view of Sovereignty, there could be no necessity for atonement. In Mohammedanism, where sovereignty is the supreme and sole theological principle, no need is felt for satisfying the divine justice. God may pardon whom he will, on whatever grounds his sovereign will may dictate. It therefore constituted a great advance in Latin theology, as also an evidence of its immeasurable superiority to Mohammedanism, when Anselm for the first time, in a clear and emphatic manner, had asserted an inward necessity in the being of God that his justice should receive satisfaction for the affront which had been offered to it by human sinfulness."

Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, 481—"In the days of feudalism, men thought of heaven as organized on a feudal basis, and ranked the first and second Persons of the Trinity as Suzerain and Tenant-in-Chief." William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 329, 330—"The monarchical type of sovereignty was, for example, so ineradicably planted in the mind of our forefathers, that a dose of cruelty and arbitrariness in their Deity seems positively to have been required by their imagination. They called

the cruelty 'retributive justice,' and a God without it would certainly not have struck them as sovereign enough. But to-day we abhor the very notion of eternal suffering inflicted; and that arbitrary dealing out of salvation and damnation to selected individuals, of which Jonathan Edwards could persuade himself that he had not only a conviction, but a 'delightful conviction,' as of a doctrine 'exceeding pleasant, bright, and sweet,' appears to us, if sovereignly anything, sovereignly irrational and mean."

(b) In its eagerness to maintain the atoning efficacy of Christ's passive obedience, the active obedience, quite as clearly expressed in Scripture, is insufficiently emphasized and well nigh lost sight of.

Neither Christ's active obedience alone, nor Christ's obedient passion alone, can save us. As we shall see hereafter, in our examination of the doctrine of Justification, the latter was needed as the ground upon which our penalty could be remitted; the former as the ground upon which we might be admitted to the divine favor. Calvin has reflected the passive element in Anselm's view, in the following passages of his Institutes: II, 17: 3—"God, to whom we were hateful through sin, was appeased by the death of his Son, and was made propitious to us." . . . II, 16: 7—"It is necessary to consider how he substituted himself in order to pay the price of our redemption. Death held us under its yoke, but he, in our place, delivered himself into its power, that he might exempt us from it." . . . II, 16: 2—"Christ interposed and bore what, by the just judgment of God, was impending over sinners; with his own blood expiated the sin which rendered them hateful to God; by this expiation satisfied and duly propitiated the Father; by this intercession appeased his anger; on this basis founded peace between God and men; and by this tie secured the divine benevolence toward them."

It has been said that Anselm regarded Christ's death not as a vicarious punishment, but as a voluntary sacrifice in compensation for which the guilty were released and justified. So Neander, *Hist. Christ. Dogmas* (Bohn), 2: 517, understands Anselm to teach "the necessity of a satisfactio vicaria activa," and says: "We do not find in his writings the doctrine of a satisfactio passiva; he nowhere says that Christ had endured the punishment of men." Shedd, *Hist. Christ. Doctrine*, 2: 232, thinks this a misunderstanding of Anselm. The *Encyclopædia Britannica* takes the view of Shedd, when it speaks of Christ's sufferings as penalty: "The justice of man demands satisfaction; and as an insult to infinite honor is itself infinite, the satisfaction must be infinite, *i. e.*, it must outweigh all that is not God. Such a penalty can only be paid by God himself, and, as a penalty for man, must be paid under the form of man. Satisfaction is only possible through the God-man. Now this God-man, as sinless, is exempt from the punishment of sin; his passion is therefore voluntary, not given as due. The merit of it is therefore infinite; God's justice is thus appeased, and his mercy may extend to man." The truth then appears to be that Anselm held Christ's obedience to be passive, in that he satisfied God's justice by enduring punishment which the sinner deserved; but that he held this same obedience of Christ to be active, in that he endured this penalty voluntarily, when there was no obligation upon him so to do.

Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, 2: 431, 461, 462—"Christ not only suffered the penalty, but obeyed the precept, of the law. In this case law and justice get their whole dues. But when lost man only suffers the penalty, but does not obey the precept, the law is defrauded of a part of its dues. No law is completely obeyed, if only its penalty is endured. . . . Consequently, a sinner can never completely and exhaustively satisfy the divine law, however much or long he may suffer, because he cannot at one and the same time endure the penalty and obey the precept. He owes 'ten thousand talents' and has 'not wherewith to pay' (Mat. 18: 24, 25). But Christ did both, and therefore he 'magnified the law and made it honorable' (Is. 42: 21), in an infinitely higher degree than the whole human family would have done, had they all personally suffered for their sins." *Cf. Edwards, Works*, 1: 406.

(c) It allows disproportionate weight to those passages of Scripture which represent the atonement under commercial analogies, as the payment of a debt or ransom, to the exclusion of those which describe it as an ethical fact, whose value is to be estimated not quantitatively, but qualitatively.

Milton, *Paradise Lost*, 3: 209-212—"Die he, or justice must, unless for him Some other, able and as willing, pay The rigid satisfaction, death for death." The main text

relied upon by the advocates of the Commercial theory is Mat. 20: 28 — "give his life a ransom for many." Pfleiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, i: 267 — "The work of Christ, as Anselm construed it, was in fact nothing else than the prototype of the meritorious performances and satisfactions of the ecclesiastical saints, and was therefore, from the point of view of the medieval church, thought out quite logically. All the more remarkable is it that the churches of the Reformation could be satisfied with this theory, notwithstanding that it stood in complete contradiction to their deeper moral consciousness. If, according to Protestant principles generally, there are no supererogatory meritorious works, then one would suppose that such cannot be accepted even in the case of Jesus."

E. G. Robinson, *Christian Theology*, 268 — "The Anselmic theory was rejected by Abelard for grounding the atonement in justice instead of benevolence, and for taking insufficient account of the power of Christ's sufferings and death in procuring a subjective change in man." *Encyc. Brit.*, 2: 98 (art.: Anselm) — "This theory has exercised immense influence on the form of church doctrine. It is certainly an advance on the older patristic theory, in so far as it substitutes for a contest between God and Satan, a contest between the goodness and justice of God; but it puts the whole relation on a merely legal footing, gives it no ethical bearing, and neglects altogether the consciousness of the individual to be redeemed. In this respect it contrasts unfavorably with the later theory of Abelard."

(d) It represents the atonement as having reference only to the elect, and ignores the Scripture declarations that Christ died for all.

Anselm, like Augustine, limited the atonement to the elect. Yet Leo the Great, in 461, had affirmed that "so precious is the shedding of Christ's blood for the unjust, that if the whole universe of captives would believe in the Redeemer, no chain of the devil could hold them" (Crippen, 182). Bishop Gallor, of the Episcopal Church, heard General Booth at Memphis say in 1908: "Friends, Jesus shed his blood to pay the price, and he bought from God enough salvation to go round." The Bishop says: "I felt that his view of salvation was different from mine. Yet such teaching, partial as it is, lifts men by the thousand from the mire and vice of sin into the power and purity of a new life in Jesus Christ."

Foster, *Christian Life and Theology*, 221 — "Anselm does not clearly connect the death of Christ with the punishment of sin, since he makes it a supererogatory work voluntarily done, in consequence of which it is 'fitting' that forgiveness should be bestowed on sinners. . . . Yet his theory served to hand down to later theologians the great idea of the objective atonement."

(e) It is defective in holding to a merely external transfer of the merit of Christ's work, while it does not clearly state the internal ground of that transfer, in the union of the believer with Christ.

This needed supplement, namely, the doctrine of the Union of the Believer with Christ, was furnished by Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, pars 3, quæst. 8. The Anselmic theory is Romanist in its tendency, as the theory next to be mentioned is Protestant in its tendency. P. S. Moxon asserts that salvation is not by substitution, but by incorporation. We prefer to say that salvation is by substitution, but that the substitution is by incorporation. Incorporation involves substitution, and another's pain inures to my account. Christ being incorporate with humanity, all the exposures and liabilities of humanity fell upon him. Simon, Reconciliation by Incarnation, is an attempt to unite the two elements of the doctrine.

Lidgett, *Spir. Prin. of Atonement*, 122-123 — "As Anselm represents it, Christ's death is not ours in any such sense that we can enter into it. Bushnell justly charges that it leaves no moral dynamic in the Cross." For criticism of Anselm, see John Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, 2: 172-193; *Thomasus, Christi Person und Werk*, III, 2: 230-241; Philipp, *Glaubenslehre*, iv, 2: 70 sq.; Baur, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2: 416 sq.; Shedd, *Hist. Doct.*, 2: 273-286; Dale, *Atonement*, 279-282; Mollvaine, *Wisdom of Holy Scripture*, 196-199; Kreibitz, *Versöhnungslehre*, 176-178.

#### 6th. The Ethical Theory of the Atonement.

In propounding what we conceive to be the true theory of the atonement, it seems desirable to divide our treatment into two parts. No theory

can be satisfactory which does not furnish a solution of the two problems: 1. What did the atonement accomplish? or, in other words, what was the object of Christ's death? The answer to this question must be a description of the atonement in its relation to holiness in God. 2. What were the means used? or, in other words, how could Christ justly die? The answer to this question must be a description of the atonement as arising from Christ's relation to humanity. We take up these two parts of the subject in order.

Edwards, Works, 1: 609, says that two things make Christ's sufferings a satisfaction for human guilt: (1) their equality or equivalence to the punishment that the sinner deserves; (2) the union between him and them, or the propriety of his being accepted, in suffering, as the representative of the sinner. Christ bore God's wrath: (1) by the sight of sin and punishment; (2) by enduring the effects of wrath ordered by God. See also Edwards, Sermon on the Satisfaction of Christ. These statements of Edwards suggest the two points of view from which we regard the atonement; but they come short of the Scriptural declarations, in that they do not distinctly assert Christ's endurance of penalty itself. Thus they leave the way open for the New School theories of the atonement, propounded by the successors of Edwards.

Adolphe Monod said well: "Save first the holy law of my God, — after that you shall save me." Edwards felt the first of these needs, for he says, in his *Mysteries of Scripture*, Works, 3: 542 — "The necessity of Christ's satisfaction to divine justice is, as it were, the centre and hinge of all doctrines of pure revelation. Other doctrines are comparatively of little importance, except as they have respect to this." And in his *Work of Redemption*, Works, 1: 412 — "Christ was born to the end that he might die; and therefore he did, as it were, begin to die as soon as he was born." See John 12: 32 — "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto myself. But this he said, signifying by what manner of death he should die." Christ was "lifted up": 1. as a propitiation to the holiness of God, which makes suffering to follow sin, so affording the only ground for pardon without and peace within; 2. as a power to purify the hearts and lives of men, Jesus being as "the serpent lifted up in the wilderness" (John 3: 14), and we overcoming "because of the blood of the Lamb" (Rev. 12: 11).

#### *First*. — the Atonement as related to Holiness in God.

The Ethical theory holds that the necessity of the atonement is grounded in the holiness of God, of which conscience in man is a finite reflection. There is an ethical principle in the divine nature, which demands that sin shall be punished. Aside from its results, sin is essentially ill-deserving. As we who are made in God's image mark our growth in purity by the increasing quickness with which we detect impurity, and the increasing hatred which we feel toward it, so infinite purity is a consuming fire to all iniquity. As there is an ethical demand in our natures that not only others' wickedness, but our own wickedness, be visited with punishment, and a keen conscience cannot rest till it has made satisfaction to justice for its misdeeds, so there is an ethical demand of God's nature that penalty follow sin.

The holiness of God has conscience and penalty for its correlates and consequences. Gordon, *Christ of To-day*, 216 — "In old Athens, the rock on whose top sat the Court of the Areopagus, representing the highest reason and the best character of the Athenian state, had underneath it the Cave of the Furies." Shakespeare knew human nature and he bears witness to its need of atonement. In his last Will and Testament he writes: "First, I commend my soul into the hands of God, my Creator, hoping and assuredly believing, through the only merits of Jesus Christ my Savior, to be made partaker of life everlasting." Richard III, 1: 4 — "I charge you, as you hope to have redemption By Christ's dear blood shed for our grievous sins, That you depart and lay no hands on me." Richard II, 4: 1 — "The world's Ransom, blessed Mary's Son." Henry VI, 2d part, 3: 2 — "That dread King took our state upon him, To free us from

his Father's wrathful curse." Henry IV, 1st part, 1: 1—"Those holy fields, Over whose acres walked those blessed feet, Which fourteen hundred years ago were nailed For our advantage on the bitter Cross." Measure for Measure, 2: 2—"Why, all the souls that are were forfeit once; And he that might the vantage best have took Found out the remedy." Henry VI, 2d part, 1: 1—"Now, by the death of him that died for all!" All's Well that Ends Well, 3: 4—"What angel shall Bless this unworthy husband? He cannot thrive Unless her prayers, whom heaven delights to hear And loves to grant, relieve him from the wrath Of greatest justice." See a good statement of the Ethical theory of the Atonement in its relation to God's holiness, in Denney, *Studies in Theology*, 100-124.

Punishment is the constitutional reaction of God's being against moral evil—the self-assertion of infinite holiness against its antagonist and would-be destroyer. In God this demand is devoid of all passion, and is consistent with infinite benevolence. It is a demand that cannot be evaded, since the holiness from which it springs is unchanging. The atonement is therefore a satisfaction of the ethical demand of the divine nature, by the substitution of Christ's penal sufferings for the punishment of the guilty.

John Wessel, a Reformer before the Reformation (1419-1489): "Ipse deus, ipse sacerdos, ipse hostia, pro se, de se, sibi satisfecit"—"Himself being at the same time God, priest, and sacrificial victim, he made satisfaction to himself, for himself [*i. e.*, for the sins of men to whom he had united himself], and by himself [by his own sinless sufferings]." Quarles's Emblems: "O groundless deeps! O love beyond degree! The Offended dies, to set the offender free!"

Spurgeon, *Autobiography*, 1: 98—"When I was in the hand of the Holy Spirit, under conviction of sin, I had a clear and sharp sense of the justice of God. Sin, whatever it might be to other people, became to me an intolerable burden. It was not so much that I feared hell, as that I feared sin; and all the while I had upon my mind a deep concern for the honor of God's name and the integrity of his moral government. I felt that it would not satisfy my conscience if I could be forgiven unjustly. But then there came the question: 'How could God be just, and yet justify me who had been so guilty?' . . . The doctrine of the atonement is to my mind one of the surest proofs of the inspiration of Holy Scripture. Who would or could have thought of the just Ruler dying for the unjust rebel?"

This substitution is unknown to mere law, and above and beyond the powers of law. It is an operation of grace. Grace, however, does not violate or suspend law, but takes it up into itself and fulfils it. The righteousness of law is maintained, in that the source of all law, the judge and punisher, himself voluntarily submits to bear the penalty, and bears it in the human nature that has sinned.

Matheson, *Moments on the Mount*, 221—"In conscience, man condemns and is condemned. Christ was God in the flesh, both priest and sacrificial victim (Leh 9:12). He is 'full of grace'—forgiving grace—but he is 'full of truth' also, and so 'the only-begotten from the Father' (Joh 1:14). Not forgiveness that ignores sin, not justice that has no mercy. He forgave the sinner, because he bore the sin." Kaftan, referring to some modern theologians who have returned to the old doctrine but who have said that the basis of the atonement is, not the juridical idea of punishment, but the ethical idea of propitiation, affirms as follows: "On the contrary the highest ethical idea of propitiation is just that of punishment. Take this away, and propitiation becomes nothing but the inferior and unworthy idea of appeasing the wrath of an incensed deity. Precisely the idea of the vicarious suffering of punishment is the idea which must in some way be brought to a full expression for the sake of the ethical consciousness.

"The conscience awakened by God can accept no forgiveness which is not experienced as at the same time a condemnation of sin. . . . Jesus, though he was without sin and deserved no punishment, took upon himself all the evils which have come into the world as the consequence and punishment of sin, even to the shameful death on the Cross at the hand of sinners. . . . Consequently for the good of man he bore all that

which man had deserved, and thereby has man escaped the final eternal punishment and has become a child of God. . . . This is not merely a subjective conclusion upon the related facts, but it is as objective and real as anything which faith recognizes and knows."

Thus the atonement answers the ethical demand of the divine nature that sin be punished if the offender is to go free. The interests of the divine government are secured as a first subordinate result of this satisfaction to God himself, of whose nature the government is an expression; while, as a second subordinate result, provision is made for the needs of human nature, — on the one hand the need of an objective satisfaction to its ethical demand of punishment for sin, and on the other the need of a manifestation of divine love and mercy that will affect the heart and move it to repentance.

The great classical passage with reference to the atonement is Rom. 3:25, 26 — "whom God set forth to be a propitiation, through faith, in his blood, to show his righteousness because of the passing over of the sins done aforetime, in the forbearance of God; for the showing, I say, of his righteousness at this present season: that he might himself be just, and the justifier of him that hath faith in Jesus." Or, somewhat more freely translated, the passage would read: — "whom God hath set forth in his blood as a propitiatory sacrifice, through faith, to show forth his righteousness on account of the pretermission of past offences in the forbearance of God; to declare his righteousness in the time now present, so that he may be just and yet may justify him who believeth in Jesus."

EXPOSITION OF ROM. 3:25, 26. — These verses are an expanded statement of the subject of the epistle — the revelation of the "righteousness of God" (= the righteousness which God provides and which God accepts) — which had been mentioned in 1:17, but which now has new light thrown upon it by the demonstration, in 1:18—3:20, that both Gentiles and Jews are under condemnation, and are alike shut up for salvation to some other method than that of works. We subjoin the substance of Meyer's comments upon this passage.

"Verse 25. 'God has set forth Christ as an effectual propitiatory offering, through faith, by means of his blood,' i. e., in that he caused him to shed his blood. *ἐν τῷ αἵματι αἰμαρ* belongs to *προέθετο*, not to *πίστεως*. The purpose of this setting forth in his blood is *εἰς ἐνδειξὴν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ*, 'for the display of his [judicial and punitive] righteousness,' which received its satisfaction in the death of Christ as a propitiatory offering, and was thereby practically demonstrated and exhibited. 'On account of the passing-by of sins that had previously taken place,' i. e., because he had allowed the pre-Christian sins to go without punishment, whereby his righteousness had been lost sight of and obscured, and had come to need an *ἐνδειξή*, or exhibition to men. Omission is not acquittance, *πάρεσις*, passing-by, is intermediate between pardon and punishment. 'In virtue of the forbearance of God' expresses the motive of the *πάρεσις*. Before Christ's sacrifice, God's administration was a scandal, — it needed vindication. The atonement is God's answer to the charge of freeing the guilty.

"Verse 26. *εἰς τὸ εἶναι* is not epexegetical of *εἰς ἐνδειξήν*, but presents the teleology of the *ἰλαστήριον*, the final aim of the whole affirmation from *ἐν προέθετο* to *καρπῷ* — namely, first, God's *being just*, and secondly, his *appearing just* in consequence of this. *Justus et justificans*, instead of *justus et condemnans*, this is the *summum paradoxon evangelicum*. Of this revelation of righteousness, not through condemnation, but through atonement, grace is the determining ground."

We repeat what was said on pages 719, 720, with regard to the teaching of the passage, namely, that it shows: (1) that Christ's death is a propitiatory sacrifice; (2) that its first and main effect is upon God; (3) that the particular attribute in God which demands the atonement is his justice, or holiness; (4) that the satisfaction of this holiness is the necessary condition of God's justifying the believer. It is only incidentally and subordinately that the atonement is a necessity to man; Paul speaks of it here mainly as a necessity to God. Christ suffers, indeed, that God may *appear* righteous; but behind the appearance lies the reality; the main object of Christ's suffering is that God may *be* righteous, while he pardons the believing sinner; in other words, the ground of the atonement is something internal to God himself. See Heb. 2:10 — it "became" God — it was morally fitting in God, to make Christ suffer; cf. Zech. 6:8 — "they that go toward the north country have quieted my spirit in the north country" — the judgments inflicted on Babylon have satisfied my justice.

Charnock: "He who once 'quenched the violence of fire' for those Hebrew children, has also quenched the fires of God's anger against the sinner, hotter than furnace heated seven times." The same God who is a God of holiness, and who in virtue of his holiness must punish human sin, is also a God of mercy, and in virtue of his mercy himself bears the punishment of human sin. Dorner, *Gesch. prot. Theologie*, 33—"Christ is not only mediator between God and man, but between the just God and the merciful God"—*cf. R. 8: 19*—"Mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other." "Conscience demands vicariousness, for conscience declares that a gratuitous pardon would not be just"; see Knight, *Colloquia Peripatetica*, 88.

Lidgett, *Spir. Principle of the Atonement*, 219, 304—"The Atonement 1. has Godward significance; 2. consists in our Lord's endurance of death on our behalf; 3. the spirit in which he endured death is of vital importance to the efficacy of his sacrifice, namely, obedience. . . . God gives repentance, yet requires it; he gives atonement, yet requires it. 'Thanks be to God for his unspeakable gift' (2 Cor. 9: 15)." Simon, in *Expositor*, 6: 331-334 (for substance)—"As in prayer we ask God to energize us and enable us to obey his law, and he answers by entering our hearts and obeying in us and for us; as we pray for strength in affliction, and find him helping us by putting his Spirit into us, and suffering in us and for us; so in atonement, Christ, the manifested God, obeys and suffers in our stead. Even the moral theory implies substitution also. God in us obeys his own law and bears the sorrows that sin has caused. Why can he not, in human nature, also endure the penalty of sin? The possibility of this cannot be consistently denied by any who believe in divine help granted in answer to prayer. The doctrine of the atonement and the doctrine of prayer stand or fall together."

See on the whole subject, Shedd, *Discourses and Essays*, 272-324, *Philosophy of History*, 65-80, and *Dogmatic Theology*, 2: 401-463; Magee, *Atonement and Sacrifice*, 27, 53, 253; Edwards's Works, 4: 140 sq.; Weber, *Vom Zorne Gottes*, 214-334; Owen, on *Divine Justice*, in Works, 10: 500-512; Philipp, *Glaubenslehre*, iv, 2: 27-114; Hopkins, Works, 1: 819-823; Schöberlein, in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1845: 267-318, and 1847: 7-70, also in Herzog, *Encyclopädie*, art.: *Versöhnung*; *Jahrbuch f. d. Theol.*, 3: 718, and 8: 213; Macdonnell, *Atonement*, 115-214; Luthardt, *Saving Truths*, 114-138; Baird, *Richim Revealed*, 606-637; Lawrence, in *Bib. Sac.*, 20: 322-339; Kretzig, *Versöhnungslehre*; Waffle, in *Bap. Rev.*, 1833: 253-256; Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 341-363 (*Syst. Doct.*, 4: 107-124); Remensnyder, *The Atonement and Modern Thought*.

#### *Secondly*, — the Atonement as related to Humanity in Christ.

The Ethical theory of the atonement holds that Christ stands in such relation to humanity, that what God's holiness demands Christ is under obligation to pay, longs to pay, inevitably does pay, and pays so fully, in virtue of his two-fold nature, that every claim of justice is satisfied, and the sinner who accepts what Christ has done in his behalf is saved.

Dr. E. W. Dale, in his work on *The Atonement*, states the question before us: "What must be Christ's relation to men, in order to make it possible that he should die for them?" We would charge the form of the question, so that it should read: "What must be Christ's relation to men, in order to make it not only possible, but just and necessary, that he should die for them?" Dale replies, for substance, that Christ must have had an original and central relation to the human race and to every member of it; see Denney, *Death of Christ*, 312. In our treatment of Ethical Monism, of the Trinity, and of the Person of Christ, we have shown that Christ, as Logos, as the immanent God, is the Life of humanity, laden with responsibility for human sin, while yet he personally knows no sin. Of this race-responsibility and race-guilt which Christ assumed, and for which he suffered so soon as man had sinned, Christ's obedience and suffering in the flesh were the visible reflection and revelation. Only in Christ's organic union with the race can we find the vital relation which will make his vicarious sufferings either possible or just. Only when we regard Calvary as revealing eternal principles of the divine nature, can we see how the sufferings of those few hours upon the Cross could suffice to save the millions of mankind.

Dr. E. Y. Mullins has set forth the doctrine of the Atonement in five propositions: "1. In order to atonement Christ became vitally united to the human race. It was only by assuming the nature of those he would redeem that he could break the power of their captor. . . . The human race may be likened to many sparrows who had been caught in the snare of the fowler, and were hopelessly struggling against their fate.

A great eagle swoops down from the sky, becomes entangled with the sparrows in the net, and then spreading his mighty wings he soars upward bearing the snare and captives and breaking its meshes he delivers himself and them. . . . Christ the fountain head of life imparting his own vitality to the redeemed, and causing them to share in the experiences of Gethsemane and Calvary, breaking thus for them the power of sin and death—this is the atonement, by virtue of which sin is put away and man is united to God."

Dr. Mullins properly regards this view of atonement as too narrow, inasmuch as it disregards the differences between Christ and men arising from his sinlessness and his deity. He adds therefore that "2. Christ became the substitute for sinners; 3. became the representative of men before God; 4. gained power over human hearts to win them from sin and reconcile them to God; and 5. became a propitiation and satisfaction, rendering the remission of sins consistent with the divine holiness." If Christ's union with the race be one which begins with creation and antedates the Fall, all of the later points in the above scheme are only natural correlates and consequences of the first,—substitution, representation, reconciliation, propitiation, satisfaction, are only different aspects of the work which Christ does for us, by virtue of the fact that he is the immanent God, the Life of humanity, priest and victim, condemning and condemned, atoning and atoned.

We have seen how God can justly demand satisfaction; we now show how Christ can justly make it; or, in other words, how the innocent can justly suffer for the guilty. The solution of the problem lies in Christ's union with humanity. The first result of that union is obligation to suffer for men; since, being one with the race, Christ had a share in the responsibility of the race to the law and the justice of God. In him humanity was created; at every stage of its existence humanity was upheld by his power; as the immanent God he was the life of the race and of every member of it. Christ's sharing of man's life justly and inevitably subjected him to man's exposures and liabilities, and especially to God's condemnation on account of sin.

In the seventh chapter of *Elsie Venner*, Oliver Wendell Holmes makes the Reverend Mr. Honeywood lay aside an old sermon on Human Nature, and write one on The Obligations of an Infinite Creator to a finite Creature. A. J. F. Behrends grounded our Lord's representative relation not in his human nature but in his divine nature. "He is our representative not because he was in the loins of Adam, but because we, Adam included, were in his loins. Personal created existence is grounded in the Logos, so that God must deal with him as well as with every individual sinner, and sin and guilt and punishment must smite the Logos as well as the sinner, and that, whether the sinner is saved or not. This is not, as is often charged, a denial of grace or of freedom in grace, for it is no denial of freedom or grace to show that they are eternally rational and conformable to eternal law. In the ideal sphere, necessity and freedom, law and grace, coalesce." J. C. C. Clarke, *Man and his Divine Father*, 387—"Vicarious atonement does not consist in any single act. . . . No one act embraces it all, and no one definition can compass it." In this sense we may adopt the words of Forsyth: "In the atonement the Holy Father dealt with a world's sin on (not *in*) a world-soul."

G. B. Foster, on *Mat. 26: 53, 54*—"Thinkest thou that I cannot beseech my Father, and he shall even now send me more than twelve legions of angels? How then should the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be?" "On this 'must be' the Scripture is based, not this 'must be' on the Scripture. The 'must be' was the ethical demand of his connection with the race. It would have been immoral for him to break away from the organism. The law of the organism is: From each according to ability; to each according to need. David in song, Aristotle in logic, Darwin in science, are under obligation to contribute to the organism the talent they have. Shall they be under obligation, and Jesus go scot-free? But Jesus can contribute atonement, and because he can, he must. Moreover, he is a member, not only of the whole, but of each part,—*Rom. 12: 5*—'members one of another.' As membership of the whole makes him liable for the sin of the whole, so his being a member of the part makes him liable for the sin of that part."

Fairbairn, *Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, 482, 484—"There is a sense in which the Patristic theory is right; the Father did suffer; though it was not as the Son

that he suffered, but in modes distinct and different. . . . Through his pity the misery of man became his sorrow. . . . There is a disclosure of his suffering in the surrender of the Son. This surrender represented the sacrifice and passion of the whole Godhead. Here degree and proportion are out of place; were it not, we might say that the Father suffered more in giving than the Son in being given. He who gave to duty had not the reward of him who rejoiced to do it. . . . One member of the Trinity could not suffer without all suffering. . . . The visible sacrifice was that of the Son; the invisible sacrifice was that of the Father." The Andover Theory, represented in Progressive Orthodoxy, 43-53, affirms not only the Moral Influence of the Atonement, but also that the whole race of mankind is naturally in Christ and was therefore punished in and by his suffering and death; quoted in Hovey, *Manual of Christian Theology*, 269; see Hovey's own view, 270-276, though he does not seem to recognize the atonement as existing before the incarnation.

Christ's share in the responsibility of the race to the law and justice of God was not destroyed by his incarnation, nor by his purification in the womb of the virgin. In virtue of the organic unity of the race, each member of the race since Adam has been born into the same state into which Adam fell. The consequences of Adam's sin, both to himself and to his posterity, are: (1) depravity, or the corruption of human nature; (2) guilt, or obligation to make satisfaction for sin to the divine holiness; (3) penalty, or actual endurance of loss or suffering visited by that holiness upon the guilty.

Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, 117—"Christ had taken upon him, as the living expression of himself, a nature which was weighed down, not merely by present incapacities, but by present incapacities as part of the judicial necessary result of accepted and inherent sinfulness. Human nature was not only disabled but guilty, and the disabilities were themselves a consequence and aspect of the guilt"; see review of Moberly by Rashdall, in *Journ. Theol. Studies*, 3: 198-211. Lidgett, *Spir. Princ. of Atonement*, 186-188, criticizes Dr. Dale for neglecting the fatherly purpose of the Atonement to serve the moral training of the child—punishment marking ill-desert in order to bring this ill-desert to the consciousness of the offender,—and for neglecting also the positive assertion in the atonement that the law is holy and just and good—something more than the negative expression of sin's ill-desert. See especially Lidgett's chapter on the relation of our Lord to the human race, 351-373, in which he grounds the atonement in the solidarity of mankind, its organic union with the Son of God, and Christ's immanence in humanity.

Bowne, *The Atonement*, 101—"Something like this work of grace was a moral necessity with God. It was an awful responsibility that was taken when our human race was launched with its fearful possibilities of good and evil. God thereby put himself under infinite obligation to care for his human family; and reflections upon his position as Creator and Ruler, instead of removing only make more manifest this obligation. So long as we conceive of God as sitting apart in supreme ease and self-satisfaction, he is not love at all, but only a reflex of our selfishness and vulgarity. So long as we conceive him as bestowing upon us out of his infinite fulness but at no real cost to himself, he sinks before the moral heroes of the race. There is ever a higher thought possible, until we see God taking the world upon his heart, entering into the fellowship of our sorrow, and becoming the supreme burdenbearer and leader in all self-sacrifice. Then only are the possibilities of grace and love and moral heroism and condescension filled up, so that nothing higher remains. And the work of Christ himself, so far as it was an historical event, must be viewed, not merely as a piece of history, but also as a manifestation of that Cross which was hidden in the divine love from the foundation of the world, and which is involved in the existence of the human world at all."

John Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, 2: 90, 91—"Conceive of the ideal of moral perfection incarnate in a human personality, and at the same time one who loves us with a love so absolute that he identifies himself with us and makes our good and evil his own—bring together these elements in a living, conscious human spirit, and you have in it a capacity of shame and anguish, a possibility of bearing the burden of human guilt and wretchedness, which lost and guilty humanity can never bear for itself."

If Christ had been born into the world by ordinary generation, he too would have had depravity, guilt, penalty. But he was not so born. In the womb of the Virgin, the human nature which he took was purged from its depravity. But this purging away of depravity did not take away guilt, or penalty. There was still left the just exposure to the penalty of violated law. Although Christ's nature was purified, his obligation to suffer yet remained. He might have declined to join himself to humanity, and then he need not have suffered. He might have sundered his connection with the race, and then he need not have suffered. But once born of the Virgin, once possessed of the human nature that was under the curse, he was bound to suffer. The whole mass and weight of God's displeasure against the race fell on him, when once he became a member of the race.

Because Christ is essential humanity, the universal man, the life of the race, he is the central brain to which and through which all ideas must pass. He is the central heart to which and through which all pains must be communicated. You cannot telephone to your friend across the town without first ringing up the central office. You cannot injure your neighbor without first injuring Christ. Each one of us can say of him: "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned" (Ps 51: 4). Because of his central and all-inclusive humanity, he must bear in his own person all the burdens of humanity, and must be "the Lamb of God, that" taketh, and so "taketh away, the sin of the world" (John 1: 29). Simms Reeves, the great English tenor, said that the passion-music was too much for him; he was found completely overcome after singing the prophet's words in Lam. 1: 12—"Is it nothing to you, all ye that pass by? Behold, and see if there be any sorrow like unto my sorrow, which is brought upon me, wherewith Jehovah hath afflicted me in the day of his fierce anger."

Father Damien gave his life in ministry to the lepers' colony of the Hawaiian Islands. Though free from the disease when he entered, he was at last himself stricken with the leprosy, and then wrote: "I must now stay with my own people." Once a leper, there was no release. When Christ once joined himself to humanity, all the exposures and liabilities of humanity fell upon him. Through himself personally without sin, he was made sin for us. Christ inherited guilt and penalty. Heb. 2: 14, 15—"Since then the children are sharers in flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner partook of the same; that through death he might bring to nought him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; and might deliver all them who through fear of death were all their life-time subject to bondage."

Only God can forgive sin, because only God can feel it in its true heinousness and rate it at its true worth. Christ could forgive sin because he added to the divine feeling with regard to sin the anguish of a pure humanity on account of it. Shelley, Julian and Maddalo: "Me, whose heart a stranger's tear might wear, As water-drops the sandy fountain-stone; Me, who am as a nerve o'er which do creep The Else unfelt oppressions of the earth." S. W. Culver: "We cannot be saved, as we are taught geometry, by lecture and diagram. No person ever yet saved another from drowning by standing coolly by and telling him the importance of rising to the surface and the necessity of respiration. No, he must plunge into the destructive element, and take upon himself the very condition of the drowning man, and by the exertion of his own strength, by the vigor of his own life, save him from the impending death. When your child is encompassed by the flames that consume your dwelling, you will not save him by calling to him from without. You must make your way through the devouring flame, till you come personally into the very conditions of his peril and danger, and, thence returning, bear him forth to freedom and safety."

Notice, however, that this guilt which Christ took upon himself by his union with humanity was: (1) not the guilt of personal sin—such guilt as belongs to every adult member of the race; (2) not even the guilt of inherited depravity—such guilt as belongs to infants, and to those who have not come to moral consciousness; but (3) solely the guilt of Adam's sin, which belongs, prior to personal transgression, and apart from inherited depravity, to every member of the race who has derived his life from Adam. This original sin and inherited guilt, but without the depravity that ordina-

rily accompanies them, Christ takes, and so takes away. He can justly bear penalty, because he inherits guilt. And since this guilt is not his personal guilt, but the guilt of that one sin in which "all sinned"—the guilt of the common transgression of the race in Adam, the guilt of the root-sin from which all other sins have sprung—he who is personally pure can vicariously bear the penalty due to the sin of all.

Christ was conscious of innocence in his personal relations, but not in his race relations. He gathered into himself all the penalties of humanity, as Winkelried gathered into his own bosom at Sempach the pikes of the Austrians and so made a way for the victorious Swiss. Christ took to himself the shame of humanity, as the mother takes upon her the daughter's shame, repenting of it and suffering on account of it. But this could not be in the case of Christ unless there had been a tie uniting him to men far more vital, organic, and profound than that which unites mother and daughter. Christ is naturally the life of all men, before he becomes spiritually the life of true believers. Matheson, *Spir. Dével. of St. Paul*, 197-215, 244, speaks of Christ's secular priesthood, of an outer as well as an inner membership in the body of Christ. He is sacrificial head of the world as well as sacrificial head of the church. In Paul's latest letters, he declares of Christ that he is "the Savior of all men, specially of them that believe" (1 Tim. 4:10). There is a grace that "hath appeared, bringing salvation to all men" (Tit. 2:11). He "gave gifts unto men" (Eph. 4:8), "Yes, among the rebellious also, that Jehovah God might dwell with them" (Ps. 68:18). "Every creature of God is good, and nothing is to be rejected" (1 Tim. 4:4).

Royce, *World and Individual*, 2:408—"Our sorrows are identically God's own sorrows. . . . I sorrow, but the sorrow is not only mine. This same sorrow, just as it is for me, is God's sorrow. . . . The divine fulfilment can be won only through the sorrows of time. . . . Unless God knows sorrow, he knows not the highest good, which consists in the overcoming of sorrow." Godet, in *The Atonement*, 331-351—"Jesus condemned sin as God condemned it. When he felt forsaken on the Cross, he performed that act by which the offender himself condemns his sin, and by that condemnation, so far as it depends on himself, makes it to disappear. There is but one conscience in all moral beings. This echo in Christ of God's judgment against sin was to re-echo in all other human consciences. This has transformed God's love of compassion into a love of satisfaction. Holiness joins suffering to sin. But the element of reparation in the Cross was not in the suffering but in the submission. The child who revolts against its punishment has made no reparation at all. We appropriate Christ's work when we by faith ourselves condemn sin and accept him."

If it be asked whether this is not simply a suffering for his own sin, or rather for his own share of the sin of the race, we reply that his own share in the sin of the race is not the sole reason why he suffers; it furnishes only the subjective reason and ground for the proper laying upon him of the sin of all. Christ's union with the race in his incarnation is only the outward and visible expression of a prior union with the race which began when he created the race. As "in him were all things created," and as "in him all things consist," or hold together (Col. 1:16, 17), it follows that he who is the life of humanity must, though personally pure, be involved in responsibility for all human sin, and "it was necessary that the Christ should suffer" (Acts 17:3). This suffering was an enduring of the reaction of the divine holiness against sin and so was a bearing of penalty (Is. 53:6; Gal. 3:13), but it was also the voluntary execution of a plan that antedated creation (Phil. 2:6, 7), and Christ's sacrifice in time showed what had been in the heart of God from eternity (Heb. 9:14; Rev. 13:8).

Our treatment is intended to meet the chief modern objection to the atonement. Greg, *Creed of Christendom*, 2:222, speaks of "the strangely inconsistent doctrine that God is so *just* that he could not let sin go unpunished, yet so *unjust* that he could punish it in the person of the innocent. . . . It is for orthodox dialectics to explain how the divine justice can be *impugned* by pardoning the guilty, and yet *vindicated* by punish-

ing the innocent" (quoted in *Lias, Atonement*, 16). In order to meet this difficulty, the following accounts of Christ's identification with humanity have been given:

1. That of Isaac Watts (see *Hib. Sac.*, 1875: 421). This holds that the humanity of Christ, both in body and soul, pre-existed before the incarnation, and was manifested to the patriarchs. We reply that Christ's human nature is declared to be derived from the Virgin.

2. That of E. W. Dale (*Atonement*, 365-440). This holds that Christ is responsible for human sin because, as the Upholder and Life of all, he is naturally one with all men, and is spiritually one with all believers (*Acts 17: 28*—"in him we live, and move, and have our being"; *Col. 1: 17*—"in him all things consist"; *Johs 14: 20*—"I am in my Father, and ye in me, and I in you"). If Christ's bearing our sins, however, is to be explained by the union of the believer with Christ, the effect is made to explain the cause, and Christ could have died only for the elect (see a review of Dale, in *Brit. Quar. Rev.*, Apr., 1876; 221-225). The union of Christ with the race by creation—a union which recognizes Christ's purity and man's sin—still remains as a most valuable element of truth in the theory of Dr. Dale.

3. That of Edward Irving. Christ has a corrupted nature, an inborn infirmity and depravity, which he gradually overcomes. But the Scriptures, on the contrary, assert his holiness and separateness from sinners. (See references, on pages 744-747.)

4. That of John Miller, *Theology*, 114-122; also in his chapter: *Was Christ in Adam?* in *Questions Awakened by the Bible*. Christ, as to his human nature, although created pure, was yet, as one of Adam's posterity, conceived of as a sinner in Adam. To him attached "the guilt of the act in which all men stood together in a federal relation. . . . He was decreed to be guilty for the sins of all mankind." Although there is a truth contained in this statement, it is vitiated by Miller's federalism and creatianism. Arbitrary imputation and legal fiction do not help us here. We need such an actual union of Christ with humanity, and such a derivation of the substance of his being, by natural generation from Adam, as will make him not simply the constructive heir, but the natural heir, of the guilt of the race. We come, therefore, to what we regard as the true view, namely:

5. That the humanity of Christ was not a new creation, but was derived from Adam, through Mary his mother; so that Christ, so far as his humanity was concerned, was in Adam just as we were, and had the same race-responsibility with ourselves. As Adam's descendant, he was responsible for Adam's sin, like every other member of the race; the chief difference being, that while we inherit from Adam both guilt and depravity, he whom the Holy Spirit purified, inherited not the depravity, but only the guilt. Christ took to himself, not sin (depravity), but the consequences of sin. In him there was abolition of sin, without abolition of obligation to suffer for sin; while in the believer, there is abolition of obligation to suffer, without abolition of sin itself.

The justice of Christ's sufferings has been imperfectly illustrated by the obligation of the silent partner of a business firm to pay debts of the firm which he did not personally contract; or by the obligation of the husband to pay the debts of his wife; or by the obligation of a purchasing country to assume the debts of the province which it purchases (*Wm. Ashmore*). There have been men who have spent the strength of a lifetime in clearing off the indebtedness of an insolvent father, long since deceased. They recognized an organic unity of the family, which morally, if not legally, made their father's liabilities their own. So, it is said, Christ recognized the organic unity of the race, and saw that, having become one of that sinning race, he had involved himself in all its liabilities, even to the suffering of death, the great penalty of sin.

The fault of all the analogies just mentioned is that they are purely commercial. A transference of pecuniary obligation is easier to understand than a transference of criminal liability. I cannot justly bear another's penalty, unless I can in some way share his guilt. The theory we advocate shows how such a sharing of our guilt on the part of Christ was possible. All believers in substitution hold that Christ bore our guilt: "My soul looks back to see The burdens thou didst bear When hanging on the accursed tree, And hopes her guilt was there." But we claim that, by virtue of Christ's union with humanity, that guilt was not only an imputed, but also an imparted, guilt.

With Christ's obligation to suffer, there were connected two other, though minor, results of his assumption of humanity: first, the longing to suffer; and secondly, the inevitableness of his suffering. He felt the longing to suffer which perfect love to God must feel, in view of the demands upon the race, of that holiness of God which he loved more than he loved the race itself; which perfect love to man must feel, in view of the fact that bearing the penalty of man's sin was the only way to save him. Hence we see Christ pressing forward to the cross with such majestic determination that the

disciples were amazed and afraid (Mark 10:32). Hence we hear him saying: "With desire have I desired to eat this passover" (Luke 22:15); "I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!" (Luke 12:50).

Here is the truth in Campbell's theory of the atonement. Christ is the great Penitent before God, making confession of the sin of the race, which others of that race could neither see nor feel. But the view we present is a larger and completer one than that of Campbell, in that it makes this confession and reparation obligatory upon Christ, as Campbell's view does not, and recognizes the penal nature of Christ's sufferings, which Campbell's view denies. *Lias, Atonement, 79*—"The head of a clan, himself intensely loyal to his king, finds that his clan have been involved in rebellion. The more intense and perfect his loyalty, the more thorough his nobleness of heart and affection for his people, the more inexcusable and flagrant the rebellion of those for whom he pleads,—the more acute would be his agony, as their representative and head. Nothing would be more true to human nature, in the best sense of those words, than that the conflict between loyalty to his king and affection for his vassals should induce him to offer his life for theirs, to ask that the punishment they deserved should be inflicted on him."

The second minor consequence of Christ's assumption of humanity was, that, being such as he was, he could not help suffering; in other words, the obligatory and the desired were also the inevitable. Since he was a being of perfect purity, contact with the sin of the race, of which he was a member, necessarily involved an actual suffering, of an intenser kind than we can conceive. Sin is self-isolating, but love and righteousness have in them the instinct of human unity. In Christ all the nerves and sensibilities of humanity met. He was the only healthy member of the race. When life returns to a frozen limb, there is pain. So Christ, as the only sensitive member of a benumbed and stupefied humanity, felt all the pangs of shame and suffering which rightfully belonged to sinners; but which they could not feel, simply because of the depth of their depravity. Because Christ was pure, yet had united himself to a sinful and guilty race, therefore "it must needs be that Christ should suffer" (A. V.) or, "it behooved the Christ to suffer" (Rev. Vers., Acts 17:3); see also John 3:14—"so must the Son of man be lifted up"—"The Incarnation, under the actual circumstances of humanity, carried with it the necessity of the Passion" (Westcott, in *Bib. Com.*, *in loco*).

Compare John Woolman's Journal, 4, 5—"O Lord, my God, the amazing horrors of darkness were gathered about me, and covered me all over, and I saw no way to go forth; I felt the depth and extent of the misery of my fellow creatures, separated from the divine harmony, and it was greater than I could bear, and I was crushed down under it; I lifted up my head, I stretched out my arm, but there was none to help me; I looked round about, and was amazed. In the depths of misery, I remembered that thou art omnipotent and that I had called thee Father." He had vision of a "dull, gloomy mass," darkening half the heavens, and he was told that it was "human beings, in as great misery as they could be and live; and he was mixed with them, and henceforth he might not consider himself a distinct and separate being."

This suffering in and with the sins of men, which Dr. Bushnell emphasized so strongly, though it is not, as he thought, the principal element, is notwithstanding an indispensable element in the atonement of Christ. Suffering in and with the sinner is one way, though not the only way, in which Christ is enabled to bear the wrath of God which constitutes the real penalty of sin.

EXPOSITION OF 2 COR. 5:21.—It remains for us to adduce the Scriptural proof of this natural assumption of human guilt by Christ. We find it in 2 Cor. 5:21—"Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf; that we might become the righteousness of God in him." "Righteousness" here cannot mean subjective purity, for then "made to be sin" would mean that God made Christ to be subjectively depraved. As Christ was not made *unholy*, the meaning cannot be that we are made *holy* persons in him. Meyer calls attention to this parallel between "righteousness" and "sin":—"That we might become the righteousness of God in him"—that we might become justified persons. Correspondingly, "made to be sin on our behalf" must—made to be a condemned person. "Him who knew no sin"—Christ had no experience of sin—this was the necessary postulate of his work of atonement. "Made sin for us," therefore, is the abstract for the concrete, and—made a sinner, in the sense that the penalty of sin fell upon him. So Meyer, for substance.

We must, however, regard this interpretation of Meyer's as coming short of the full meaning of the apostle. As justification is not simply remission of *actual* punishment, but is also deliverance from the *obligation* to suffer punishment,—in other words, as "righteousness" in the text—persons delivered from the *guilt* as well as from the *penalty*

of sin,—so the contrasted term "sin," in the text,—a person not only *actually* punished, but also under *obligation* to suffer punishment;—in other words, Christ is "made sin," not only in the sense of being put under *penalty*, but also in the sense of being put under *guilt*. (Cf. Symington, Atonement, 17.)

In a note to the last edition of Meyer, this is substantially granted. "It is to be noted," he says, "that ἀμαρτία, like κατέπα in Gal. 3:13, necessarily includes in itself the notion of guilt." Meyer adds, however: "The guilt of which Christ appears as bearer was not his own (μὴ ἑδύρα ἀμαρτιῶν); hence the guilt of men was transferred to him; consequently the justification of men is imputative." Here the implication that the guilt which Christ bears is his simply by imputation seems to us contrary to the analogy of faith. As Adam's sin is ours only because we are actually one with Adam, and as Christ's righteousness is imputed to us only as we are actually united to Christ, so our sins are imputed to Christ only as Christ is actually one with the race. He was "made sin" by being made one with the sinners; he took our guilt by taking our nature. He who "knew no sin" came to be "sin for us" by being born of a sinful stock; by inheritance the common guilt of the race became his. Guilt was not simply *imputed* to Christ; it was *imparted* also.

This exposition may be made more clear by putting the two contrasted thoughts in parallel columns, as follows:

<p>Made righteousness in him— righteous persons; justified persons; freed from guilt, or obligation to suffer; by spiritual union with Christ.</p>	<p>Made sin for us— a sinful person; a condemned person; put under guilt, or obligation to suffer; by natural union with the race.</p>
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For a good exposition of 2 Cor. 5:21, Gal. 3:13, and Rom. 3:25, 26, see Denney, *Studies in Theology*, 109-124.

The Atonement, then, on the part of God, has its ground (1) in the holiness of God, which must visit sin with condemnation, even though this condemnation brings death to his Son; and (2) in the love of God, which itself provides the sacrifice, by suffering in and with his Son for the sins of men, but through that suffering opening a way and means of salvation.

The Atonement, on the part of man, is accomplished through (1) the solidarity of the race; of which (2) Christ is the life, and so its representative and surety; (3) justly yet voluntarily bearing its guilt and shame and condemnation as his own.

Melanchthon: "Christ was made sin for us, not only in respect to punishment, but primarily by being chargeable with guilt also (*culpe et reatus*)"—quoted by Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, 3:96, 102, 103, 107; also 1:307, 314 sq. Thomasius says that "Christ bore the guilt of the race by imputation; but as in the case of the imputation of Adam's sin to us, imputation of our sins to Christ presupposes a real relationship. Christ appropriated our sin. He sank himself into our guilt." Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2:442 (Syst. Doct., 3:350, 351), agrees with Thomasius, that "Christ entered into our natural mortality, which for us is a penal condition, and into the state of collective guilt, so far as it is an evil, a burden to be borne; not that he had personal guilt, but rather that he entered into our guilt-laden common life, not as a stranger, but as one actually belonging to it—put under its law, according to the will of the Father and of his own love."

When, and how, did Christ take this guilt and this penalty upon him? With regard to penalty, we have no difficulty in answering that, as his whole life of suffering was propitiatory, so penalty rested upon him from the very beginning of his life. This penalty was inherited, and was the consequence of Christ's taking human nature (Gal. 4:4, 5—"born of a woman, born under the law"). But penalty and guilt are correlates; if Christ inherited penalty, it must have been because he inherited guilt. This subjection to the common guilt of the race was intimated in Jesus' circumcision (Luke 2:21); in his ritual purification (Luke 2:22—"their purification"—i. e., the purification of Mary and the babe; see Lange, *Life of Christ*; Commentaries of Alford, Webster and Wilkinson; and An. Par. Bible); in his legal redemption (Luke 2:23, 24; cf. Ex. 13:2, 13); and in his baptism (Mat. 3:15—"thus it becometh us to fulfill all righteousness"). The baptized person went

down into the water, as one laden with sin and guilt, in order that this sin and guilt might be buried forever, and that he might rise from the typical grave to a new and holy life. (Ebrard: "Baptism — death.") So Christ's submission to John's baptism of repentance was not only a consecration to death, but also a recognition and confession of his implication in that guilt of the race for which death was the appointed and inevitable penalty (cf. Mat. 10:38; Luke 12:50; Mat. 26:39); and, as his baptism was a pre-figuration of his death, we may learn from his baptism something with regard to the meaning of his death. See further, under The Symbolism of Baptism.

As one who had had guilt, Christ was "justified in the spirit" (1 Tim. 3:16); and this justification appears to have taken place after he "was manifested in the flesh" (1 Tim. 3:16), and when "he was raised for our justification" (Rom. 4:25). Compare Rom. 1:4—"declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead"; 6:7-10—"he that hath died is justified from sin. But if we died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him; knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death no more hath dominion over him. For the death that he died, he died unto sin once: but the life that he liveth, he liveth unto God"—here all Christians are conceived of as ideally justified in the justification of Christ, when Christ died for our sins and rose again. 8:3—"God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh"—here Meyer says: "The sending does not precede the condemnation; but the condemnation is effected in and with the sending." John 16:10—"of righteousness, because I go to the Father"; 19:30—"It is finished." On 1 Tim. 3:16, see the Commentary of Bengel.

If it be asked whether Jesus, then, before his death, was an unjustified person, we answer that, while personally pure and well-pleasing to God (Mat. 3:17), he himself was conscious of a race-responsibility and a race-guilt which must be atoned for (John 12:27—"Now is my soul troubled; and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour. But for this cause came I unto this hour"); and that guilty human nature in him endured at the last the separation from God which constitutes the essence of death, sin's penalty (Mat. 27:46—"My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"). We must remember that, as even the believer must "be judged according to man in the flesh" (1 Pet. 4:6), that is, must suffer the death which to unbelievers is the penalty of sin, although he "live according to God in the Spirit," so Christ, in order that we might be delivered from both guilt and penalty, was "put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit" (3:18);—in other words, as Christ was man, the penalty due to human guilt belonged to him to bear; but, as he was God, he could exhaust that penalty, and could be a proper substitute for others.

If it be asked whether he, who from the moment of the conception "sanctified himself" (John 17:19), did not from that moment also justify himself, we reply that although, through the retroactive efficacy of his atonement and upon the ground of it, human nature in him was purged of its depravity from the moment that he took that nature; and although, upon the ground of that atonement, believers before his advent were both sanctified and justified; yet his own justification could not have proceeded upon the ground of his atonement, and also his atonement have proceeded upon the ground of his justification. This would be a vicious circle; somewhere we must have a beginning. That beginning was in the cross, where guilt was first purged (Heb. 1:3—"when he had made purification of sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high"; Mat. 27:42—"He saved others; himself he cannot save"; cf. Rev. 13:8—"the Lamb that hath been slain from the foundation of the world").

If it be said that guilt and depravity are practically inseparable, and that, if Christ had guilt, he must have had depravity also, we reply that in civil law we distinguish between them,—the conversion of a murderer would not remove his obligation to suffer upon the gallows; and we reply further, that in justification we distinguish between them,—depravity still remaining, though guilt is removed. So we may say that Christ takes guilt without depravity, in order that we may have depravity without guilt. See page 645; also Böhl, Incarnation des göttlichen Wortes; Pope, Higher Catechism, 118; A. H. Strong, on the Necessity of the Atonement, in Philosophy and Religion, 213-216. *Per contra*, see Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 3:59 note, 82.

Christ therefore, as incarnate, rather revealed the atonement than made it. The historical work of atonement was finished upon the Cross, but that historical work only revealed to men the atonement made both before and since by the extra-mundane Logos. The eternal Love of God suffering the necessary reaction of his own Holiness against the sin of his creatures and with a view to their salvation—this is the essence of the Atonement.

Nash, *Ethics and Revelation*, 252, 253—“Christ, as God's atonement, is the revelation and discovery of the fact that sacrifice is as deep in God as his being. He is a holy Creator. . . . He must take upon himself the shame and pain of sin.” The earthly tabernacle and its sacrifices were only the shadow of those in the heavens, and Moses was bidden to make the earthly after the pattern which he saw in the mount. So the historical atonement was but the shadowing forth to dull and finite minds of an infinite demand of the divine holiness and an infinite satisfaction rendered by the divine love. Godet, *S. S. Times*, Oct. 16, 1886—“Christ so identified himself with the race he came to save, by sharing its life or its very blood, that when the race itself was redeemed from the curse of sin, his resurrection followed as the first fruits of that redemption”; *Rom. 4:25*—“delivered up for our trespasses . . . . raised for our justification.”

Simon, *Redemption of Man*, 322—“If the Logos is generally the Mediator of the divine immanence in Creation, especially in man; if men are differentiations of the effluent divine energy; and if the Logos is the immanent controlling principle of all differentiation, i. e., the principle of all *forma*—must not the self-perversion of these human differentiations necessarily react on him who is their constitutive principle? 323—Remember that men have not first to engraft themselves into Christ, the living whole. . . . They subsist naturally in him, and they have to separate themselves, cut themselves off from him, if they are to be separate. This is the mistake made in the ‘Life in Christ’ theory. Men are treated as in some sense out of Christ, and as having to get into connection with Christ. . . . It is not that we have to create the relation,—we have simply to accept, to recognize, to ratify it. Rejecting Christ is not so much refusal to become one with Christ, as it is refusal to remain one with him, refusal to let him be our life.”

A. H. Strong, *Christ in Creation*, 33, 173—“When God breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, he communicated freedom, and made possible the creature's self-chosen alienation from himself, the giver of that life. While man could never break the natural bond which united him to God, he could break the spiritual bond, and could introduce even into the life of God a principle of discord and evil. Tie a cord tightly about your finger; you partially isolate the finger, diminish its nutrition, bring about atrophy and disease. Yet the life of the whole system rouses itself to put away the evil, to untie the cord, to free the diseased and suffering member. The illustration is far from adequate; but it helps at a single point. There has been given to each intelligent and moral agent the power, spiritually, to isolate himself from God, while yet he is naturally joined to God, and is wholly dependent upon God for the removal of the sin which has so separated him from his Maker. Sin is the act of the creature, but salvation is the act of the Creator.

“If you could imagine a finger endowed with free will and trying to sunder its connection with the body by tying a string around itself, you would have a picture of man trying to sunder his connection with Christ. What is the result of such an attempt? Why, pain, decay; possible, nay, incipient death, to the finger. By what law? By the law of the organism, which is so constituted as to maintain itself against its own disruption by the revolt of the members. The pain and death of the finger is the reaction of the whole against the treason of the part. The finger suffers pain. But are there no results of pain to the body? Does not the body feel pain also? How plain it is that no such pain can be confined to the single part! The heart feels, aye, the whole organism feels, because all the parts are members one of another. It not only suffers, but that suffering tends to remedy the evil and to remove its cause. The body summons its forces, pours new tides of life into the dying member, strives to rid the finger of the ligature that binds it. So through all the course of history, Christ, the natural life of the race, has been afflicted in the affliction of humanity and has suffered for human sin. This suffering has been an atoning suffering, since it has been due to righteousness. If God had not been holy, if God had not made all nature express the holiness of his being, if God had not made pain and loss the necessary consequences of sin, then Christ would not have suffered. But since these things are sin's penalty and Christ is the life of the sinful race, it must needs be that Christ should suffer. There is nothing arbitrary in laying upon him the iniquities of us all. Original grace, like original sin, is only the ethical interpretation of biological facts.” See also Ames, on *Biological Aspects of the Atonement*, in *Methodist Review*, Nov. 1906: 943-953.

In favor of the Substitutionary or Ethical view of the atonement we may urge the following considerations:

(a) It rests upon correct philosophical principles with regard to the nature of will, law, sin, penalty, righteousness.

This theory holds that there are permanent states, as well as transient acts, of the will; and that the will is not simply the faculty of volitions, but also the fundamental determination of the being to an ultimate end. It regards law as having its basis, not in arbitrary will or in governmental expediency, but rather in the nature of God, and as being a necessary transcript of God's holiness. It considers sin to consist not simply in acts, but in permanent evil states of the affections and will. It makes the object of penalty to be, not the reformation of the offender, or the prevention of evil doing, but the vindication of justice, outraged by violation of law. It teaches that righteousness is not benevolence or a form of benevolence, but a distinct and separate attribute of the divine nature which demands that sin should be visited with punishment, apart from any consideration of the useful results that will flow therefrom.

(b) It combines in itself all the valuable elements in the theories before mentioned, while it avoids their inconsistencies, by showing the deeper principle upon which each of these elements is based.

The Ethical theory admits the indispensableness of Christ's example, advocated by the Socinian theory; the moral influence of his suffering, urged by the Bushnellian theory; the securing of the safety of government, insisted on by the Grotian theory; the participation of the believer in Christ's new humanity, taught by the Irvingian theory; the satisfaction to God's majesty for the elect, made so much of by the Anselmic theory. But the Ethical theory claims that all these other theories require, as a presupposition for their effective working, that ethical satisfaction to the holiness of God which is rendered in guilty human nature by the Son of God who took that nature to redeem it.

(c) It most fully meets the requirements of Scripture, by holding that the necessity of the atonement is absolute, since it rests upon the demands of immanent holiness, the fundamental attribute of God.

Acts 17: 3— "It behooved the Christ to suffer, and to rise again from the dead"—lit.: "It was necessary for the Christ to suffer"; Luke 24: 26—"Behooved it not the Christ to suffer these things, and to enter into his glory?"—lit.: "Was it not necessary that the Christ should suffer these things?" It is not enough to say that Christ must suffer in order that the prophecies might be fulfilled. Why was it prophesied that he should suffer? Why did God purpose that he should suffer? The ultimate necessity is a necessity in the nature of God.

Plato, Republic, 3: 361—"The righteous man who is thought to be unrighteous will be scourged, racked, bound; will have his eyes put out; and finally, having endured all sorts of evil, will be impaled." This means that, as human society is at present constituted, even a righteous person must suffer for the sins of the world. "Mors mortis Morti mortem nisi morte dedisset, *Æternæ vitæ janua clausa foret*"—"Had not the Death-of-death to Death his death-blow given, Forever closed were the gate, the gate of life and heaven."

(d) It shows most satisfactorily how the demands of holiness are met; namely, by the propitiatory offering of one who is personally pure, but who by union with the human race has inherited its guilt and penalty.

"*Quo non ascendam?*"—"Whither shall I not rise?" exclaimed the greatest minister of modern kings, in a moment of intoxication. "Whither shall I not stoop?" says the Lord Jesus. King Humbert, during the scourge of cholera in Italy: "In Castellammare they make merry; in Naples they die: I go to Naples."

Wrightnour: "The illustration of Powhatan raising his club to slay John Smith, while Pocahontas flings herself between the uplifted club and the victim, is not a good one. God is not an angry being, bound to strike something, no matter what. If Powhatan could have taken the blow himself, out of a desire to spare the victim, it would be better. The Father and the Son are one. Bronson Alcott, in his school at Concord, when punishment was necessary, sometimes placed the rod in the hand of the offender and bade him strike his (Alcott's) hand, rather than that the law of the school should be broken without punishment following. The result was that very few rules were

roken. So God in Christ bore the sins of the world, and endured the penalty for an's violation of his law."

(e) It furnishes the only proper explanation of the sacrificial language of the New Testament, and of the sacrificial rites of the Old, considered as prophetic of Christ's atoning work.

Foster, *Christian Life and Theology*, 207-211 — "The imposition of hands on the head of the victim is entirely unexplained, except in the account of the great day of Atonement, when by the same gesture and by distinct confession the sins of the people were 'put upon the head of the goat' (Lev. 16:21) to be borne away into the wilderness. The blood was sacred and was to be poured out before the Lord, evidently in place of the forfeited life of the sinner which should have been rendered up." Watts, *New Apologetics*, 205 — "The Lord will provide" was the truth taught when Abraham found a ram provided by God which he 'offered up as a burnt offering in the stead of his son' (Gen. 22:13, 14). As the ram was not Abraham's ram, the sacrifice of it could not teach that all Abraham had belonged to God, and should, with entire faith in his goodness, be devoted to him; but it did teach that 'apart from shedding of blood there is no remission' (Heb. 9:22)." 3 Chron. 29:27 — "when the burnt offering began, the song of Jehovah began also."

(f) It alone gives proper place to the death of Christ as the central feature of his work, — set forth in the ordinances, and of chief power in Christian experience.

Martin Luther, when he had realized the truth of the Atonement, was found sobbing before a crucifix and moaning: "Für mich! für mich!" — "For me! for me!" Elisha Kane, the Arctic explorer, while searching for signs of Sir John Franklin and his party, sent out eight or ten men to explore the surrounding region. After several days three returned, almost crazed with the cold — thermometer fifty degrees below zero — and reported that the other men were dying miles away. Dr. Kane organized a company of ten, and though suffering himself with an old heart-trouble, led them to the rescue. Three times he fainted during the eighteen hours of marching and suffering; but he found the men. "We knew you would come! we knew you would come, brother!" whispered one of them, hardly able to speak. Why was he sure Dr. Kane would come? Because he knew the stuff Dr. Kane was made of, and knew that he would risk his life for any one of them. It is a parable of Christ's relation to our salvation. He is our elder brother, bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, and he not only risks death, but he endures death, in order to save us.

(g) It gives us the only means of understanding the sufferings of Christ in the garden and on the cross, or of reconciling them with the divine justice.

Krefbig, *Versöhnungslehre*: "Man has a guilt that demands the punitive sufferings of a mediator. Christ shows a suffering that cannot be justified except by reference to some other guilt than his own. Combine these two facts, and you have the problem of the atonement solved." J. G. Whittier: "Through all the depths of sin and loss Drops the plummet of the Cross; Never yet abyss was found Deeper than the Cross could sound." Alcestis purchased life for Admetus her husband by dying in his stead; Marcus Curtius saved Rome by leaping into the yawning chasm; the Russian servant threw himself to the wolves to rescue his master. Berdoe, *Robert Browning*, 47 — "To know God as the theist knows him may suffice for pure spirits, for those who have never sinned, suffered, nor felt the need of a Savior; but for fallen and sinful men the Christ of Christianity is an imperative necessity; and those who have never surrendered themselves to him have never known what it is to experience the rest he gives to the heavy-laden soul."

(h) As no other theory does, this view satisfies the ethical demand of human nature; pacifies the convicted conscience; assures the sinner that he may find instant salvation in Christ; and so makes possible a new life of holiness, while at the same time it furnishes the highest incentives to such a life.

Shedd: "The offended party (1) permits a substitution; (2) provides a substitute; (3) substitutes himself." George Eliot: "Justice is like the kingdom of God; it is not without us, as a fact; it is 'within us,' as a great yearning." But it is both without and within, and the inward is only the reflection of the outward; the subjective demands of conscience only reflect the objective demands of holiness.

And yet, while this view of the atonement exalts the holiness of God, it surpasses every other view in its moving exhibition of God's love—a love that is not satisfied with suffering in and with the sinner, or with making that suffering a demonstration of God's regard for law; but a love that sinks itself into the sinner's guilt and bears his penalty,—comes down so low as to make itself one with him in all but his depravity—makes every sacrifice but the sacrifice of God's holiness—a sacrifice which God could not make, without ceasing to be God; see 1 Joh 4:10—"Eatin is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his son to be the propitiation for our sins."

The soldier who had been thought reprobate was moved to complete reform when he was once forgiven. William Huntington, in his *Autobiography*, says that one of his sharpest sensations of pain, after he had been quickened by divine grace, was that he felt such pity for God. Never was man abused as God has been. Rom. 2:4—"the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance"; 12:1—"the mercies of God" lead you "to present your bodies a living sacrifice"; 2 Cor. 5:14, 15—"the love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that one died for all, therefore all died; and he died for all, that they that live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again." The effect of Christ's atonement on Christian character and life may be illustrated from the proclamation of Garibaldi: "He that loves Italy, let him follow me! I promise him hardship, I promise him suffering, I promise him death. But he that loves Italy, let him follow me!"

#### D. Objections to the Ethical Theory of the Atonement.

On the general subject of these objections, Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, iv, 2:156-180, remarks: (1) that it rests with God alone to say whether he will pardon sin, and in what way he will pardon it; (2) that human instincts are a very unsafe standard by which to judge the procedure of the Governor of the universe; and (3) that one plain declaration of God, with regard to the plan of salvation, proves the fallacy and error of all reasonings against it. We must correct our watches and clocks by astronomical standards.

(a) That a God who does not pardon sin without atonement must lack either omnipotence or love.—We answer, on the one hand, that God's omnipotence is the revelation of his nature, and not a matter of arbitrary will; and, on the other hand, that God's love is ever exercised consistently with his fundamental attribute of holiness, so that while holiness demands the sacrifice, love provides it. Mercy is shown, not by trampling upon the claims of justice, but by vicariously satisfying them.

Because man does not need to avenge personal wrongs, it does not follow that God must not. In fact, such avenging is forbidden to us upon the ground that it belongs to God; Rom. 12:19—"Avenge not yourselves, beloved, but give place unto wrath: for it is written, Vengeance belongeth unto me; I will recompense, saith the Lord." But there are limits even to our passing over of offences. Even the father must sometimes chastise; and although this chastisement is not properly punishment, it becomes punishment, when the father becomes a teacher or a governor. Then, other than personal interests come in. "Because a father can forgive without atonement, it does not follow that the state can do the same" (Shedd). But God is more than Father, more than Teacher, more than Governor. In him, person and right are identical. For him to let sin go unpunished is to approve of it; which is the same as a denial of holiness.

Whatever pardon is granted, then, must be pardon through punishment. Mere repentance never expiates crime, even under civil government. The truly penitent man never feels that his repentance constitutes a ground of acceptance; the more he repents, the more he recognizes his need of reparation and expiation. Hence God meets the demand of man's conscience, as well as of his own holiness, when he provides a substituted punishment. God shows his love by meeting the demands of holiness, and by meeting them with the sacrifice of himself. See Mozley on *Pedestration*, 380.

The publican prays, not that God may be merciful without sacrifice, but: "God be propitious toward me, the sinner!" (Luk 18:13); in other words, he asks for mercy only through

and upon the ground of sacrifice. We cannot atone to others for the wrong we have done them, nor can we even atone to our own souls. A third party, and an infinite being, must make atonement, as we cannot. It is only upon the ground that God himself has made provision for satisfying the claims of justice, that we are bidden to forgive others. Should Othello then forgive Iago? Yes, if Iago repents; Luke 17: 3— "If thy brother sin, rebuke him; and if he repent, forgive him." But if he does not repent? Yes, so far as Othello's own disposition is concerned. He must not hate Iago, but must wish him well; Luke 6: 27— "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you." But he cannot receive Iago to his fellowship till he repents. On the duty and ground of forgiving one another, see Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, 618, 614; Straffen, *Hulsean Lectures on the Propitiation for Sin*.

(b) That satisfaction and forgiveness are mutually exclusive.— We answer that, since it is not a third party, but the Judge himself, who makes satisfaction to his own violated holiness, forgiveness is still optional, and may be offered upon terms agreeable to himself. Christ's sacrifice is not a pecuniary, but a penal, satisfaction. The objection is valid against the merely commercial view of the atonement, not against the ethical view of it.

Forgiveness is something beyond the mere taking away of penalty. When a man bears the penalty of his crime, has the community no right to be indignant with him? There is a distinction between pecuniary and penal satisfaction. Pecuniary satisfaction has respect only to the thing due; penal satisfaction has respect also to the person of the offender. If pardon is a matter of justice in God's government, it is so only as respects Christ. To the recipient it is only mercy. "Faithful and righteous to forgive us our sins" (1 John 1: 9)— faithful to his promise, and righteous to Christ. Neither the atonement, nor the promise, gives the offender any personal claim.

Philemon must forgive Onesimus the pecuniary debt, when Paul pays it; not so with the personal injury Onesimus has done to Philemon; there is no forgiveness of this, until Onesimus repents and asks pardon. An amnesty may be offered to all, but upon conditions. Instance Amos Lawrence's offering to the forger the forged paper he had bought up, upon condition that he would confess himself bankrupt, and put all his affairs into the hands of his benefactor. So the fact that Christ has paid our debts does not preclude his offering to us the benefit of what he has done, upon condition of our repentance and faith. The equivalent is not furnished by man, but by God. God may therefore offer the results of it upon his own terms. Did then the entire race fairly pay its penalty when one suffered, just as all incurred the penalty when one sinned? Yes,—all who receive their life from each—Adam on the one hand, and Christ on the other. See under Union with Christ—its Consequences; see also Shedd, *Discourses and Essays*, 235 note, 321, and *Dogm. Theol.*, 2: 383-389; Dörner, *Glaubenslehre*, 2: 614-615 (*Syst. Doct.*, 4: 82, 83). *Versus Current Discussions in Theology*, 5: 281.

Hovey calls Christ's relation to human sin a vice-penal one. Just as vice-regal position carries with it all the responsibility, care, and anxiety of regal authority, so does a vice-penal relation to sin carry with it all the suffering and loss of the original punishment. The person on whom it falls is different, but his punishment is the same, at least in penal value. As vice-regal authority may be superseded by regal, so vice-penal suffering, if despised, may be superseded by the original penalty. Is there a waste of vice-penal suffering when any are lost for whom it was endured? On the same principle we might object to any suffering on the part of Christ for those who refuse to be saved by him. Such suffering may benefit others, if not those for whom it was in the first instance endured.

If compensation is made, it is said, there is nothing to forgive; if forgiveness is granted, no compensation can be required. This reminds us of Narvaes, who saw no reason for forgiving his enemies until he had shot them all. When the offended party furnishes the compensation, he can offer its benefits upon his own terms. Dr. Pentecost: "A prisoner in Scotland was brought before the Judge. As the culprit entered the box, he looked into the face of the Judge to see if he could discover mercy there. The Judge and the prisoner exchanged glances, and then there came a mutual recognition. The prisoner said to himself: 'It is all right this time,' for the Judge had been his classmate in Edinburgh University twenty-five years before. When sentence was pronounced, it was five pounds sterling, the limit of the law for the misdemeanor charged, and the culprit was moral= disappointed as he was led away to prison. But

the Judge went at once and paid the fine, telling the clerk to write the man's discharge. This the Judge delivered in person, explaining that the demands of the law must be met, and having been met, the man was free."

(c) That there can be no real propitiation, since the judge and the sacrifice are one. — We answer that this objection ignores the existence of personal relations within the divine nature, and the fact that the God-man is distinguishable from God. The satisfaction is grounded in the distinction of persons in the Godhead; while the love in which it originates belongs to the unity of the divine essence.

The satisfaction is not rendered to a *part* of the Godhead, for the whole Godhead is in the Father, in a certain manner; as omnipresence — *totus in omni parte*. So the offering is perfect, because the whole Godhead is also in Christ (2 Cor. 5:19 — "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself"). Lyman Abbott says that the word "propitiate" is used in the New Testament only in the middle voice, to show that God propitiates himself. Lyttelton, in *Lux Mundi*, 302 — "The Atonement is undoubtedly a mystery, but all forgiveness is a mystery. It avails to lift the load of guilt that presses upon an offender. A change passes over him that can only be described as regenerative, life-giving; and thus the assurance of pardon, however conveyed, may be said to obliterate in some degree the consequences of the past. 310 — Christ bore sufferings, not that we might be freed from them, for we have deserved them, but that we might be enabled to bear them, as he did, victoriously and in unbroken union with God."

(d) That the suffering of the innocent for the guilty is not an execution of justice, but an act of manifest injustice. — We answer, that this is true only upon the supposition that the Son bears the penalty of our sins, not voluntarily, but compulsorily; or upon the supposition that one who is personally innocent can in no way become involved in the guilt and penalty of others, — both of them hypotheses contrary to Scripture and to fact.

The mystery of the atonement lies in the fact of unmerited sufferings on the part of Christ. Over against this stands the corresponding mystery of unmerited pardon to believers. We have attempted to show that, while Christ was personally innocent, he was so involved with others in the consequences of the Fall, that the guilt and penalty of the race belonged to him to bear. When we discuss the doctrine of Justification, we shall see that, by a similar union of the believer with Christ, Christ's justification becomes ours.

To one who believes in Christ as the immanent God, the life of humanity, the Creator and Upholder of mankind, the bearing by Christ of the just punishment of human sin seems inevitable. The very laws of nature are only the manifestation of his holiness, and he who thus reveals God is also subject to God's law. The historical process which culminated on Calvary was the manifestation of an age-long suffering endured by Christ on account of his connection with the race from the very first moment of their sin. A. H. Strong, *Christ in Creation*, 80-83 — "A God of love and holiness must be a God of suffering just so certainly as there is sin. Paul declares that he fills up "that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ . . . for his body's sake, which is the church" (Col. 1:24); in other words, Christ still suffers in the believers who are his body. The historical suffering indeed is ended; the agony of Golgotha is finished; the days when joy was swallowed up in sorrow are past; death has no more dominion over our Lord. But sorrow for sin is not ended; it still continues and will continue so long as sin exists. But it does not now militate against Christ's blessedness, because the sorrow is overbalanced and overborne by the infinite knowledge and glory of his divine nature. Bushnell and Beecher were right when they maintained that suffering for sin was the natural consequence of Christ's relation to the sinning creation. They were wrong in mistaking the nature of that suffering and in not seeing that the constitution of things which necessitates it, since it is the expression of God's holiness, gives that suffering a penal character and makes Christ a substitutionary offering for the sins of the world."

(e) That there can be no transfer of punishment or merit, since these are personal. — We answer that the idea of representation and suretyship

is common in human society and government; and that such representation and suretyship are inevitable, wherever there is community of life between the innocent and the guilty. When Christ took our nature, he could not do otherwise than take our responsibilities also.

Christ became responsible for the humanity with which he was organically one. Both poets and historians have recognized the propriety of one member of a house, or a race, answering for another. Antigone expiates the crime of her house. Marcus Curtius holds himself ready to die for his nation. Louis XVI has been called a "sacrificial lamb," offered up for the crimes of his race. So Christ's sacrifice is of benefit to the whole family of man, because he is one with that family. But here is the limitation also. It does not extend to angels, because he took not on him the nature of angels (Hab. 2: 16 — "For verily not of the angels doth he take hold, but he taketh hold of the seed of Abraham").

"A strange thing happened recently in one of our courts of justice. A young man was asked why the extreme penalty should not be passed upon him. At that moment, a gray-haired man, his face furrowed with sorrow, stepped into the prisoner's box unhindered, placed his hand affectionately upon the culprit's shoulder, and said: 'Your honor, we have nothing to say. The verdict which has been found against us is just. We have only to ask for mercy.' 'We!' There was nothing against this old father. Yet, at that moment he lost himself. He identified his very being with that of his wayward boy. Do you not pity the criminal son because of your pity for his aged and sorrowing father? Because he has so suffered, is not your demand that the son suffer somewhat mitigated? Will not the judge modify his sentence on that account? Nature knows no forgiveness; but human nature does; and it is not nature, but human nature, that is made in the image of God"; see Prof. A. S. Coats, in *The Examiner*, Sept. 12, 1893.

(f) That remorse, as a part of the penalty of sin, could not have been suffered by Christ.— We answer, on the one hand, that it may not be essential to the idea of penalty that Christ should have borne the identical pangs which the lost would have endured; and, on the other hand, that we do not know how completely a perfectly holy being, possessed of super-human knowledge and love, might have felt even the pangs of remorse for the condition of that humanity of which he was the central conscience and heart.

Instance the lawyer, mourning the fall of a star of his profession; the woman, filled with shame by the degradation of one of her own sex; the father, anguished by his daughter's waywardness; the Christian, crushed by the sins of the church and the world. The self-isolating spirit cannot conceive how perfectly love and holiness can make their own the sin of the race of which they are a part.

Simon, *Reconciliation*, 366 — "Inasmuch as the sin of the human race culminated in the crucifixion which crowned Christ's own sufferings, clearly the life of humanity entering him subconsciously must have been most completely laden with sin and with the fear of death which is its fruit, at the very moment when he himself was enduring death in its most terrible form. Of necessity therefore he felt as if he were the sinner of sinners, and cried out in agony: 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' (Mat. 27: 46)."

Christ could realize our penal condition. Beings who have a like spiritual nature can realize and bear the spiritual sufferings of one another. David's sorrow was not unjust, when he cried: "Would I had died for thee, O Absalom, my son, my son!" (2 Sam. 18: 33). *Moberly, Atonement and Personality*, 117 — "Is penitence possible in the personally sinless? We answer that only one who is perfectly sinless can perfectly repent, and this identification of the sinless with the sinner is vital to the gospel." Lucy Larcom: "There be sad women, sick and poor, And those who walk in garments soiled; Their shame, their sorrow I endure; By their defeat my hope is foiled; The blot they bear is on my name; Who sins, and I am not to blame?"

(g) That the sufferings of Christ, as finite in time, do not constitute a satisfaction to the infinite demands of the law.— We answer that the infinite dignity of the sufferer constitutes his sufferings a full equivalent, in the eye of infinite justice. Substitution excludes identity of suffering; it

does not exclude equivalence. Since justice aims its penalties not so much at the person as at the sin, it may admit equivalent suffering, when this is endured in the very nature that has sinned.

The sufferings of a dog, and of a man, have different values. Death is the wage of sin; and Christ, in suffering death, suffered our penalty. Eternity of suffering is essential to the idea of penalty. A finite being cannot exhaust an infinite curse; but an infinite being can exhaust it, in a few brief hours. Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 307— "A golden eagle is worth a thousand copper cents. The penalty paid by Christ is strictly and literally *equivalent* to that which the sinner would have borne, although it is not *identical*. The vicarious bearing of it excludes the latter." Andrew Fuller thought Christ would have had to suffer just as much, if only one sinner were to have been saved thereby.

The atonement is a unique fact, only partially illustrated by debt and penalty. Yet the terms 'purchase' and 'ransom' are Scriptural, and mean simply that the justice of God punishes sin as it deserves; and that, having determined what is deserved, God cannot change. See Owen, quoted in Campbell on Atonement, 58, 59. Christ's sacrifice, since it is absolutely infinite, can have nothing added to it. If Christ's sacrifice satisfies the Judge of all, it may well satisfy us.

(h) That if Christ's passive obedience made satisfaction to the divine justice, then his active obedience was superfluous.—We answer that the active obedience and the passive obedience are inseparable. The latter is essential to the former; and both are needed to secure for the sinner, on the one hand, pardon, and, on the other hand, that which goes beyond pardon, namely, restoration to the divine favor. The objection holds only against a superficial and external view of the atonement.

For more full exposition of this point, see our treatment of Justification; and also, Owen, in Works, 5: 173-204. Both the active and the passive obedience of Christ are insisted on by the apostle Paul. Opposition to the Pauline theology is opposition to the gospel of Christ. Charles Cuthbert Hall, Universal Elements of the Christian Religion, 140—"The effects of this are already appearing in the impoverished religious values of the sermons produced by the younger generation of preachers, and the deplorable decline of spiritual life and knowledge in many churches. Results open to observation show that the movement to simplify the Christian essence by discarding the theology of St. Paul easily carries the teaching of the Christian pulpit to a position where, for those who submit to that teaching, the characteristic experiences of the Christian life became practically impossible. The Christian sense of sin; Christian penitence at the foot of the Cross; Christian faith in an atoning Savior; Christian peace with God through the mediation of Jesus Christ—these and other experiences, which were the very life of apostles and apostolic souls, fade from the view of the ministry, have no meaning for the younger generation."

(i) That the doctrine is immoral in its practical tendencies, since Christ's obedience takes the place of ours, and renders ours unnecessary.—We answer that the objection ignores not only the method by which the benefits of the atonement are appropriated, namely, repentance and faith, but also the regenerating and sanctifying power bestowed upon all who believe. Faith in the atonement does not induce license, but "works by love" (Gal. 5: 6) and "cleanses the heart" (Acts 15: 9).

Water is of little use to a thirsty man, if he will not drink. The faith which accepts Christ ratifies all that Christ has done, and takes Christ as a new principle of life. Paul bids Philemon receive Onesimus as himself,—not the old Onesimus, but a new Onesimus into whom the spirit of Paul has entered (Philemon 17). So God receives us as new creatures in Christ. Though we cannot earn salvation, we must take it; and this taking it involves a surrender of heart and life which ensures union with Christ and moral progress.

What shall be done to the convicted murderer who tears up the pardon which his wife's prayers and tears have secured from the Governor? Nothing remains but to

execute the sentence of the law. Hon. George F. Danforth, Justice of the New York State Court of Appeals, in a private letter says: "Although it may be stated in a general way that a pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender, so that in the eye of the law he is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence, the pardon making him as it were a new man with a new credit and capacity, yet a delivery of the pardon is essential to its validity, and delivery is not complete without acceptance. It cannot be forced upon him. In that respect it is like a deed. The delivery may be in person to the offender or to his agent, and its acceptance may be proved by circumstances like any other fact."

(j) That if the atonement requires faith as its complement, then it does not in itself furnish a complete satisfaction to God's justice.—We answer that faith is not the ground of our acceptance with God, as the atonement is, and so is not a work at all; faith is only the medium of appropriation. We are saved not by faith, or on account of faith, but only through faith. It is not faith, but the atonement which faith accepts, that satisfies the justice of God.

Illustrate by the amnesty granted to a city, upon conditions to be accepted by each inhabitant. The acceptance is not the ground upon which the amnesty is granted; it is the medium through which the benefits of the amnesty are enjoyed. With regard to the difficulties connected with the atonement, we may say, in conclusion, with Bishop Butler: "If the Scripture has, as surely it has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any one reason to complain for want of further information, unless he can show his claim to it." While we cannot say with President Stearns: "Christ's work removed the hindrances in the eternal justice of the universe to the pardon of the sinner, but how we cannot tell"—cannot say this, because we believe the main outlines of the plan of salvation to be revealed in Scripture—yet we grant that many questions remain unsolved. But, as bread nourishes even those who know nothing of its chemical constituents, or of the method of its digestion and assimilation, so the atonement of Christ saves those who accept it, even though they do not know how it saves them. Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*, 264-267—"Heat was once thought to be a form of matter; now it is regarded as a mode of motion. We can get the good of it, whichever theory we adopt, or even if we have no theory. So we may get the good of reconciliation with God, even though we differ as to our theory of the Atonement."—"One of the Roman Emperors commanded his fleet to bring from Alexandria sand for the arena, although his people at Rome were visited with famine. But a certain shipmaster declared that, whatever the emperor commanded, his ship should bring wheat. So, whatever sand others may bring to starving human souls, let us bring to them the wheat of the gospel—the substitutionary atonement of Jesus Christ." For answers to objections, see Philippi, *Glaubenslehre*, iv, 2: 156-180; Crawford, *Atonement*, 394-408; Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, 2: 523-543; Baird, *Elohim Revealed*, 623 sq.; Wm. Thomson, *The Atoning Work of Christ*; Hopkins, *Works*, 1: 321.

#### E. The Extent of the Atonement.

The Scriptures represent the atonement as having been made for all men, and as sufficient for the salvation of all. Not the *atonement* therefore is limited, but the *application* of the atonement through the work of the Holy Spirit.

Upon this principle of a universal atonement, but a special application of it to the elect, we must interpret such passages as Eph. 1: 4, 7; 2 Tim. 1: 9, 10; John 17: 9, 20, 24—asserting a special efficacy of the atonement in the case of the elect; and also such passages as 2 Pet. 2: 1; 1 John 2: 2; Tim. 2: 6; 4: 10; Tit. 2: 11—asserting that the death of Christ is for all.

Passages asserting special efficacy of the atonement, in the case of the elect, are the following: Eph. 1: 4—"choose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without

blemish before him in love"; 7—"in whom we have our redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, according to the riches of his grace;" 2 Tim. 1: 9, 10—God "who saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before times eternal, but hath now been manifested by the appearing of our Savior Christ Jesus, who abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel"; John 17: 9—"I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for those whom thou hast given me"; 20—"Neither for these only do I pray, but for them also that believe on me through their word"; 24—"Father, that which thou hast given me, I desire that where I am, they also may be with me; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me."

Passages asserting that the death of Christ is for all are the following: 2 Pet. 3: 1—"false teachers, who shall privily bring in destructive heresies, denying even the Master that bought them"; 1 John 2: 2—"and he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the whole world"; 1 Tim. 2: 6—Christ Jesus "who gave himself a ransom for all"; 4: 10—"the living God, who is the Savior of all men, specially of them that believe"; Tit. 2: 11—"For the grace of God hath appeared, bringing salvation to all men." Rom. 3: 28 (A. V.)—"unto all and upon all them that believe"—has sometimes been interpreted as meaning "unto all men, and upon all believers" (i.e.—destination; i.e.—extent). But the Rev. Vers. omits the words "and upon all," and Meyer, who retains the words, remarks that τοῖς πιστεύουσιν belongs to σώζονται in both instances.

Unconscious participation in the atonement of Christ, by virtue of our common humanity in him, makes us the heirs of much temporal blessing. Conscious participation in the atonement of Christ, by virtue of our faith in him and his work for us, gives us justification and eternal life. Matthew Henry said that the Atonement is "sufficient for all; effectual for many." J. M. Whiton, in *The Outlook*, Sept. 26, 1897—"It was Samuel Hopkins of Rhode Island (1721-1803) who first declared that Christ had made atonement for all men, not for the elect part alone, as Calvinists affirmed." We should say "as some Calvinists affirmed"; for, as we shall see, John Calvin himself declared that "Christ suffered for the sins of the whole world." Alfred Tennyson once asked an old Methodist woman what was the news. "Why, Mr. Tennyson, there's only one piece of news that I know,—that Christ died for all men." And he said to her: "That is old news, and good news, and new news."

If it be asked in what sense Christ is the Savior of all men, we reply:

(a) That the atonement of Christ secures for all men a delay in the execution of the sentence against sin, and a space for repentance, together with a continuance of the common blessings of life which have been forfeited by transgression.

If strict justice had been executed, the race would have been cut off at the first sin. That man lives after sinning, is due wholly to the Cross. There is a pretermission, or "passing over of the sins done afortime, in the forbearance of God" (Rom. 3: 25), the justification of which is found only in the sacrifice of Calvary. This "passing over," however, is limited in its duration: see Acts 17: 30, 31—"The times of ignorance therefore God overlooked; but now he commandeth men that they should all everywhere repent: inasmuch as he hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness by the man whom he hath ordained."

One may get the benefit of the law of gravitation without understanding much about its nature, and patriarchs and heathen have doubtless been saved through Christ's atonement, although they have never heard his name, but have only cast themselves as helpless sinners upon the mercy of God. That mercy of God was Christ, though they did not know it. Our modern pious Jews will experience a strange surprise when they find that not only forgiveness of sin but every other blessing of life has come to them through the crucified Jesus. Mat. 3: 11—"many shall come from the east and the west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven."

Dr. G. W. Northrup held that the work of Christ is universal in three respects: 1. It reconciled God to the whole race, apart from personal transgression; 2. It secured the bestowment upon all of common grace, and the means of common grace; 3. It rendered certain the bestowment of eternal life upon all who would so use common grace and the means of common grace as to make it morally possible for God as a wise and holy Governor to grant his special and renewing grace.

(b) That the atonement of Christ has made objective provision for the salvation of all, by removing from the divine mind every obstacle to the pardon and restoration of sinners, except their wilful opposition to God and refusal to turn to him.

Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 604—"On God's side, all is now taken away which could make a separation,—unless any should themselves choose to remain separated from him." The gospel message is not: God will forgive if you return; but rather: God has shown mercy; only believe, and it is your portion in Christ.

Ashmore, The New Trial of the Sinner, in Christian Review, 20: 245-264—"The atonement has come to all men and upon all men. Its coextensiveness with the effects of Adam's sin is seen in that all creatures, such as infants and insane persons, incapable of refusing it, are saved without their consent, just as they were involved in the sin of Adam without their consent. The reason why others are not saved is because when the atonement comes to them and upon them, instead of consenting to be included in it, they reject it. If they are born under the curse, so likewise they are born under the atonement which is intended to remove that curse; they remain under its shelter till they are old enough to repudiate it; they shut out its influences as a man closes his window-blind to shut out the beams of the sun; they ward them off by direct opposition, as a man builds dykes around his field to keep out the streams which would otherwise flow in and fertilize the soil."

(c) That the atonement of Christ has procured for all men the powerful incentives to repentance presented in the Cross, and the combined agency of the Christian church and of the Holy Spirit, by which these incentives are brought to bear upon them.

Just as much sun and rain would be needed, if only one farmer on earth were to be benefited. Christ would not need to suffer more, if all were to be saved. His sufferings, as we have seen, were not the payment of a pecuniary debt. Having endured the penalty of the sinner, justice permits the sinner's discharge, but does not require it, except as the fulfilment of a promise to his substitute, and then only upon the appointed condition of repentance and faith. The atonement is unlimited,—the whole human race might be saved through it; the application of the atonement is limited,—only those who repent and believe are actually saved by it.

Robert G. Farley: "The prospective mother prepares a complete and beautiful outfit for her expected child. But the child is still-born. Yet the outfit was prepared just the same as if it had lived. And Christ's work is completed as much for one man as for another, as much for the unbeliever as for the believer."

Christ is specially the Savior of those who believe, in that he exerts a special power of his Spirit to procure their acceptance of his salvation. This is not, however, a part of his work of atonement; it is the application of the atonement, and as such is hereafter to be considered.

Among those who hold to a limited atonement is Owen. Campbell quotes him as saying: "Christ did not die for all the sins of all men; for if this were so, why are not all freed from the punishment of all their sins? You will say, 'Because of their unbelief,—they will not believe.' But this unbelief is a sin, and Christ was punished for it. Why then does this, more than other sins, hinder them from partaking of the fruits of his death?"

So also Turretin, loc. 4, quæst. 10 and 17; Symington, Atonement, 184-224; Candlish on the Atonement; Cunningham, Hist. Theol., 2: 323-370; Shedd, Dogm. Theol., 2: 464-489. For the view presented in the text, see Andrew Fuller, Works, 2: 373, 374; 630-638; 706-709; Wardlaw, Syst. Theol., 2: 435-549; Jenkyn, Extent of the Atonement; E. P. Griffin, Extent of the Atonement; Woods, Works, 2: 490-521; Richards, Lectures on Theology, 303-327.

## 2. Christ's Intercessory Work.

The Priesthood of Christ does not cease with his work of atonement, but continues forever. In the presence of God he fulfils the second office of the priest, namely that of intercession.

Heb. 7: 23-25—"priests many in number, because that by death they are hindered from continuing; but he, because he abideth forever, hath his priesthood unchangeable. Wherefore also he is able to save to the uttermost them that draw near unto God through him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them." C. H. M., on He. 7: 12—"The

hands of our great Intercessor never hang down, as Moses' did, nor does he need any one to hold them up. The same rod of God's power which was used by Moses to smite the rock (Atonement) was in Moses' hand on the hill (Intercession)."

Denney's Studies in Theology, 166—"If we see nothing unnatural in the fact that Christ prayed for Peter on earth, we need not make any difficulty about his praying for us in heaven. The relation is the same; the only difference is that Christ is now exalted, and prays, not with strong crying and tears, but in the sovereignty and prevailing power of one who has achieved eternal redemption for his people."

**A. Nature of Christ's Intercession.**—This is not to be conceived of either as an external and vocal petitioning, nor as a mere figure of speech for the natural and continuous influence of his sacrifice; but rather as a special activity of Christ in securing, upon the ground of that sacrifice, whatever of blessing comes to men, whether that blessing be temporal or spiritual.

1 John 2:1—"If any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous"; Rom. 8:34—"It is Jesus Christ that died, yea rather, that was raised from the dead, who is at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us"—here Meyer seems to favor the meaning of external and vocal petitioning, as of the glorified God-man: Heb. 7:25—"ever liveth to make intercession for them." On the ground of this effectual intercession he can pronounce the true sacerdotal *benediction*; and all the benedictions of his ministers and apostles are but fruits and emblems of this (see the Aaronic benediction in Num. 6:24-26, and the apostolic benedictions in 1 Cor. 1:3 and 2 Cor. 13:14).

**B. Objects of Christ's Intercession.**—We may distinguish (a) that general intercession which secures to all men certain temporal benefits of his atoning work, and (b) that special intercession which secures the divine acceptance of the persons of believers and the divine bestowment of all gifts needful for their salvation.

(a) General intercession for all men: Is. 53:12—"he bore the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors"; Luke 23:34—"And Jesus said, Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do"—a beginning of his priestly intercession, even while he was being nailed to the cross.

(b) Special intercession for his saints: Mat. 18:19, 20—"if two of you shall agree on earth as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven. For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them"; Luke 23:31, 32—"Simon, Simon, behold, Satan asked to have you, that he might sift you as wheat: but I made supplication for thee, that thy faith fail not"; John 14:16—"I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter"; 17:9—"I pray for them; I pray not for the world, but for those whom thou hast given me"; Acts 2:33—"Being therefore by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, he hath poured forth this, which ye see and hear"; Eph. 1:6—"the glory of his grace, which he freely bestowed on us in the Beloved"; 2:18—"through him we both have our access in one Spirit unto the Father"; 3:12—"in whom we have boldness and access in confidence through our faith in him"; Heb. 2:17, 18—"Wherefore it behooved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren, that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people. For in that he himself hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted"; 4:15, 16—"For we have not a high priest that cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but one that hath been in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin. Let us therefore draw near with boldness unto the throne of grace, that we may receive mercy, and may find grace to help us in time of need"; 1 Pet. 2:5—"a holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God through Jesus Christ"; Rev. 5:6—"And I saw in the midst of the throne . . . a Lamb standing, as though it had been slain, having seven horns, and seven eyes, which are the seven Spirits of God, sent forth into all the earth"; 7:16, 17—"They shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more; neither shall the sun strike upon them, nor any heat: for the Lamb that is in the midst of the throne shall be their shepherd, and shall guide them unto fountains of waters of life: and God shall wipe away every tear from their eyes."

**C. Relation of Christ's Intercession to that of the Holy Spirit.**—The Holy Spirit is an advocate within us, teaching us how to pray as we ought; Christ is an advocate in heaven, securing from the Father the answer of our prayers. Thus the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit are complements to each other, and parts of one whole.

John 14:26—"But the Comforter, even the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I said unto you"; Rom. 8:26—"And in like manner the Spirit

also helpeth our infirmity: for we know not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit himself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered"; 27—"and he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God."

The intercession of the Holy Spirit may be illustrated by the work of the mother, who teaches her child to pray by putting words into his mouth or by suggesting subjects for prayer. "The whole Trinity is present in the Christian's closet; the Father hears; the Son advocates his cause at the Father's right hand; the Holy Spirit intercedes in the heart of the believer." Therefore "When God inclineth the heart to pray, He hath an ear to hear." The impulse to prayer, within our hearts, is evidence that Christ is urging our claims in heaven.

D. Relation of Christ's Intercession to that of saints. — All true intercession is either directly or indirectly the intercession of Christ. Christians are organs of Christ's Spirit. To suppose Christ in us to offer prayer to one of his saints, instead of directly to the Father, is to blaspheme Christ, and utterly misconceive the nature of prayer.

Saints on earth, by their union with Christ, the great high priest, are themselves constituted intercessors; and as the high priest of old bore upon his bosom the breastplate engraven with the names of the tribes of Israel (Ex. 28:9-12), so the Christian is to bear upon his heart in prayer before God the interests of his family, the church, and the world (1 Tim. 2:1—"I exhort therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, thankings be made for all men"). See Symington on Intercession, in Atonement and Intercession, 266-309; Milligan, Ascension and Heavenly Priesthood of our Lord.

Luckock, After Death, finds evidence of belief in the intercession of the saints in heaven as early as the second century. Invocation of the saints he regards as beginning not earlier than the fourth century. He approves the doctrine that the saints pray for us, but rejects the doctrine that we are to pray to them. Prayers for the dead he strongly advocates. Bramhall, Works, 1:37—Invocation of the saints is "not necessary, for two reasons: first, no saint doth love us so well as Christ; no saint hath given us such assurance of his love, or done so much for us as Christ; no saint is so willing to help us as Christ; and secondly, we have no command from God to invoke them." A. R. Cave: "The system of human mediation falls away in the advent to our souls of the living Christ. Who wants stars, or even the moon, after the sun is up?"

### III. THE KINGLY OFFICE OF CHRIST.

This is to be distinguished from the sovereignty which Christ originally possessed in virtue of his divine nature. Christ's kingship is the sovereignty of the divine-human Redeemer, which belonged to him of right from the moment of his birth, but which was fully exercised only from the time of his entrance upon the state of exaltation. By virtue of this kingly office, Christ rules all things in heaven and earth, for the glory of God and the execution of God's purpose of salvation.

(a) With respect to the universe at large, Christ's kingdom is a kingdom of power; he upholds, governs, and judges the world.

Ps. 2:6-8—"I have set my king . . . Thou art my son . . . uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession"; 8:6—"madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; Thou hast put all things under his feet"; cf. Heb. 2:8, 9—"we see not yet all things subjected to him. But we beheld . . . Jesus . . . crowned with glory and honor"; Mat. 26:28, 29—"when the Son of man shall come in his glory . . . then shall he sit on the throne of his glory; and before him shall be gathered all the nations"; 28:18—"All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth"; Heb. 1:3—"upholding all things by the word of his power"; Rev. 19:15, 16—"smite the nations . . . rule them with a rod of iron . . . King of Kings, and Lord of Lords."

Julius Müller, Proof-texts, 84, says incorrectly, as we think, that "the *regnum naturæ* of the old theology is unsupported, — there are only the *regnum gracie* and the *regnum gloriæ*." A. J. Gordon: "Christ is now creation's sceptre-bearer, as he was once creation's burden-bearer."

(b) With respect to his militant church, it is a kingdom of grace; he founds, legislates for, administers, defends, and augments his church on earth.

Luke 2:11—"born to you . . . a Saviour, who is Christ the Lord"; 19:28—"Blessed is the King that cometh in the name of the Lord"; John 18:36, 37—"My kingdom is not of this world . . . Thou sayest it, for I am a King . . . Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice"; Eph. 1:22—"he put all things in subjection under his feet, and gave him to be head over all things to the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all"; Heb. 1:8—"of the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever."

Dorner, Glaubenslehre, 2: 677 (Syst. Doct., 4: 142, 143)—"All great men can be said to have an after-influence (*Nachwirkung*) after their death, but only of Christ can it be said that he has an after-activity (*Fortwirkung*). The sending of the Spirit is part of Christ's work as King." P. S. Moxom, Bap. Quar. Rev., Jan. 1886:25-26—"Pre-eminence of Christ, as source of the church's being; ground of the church's unity; source of the church's law; mould of the church's life." A. J. Gordon: "As the church endures hardness and humiliation as united to him who was on the cross, so she should exhibit something of supernatural energy as united with him who is on the throne." Luther: "We tell our Lord God, that if he will have his church, he must look after it himself. We cannot sustain it, and, if we could, we should become the proudest asses under heaven. . . . If it had been possible for pope, priest or minister to destroy the church of Jesus Christ, it would have been destroyed long ago." Luther, watching the proceedings of the Diet of Augsburg, made a noteworthy discovery. He saw the stars bestud the canopy of the sky, and though there were no pillars to hold them up they kept their place and the sky fell not. The business of holding up the sky and its stars has been on the minds of men in all ages. But we do not need to provide props to hold up the sky. God will look after his church and after Christian doctrine. For of Christ it has been written in 1 Cor. 15:25—"For he must reign, till he hath put all his enemies under his feet."

"Thrice blessed is he to whom is given The instinct that can tell That God is in the field when he is most invisible." Since Christ is King, it is a duty never to despair of church or of the world. Dr. E. G. Robinson declared that Christian character was never more complete than now, nor more nearly approaching the ideal man. We may add that modern education, modern commerce, modern invention, modern civilization, are to be regarded as the revelations of Christ, the Light of the world, and the Ruler of the nations. All progress of knowledge, government, society, is progress of his truth, and a prophecy of the complete establishment of his kingdom.

(c) With respect to his church triumphant, it is a kingdom of glory; he rewards his redeemed people with the full revelation of himself, upon the completion of his kingdom in the resurrection and the judgment.

John 17:24—"Father, that which thou hast given me, I desire that where I am, they also may be with me, that they may behold my glory"; 1 Pet. 3:21, 22—"Jesus Christ; who is on the right hand of God, having gone into heaven; angels and authorities and powers being made subject unto him"; 2 Pet. 1:11—"thus shall cheerfully supplied unto you the entrance into the eternal kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." See Andrew Murray, With Christ in the School of Prayer, preface, vi—"Rev. 1:6—'made us to be a kingdom, to be priests unto his God and Father.' Both in the king and the priest, the chief thing is power, influence, blessing. In the king, it is the power coming downward; in the priest, it is the power rising upward, prevailing with God. As in Christ, so in us, the kingly power is founded on the priestly: Heb. 7:25—'able to save to the uttermost, . . . seeing he ever liveth to make intercession.'"

Watts, New Apologetic, preface, ix—"We cannot have Christ as King without having him also as Priest. It is as the Lamb that he sits upon the throne in the Apocalypse; as the Lamb that he conducts his conflict with the kings of the earth; and it is from the throne of God on which the Lamb appears that the water of life flows forth that carries refreshing throughout the Paradise of God."

Luther: "Now Christ reigns, not in visible, public manner, but through the word, just as we see the sun through a cloud. We see the light, but not the sun itself. But when the clouds are gone, then we see at the same time both light and sun." We may close our consideration of Christ's Kingship with two practical remarks: 1. We never can think too much of the cross, but we may think too little of the throne. 2. We can not have Christ as our Prophet or our Priest, unless we take him also as our King. On Christ's Kingship, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, iv, 2: 342-351; Van Oosterzee, Dormitio, 586 sq.; Garbett, Christ as Prophet, Priest, and King, 2: 342-433; J. M. Mason, Sermon on Messiah's Throne, in Works, 2: 241-275.